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Showing 1 to 20 of 49 Records
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1959 (5) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ant near the dead body. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has not asked us to accept the defence suggestion that the appellant was away at Mathura on November 20, 1957. The evidence of the witness examined on behalf of the appellant was considered both by the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court, and the High Court rightly pointed out that the petition said to have been filed by the appellant in the box of the Superintendent of Police, Mathura, was found on November 22, 1957, though the date mentioned in the petition was November 20, 1957. It is obvious that that petition did not establish the plea of alibi which the appellant appears to have raised in the Courts below. 11. For the reasons given above, we see no good grounds for interference either with the conviction or the sentence of the appellant. The murder was a cold-blooded murder of a defenceless child and there are no mitigating circumstances. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ght to quash the order, because it is not in a position to know which of the reasons or the grounds, had operated on the mind of the authorities concerned, when they decided the pass the impugned order. As already pointed out, no such situation arises in this case, because, in our opinion, none of the grounds is either vague or irrelevant. It may also be pointed out that the ground of irrelevance wag not urged before the High Court, but even so, we allowed the petitioner's counsel to urge that ground before us, and having heard him on that aspect of the matter, we have no doubt that there is no justification for the contention that any of the matters taken into consideration by the authorities concerned in the matter of the detention of the petitioner, was irrelevant. For the reasons given above, it must be held that there is no merit in this appeal or in the application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. They are, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal and application dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... matter on which we do not propose to express any opinion. The proceedings are so far at the initial stage and the effect of re-employment, in the absence of full facts, on the question of waiver cannot be determined at this stage. It is enough to point out that the order we have passed above is an interim relief and it will be liable to be modified one way or the other, when the Industrial Tribunal proceeds to make the final determination of the questions referred to it in the light of the observations we have made on the matter of suspension. The appeals are partly allowed and the order dated December, 5, 1955, granting interim relief is modified in the manner indicated above. In the circumstances, we order the parties to bear their own costs of this Court. As more than three years have gone by in these preliminaries since the references were made, we trust that the Industrial Tribunal will now dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. 25. Appeals allowed in part.
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1959 (5) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it filed on behalf of the respondents an attempt was made to support the Act on the ground that it was intended to serve a dual purpose of stablising the internal market and earn foreign exchange for the country. An attempt was also made to link the one with the other, but the learned Attorney-General did not pursue that line in his argument, and I have, therefore, considered the question only from the standpoint of the compelling need of the State to earn foreign exchange, and the long range aim of the industry to build up a foreign market. I therefore, hold that the restrictions imposed by the statute on the fundamental rights of the petitioners are not arbitrary, and are reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution. 99. I agree with my learned brother, Hidayatullah. J., on the other questions raised in this case. In the result, the petitions are dismissed with costs. ORDER 100. In view of the opinion of the majority these petitions are dismissed with costs.
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1959 (5) TMI 59 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as in consequence of this investment that he became a partner is this enterprise, and that it was in consequence of his being a partner that he became entitled to drawn his salary. The investment of family funds in the partnership business and the salary earned by S. Bhagwant Singh are related to each other as cause and effect. The right to draw a salary was made possible by the use of joint family funds which enabled him to become a partner and to claim remuneration for the services rendered by him. In other words his right to draw salary flowed directly from the joint family funds. This is another way of saying that the income on account of salary was acquired with the aid of joint family property. For these reasons I would answer all the three questions pro- pounded by the Tribunal in the negative, the Department will be entitled to the costs of this court and counsel's fee which I assess at ₹ 250. BISHAN NARAIN , J. -- I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (5) TMI 58 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent up to the date of the first hearing, he had deposited the full amount of rent due; he could not have meant to state that the amount of rent due only up to the date of the landlord's application, ex-elusive of interest, had been deposited. Indeed, even Mr. Bahri does not contend that the full amount actually deposited does not cover the amount of interest due on the date of the petition. But this apart the point now sought to be raised by Mr. Bahri was not raised either before the Rent Controller or before the Appellate Authority and, in my opinion, it is not open to him on revision even as a respondent, to raise this mixed question of fact and law in this Court. 10. For the reasons given above, the revision is allowed and the orders of the Appellate Authority as well as of the Rent Controller are set aside and the petition of the landlord dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. D. Falshaw, J. 11. I agree.
