|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 20 Records
-
1961 (6) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rate is set aside, and it is ordered instead that apart from the 18 sheets which are to be kept back by the Enforcement Directorate the other documents mentioned in the list attached to the letter of request be made over to the Income-tax Officer (Central) Circle No. VII, and the Income-tax Officer and the Department and directed to return the document and books of account as expeditiously as possible to opposite party No. 2 Sohan Lal Sethia, having regard to the provisions of section 37(3) of the Income-tax Act. If the requirement of the Enforcement Directorate regarding the 18 sheets mentioned in their application dated April 22, 1961, has been satisfied in the meantime, these 18 sheets will also be made over to the Income-tax Department and the Income-tax Officer of (Central) Circle No. VII; if not, the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate may pass further direction regarding the 18 sheets in the light of the observations made above. K.C. SEN, J.--I agree. Petition allowed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
... ...
... ... ..... been shown in the account books of the assessee, though they really belonged to the assessee and overdrafts have been taken by the assessee on the collateral security of these deposits. In our opinion, the present case falls within the principles laid down by this High Court in a later case, Murlidhar Tejpal v. Commissioner of Income Tax. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the Income Tax authorities for holding that there was a willful suppression by the assessee of the particulars of its income within the meaning of section 28(1) (c) of the Income Tax Act and accordingly a penalty of ₹ 35,000 has been validly imposed upon the assessee under that section. For these reasons, we answer the question of law referred by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal against the assessee and in favour of the Income Tax department. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Question answered accordingly.
-
1961 (6) TMI 25 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of lease and that the assessee had no other interest in the business excepting this ten per cent. of the net profit. At every material place the recital is that of a lease and the relationship that of lessor and lessee. That appears to be the reason why at all earlier stages the contentions of the assessee proceeded on the footing that it was a deed of lease and the premium payable was by way of use and occupation of the premises and other properties of the assessee. It is, therefore, too late now to raise any such contention before this court. For the above reasons the reference has to be answered in the affirmative as stated earlier. Although the assessee has succeeded in showing that the reasons given by the Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal are erroneous, in substance, the assessee has failed. We, therefore, direct that parties will bear their own costs of this reference. We regret the unavoidable delay in deciding this matter. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1961 (6) TMI 24 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ommissioner of Income-tax 1961 42 I.T.R. 179 (S.C.). The facts in each case have to be assessed for the purpose of finding as to whether they constitute a venture in the nature of trade or business and the original intention at the time of acquisition of the property by itself cannot be conclusive. What is a finding binding on the High Court is dealt with in the case of Raja Rameshwara Rao v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 32 I.T.R. 552, a judgment of Subba Rao C.J., as he then was. In this case, the situation is correctly assessed, in our opinion, by the Income-tax Tribunal and we see no necessity to go behind it. Mr. Choudhury for the department contended that at the time the contract of sale was entered into by the assessee company, the property was converted into stock-in-trade as held by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. Read with the circumstances, we cannot say that this assessment was correct. I have nothing more to add. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1961 (6) TMI 23 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... iple on which Russel's case ( 1962 44 I.T.R. 816) has been decided would be applicable to the present case. The learned Government advocate has argued that the payments are towards life assurance of the employee and covered by sub-clause (v) of Explanation 1 to section 7(1) of the Act. We feel that the aforesaid sub-clause would not cover payments towards life assurance, which is liable to be surrendered, on certain events happening, and the benefit thus got becoming payable at the direction of the employer. The employee gets, in payments towards such an assurance only contingent interest in the years in which they are paid, because the possibility of the benefit being diverted at the employer's direction is not then excluded, and we think such payments are not covered by the aforesaid clause. In such circumstances, we answer the question in the negative, which answer be sent to the Tribunal, and there will be no costs in this case. Question answered in the negative.
