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Showing 1 to 20 of 81 Records
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1960 (11) TMI 139 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contentions ground ed on Articles 14 and 31 are barred. Apart from that consideration we hold that the Act cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not supported by a public purpose or on the ground that it is discriminatory. It is also conceded in view of the several pronouncements of the Supreme Court that It cannot be challenged on the ground of adequacy or otherwise of compensation. It cannot also be held on a consideration of the provisions in the Act for compensation that the compensation provided therein is inadequate. On all these reasons the present statute in our view falls under Article 31A and, therefore, cannot he challenged on the grounds raised by the petitioner. 19. The petition therefore, falls and is dismissed. So far as the question of costs is concerned, the fair order would be that each party should bear his own costs. But in view of the importance of the questions raised in this petition, we think it necessary that fees should be taxed at Rs. 350/-.
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1960 (11) TMI 138 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... deal with it, as the question was not raised before me by Mr. Amin. (17) I was informed during the course of arguments that the Society has made an application to the State Government for an order directing its exemption from the provisions of the Act as contemplated under the first proviso to section 1 (4) of the Act. That application, the learned Government Pleader informs me, could not be considered by the State Government because these proceedings have been pending. Nothing in this judgment may, however, be taken to affect a favourable consideration of that application on merits. (18) The result is that I hold, agreeing with my brother Patel, J., that the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, applies to the appellant-Society, though it is registered under the Societies Registration Act and has its objects not confined to one State. This appeal, therefore, will have to be dismissed, but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. (19) Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s aspect and have kept in mind the undisputed right of the legislature to decide what provisions are necessary to give effect to the main object of the legislation. In these cases that petitioners have complained that the main object of the impugned provisions is not the prohibition of slaughter of animals which are still useful; the impugned provisions as they are worded really put a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes and for all practical purposes they put a stop to the profession and trade of the petitioners. We have held that this complaint is justified in respect of the main provisions in the three Acts. 40. We, therefore, allow the three writ petitions and direct, as we directed in Md. Hanif Quareshi's case 1959 1SCR629 the respondent States not to enforce the Acts or the rules made thereunder in so far as they have been declared void by us. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs of the hearing in this Court. 41. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 136 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld that all the deposits on which interest was paid in 1950 constituted borrowed capital within the meaning of section 10(2)(iii). Where interest charges are to be deducted under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act, there can be no apportionment on the basis that a portion of the income resulting from the trading activities of the assessee was tax free. There was thus no statutory basis for any apportionment. Once again we have to emphasise that, where the deduction has to be under section 10(2)(iii) and not under the proviso to section 8, the fact that the income from the Mysore securities was tax free was not a relevant factor. ₹ 2,80,194 was also an item of admissible deduction under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act. Our answer to the question is that the entire interest paid by the bank in the year of account inclusive of the sum of ₹ 2,80,194 was a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(iii) of the Act. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1960 (11) TMI 135 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... relating to the working of taxation laws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods and the like. The validity of the Explanation to paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, was upheld by the Supreme Court. If the Explanation is valid, it follows that the substantive provision must also be held to be valid. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court the power given to the Central Government under section 12 of the Finance Act, 1950, must be held to be a wide one permitting the Government to modify a provision substantially if it becomes necessary for the removal of a difficulty. The second question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. Both the questions referred to us for decision are, therefore, answered in the affirmative. The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 250.
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1960 (11) TMI 134 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct of service but the payment was made after the contract of service was broken and the compensation was fixed as a result of a subsequent agreement. It is manifest that the principle of that case has no application to the present case. On the contrary, my concluded opinion is that the present case falls within the principle enunciated in Dale v. de Soissons 1950 32 Tax Cas. 118and Henry v. Arthur Foster and Henry v. Joseph Foster 1932 16 Tax Cas. 605to which I have already made reference. For these reasons I hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case the sum of ₹ 25,200 received by the assessee during the previous year was an income receipt of the assessee liable to be taxed under the Income-tax Act. I would accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Kanhaiya Singh, J.-I agree.
