|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 49 Records
-
1961 (7) TMI 91 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
... ...
... ... ..... ssible for this court to treat the Petitioner as a civil servant, entitled to the privileges conferred by Article 311 of the Constitution, then I would have to go into the question as to whether the order made by the Secretary or the Chairman of the Council was a valid order. It was argued, not without substance, that it was only the committees the Council that could make such an order and no power is given to the chairman. In my opinion, however, on the authority of the cases cited above, the petitioner is not a civil servant and is not entitled to the privileges of Article 311 of the Constitution. Further, the Council not being a 'public body' or a 'public authority', and not carrying out statutory duties in appointing or dismissing its employees, cannot be made the subject-matter of a high prerogative writ. 3. The result is that on this preliminary point this application fails. The rule is discharged, interim order, if any, is vacated. No order as to costs.
-
1961 (7) TMI 90 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ere was no allegation that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with and it is to such a case that the observations of their Lordships that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is excluded by the order of the Collector in appeal have reference. If the order passed is illegal and unjustified the observations of their Lordships that the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into case where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure would apply. In view of these observations we hold that there is no merit in the contention of the learned Government Pleader that Section 35(2) is a bar to this litigation. 16. In the result the suit filed by the plaintiff is not barred and the claim is also justified. The decree passed by the lower Court would therefore be set aside and the plaintiffs suit decreed in full. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
-
1961 (7) TMI 89 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t of the only other adult member of the family was to set apart a portion of the family assets for the education of their respective sons existing or to be born, and the savings, if any, were to be accumulated as a reserve, eventually to be distributed among all the beneficiaries on the youngest of them attaining majority. Ex facie this is an arrangement which is entirely for the benefit of the minors and we are not at all satisfied on any authority or principle that such a transaction should be held to be necessarily void ab initio. It only remains for us to mention in passing that it was not the case of the department before us that this transaction was a sham or a fictitious one and, therefore, the property under gift still belonged to the family. In these circumstances, and for the reasons mentioned at length above, our answers to both the questions raised before us are against the department and we hold accordingly. The respondent will have his costs from the petitioner.
-
1961 (7) TMI 88 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e were obviously overruled. With reference to the letter referred to above it is further pleaded that the objections regarding jurisdiction were overruled and that so far as the other objections relating to the taxability of the income was concerned, no decision has been given because it is not possible to do so without examining the assessee's account books. In view of the foregoing discussion, in my opinion, no good and cogent ground has been made out in this case for by passing the normal procedure prescribed by the Income-tax Act and for inducing this court to hold an inquiry in proceedings for a prerogative writ under article 226 of the Constitution. It is apparent that the respondent will decide the validity of the objections claiming exemption from assessment after the whole relevant material is placed before him and the apprehension on behalf of the petitioner does not seem to be well founded. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed, but with no costs.
-
1961 (7) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ount should have been assessed in the assessment year 1946-47 and not in 1947-48. In order to decide this question, it was necessary for the Assistant Commissioner to determine in which particular assessment year the above income should have been assessed. The appellate authority found that the amount of ₹ 85,000 should have been included in the income for 1946-47 and not for 1947-48. This was a finding, which it was necessary for him to record, in order to decide the question, which has been raised by the appellants themselves. The finding recorded by him cannot, therefore, be said to be a finding without jurisdiction. The notice can, therefore, be said to have been issued in consequence of or to give effect to a finding contained in an order made under section 31 and would consequently be in time under the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34, if this section as amended in 1953 applies in this case. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1961 (7) TMI 86 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y, it is not necessary to go into that question at all. On the plain language of section 40, a guardian can be held liable to pay tax only on the share of the profit received by him of each of the minors separately. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. Mr. Choudhary referred to cases of Vedathanni v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1933 1 I.T.R. 70, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gomedalli Lakshminarayan 1935 3 I.T.R. 367, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lakshmanan Chettiar 1940 8 I.T.R. 545, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dhannalal Devilal 1956 29 I.T.R. 165., in support of his contention that a joint family may consist of a single male member. It is not necessary to deal with these cases at length as they do not decide the point for consideration before us. The assessees will be entitled to their costs which we assess at ₹ 200, inclusive of the hearing fee and other costs. S.K. DATTA J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
-
1961 (7) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not any amount that the directors of the company in their discretion think necessary but only such amounts as are necessary to meet depreciation or loss that has actually occurred or has actually been suffered. It is not therefore open to the assessee company to write off amounts larger than those actually lost by depreciation. It seems to us that having regard to the content and scope of rule 3(b), the same view must hold good. It is not open to the assessee to write off any amount on a notional basis. His right is clearly restricted only to such amounts as are required to meet the depreciation, that is to say, to meet the actual loss by depreciation. It follows from what has been stated above that, in the absence of any material to establish any actual loss in the depreciation of the assets, the Tribunal was justified in disallowing the amount. The question is accordingly answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
-
1961 (7) TMI 84 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sions of section 4 is that it has reference only to notices which are issued under section 34 as amended by section 18 of the Finance Act of 1956. But we do not find any warrant for putting any such limitation on the very wide words used in the section. It appears to us that even a notice which is issued under the provisions of section 34(1)(a) as it stood before the amendment of 1956 is also covered by the language employed in that section. In fact, it appears that the precise object of enacting the section was not only to save notices which were issued under section 34(1)(a) as it stood before the amendment as also notices which were issued subsequent to the amendment of 1956. (See also Onkarmal Meghraj v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1960 38 ITR 369 ). In the result, this appeal must be allowed, the order and judgment of Sinha J. are set aside and the application under article 226 of the Constitution is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. G.K. Mitter, J.-I agree.
