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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1960 (4) TMI 100 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused". The same view was taken with regard to circumstantial evidence in the case of Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 354 and the earlier decision in the case of Hamimant.Govind Nargundkar, AIR 1952 SC 343, just referred to above, was relied upon. To crown all, it is difficult to believe the evidence of the approver that Srilal and Mahadoe Lal if present went back home leaving Bhagwati Ram, an old man of 50 years of age, in the Mill premises to take care of himself at the dead of night. (After discussing some evidence His Lordship concluded). 45. As a result of all these considerations I am of the opinion that the prosecution has not proved that the explosion was brought about by Bhagwati Ram as well.
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1960 (4) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 13. Even under 0. XXXIV, which requires puisne or subsequent mortgagees to be joined as parties in a suit for sale, a decree obtained in a suit to which the subsequent mortgagee was not joined as a party does not affect his rights and the proceedings in such a suit are not binding on him so as to affect his rights under the second mortgage. He can thus follow the property by suing his mortgagor, even though it may have been sold under the decree of an earlier mortgagee in a suit to which he was not a party. Therefore, the interest of the prior mortgagee or the subsequent mortgagee, if any, would not be affected by a decree passed on an application under s. 13 and there is no reason therefore to cut down the plain meaning of the words used in s. 2 (6) (c) on the ground that the proceedings under the Act would prejudicially affect the rights of prior or puisne mortgagees. 13. There is therefore no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs. 14. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 98 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t; of the mother, and, therefore, the family was not entitled to the higher limit of exemption from tax provided in the limit clause to the proviso of Part I(A) of Schedule I of the Finance Act of 1951. It was further held in that case that a son or a grandson was a "lineal descendant" of his mother or grandmother, respectively, irrespective of the question whether the mother or the grandmother can form a line of succession in Hindu law. In our opinion, the principle of this decision is correct, and applying this principle to the present case, we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was right in making the view that the Hindu undivided family cannot get the benefit of the higher exemption limit of ₹ 12,600 under the First Schedule. We accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court against the assessee and in favour of the Income Tax Department. The assessee pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 97 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... only be ascertained on the expiry of the calendar year. The firm being registered, the amount of profits of the firm for the calendar year 1955, was liable to be distributed amongst the partners of the firm and then assessed to tax in the hands of the partners. On December 31, 1955, Ashokbhai Chimanbhai, the individual, had become the beneficial owner of the profits of the firm from January 1, 1955. to December 31, 1955, coming to his share. He was also the legal owner of the amount of profits coming to his five annas share. This amount was not liable to be apportioned between the Hindu undivided family on the one hand and Ashokbhai, the individual, on the other. No part of the profit for the calendar year 1955 accrued to the Hindu undivided family of Ashokbhai Chimanbhai. No part thereof is liable to be charged in the hands of the said Hindu undivided family. Our answer to the question is in the negative. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1960 (4) TMI 96 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mma, her daughter, her brother and son-in-law, the total percentage is only about 47 per cent. Therefore, even if it were to be held that the third proviso of the section is governed by the explanation thereto in its entirety, the position is that the public are having more than 25 per cent of the voting power and, therefore, the company is one in which the public would be substantially interested. 26. The result of the conclusion is that the Income Tax Officer has no authority to take proceedings under section 23A. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to deal with the other points raised on behalf of the company, namely, those relating to the applicability of the Public Companies (Limitation of Dividends) Ordinance, 1948, and the third Public Companies (Limitation of Dividends) Act, 1949. We answer the third question in the negative, and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Advocates fee ₹ 250. Questions answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 95 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e company at the place where it was carrying on business. Therefore, sending them to Petlad does not really touch the matter one way or other. What is of the crux of the matter is that the mode of payment acceptable to and accepted by the assessee company was that payment should be made by sending the cheques, hundies or drafts by post from British India. Since that was the accepted mode of payment, it is difficult to see how it can be said that there was no evidence before the Tribunal for holding that there was an implied request by the assessee company to the buyers of the goods to make payment by posting cheques in a manner as would constitute the post office the agent of the assessee company for the purpose of receiving payment. The present contention of Mr. Palkhivala must, therefore, be negatived. Our answer to the question will be in the affirmative. Assessee to pay the costs. There will be no order on the notice of motion. No order for costs of the notice of motion.
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1960 (4) TMI 94 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Bom); Dayabhai Girdharibhai v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 32 ITR 677 (Bom.); Mayaram Durgaprasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1931 5 ITC 471 (All.); Govindarajulu Iyer v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1948 16 ITR 391 (Mad.). There are some general observations in the last mentioned case, but Mr. Kolah has not relied on the same and we need not burden this judgment with any discussion of the proposition considered there. There remains to be mentioned one more argument of Mr. Joshi and it is this Counsel for the revenue has urged that the contention urged by Mr. Kolah before us goes very much beyond the scope of the question which has been referred to this court. The way we read the question it is in language of amplitude and width and we do not think Mr. Joshi is right when he says that the contention pressed for our acceptance by Mr. Kolah travels beyond the ambit of the question. Our answer to the question submitted to us is in the affirmative. Assessee to pay the costs.
