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Showing 1 to 20 of 52 Records
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1960 (12) TMI 103 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... who are directors also of all the other companies in the group, and who are well acquainted with the undertaking of Cable and Wireless Ltd." It is thus clear that even for the limited purpose of securing the maximum amount of compensation, it is desirable that the Company should be kept on going, so that the directors would be in a position to extract the maximum advantage out of it. 21. After giving my anxious consideration to the pros and cons of the situation. I have come to the conclusion that no case has been made out by the petitioners which will justify an order for winding up the Company. 22 The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed with cost. These costs will include costs of the petition before Shah J., as also costs in appeal from that order. They will also include costs of the notice of motion taken out by the petitioners. Costs to be taxed. Counsel certify. The undertaking given by the Company in the appeal is discharged. 23.Petition dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 102 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ciding factor whether the particular allowance is excessive or unreasonable. No doubt the statute lays down the guides by saying (1) "having regard to the legitimate business needs of the company" and (2) "the benefit derived by or accruing to it therefrom". No question here arises to suggest that the Income Tax Officer travelled beyond these two tests of (1) legitimate business needs and (2) the benefit derived. If he did, then it would have been a question of law. What is being really said is that the quantum that he permitted was too small. That, in our opinion, is a question of pure fact. There is no doubt again that the opinion of the Income Tax Officer should be exercised judicially and not capriciously. But the facts in this case do not even suggest, far less allege, any capricious or unjudicial expression of that opinion. Therefore, in our view, no question of law arises. The application is dismissed. H.K. Bose, J. - I agree. Application dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 101 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the company itself that, ever since 1952, the Reserve Bank was taking grave defects in its working to the notice of the company and was giving it repeated opportunities either to explain away the defects if it could, or remedy them. Neither was done by the company, and it) seems to me that the Reserve Bank far from having acted without adequate material or in a hasty and ill-considered manner was doubtless alive to the grave responsibility placed upon it to preserve the banking structure of the country, acted with a degree of care and circumspection which has drawn to it adverse criticism from those who do not share its responsibility. Faced with the run it would have failed in its duty by the depositors had it not acted as it did. 46. In the result I allow the application and order that the Palai Central Bank Ltd., be wound up. 47. The Reserve Bank will get its costs from those who have appeared to oppose this application, in the last resort from the assets of the company.
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1960 (12) TMI 100 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... R 1935 Rang 84).) The correct statement of the law as pointed out by the learned author is as stated by Lord Macmillan in Pir Bux v Mohomed Tahar 61 Ind App 388 (AIR 1934 PC 235) in which it was laid down that an averment of the existence of a contract of sale, whether with or without an averment of possession following upon the contract is not a relevant defence to an action of ejectment in India. 9. Having given my anxious consideration to all the points urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of this appeal I am of the opinion that the present appellant cannot till he succeeds in his suit for specific performance of the contract enforce the equities in his favour as against the plaintiff in the present suit, especially because in the present case his possession throughout has been that of a tenant and never in part performance of the contract. 10. I would, for the reasons stated above, hold that this appeal has no force. It is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1960 (12) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . The Tribunal is more familiar with the trend prevailing in comparable concerns, and unless it appears that the impugned provisions cannot be sustained on any reasonable ground or that they mark a violent departure from the prevailing practice or trend, we would be reluctant to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. After all, in deciding what ,would be a reasonable provision for privilege leave or sick leave, the Tribunal has to take into account all relevant factors and come to its own decision. As we have already indicated, in making the present award the Tribunal has considered previous decisions which were relevant and prevailing agreements in comparable concerns. We have carefully considered the criticism made by the learned Attorney-General against the provisions contained in the award, but we are not satisfied that a case has been made out for interference in an appeal under Art. 136. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... our's share in the profits, and as it is a remuneration which takes the form of a share in profits, it comes within the mischief of section 10 of the Banking Companies Act.” Section 10 of the Banking Companies Act is comparable to section 31A of the Insurance Act, and so this decision supports the view that we have taken about the effect of section 31A(1)(c). We have already held that the payment of bonus would be an additional remuneration to the employees of Insurance Companies and it would be bonus in respect of the general insurance business of the insurer. In view of our conclusion that the Tribunal was right in upholding the preliminary objection, we do not propose to consider the other argument which had been urged by the respondent before the Tribunal under section 40C of the Act, and which the Tribunal has incidentally considered and accepted. 9. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 10. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 97 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r of the name of Chambers and Co. has also to our minds not the effect of indicating that there was no transfer of the goodwill, because all the advantages that would spring from the use of that name were in fact made available to K.H. Chambers. The suggestion that the business should be closed down that was earlier made by the father was most definitely not given effect to, the father, as it clearly appears from the subsequent conduct of the parties, agreeing that the same business should be carried on by the son, the son being relieved of the burden of discharging the liabilities by the good offices of the father, who separated an adequate portion of the assets for that purpose. In the light of all these circumstances, the proper view to take is in our opinion that there was a succession to the business within the meaning of section 25(4) of the Act. In the result, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to costs.