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1959 (5) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oon Siding which was not accepted. The prosecution also set out to prove that the goods were disposed of by the appellant by giving them to one Gurbachan Singh who in turn put these at the premises of Amar Singh and some steel goods were' recovered from there but the prosecution have neither produced Gurbachan Singh nor has it been proved that the goods are part of the consignment which was taken delivery of by the appellant. If under the law it is not necessary or possible for the prosecution to prove the manner in which the goods have been misappropriated then the failure of the prosecution to prove facts it set out to prove would be of little relevance. The question would only be one of intention of the appellant and the circumstances which have been above set out do show that the appellant in what he has done or has omitted to do was moved by a guilty mind. In our opinion the appellant was rightly convicted and we would therefore dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... actories who are not workers. It is in reference to this provision that s. 70 has provided that notwithstanding the said provision the relevant provisions of the Factories Act will apply to persons employed in a factory. The non-obstante clause in s. 70 thus serves the purpose of clarifying the position that the Factories Act is made applicable to employees in factories and that they are not governed by any of the provisions of the Act. This conclusion is obviously consistent -with the policy of the Act. It has itself made provision for the payment of overtime wages to employees in all establishments by s. 63; and it has made applicable inter alia the relevant provisions of the Factories Act in regard to employees in factories. That is the view which the Authority has taken, and in our opinion its validity or correctness is not open to doubt. In the result the orders passed by the authority are confirmed and the appeals are dismissed with costs in one set. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 55 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessment and increase in the taxable income of the firm having been found, that means corresponding increase in the taxable income of the appellant when his share of the increase in the taxable income of the firm is added to his taxable income. Such inclusion in his taxable income is by statutory fiction deemed to be a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of section 35, and that being so under sub-section (5) of that section such rectification can be made within four years from the date of the final order passed in regard to the re-assessment of the firm. Such rectification has in the present case taken place within that statutory period. So this argument on behalf of the appellant was on sound considerations repelled by the learned single Judge. No other question has arisen in this appeal and none other has been argued by the learned counsel for the parties. In consequence the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Falshaw, J.-I agree.
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1959 (5) TMI 54 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... firm or its dissolution to convert it into a sole proprietorship. This point is not exactly covered by any previous decision. Reference may, however, be made to the decision of the case of Kay's Construction Co. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 208. At page 210, there are observations which support the view which I am taking. 4. The petitioner at one stage tried to urge that retrenchment was not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal but later gave it up. That must be recorded with this statement that the petitioner's own case before the Tribunal was that the driver was unwilling to stay and resigned from his job by handing over the key of the car and went away. That certainly makes it come under retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (00) of the Act. I do not think the petitioner can be heard now to contend otherwise. 5. For these reasons, the petition must be dismissed and the Rule discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1959 (5) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... we think it should be, then on that basis the available surplus would permit the payment of bonus of one month's basic wages to the workmen. The company has no objection to payment of bonus to the workmen amounting to one month's basic wages, subject to the conditions laid down in the award in this behalf and indeed it has done so since the date of the award. The result, therefore, is that we allow, these appeals to the extent that the award of the Tribunal 'be varied and modified by allowing only one month's basic wages to its workmen who are respondents to these appeals instead of 2 1/2 months' basic wages as provided in the award, subject, of course, to the conditions laid down in the award. Be it noted here that the company has paid this bonus to the respondents and nothing remains due and payable for bonus for 1954-55. Considering all circumstances of these appeals, we direct each party to bear its own costs of these appeals. Appeal allowed in part.
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1959 (5) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the company did before the Tribunal was to produce the statements recorded by the manager during what we have called investigation. This left the matters where they were and Das had never an opportunity of questioning the witnesses after knowing in full what they had stated against him. In these circumstances we are of opinion that the finding of the Tribunal that the enquiry in this case was not proper is correct and must stand. 10. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We should, however, like to make it clear that the order of the Tribunal fixing grant of compensation till the date of payment must be taken to be limited to the sum of ₹ 11,125, which has been deposited in this Court in pursuance of this Court's order of April 22, 1957 and Das will not be entitled to anything more, as further stay of payment was pursuant to the order of this Court. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the parties should bear their own costs of this Court. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... prohibit the banking company from continuing its business, I cannot, however, accept this argument. Section 35(4) would relate to a bank for which a licence had already been given. At the same time I am of the opinion that it would be open to the respondent to consider the defects or improvements revealed in an inspection under Section 35 for disposing of the application for licence as there is nothing in the statute to prohibit it from taking into consideration all relevant facts. There has been no excess of jurisdiction, and the refusal of the licence under Section 22(1) of the Act is, therefore, proper in the circumstances of the case. 19. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the, action of the Reserve Bank in refusing to grant the licence to the petitioner is within its jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction has been properly exercised in the case, and that there is no case for the issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. This petition is dismissed with costs.