-
1961 (6) TMI 22 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rent from the effect which the scheme will have on the material Interests of the Sidhpur shareholders.Whereas the Sidhpur company at present is a public limited company in which the public has a dominant voice and whereas the managing agents and the directors even if they were to combine together will not have more than 29 to 30 per cent voice In the administration of the company, the result of the present amalgamation, from the point of view of the Sidhpur shareholders, will be that one section will have definitely a voice to the extent of 57 per cent and all the office-bearers of the Sidhpur company, combined together, will have such a dominant voice that they will be able to command a majority of 74 per cent. In my judgment, this aspect of the scheme is an important and a material aspect and It should have been brought to the notice of the Sidhpur shareholders.Inasmuch as the same has not been done, in my judgment, a breach of Clause (a) to Section 393 has been committed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... income-tax department was not satisfied with the book results. The assessee must therefore have been aware of the fact that, as early as March, 1945, the department had come into possession of materials which would discredit the assessee's account books. There were therefore sufficient materials for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion it did, namely, that, in the context of the events that happened in the case, the disclosure by the assessee of full particulars was not the result of any voluntary act on his part, but by reason of the discovery of the falsity of the account books in respect of the previous year. It would therefore follow that there was a concealment of the particulars of income in the first instance, or at any rate, a deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars in the original return filed by the assessee. We therefore answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
-
1961 (6) TMI 20 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... coriander seeds, at any rate, have to be put through a process before they can yield oil and the quantity of the oil varies from 0.1 to 1.0 per cent. There is, however, no data available before us from which we can say what the percentage of oil that can be extracted from voma and sompu is. But from the samples produced, it would appear that the oil extracted is quite negligible. It is not disputed that the three commodities referred to are used as spices and have not been known in the country as oil seeds. Further, there is no evidence to show that any oil is extracted in this country or that the oil extracted from these is used commercially or industrially or can be bought in the market. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the Legislature had never contemplated nor intended to include such commodities within the definition of oil seeds. In our view therefore, this revision must be dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 50. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 19 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the question whether the Revenue authorities can direct recovery of such amount in a demand notice issued under section 13(4) of the Act, the relevant forms as far as sections 12 and 13 are concerned, are form Nos. 9 and 10. In form No. 9, the 10th column requires to state the amount of tax assessed. But this is not a tax. The Revenue authorities only found that the dealer-assessee has collected sales tax from certain dealers and has not paid to the State. The question therefore is whether that amount is to be deposited into the Government Treasury by the dealer assessee. Form No. 10 also does not apply, because there has been no determination of the tax under section 9-B(3). Accordingly, the Revenue authorities cannot direct recovery of such amounts in a demand notice issued under section 13(4) of the Act. Consequently, I would answer the latter part of the question in the negative. There would be no order for costs. R.K. Das, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1961 (6) TMI 18 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... was treated as a distinct matter for the purpose of legislative competence and was not included in the entries mentioned in the first group in either of the lists. That being the position, Article 303 cannot be invoked to strike down section 8 of the Act as discriminating between dealers of different States in the matters of granting exemption. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the expression State takes in the residents of a State or the bearing of the Australian case on that question. Therefore, the argument based on Chapter XIII of the Constitution is also unavailable to the petitioners. It follows that the impugned section is not impaired by Article 14 nor is it imperilled by Article 303 of the Constitution. In the circumstances, we hold that section 8 is constitutional and that its validity cannot be successfully challenged. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 17 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Rao, C.J., and Viswanatha Sastry, J., decided that nawar tape (material woven in bands and used as mat for cots) could not be regarded as cloth within the definition of cloth under section 5(iii) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. The decision in Pithapuram Taluk Tobacco, Cigars and Soda Merchants Union v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1958 9 S.T.C. 723., accords with the doctrine of the above cases. The principle embodied in the last cited case is that country tobacco which was subject to levy of sales tax at a single purchase point did not include cigare and cheroots out of it. In our judgment, parched rice is not the same thing as rice and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the Explanation read with Schedule III, item 6, annexed to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. In the result, the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is confirmed and the revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 75. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 16 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... enue. Orissa 1955 6 S.T.C. 400. , to the facts of the instant case. That was a case of a contract for the repair of embankments by putting new earth which was supplied by the Govern- ment from their lands and the contract consisted in removing the earth to the embankments. In these circumstances, it was held that the contract was one for pure supply of labour and did not involve any element of sale or supply of goods. In our view, there is no analogy between the facts of that case and the present case, though the Tribunal thought that if the Mohva flower is substituted for earth, the principle of that decision would become applicable. We have already sufficiently indicated the considerations, that have prevailed with us in holding that the transaction in question is not one purely of a contract for supply of Government flower to the Government, but, on the other hand, is one of sale. In this view, we allow these petitions with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. One set. allowed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 15 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ut that contention was rejected on the ground that once a dealer has been registered as a manufacturer under sub-rule (1) of rule 18, he is entitled under the provisions of sub-rule (3) to present the application for the previous month, that is, the month even prior to the month of registration. The rule itself, it was observed, nowhere says that the deduction could be claimed only in respect of the period which is subsequent to the month of registration. This judgment would indicate that once the conditions prescribed in the rule are satisfied, the assessee would be entitled to the rebate even if it is for a subsequent period. In our view, the assessee would be entitled to the rebate once he has fulfilled the conditions specified in rule 18, notwithstanding the fact that he was later found not to have maintained correct accounts or suppressed the turnover. In this view, the revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one hundred only). Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 14 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... g of additional assessment and the levy of penalty are involved in the same proceeding. The reason why the same authority should do both is obvious. It is only the authority that makes the additional assessment that is in the best position to judge whether the case requires the levy of penalty. He should exercise his mind about it and come to a conclusion whether the imposition of penalty is called for in that case. We feel from the language of the section that the conclusion is inevitable that only the assessing authority, who has assessed the escaped assessment, that is competent to levy the penalty. Since the penalty in the present case was levied by an authority other than the one who made the additional assessment, it could not be sustained. Therefore the order levying the penalty has to be set aside as being outside the competence of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. In the result, the tax revision case is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 13 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... waters of this country. And all that we need say is that the concept of a floating island cannot be invoked for the avoidance of taxation under any domestic enactment. As pointed out in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon262 U.S. 100. A merchant ship of one country, voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another, subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other objects within those limits. During her stay she is entitled to the protection of the laws of that place and correlatively, is bound to yield obedience to them. Of course, the local sovereign may, out of considerations of public policy, choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction, or to exert the same in only a limited way but this is a matter resting solely in its discretion. 4.. It follows that the T.R.C. has to be dismissed and we do so. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondent, Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 12 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed assessment of income been construed not to be limited, would equally apply to not limiting escaped assessment of turnover to cases of inadvertence, oversight, or failure to submit the returns. We, therefore, think the limitation on the word escape placed by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court not to be applicable to rule 33, because that is not justified either by the dictionary meaning of the word, nor by the opening wording of the rule, where the framers have used the words any reason . It follows that the jurisdiction under the rule is not confined to cases where the turnover has escaped assessment, due to its not being before the officer by reason of inadvertence, omission, or deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee, or because of want of care on the part of the officer. In these circumstances, the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal is correct, and the revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs, Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 11 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and the proceedings taken under that section are legally valid. In a case of this description there is no question of any review of the order of registration under section 24(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and no sanction of the Commissioner is necessary for such proceedings under rule 39(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules. For these reasons we hold that the order of assessment dated the 28th September, 1956, made by the Superintendent of Sales Tax, Patna, does not amount to an order of review within the meaning of section 24(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, and no sanction of the Commissioner is necessary to the initiation of such proceedings under rule 39, subrule (3), of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules. We accordingly answer the question of law referred to the High Court by the Board of Revenue in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. References answered accordingly.
-
1961 (6) TMI 10 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... decided erroneously or failed to be decided by it. The order specifically states The appellant s advocate, however, was amenable to the assessment being modified on the basis of the certificate produced by the appellant from the Indian Chamber of Commerce. 3.. The rest of the order is confined to the contention of the petitioner that the rate of Rs. 140 per thousand nuts for the whole year was not proper. The Tribunal went into this contention and fixed different prices for the different periods concerned. 4.. In the light of what is stated above the T.R.C. must fail and has to be dismissed. Judgment accordingly. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 9 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... osition is that the later movement is carriage of goods by the buyers for their better enjoyment. It was argued that the right of rejection at the outside destination, with the risk of losses during the journey on the petitioner, distinguishes the case before us from those decided by the Madras High Court. But we feel that the carriage, after the delivery at the railway station within the State, cannot be treated as of goods belonging to another nor vesting of ownership is postponed till the purchaser s delivery of the goods to his own agents. It follows that neither the right of rejection at the destination outside the State, nor other conditions vary the true nature of the journey which is by the owner for the better enjoyment of his own property and the bargains, therefore, do not form part of the inter-State trade channel. Therefore, the claim of exemption to sales tax must fail and the revision petition is dismissed with costs Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (6) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Share capital - Voting rights of shareholders in proportion to their share in paid up ... ... ... ... ..... 89(1) perpetuate the disproportionate voting rights provided under the old articles of association. It was only for a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the Companies Act, 1956, that the old voting rights could continue and thereafter the voting rights had to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of section 87. The period of one year expired on April 1, 1957, and each member of the company was, therefore, from and after that date, not entitled to exercise voting rights in respect of the shares held by him in accordance with the old articles of association but was bound to exercise voting rights in proportion to his share of the paid up capital of the company. This being the position, I vacate the interim injunction granted by the High Court of Bombay at Rajkot on November 5, 1956, restraining the company from holding any general meeting pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition. Costs of the application will be costs in the petition.
|