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1960 (11) TMI 133 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Learned counsel for the assessee referred in this connection to the order of the Income-tax Officer, on page four of the paper-book, where it is said that the amount of ₹ 3,19,766 includes a sum of ₹ 10,906 as "erection cost". Learned counsel submitted that the amount of ₹ 10,906 was really the cost of the materials and this amount should be deducted under section 10(2)(v) of the Income-tax Act. It is, however, not possible to entertain this argument of the assessee at this stage. No such claim was made by the assessee with regard to ₹ 10,906 before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, nor was such a claim made by him in his application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act. In my opinion the question does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal and it is not open to the assessee to debate this question at this stage. I would, therefore, reject the argument of learned counsel for the assessee on this point. Kanhaiya Singh, J.-I agree.
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1960 (11) TMI 132 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ethod for valuing the bonus shares was left open and no decision was given on this point and the case was disposed of on another line of reasoning. I am, however, of the opinion for reasons already stated that the bonus shares should be valued at the face value of the shares and with the greatest respect I differ from the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Emerald and Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) on this point. For the reasons expressed, I hold that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no legally taxable profit made by the assessee on the sale of shares of the Rohtas Industries Limited and the income-tax authorities were wrong in holding that the profit should be computed at ₹ 3,11,646 or any other amount. I would accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Kanhaiya Singh, J.-I agree.
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1960 (11) TMI 131 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on, and that there was no incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment. Hence, the Special Officer had no jurisdiction to enhance the valuation or assessment. In view of this finding, they have rightly decreed the suit. 35. The first point raised by the learned Advocate General must, accordingly, be rejected. It is unnecessary to consider the second point because, even if the Special Officer could alone take the place of the committee, referred to in Section 117, for the purpose of disposing of the objection filed under Sub-section (3) of Section 107, he could not give himself power to enhance the valuation and assessment of the holding in question by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional facts, viz., that there was an incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment and that that was due to misrepresentation or fraud. 36. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 37. I agree. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 38. I agree.
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1960 (11) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of explaining them". It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice. That is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present appeal which has, been brought to this Court under Art. 136 we see no justification for interfering with it. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Khem Chand vs. Union of India & Ors. 1958 S.C. R 1080 at p. 1096, where this Court has emphasised the importance of giving an opportunity to the public officer to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (11) TMI 129 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing people in the villages would become a mere play-thing in the hands of scheming people who may be only too prone to oppress others -- for one reason or another, and even in the name of religion. I, therefore, unshesitatingly hold that a case for grant of mandatory injunction is fully made out in these cases The other reliefs asked for are more or less consequential or incidental and call for no particular discussion. 34. I, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees of the learned Senior Civil Judge and restore those of the trial Court. The defendants are allowed one month's time from the date of this judgment to remove the impugned structure on the land ABCD in plan Ex. 1 themselves; but should they fail to do so, the plaintiffs will have the right to have the same demolished by execution at the expense of the defendants. The plaintiffs will have one set of costs in each suit from the defendants throughout. Leave for further appeal is refused.
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1960 (11) TMI 128 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ue that Shri Anand did not file his power when he signed the revision and presented it to this Court. He thought that he could act on the basis of his power filed in the trial Court. I found that this was not correct because revision is not a continuation of the suit, but is altogether a separate proceeding. Shri Anand then filed a vakalatnama, and the delay was condoned on February 12, 1960, when the revision was admitted. The revision petition was in fact filed within 45 days. Omission to file a vakalatnama was an irregularity and it could be cured. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled. (The rest of the judgment is not material for this report -- Ed.)
