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1960 (8) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nterpretation contended for by the respondent is not sustainable. (2) The decree of the Federal Court of Pakistan is covered by the words "appellate jurisdiction" in clause 2 of art. 4 of the Order. (3) The word "effect" in clause 3 of art. 4 is of wide connotation and is not equivalent to 'being enforced' by suits on a foreign judgment. (4) Clause 3 of art. 4 is in the nature of a deeming clause and makes the decree of the Pakistan court (West Punjab) a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in East Punjab (India). (5) Situs of the decree is not in Pakistan alone but the legal fiction applies to that also, and (6) the evacuee laws of Pakistan do not affect the effectiveness of the decree in India. 65. I would therefore allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court. The appellants will have their costs throughout. BY COURT 66. In view of the majority Judgment, the appeal is dismissed with costs. 67. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 110 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... istrate rejected the prayer made by the applicant before him, he came to the conclusion that Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act so far as it relates to the allegations in this case was not void. Even the counsel for the applicant conceded that the prohibition contained in this first part of Clause (a) and the last part of the dame clause are not in conflict with the rights given under Article 19 of the Constitution. 17. We have deliberately avoided referring to the merits of the case and we have refrained from expressing any opinion as to which part of Section 7 will cover the conduct of the applicant if the allegations made against him are proved. We leave it to the trial Court. 18. In view of the conclusions to which we have reached, we send this case back to the Magistrate for disposal. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Magistrate along with the file of the case with the direction that he should now proceed with the case in conformity with oar decision.
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1960 (8) TMI 109 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... .P.C. may be considered to be legal and the defect in the warrant of there being no seal on it cannot be considered to be of any significance in this connection. 11. We partly allow the reference and set aside the convictions and sentences of Pangir under Sections 353 and 225(b) I.P.C., and maintain his conviction under Section 147 I.P.C. The learned Counsel states that Pangir had already undergone about four months' rigorous imprisonment when he was sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 100/- under Section 147 I.P.C. and that the sentence already undergone may be held to be sufficient under the circumstances of the case. The request of the learned Counsel does not appear to be improper. We, therefore, order that the sentence already undergone by the accused shall be held to be sufficient to meet the ends of justice under Section 147 I.P.C. The sentence of fine is set aside and if amount has been deposited, it shall be refunded to him.
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1960 (8) TMI 108 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... recovery outside the scope of the Income Tax Act. it accordingly follows that before the Income Tax Officer could take any steps under section 46(5A) of the Act, While proceedings for recovery under section 46(2) of the Act were already on foot, he should record special reasons why the adoption of an additional mode was necessary. If no such reasons are recorded, it should necessarily follow that the later proceedings are not lawful. 20. On behalf of the Department, Sri Rama Rao Sahib has been compelled to concede that no special reasons were recorded by the Income Tax Officer. The result is inevitable that the entire proceedings under section 46(5A), whether of 1954 or 1957, stand vitiated thereby. We are of the view that on this narrow ground the petitions succeed. 21. Rule nisi is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs in W.P. No. 603. from respondent No. 1. No order as to costs in W.P. No. 604 of 1957. Counsels fee ₹ 250. 22. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... he jurisdiction, I do not think that I should in the present case constitute myself into an original Court and inquire into this application upon the evidence, especially when that evidence was recorded ex parte. If the respondents choose, they can put in a fresh application in pursuance of the sanction of the Collector granted on June 9, 1958, and I have no doubt that the proper Court will, taking into account the grave circumstances disclosed in this case and the fact that the necessity for safeguarding the trust property is very urgent, pass appropriate and immediate orders. 12. In the result, I allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Additional District Judge, Yeotmal, dated June 26, 1958, The point upon which the appeal has succeeded was never raised before, the trial Court. The conduct of the successful appellant has, in my opinion, been reprehensible. In view of these circumstances, I think it proper that both the parties should bear their own costs throughout.