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1960 (12) TMI 96 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he "accounting period. Losses or shortage due to errors in counting receipts from customers are commonly allowed. Amounts embezzled by employees entrusted with money in due course of business have been allowed to be taken into consideration in determining the real profits or income. In the instant case the loss suffered by the assessee was suffered in due course of business and having regard to its business was of a part of its stock-in-trade. It is not suggested that it materially damaged its profit-making structure. My esteemed brother has examined the various authorities in coming to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case the "true profits" of the assessee cannot be arrived at without taking this loss into account. It would evidently offend all ideas of commercial propriety or even common sense to ignore this loss and to hold that the bank had made profits despite the burglary. I respectfully agree that the answer should be in the affirmative.
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1960 (12) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hed in this case, the assessment can be sustained by reading the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) with section 12 of the Act. That the proviso is really a charging provision in computing the profits of a business under section 10, though it purports to be framed as a proviso to section 10(2)(vii), cannot admit of any doubt. But we express no opinion on the further contention of the learned counsel for the Department, that it was a general charging provision, whatever be the source of the income, business or other source. In effect, the learned counsel for the Department wanted the "deemed profit" to be read as the "deemed income" for all purposes. Our answer to the first question is that no portion of the sale proceeds realised by the assessee company in 1955 was assessable to tax as income deemed under the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii), to be profits of any business of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1960 (12) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nor can the ownership be submerged or effaced by the conduct of the assessee dove-tailing it in a business activity. This is now settled law and no useful purpose would be served by referring to the decisions on the subject. Section 25(3) deals only with business, profession or vocation. Property income cannot, under whatever circumstances derived, be comprised in the category of business income. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in excluding the property income from the relief under section 25(3), even if the assessee is entitled to such a relief. It is not necessary to discuss question No. 3 as the point raised therein is covered by the decision of this court in M.L.M. Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1959 35 ITR 339. The formula adopted by the Tribunal in giving relief to the assessee is in accordance with that decision. Following that decision the question is answered against the department and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (12) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in the Act and therefore they do not need any leave. This argument has in our opinion no force. The leave provided under s. 79 arises as a matter of right when a worker has put in a minimum number of working days and he is entitled to it. The fact that the respondents remained absent for a longer period than that provided in s, 79 has no bearing on their right to leave, for if they so remained absent for such period they lost the wages for that period which they would have otherwise earned. That however does not mean that they should also lose the leave earned by them under s. 79. In the circumstances they were entitled under s. 79 of the Factories Act to proportionate leave during the subsequent calendar year if they had worked during the previous calendar year for 240 days or more in the factory. There is nothing on the record to show that this was not so. In the circumstances the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. One set of hearing costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 92 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Opinion of the Full Bench, the Court, Rajagopalan and Ramachandra Iyar, JJ. delivered the following Order ) Subramanya Ramachandra Iyer, J. 23. We have already held that the case raises a substantial question of law. The valuation of the subject-matter of the suit as well as the value of the proposed appeal has been found by the learned Subordinate Judge to be above ₹ 20000. We accepted that valuation as representing the value on the date of the plaint as well as the subject-matter of the proposed appeal. The only question that was left outstanding was whether it was open to the defendants to go behind the valuation adopted by them in the appeal before this Court On that question the Full Bench has answered the question is the affirmative. The petitioners will therefore be entitled to a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) and the appeal involves a substantial question of law. The consolidation sought for will be allowed, except in regard to the payment of court-fee.