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1960 (4) TMI 93 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... seSscc company. What we have got to see is whether a new contention which was not before the Tribunal is sought to be raised. It is not possible to say that such is tho position in the case before us. We may also mention that all the relevant and necessary facts are to be found in the Statement of the Case. Therefore, the argument that a new contention is sought to be raised by the assessee company must be negative. 18. We have already set out the questions referred to this Court by the Tribunal. Questions 1 and 2 will remain as they are. The 3rd question requires to be refrained. We shall to so as under "Whether the sum of ₹ 57, 785/- could legally be included in the assessee company's total income for the assessment year ended 31st March, 1950? Our answer to the question is in the negative. 19. In view of our answer to the question No. 3, it is not necessary to answer the first two questions. 20. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (4) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that Form. Then it is said that in effect the result is the same and what happened was that for the time being the assessee was not to pay any tax on the amount of ₹ 2,722. Now this argument of necessary implication may avail in certain cases, but we fail to see how it can be availed of by the Department in the present case. Assuming that there is scope for some implication, how far is the implication to go ? Is the implication to be read as underlying also the notice of demand ? The answer to that must be that there is here little scope for such implication and none whatever in case of the notice of demand. For all these reasons our answer to the question will be in the negative. We may mention that there were three other questions in the reference, but those questions were already answered on an earlier occasion. The order will also be in accordance with the answers to those questions. We have heard counsel on the question of costs. There will be no order for costs.
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1960 (4) TMI 91 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... learly fall under section 7 of the Act. Remuneration for services cannot be said to be casual in nature as a gift inter vivos would be Section 7 read with explanation (2) is indicative that the section also covers gifts or payments made voluntarily where the object of the payments happens to be remuneration for services rendered and every remuneration received by a servant would be covered by section 7. The fact that the payment is out of all proportion to the services rendered would not make the payment any the less a remuneration for services rendered, coming within the ambit of section 7 of the Act. The action taken under section 34 of the Act, in our opinion, is justified in that the material on record before the Income-tax Officer was sufficient to lead him to believe that the assessee had not disclosed all material facts before him. In the circumstances, we answer both the questions referred to in the affirmative against the assessee. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1960 (4) TMI 90 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Villages, Talukas and Districts of the Bombay State. The suggestion is that there are some entries in these revenue accounts which would go to show that the assessee was in the position of an agent in the matter of the collection of the cess. We are unable to read any of those entries in the manner suggested by learned counsel. What is more important is that this Manual cannot have the force of law. The Manual is intended for the guidance of the Revenue department of the Government of Bombay and we fail to see how the case of the assessee can gain any support from this Manual. It is not necessary to repeat what we stated in the previous judgment two years ago. Our answer to the first question will be in the affirmative. Our answer to the second question will be in the negative. Of course, the amount of cess which has been found as legally payable would not be liable to income-tax and to this extent our answer to the first question is modified. The assessee to pay costs.
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1960 (4) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f fresh evidence on the record, then this direction offends against the ruling of this Court in the Jehangir Vakil Mills case ( 1960 1 S.C.R. 249). If, however, the direction be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal in giving the finding must confine itself to the facts admitted and/or found by it, the direction cannot be described as in excess of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It would have been better if the High Court had given directions confined to the record of the case before the Tribunal; but, in the absence of anything expressly to the contrary, we cannot bold that the direction would lead inevitably to the admit- ting of fresh evidence. This, at least, now cannot be done, since the Jehangir Vakil Mills case (1), has prohibited the admission of fresh evidence. In our opinion, the present case does not fall within the rule in the Jehangir Vakil Mills case (1), and is distinguishable. In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 88 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ordinance could not be construed as repealing the provisions of the agreement give an indication that the claim of the Cement Company based on the agreement would have been allowed if it had been made in circumstances such as those present in the case before us. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to succeed and that the direction prayed for by the applicant must issue. The petition is accordingly allowed and a direction restraining the opponents from making any assessment under the Indian Income Tax Act and levying or collecting Income Tax or Super-tax in contravention of the exemption given by the agreement dated the 7th April 1947 is issued. The proceedings for assessment taken by the Income Tax authorities in contravention of the said exemption are quashed. The petitioner-Company shall have costs of the petition. Counsel fee is fixed at ₹ 250/-. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1960 (4) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her by only statutory rules and not otherwise. I would, therefore, hold that if the Government seeks to make a particular officer of the Department subordinate to another, it can only do so by making a statutory rule under sub-s. (3) of s. 133A of the Act. The result is that negatively there is no statutory rule making the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner, and positively there is a rule making him subordinate to the Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.). If that be so, I must hold that the Regional Transport officer is not a subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner within the meaning of s. 44A of the Act. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Order of Court. In view of the majority judgment of the Court, the appeal is allowed with costs in this Court, and the case remanded to the High Court for a re-hearing by a single Judge. Costs in the High Court will abide the result. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (4) TMI 86 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the defendant's 3/8th share has been clearly separated and we cannot make him responsible for the shares of the others. 15. On that amount interest has to be given at Rangoon nadappu bank rate from 1-10-1937 to 1-4-1960, which so far as the information at our disposal goes is 3 per cent. That will add an amount of ₹ 2740.48 np. The total amount therefore due on 1-4-1960 will be ₹ 6799.55 np. 16. To this amount will have to be added costs which have already been granted to the respondent and which, of course, cannot be scaled down. 17. The appellant will be entitled to the costs of the Supreme Court which have already been granted to him and also the costs before us as well as the Full Bench. 18. We issue a decree in these terms m C. M. A. No. 721 of 1952 and this will also govern A. S. No. 254 of 1946. We make it clear that the costs granted to the plaintiffs will stand and no separate costs are being awarded to the respondent therein by means of this order.