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1960 (11) TMI 127 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efore to reiterate the position in law upon this point, which seems to me to have been clearly enunciated above. I have been informed that this decision is the subject matter of an appeal to the Supreme Court. But until the decision is set aside, it must be taken to be good law. For these reasons, I hold that the second point raised is also without substance and that the Assistant Collector of Customs has got ample jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and hold the enquiry and that this application is premature. Lastly, I find that the question of delay has been mentioned in the affidavits although it was not pressed before me. It does seem that there has been considerable delay in coming to this court, which has not been satisfactorily explained. However, it is not necessary to decide this case upon this preliminary point. 8. The result is that this application must be dismissed.The rule is discharged.Interim orders, if any, are vacated.There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (11) TMI 126 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent. The account books submitted by the assessee do not even mention the name of the lady. In the Hathfer Khata the expression used for the deposit is Upper Sey. There was also no evidence produced by the assessee before the income-tax authorities to establish that the amount really belonged to the lady concerned. In these circumstances we think that there were sufficient materials before the income-tax authorities to hold that there was wilful suppression by the assessee of the particulars of his income within the meaning of section 28(1)(C) of the Income-tax Act. We accordingly hold that the penalty imposed under section 28(1)(C) of the Income-tax Act is legally valid and, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the second question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal must also be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 125 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot; is intended to indicate that the expenses should relate directly to the income seems to us to be opposed to the inference that is naturally derivable from the proviso to which we have referred. The learned judges who decided Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Pullangode Rubber and Produce Co. Ltd. 1960 40 I.T.R. 681 (Ker.) do not appear to have considered the impact which the; proviso has upon the main provision. We accordingly hold that the expenditure incurred upon the clearings containing immature plants would properly be includable in the expenses of cultivating the crop. The crop in the context is not merely with reference to the particular tree from which the yield is derived but the entire plantation consisting of both mature and immature plants. The petition is accordingly allowed. The assessment is direct to be revise in the light of what has been stated above. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 124 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner might be complied with by the Income-tax Officer and it is then only that all the relevant material would be on the record to enable the authorities to decide the case properly. We are unable to appreciate this contention. The principal ground in the appeal to the Tribunal related to the validity of the proceedings under section 34 and, in declining to give its decision on the question raised, the Tribunal, as observed above, acted on an erroneous view of the law that in the absence of a subsisting demand the appeal had become infructuous. The propriety of proceedings under section 34 should have been determined upon the material already on record. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the question referred to us should be answered in the negative. The assessee will have its costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Fee of learned counsel for the Department is fixed at the same amount. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (11) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , the essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for a Company may also be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If, on the other hand, the acquisition for a Company is to be made at the cost entirely of the Company itself, such an acquisition comes under the provisions of Part VII. As in the present instance, it appears that part at any rate of the compensation to be awarded for the acquisition is to come eventually from out of public revenues, it must be held that the acquisition is not for a Company simpliciter. It was not, therefore, necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the High Court, though not for the same reasons. The appeal, accordingly, is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 122 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he only penalty which can be imposed upon an assessee is one under section 28(1)(a) of the Act. Our answer to this question makes it unnecessary for us to answer the second question referred to us which has become purely academic. As already pointed out by me, the omission on the part of the Income- tax Officer in this case to separate the two sets of penalties has made it impossible for any one to identify the penalty imposed under section 28(1)(a). The question as to whether it is incumbent on the Income-tax Officer in all cases where he imposes penalties both under clauses (a) and (b) of section 28(1) to separately quantify the penalties imposed under each of these clauses is one which does not arise for consideration and we should not, in my opinion, express any opinion on it. In the circumstances of this case it does not appear to me that we should direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to pay the costs of the assessee. HEGDE, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... election is to be held but that would only mean that it has to be held within a reasonable time of the commencement of the new Act. The course suggested by me is not without the support of precedents. Thus in Salmon v. Duncombe (1) (1886) 11 App. Cas. 627., the Judicial Committee in construing a statute omitted from it the words " as if such natural born subject resided in England " because the retention of those words would have prevented the person contemplated getting full power to dispose of his immovable property by his will which it was held, the object of the statute was, he should get. With regard to the other point argued in this .appeal, namely, whether the Municipal Committee even if properly constituted, has power to sell the land mentioned in the petition, I agree, for the reasons mentioned in the judgment delivered by the majority of the members of the bench, that it has such power and have nothing to add. The appeal therefore fails. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his aspect and have kept in mind the undisputed right of the legislature to decide what provisions are necessary to give effect to the main object of the legislation. In these cases the petitioners have complained that the main object of the impugned provisions is not the prohibition of slaughter of animals which are still useful; the impugned provisions as they are worded really put a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes and for all practical purposes they put a stop to the profession and trade of the petitioners. We have held that this complaint is justified in respect of the main provisions in the three Acts. We, therefore, allow the three writ petitions and direct, as we directed in Md. Hanif Quareshi's case (1) 1959 S.C.R. 629.the respondent States not to enforce the Acts or the rules made thereunder in so far as they have been declared void by us. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs of the hearing in this Court. Petitions allowed.
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