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1960 (12) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ties to be recovered by way of public demand, it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is said that the Act makes a distinction between other bankers and the Government as a banker, in respect of the recovery of moneys due. It seems to us that the Government, even as a banker, can be legitimately put in a separate class. The dues of the Government of a State are the dues of the entire people of the State. This being the position, a law giving special facility for the recovery of such dues cannot, in any event, be said to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. We have now discussed all the points raised in this appeal and are unable, for the reasons earlier mentioned, to find merit in any of them. In the result we come to the conclusion that the amount claimed from the appellants was a public demand within the meaning of the Act and was legally recoverable by the impugned proceedings. This appeal therefore must be dismissed with costs and we order accordingly Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... triction. Therefore, it is clear to our mind that the exercise of the power also suffers from a statutory defect as it is not channelled through an appropriate machinery. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that s. 39 of the Act infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution both from substantive and procedural aspects. The next question is whether a mandamus will issue against the Commissioner. The Commissioner admittedly has launched criminal proceedings against the petitioner under the provisions of the Act for not taking out a licence under s. 39 of the Act. As we have held that s. 39 of the Act is constitutionally void, a writ of mandamus will issue against the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, directing him not to take any further proceedings against the petitioner for not taking out a licence under the provisions of the Act. BY COURT. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this Petition is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (12) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (A.I.R. (1924) Lah. 352). It would obviously have been better if this conflict of judicial opinion in the reported decisions of the High Court had been resolved by a Full Bench of the said High Court but that does not appear to have been done so far. However, as we have indicated, the question about the competence of the appeal has to be judged in each case on its own facts and appropriate orders must be passed at the initial stage soon after the appeal is presented in the appellate Court. If any disputed question of limitation arises it may have to go before the Court for judicial decision. In the result the order passed by the High Court is right. Having regard to the fact that the decree under appeal has already been filed by the respondents before the High Court on December 23, 1959, the High Court should now proceed to hear the appeal on the merits and deal with it in accordance with law. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e discretionary power on this Court to entertain appeals in suitable cases not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. It is implicit in the reserve power that it cannot be exhaustively defined, but decided cases-, do not permit interference unless "by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done". Though Art. 136 is couched in widest terms, the practice of this Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in exceptional cases when the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of the court. In the present case, the High Court has not contravened any of the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's case and has also given reasons which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. In the circumstances, no case has been made out for our not accepting the said findings. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 87 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as held to be an entertainment in respect of which duty was payable under the Act of 1916. 12. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the Calico Dome erected by the petitioners was not a place in which any entertainment within the provisions of the Act was held and no entertainments duty under the Act was payable by the petitioners. The result is that this petition is allowed. The order of the District Excise Officer, Jabalpur, contained in Annexure-III to the petition calling upon the petitioners to pay 'entertainments duty in quashed, and the opponents, are restrained from enforcing the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Entertainments Duty Act, 1936, against the petitioners. The petitioners are entitled to the refund of the amount already collected from them and the amount be refunded to them. The petitioners shall get costs of this petition. Counsel's feo is fixed at ₹ 200/-. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be paid to the petitioners.
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1960 (12) TMI 86 - COURT OF APPEAL
Computation of salary, fees, wages, perquisites or profits - Taxation on cost of that perquisite - sum paid by employers for a suit bought by them as a present to him and supplied to him included in salary computation -assessment made under Schedule E of the Income Tax Act, 1952
as contended for the Crown that the taxpayer received in the year 1955-56, in addition to the cash emoluments of his employment, an advantage by virtue of that employment which was money's worth, namely, a suit of clothes; that, on the evidence, that advantage of money's worth fell to be measured by the price paid by Anglo-Oriental to the tailors for the suit, that was the sum of £ 14 15s.; that that sum was, correctly included in computing the amount of the salary, fees, wages, perquisites or profits of the taxpayer from his employment within the meaning of rule 1, Schedule 9, to the Income Tax Act, 1952; and that the assessment for the year 1955-56 ought to be confirmed - as contented by taxpayer suit was not an advantage received by him by virtue of his employment which was capable of being turned into money, because his employers would have been displeased if he had sold it; alternatively that, if the value of the suit was an advantage received by him by virtue of his employment which was capable of being turned into money, the value was not the price paid by Anglo-Oriental to the tailors, namely, £ 14 15s., but the sum which he could have raised by the sale of the suit in November, 1955, and that that sum was very small.
What is the money's worth which the taxpayer got, was it the payment which the employers made or was it the benefit which the taxpayer got from the payment? -
HELD THAT:- LORD EVERSHED M.R. The point involved in this appeal falls indeed within the narrowest compass; but it is, or appears to be, novel in the sense that no strictly comparable case seems to have come before the court before.
It seems that the taxpayer never acquired any rights against anybody. He received this letter; armed with it, he went to Messrs. Montague Burton's establishment, and Montague Burton expressed themselves as willing to supply him with the clothes he ordered. When the clothes were delivered, then (and then only) the taxpayer got something which was his own. He acquired at that point of time a suit, albeit he had no right against anyone to get the suit. Nor had he, as I conceive, any right against the company, though as a matter of ordinary decency as between master and servant he could no doubt rely upon the company doing what they said they would do. But this was not a case in which he was entitled to call upon the company to pay some sum of money on his behalf, as that phrase is ordinarily understood.
As I think in this case, and in accordance with Mr. Heyworth Talbot's argument, what the taxpayer got-what the company intended to give him, what the letter to him and Montague Burton said would be done, and was done--was a present of a suit. Until he got it, he got nothing; and when he got it, the thing which came in (which was his income expressed in money's worth) was the value of the suit.
We are here concerned with the present of a suit; that is the subject-matter; and the value of the suit in money seems to me to be the amount for which the taxpayer is properly taxable. Therefore, dismiss the appeal.