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1960 (8) TMI 106 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... ra vires, and once the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act is held valid, all objections against the impugned Act disappear, because the impugned Act does no more than the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. By Section 3 of that Act, the shamlat deh vests in the village Panchayat. Shamlat deh is the property of village proprietors and its vesting in the Panchayat deprives the proprietors of their proprietary rights. The Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act makes no provision for the payment of compensation to the proprietors. All that the impugned Act does is that it provides authority for adding to or taking away from the already existing shamlat deh, and this can clearly be done. 7. I would, therefore, hold that Act 27 of 1960 is saved by the provisions of Article 31A of the Constitution, and that being so, the present petition must be dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. K.L. Gosain, J. 8. I agree. D.K. Mahajan, J. 9. I agree.
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1960 (8) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eques without anything more could not be proof of actively engaging oneself in the conduct of the business. Keeping custody of the cash and the books of the firm, outside the office hours, when they were not be proof of actively engaging oneself in the conduct of the business. Both these items together did not finish proof that he satisfied the requirements of section 2(6AA) that the assessee had actively engaged himself in the conduct of the business of the firm. Something more than signing cheques should be needed to prove an active engagement in the conduct of the business. That evidence was not forthcoming. The Tribunal was certainly justified on the material place before it in coming to the conclusion, that the assessee had not satisfied the requirements of section 2(6AA) of the Act. The second question is answered in the negative and against the assessee. 6. Since neither side has succeeded wholly on this reference, there will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.
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1960 (8) TMI 104 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fficer dated 28th March, 1952, to which we have already referred. If Satya Narayan was not a successor to the firm as was contended by Dr. Gupta, then his description as a successor to the old firm must be regarded as a surplusage. The Income Tax department never absolved him of his liability as a partner. That is personal liability, pure and simple. The name of Satya Narayan appears in the certificate of public demand. That being the position, we are of opinion that the tax in question is recoverable from him. A question was also raised on behalf of the contesting respondents whether the suit of the appellant was maintainable in the trial court. In the present appeal we do not find any necessity to go into that question, because, in our opinion, the suit of the appellant is liable to be dismissed for reasons which we have already given. In view of our foregoing findings, we dismiss the appeal with costs to the contesting respondents. N.K. Sen, J. - I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ecutive for carrying it out, there will be an end of the doctrine of the rule of law. If the contention be correct, the legislature in the present case could have stated in the preamble that they were making the law for fixing the maximum rent and could have conferred an absolute power on the Government to fix suitable rents having regard to the circumstances of each case. Such a law cannot obviously be valid. When the decisions say that the legislature shall lay down the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct, they do not mean vague and general declaration of policy, but a definite policy controlling and regulating the powers conferred on the executive for carrying into effect that policy. 28. I must, therefore, hold that s. 6(2) of the Act is void inasmuch as it exceeded the permissible limits of legislative delegation. 29. In the result the appeals are allowed with costs. BY COURT In view of the majority judgment, the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is made it might have been another matter. Under these circumstances we are unable to hold that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the impugned decision of the Government is wholly punitive in character and must in the circumstances be treated as based on a consideration which is not germane and is extraneous. It is clear that the Act has been passed in order to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and if it appears that in cases falling under s. 12(5) the investigation and settlement of any industrial dispute is prevented by the appropriate Government by refusing to make a reference on grounds which are wholly irrelevant and extraneous a case for the issue of a writ of mandamus is clearly established. In the result we confirm the order passed by the High Court though not exactly for the same reasons. 19. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs, one set of hearing fees. 20. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 101 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot;These considerations lead us to the further conclusion that if the power of delegation possessed by a Legislature is of a more limited character than we have stated earlier, there are nevertheless certain classes of legislation which a Legislature must have power to entrust to another authority. Such classes will include ..... 3. Power may be conferred on a local or other territorial authority to make rules and regulations for local self-Government or for other local purposes. This power is well established and the necessity for it is obvious." 24. In view of these authorities, it must be held that the impugned Provision in Section 129 regarding the fixation of the radius by rule does not amount to delegation of legislative power. 