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1960 (4) TMI 85 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n of the mortgaged properties and (e) the statutory notice is dated August 7, 1957 and called upon the company to pay the debt within three weeks from the date of the notice, but the notice was in fact served on August 7, 1958 and in the circumstances it was impossible to comply with the notice and consequently the notice was not a valid notice under Section 434 of the Indian Companies Act and as such the inability to pay the debts has not been proved by recourse to Section 434(a) of the Indian Companies Act that there is no other proof of such inability. Having regard to our conclusions on the main question, we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on these further contentions. 20. I propose that the following order be passed 21. The appeal is dismissed with costs, 22. The appellants will pay one set of costs to the respondent Sitaram Bhartia and another set of costs to Buxar Oil and Rice Mills Ltd. 23. Certified for two counsel. S.C. Lahiri, C.J. 24. I agree.
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1960 (4) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he appellant who is the present Receiver has derived his liability to pay the debt. Section 19 is therefore in terms applicable as the acknowledgements have been signed personally by those previous Receivers and no recourse is needed by the plaintiff to the second part of Explanation 11. This position was indeed fairly conceded by Mr. Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under s. 19 of the Limitation Act. There can be no doubt that the acknowledgments on which the plaintiff relies are acknowledgments within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in respect of the period prior to August 12, 1935. The Courts below were therefore right in rejecting the defendant's plea of limitation. As both the contentions raised before us fail, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d not an attempt to commit the offence. The last point argued was that there was no attempt to cheat because the complainant had not been deceived. It is true that the complainant bad not been taken in. He had never believed that the accused could actually duplicate currency notes. He feigned belief only in order to trap the accused. That however clearly makes no difference so far as an attempt to cheat is concerned. The accused had attempted to cheat the complainant. That they had failed in their attempt is irrelevant in considering whether they had committed the offence of attempting to cheat. This view of the matter has been accepted in the High Courts uniformally. In The Government of Bengal v. Umesh Chunder Mitter (1) it was observed that " A man may attempt to cheat, although the person he attempts to cheat is forewarned, and is therefore not cheated." This is clearly the right view. This appeal is entirely without merit and it is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (4) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... 1959, a decision has yet to be recorded in the application under section 27 of the Income-tax Act which the petitioner has already moved. The facts as they are given in the affidavit filed along with the petition before us are not complete arid sufficient, and on their basis it is not possible for us to make an appropriate examination of the circumstances and to arrive at a proper finding whether the petitioner did or did not have sufficient reason for failing to comply with the requirements of the notices on the 23rd February, 1959. This is also a point which has to be left for decision by the appropriate authorities in the course of the proceedings which the petitioner has already initiated by moving an application under section 27 of the Income-tax Act. In no case can this be a ground for our exercising the power of issuing writ of certiorari to quash the order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer. As a consequence, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (4) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... at generally and vaguely, yet bearing in mind that the defendants were commission agents and the money was deposited with them by the plaintiffs to be utilized by them at Meerut for purchasing jaggery, I am inclined to accept the findings of the lower appellate court and do not see any adequate ground for disturbing the findings in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. A further support for this fact is found from the condition stated in Ex. P-1 as there is an implied agreement between the parties that the place of performance will be at Meerut. In this view of the matter the petitioners cannot invoke the aid of this rule for holding that the place of payment should be presumed to be Sibi and that on that basis, the suit was properly instituted. Under the circumstances, I have no alternative, but to reject this revision petition. 36. In the result, the revision petition is hereby dismissed. Looking to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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