HARMAN L.J. I agree. The only controversy was whether he was to pay tax on the cost of that perquisite to his employer, or the value of it to him, and it appears to me that this perquisite is a taxable subject-matter because it is money's worth. It is money's worth, because it can be turned into money, and when turned into money the taxable subject-matter is the value received. I cannot myself see how it is connected directly with the cost to the employer.
It is admitted that as a conventional matter the difference can be taken as that between £ 14 15s. and £ 5. Income-tax is a tax levied on income. The taxpayer has to pay on what he gets. Here he has got a suit. He can realise it only for £ 5. The advantage to him is, therefore, £ 5. The detriment to his employer has been considerably more, but that seems to me to be irrelevant, and I do not see that it makes any difference that no property in this suit ever passed to the employer.
I think, in Lord Watson's words in Tennant v. Smith [1892 (3) TMI 1 - HOUSE OF LORDS] that it is a benefit consisting in "something acquired which the acquirer becomes possessed of and can dispose of to his advantage--in other words, money, or that which can be turned to pecuniary account." This can be realised in cash, and it is that realisable quality which is the measure of the taxpayer's liability.I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
DONOVAN L.J. I agree, and I add a few words only because of the novelty of the point.
The case wears an aspect of triviality which is deceptive. Tax on £ 15 alone is involved, but the proposition on which the claim is based is of much wider significance, and it will look very different when applied to other cases which can easily be foreseen, and some of which were referred to during the argument.
The proposition was stated thus: Where an employer offers to spend money for an employee as a reward for service ; and that offer is accepted, the employee is liable to be taxed on the money so spent, and not on the thing which the money provides for him. A good many qualifications would need to be added to that proposition to make it true. It looks true in cases like Hartland v. Diggines and Nicoll v. Austin where money liabilities of the employed officers were discharged by the employer. But what the officers were really taxed upon was the money's worth of the immunity they were thus given from their own liabilities. No valuation of that money's worth was required, it was obviously of the same value as the liability which had been discharged.
In the present case the taxpayer never became liable to pay the £ 14 15s. to Messrs. Montague Burton. Between him and them there was no privity of contract at all; and when the employers paid this sum, they discharged their own liability, and nobody else's.
On what principle is this payment nevertheless to be treated as the taxpayer's income? To that question, I think, no satisfactory answer is or can be given. At first the Crown suggested that it was the principle underlying certain surtax cases where taxed income had been applied under a trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries; but the court in those cases explained that once the trustees so applied the income, that income itself became the beneficiaries'; In the end the Crown conceded (I think rightly) that no true analogy could be drawn between that class of case and the present.
That being so, I can discover no test which yields the result that the payment by the employer to Messrs. Montague Burton in the circumstances of this case is the income of the employee.
In that situation one must get back to what has always, so far as I know, been accepted as the basis of liability under Schedule E, namely, that liability extends to the profits or gains arising or accruing to the holder of the office or employment as such, whether those profits take the form of money, or money's worth. No money arose or accrued to the tax- payer here from this transaction. Money's worth did, in the shape of the suit.
The suit (and the suit alone) answers the description of profit accruing to the employee from his employment. On that basis it should be assessed to income tax at its money value in the taxpayer's hands, that is to say, what he could get for it if he sold it as soon as he received it. It is agreed between the parties that this is the sum of £ 5; and I therefore also think that the special commissioners and Danckwerts J. came to the right conclusion in this case, and that the appeal should be dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Attorney- General has strenuously contended that it is unfair to give the same pay to the three workmen who are doing the work of cut-lookers only for a part of the time and were substantially doing the work of bleach-folders; that, however, has no relevance in determining the present dispute. The only point which calls for decision is whether or not the work done by the three respondents takes them within the category of cut-lookers specified under cl. 5, and as we have already pointed out, on an earlier occasion the authority has found in favour of two of the three respondents when it held that they were folders doing cut- looking. If the said finding amounts to res judicata it is in favour of the two respondents and not in favour of the appellant; that is why the learned Attorney-General did not seriously dispute the correctness of the decision of the High Court on the question of res judicata. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (12) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gment of Mr. Justice Subba Rao and no useful purpose would be served in discussing them over again. For the reasons discussed above I have reached the conclusion that while the Government of India is within the territories of every High Court in India the only High Court which has jurisdiction to issue a writ or order or directions under Art. 226 or Art. 32 (2A) against it is the one within the territories under which the act or omission against which relief was sought took place. In the present case the act against which the relief has been sought was clearly performed at Delhi which is within the territories under the jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court and the Jammu and Kashmir High Court cannot therefore exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226. In the result, I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. BY COURT. In accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Court, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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