25. Since all the contentions of the petitioners have been repelled, there is no force in these petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. The petitioners in each case shall pay to the Municipal Board, Saharanpur, ₹ 201/- as costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mployee incidental to that entrustment? These question have to be answered from the view point of a prudent man of business. If these tests are satisfied then the loss would be a trading loss. The assessee in this case carried on a money-lending business. The employment of a cashier was obviously a normal incident of that business. So was the entrustment of the cash of the business to that cashier. That Inderchand Galada was in charge of the business and that his temporary absence from Madras facilitated the embezzlement by Ranka did not really affect the determination of the question, was the embezzlement effected by Ranka incidental to his employment under the assessee. It was. Therefore, the loss to the assessee caused by the embezzlement by the cashier Ranka was a trading loss. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (8) TMI 99 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... compensation in favour of the other partners under paragraph 1(iii) of the deed and in the provision in paragraph 6 thereof for the transfer of some of the shares of the company between some of the parties to the agreement. We do not think that any of these circumstances have any real bearing on the question at issue. We have considered the deed carefully and our conclusion is that the payment of ₹ 3 lakhs by the company was for nothing other than the termination of an arrangement which had become dangerous to its future well-being. We are quite satisfied that the payment of the said sum reflects a genuine and bona fide settlement, that it was not actuated by generosity or any indirect or improper motive, and that it was dictated solely by considerations of commercial expediency and for the benefit of the company. In the light of what is stated above all the three questions referred have to be answered in the affirmative and we do so. There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (8) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n-trade of its money-lending business. The sums spent for the improvement and upkeep of these properties were treated as items of expenditure in the usual course of the banking business of the assessee. There was no indication available which showed that the assessee bank ever sought to treat the acquisition of any of these three items as investments. In other words, there was no indication that the amounts spent on the acquisition of these properties or even their improvement ceased to be part of the circulating capital of the assessee. 16. In the light of the foregoing, we are of the view that in so far as three items are concerned, the profit realised by their sale was income of the money-lending business assessable to tax. 17. Our answer to the question referred to us is that only a sum of ₹ 14, 357-11-9 out of the sum of ₹ 27,694 was assessable to tax. 18. Since neither party has wholly succeeded, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (8) TMI 97 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... "net profits" of the year and the "net profits" is defined as "the amount for which the company's audited profits in any year are assessed to income-tax in the State of Travancore." This apparently shows that the ten per cent. payable was not intended to have any impact on the assessment to income-tax. According to the department the payment under clause 7 will represent only a division of the earned profits of a common adventure between the assessee and the Government ; and the payment will not hence constitute an admissible deduction. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to evaluate this contention or consider cases like British Sugar Manufacturers Ltd. v. Harris ( Inspector of Taxes) 1938 1 All ER 149 ; 1939 7 ITR 101 . A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1960 (8) TMI 96 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ision within two months, that is, before June 30. The difficulties visualised by learned counsel are no doubt there. But difficulties and individual hardships in working out the rule cannot justify reading into the rules more than what they contain. We have to interpret the rules and the requirements of the forms as they stand. It is for the rule-making authority to amend the rules. We quite agree with the learned counsel for the assessee that prescribing a date for application, either for registration or for renewal of registration, makes a lot of difference, and there is everything to be said in offering the alternatives both to continuing firms and to dissolved firms. That, however, as we have pointed out, is a matter for the rule making authority to rectify and not for the court to rectify by a process of interpretation. On our reading of the rules and the forms which have "to be read with the rules we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1960 (8) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate direction, order or writ to direct the respondent, the Union of India, to withdraw or cancel the notification dated August 31, 1957, recognising " the Stock Exchange, Bombay" under section 4 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (XLII of 1956)
Held that:- The Act, the validity of which he has not chosen to question, enables the State to give or refuse recognition to any stock exchange and it has chosen to give recognition to the Stock Exchange, Bombay, subject to the conditions prescribed. The restrictions in our view, are not unreasonable, having regard to the importance of the business of a stock exchange in the country's national economy and having regard to the magnitude of the mischief sought to be remedied in the interest of the general public. At another place we have already dealt with the necessity for stringent rules governing this type of business. For the reasons mentioned we reject the first contention that that under rule 20 a candidate for admission falls under two categories, namely, (1) a candidate who must obtain a nomination in the manner provided in the rules, i.e., rule 11(a) and (b ); and (2) a candidate applying for a membership vesting in the exchange; and, therefore, these two categories exhaust the candidates for admission.