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1959 (5) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . 12 of the Act, are not attracted to the appeal purported to have been filed by the auction-purchaser. It is a little difficult to appreciate why the auction-purchaser, having succeeded in obtaining the order, set out above, in his favour, changed his mind and preferred an appeal which, in the events that had happened, was not maintainable. 12. In our opinion, therefore, the Labour Appellate Tribunal was not in error in dismissing the appeal by the Company and by the auction-purchaser, as incompetent. It follows, therefore, that we are not concerned with the merits of the appeal. In view of the fact that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy raised in the abortive appeal, this dismissal shall be without prejudice to the appellants' rights, if any. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but the parties here are directed to bear their own costs, in view of the fact that we have not gone into the merits of the controversy. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 49 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... opt the one which is in favour of the accused. 5. But this apart, this is not a fit case in which this Court should set aside the order of acquittal. As suggested by the counsel for the State the Opium Orders have now been suitably amended and made very much more stringent than what existed on 17-4-1957. In order to set aside an acquittal there must be very substantial and compelling reasons justifying reversal of the impugned order which should he shown to be clearly erroneous, because the presumption of innocence of the accused has been further reinforced by his acquittal. This Court is, generally speaking, also slow in setting aside orders of acquittal in petty cases where no question of principle is involved. On the facts and circumstances, therefore, I do not think this is a fit case in which we should set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused-respondent. 6. For the reasons given above, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. D. Falshaw, J. 7. I agree.
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1959 (5) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... actory. However from such material as is available it appears that if the profits made by the said factory are included in the calculations and rehabilitation required by it is worked out, it would not materially affect the’ figure of rehabilitation amount determined by us. The result is that there is no available surplus from which the respondents can claim any bonus for the relevant year. It is true that the appellant has already paid the respondents 20.65 lakhs as bonus for the relevant year, and it is likely that it may continue to do so in future ; but that is a matter which is not governed by the formula. In view of the fact that the working of the formula leaves no available surplus the appeal must be allowed and the award made by the tribunal set aside. Since the appellant had come to this Court for the decision of the larger and more important question about the revision of the formula, we would direct that there should be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of profit in which cloth-bonus for half a month was specially paid. Thus the rate so far as the puja bonus is concerned has always remained uniform at one month’s basic wage. It is true that the workmen pitched their demand too high for three month’s bonus in 1953. But that doe,-, not in our opinion detract from the inference to be drawn from the facts proved in this case. All the conditions, therefore, of a customary and traditional bonus are satisfied in this case and there is no reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Tribunal, though we should like to make it clear that we do not agree with the observations of the Appellate Tribunal in connection with the profit bonus aspect of the matter. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. As this question has arisen for the first time in this Court as a distinct issue and was not clearly considered before by the Appellate Tribunal, we order the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed,
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1959 (5) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Nitai Manji, Satya Charan Das, Mustafa Khan and Akil-ud-Din. The appeal of the company must therefore be allowed with respect to the remaining eleven workmen who have been ordered to be reinstated by the Appellate Tribunal. The order of the Appellate Tribunal will stand with respect to the four workmen named above in view of the company's willingness to take them back. The appeal of the workmen on the question of reinstatment fails and is hereby dismissed. We may, however, make it clear that payment made pursuant to the order of this Court will not in any event be refundable or adjustable towards the future wages of those workmen who will be reinstated by the company. Both the company and the workmen have raised other points in their respective grounds of appeal; but as they have not been pressed before us we need not say anything with respect to them. In these circumstances we are of opinion that both the parties will bear their own costs of this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... also would not have been able to recover the damages suffered by him from the assured, the person causing the injuries. The loss had to fall on some one and the statute has thought fit that it shall be borne by the insurer. That also seems to us to be equitable for the loss falls on the insurer in the course of his carrying on his business, a business out of which he makes profit, and he could so arrange his business that in the net result he would never suffer a loss. On the other hand, if the loss fell on the injured person, it would be due to no fault of his; it would have been a loss suffered by him arising out of an incident in the happening of which he had no hand at all. We therefore feel that the plain words of sub-s.(2) should prevail and that no ground exists to lead us to adopt the extraordinary course of adding anything to it. We think that the High Court was right in the view that it took, In the result these appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 44 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ras High Court in Lodd Govindoss Krishnadas v. Muthiah Chetty, AIR 1925-Mad 660. For these reasons we are of opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case the signature of Parbati Devi in the memorandum of appeal as duly constituted agent of the assessee was a valid signature and, in any event, in view of the petition filed by the assessee on the 20th April, 1956 removing the defect of want of her signature, there was a proper appeal presented before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and that appeal could not be dismissed on the ground that it was barred by time. Accordingly, we answer the first question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. 3. In view of our answer to the first question, the second question becomes academic and it is not necessary to furnish any answer to the second question. 4. The assessee is entitled to costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 200/-.
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