The record discloses that the Central Government in recognising the stock exchange sought to avoid the consequential hardship on the members of the rival stock exchange and therefore imposed the said condition on the Stock Exchange, Bombay, as a condition for its recognition. The condition germane to the recognition of the stock exchange and is therefore, a condition within the meaning of " any other conditions " in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act.
The Indian Stock Exchange Limited became moribund in a few ears and to revive its activities it allowed the members of the East India Chamber of Commerce, by relaxing its entrance fee and security deposit requirements in 1950-51 and created a new class of associate members, which facilitated the enrolment of hundreds of associated members on payment of a nominal entrance fee of ₹ 100. The Government on a consideration of the necessary data and presumably having regard to the record of the activities of the various members fixed the activities in the crucial year 1956-57 as the standard of activity for membership.
The burden which lie upon the petitioner who impeached the validity of the classification to show that it violates the guarantee of equal 'protection has been discharged. On the material placed before us we cannot say that the period fixed by take Government as the standard for ascertaining the active membership is arbitrary or unreasonable. We must make it clear that this finding must be confined only to the validity of the impugned notification dated August 31,1956. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (8) TMI 94 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d judge on metrits. The learned Government Pleader docs not seek anything more than what Mr. Bhabba has agreed to do on behalf of his clients. I feel that the healthy traditions of the Courts in this country must be upheld at any costs, and I am glad that Mr. Bhaba, a member of the Original Side Bar of the High Court, has rightly agrered to do on behalf of his clients what I have stated above. 7. It is stated in this civil revision application that defendant No. 8 who is a guarantor of the mortgage should not be allowed by the learned judge to cross-examine the defendants or their witnesses. The learned judge, however, has not passed any order in that behalf. It is open to the petitioner to raise this contention before the learned judge as and when the occasion arises and, therefore, I need not express any opinion upon that question at the moment. 8. In the circumstances, I pass no order on the application and no order as to costs either. 9. Opinion expressed Counsel agreed.
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1960 (8) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e sale took place later and the suit was brought earlier but the suit as laid down was one to pre-empt a sale of April 1943 when, as a matter of fact, no sale had taken place. If respondent Sridhar had based his right of pre-emption on the basis of the sale of February 1, 1944, the appellant would have taken such defence as the law allowed him. The defence in regard to the conversion of the land from agricultural into non- agricultural site which negatives the right of pre-emption would then have become a very important issue in the case and the appellant would have adduced proper proof in regard to it. The right of pre-emption is a weak right and is not looked upon with favour by courts and therefore the courts could not go out of their way to help the pre-emptor. In our opinion the judgment of the High Court was erroneous and we would therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss the suit with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (8) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ever be that such a prosecution should be launched. Therefore where the penalty is fine and the fine goes to the State, it must be held that by necessary implication the law does not intend the State to be prosecuted for such an offence. In the present case I find that under s. 81 of the Act of 1923 (or the corresponding s. 115 of the Act of 1951) the fines imposed by the Magistrate will not go to the Corporation but in the usual way to the State. Under the circumstances whatever other methods may be possible for enforcing the provisions of s. 386 (or s. 437 now) against the State it cannot be intended to be enforced by prosecution resulting in fine which would go to the State itself. In these circumstances it must be held that by necessary implication the State is exempt from the penal provisions contained in s. 488 (now s. 537). I would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of acquittal by the Magistrate. Appeal allowed.
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