-
1961 (7) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... would be borne by S and D in the proportion of 1 4 in these proceedings and in the proceedings before the Bar Council Tribunal. A notice was issued to the Bar Council and the Bar Council has appeared before us through Mr. Ramnath Shivlal and he pressed for the costs. We do not think that the Bar Council is entitled to any costs in these proceedings. In the same way, the Incorporated Law Society has been represented before us by its President, Mr. Gagrat, Mr. Gagrat, however, has not pressed for the costs of the Society. All that the Society and the Bar Council Tribunal have done before us is that they have supported the findings arrived at by the Bar Council Tribunal. Neither of them, therefore, is entitled to any costs. (34) Mr. Gupte, on behalf of D, and Mr. Kotwal, on behalf of S. requested that the order for removing the solicitor and the Advocate from practice may be stayed for a period of about two weeks. We are unable to accede to this request. (35) Order accordingly.
-
1961 (7) TMI 82 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d law would equally govern a new enactment repealing an old one. Consequently, the assessing authority was well within his right in making the additional assessment within four years next succeeding the assessment year. 14. Sri Rama Rao then advanced an argument based on Section 41 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, namely, that, in any event, the right which had accrued to the petitioner could not be disturbed as it was specifically saved by the proviso to Section 41. This contention is again based upon the concept that the petitioner had acquired a vested right, i.e., the assessment had become final, and as such it could not be re-opened. The above discussion contains an answer to this contention, namely, that no finality attached on the date the new Act, i.e., the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, came into operation. Therefore, this argument is also repelled. 15. In the result, the revision case is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 150.
-
1961 (7) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... roperties has been utilised in the furtherance of the money-lending business, cannot possibly convert the capital, from which the income arose, into stock-in-trade of the money-lending business itself. Had the Tribunal studied the order of this court under section 66(2) with some care, it would, to our minds, have avoided the wholly erroneous and unsupportable conclusions which it has chosen to draw on non-existent material. In refreshing contrast, we may point out that the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax approached the question from the right point of view and reached what seems to us to be the only possible conclusion in the case. In the result we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee so far as the item in dispute relate to the 34 items allotted at the partition. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. The Tribunal will also refund the deposit of ₹ 100 in each case. Question answered in the negative.
-
1961 (7) TMI 80 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... source from which he derives the income. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It has, therefore, been held by all courts, without any dissenting note, that the burden of proving that a particular income has its origin in capital source lies upon the assessee, for it is within his particular knowledge to know that fact." We have referred to this only to show that the assessee is bound to place the information regarding the particular sources of income. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the said decision. We find that as discussed in answer to question No. (1) of the Reference, there is ample material for the assessment as upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. No other points are urged before us. The reference is answered as above. The applicant will pay the costs of the respondent, ₹ 150. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1961 (7) TMI 79 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... above do not perform the charter-party entered into between you and them on 23rd September, 1952, I shall indemnify you against all loss or damage you may incur by such breach of the agreement." Learned counsel argues that as the vessel Manek Prasad could not be made available to the charterers on the due date, he had to undertake the responsibility of furnishing an alternative vessel. M.V. Jehangir was accordingly acquired for the purpose, and for such acquisition, again the charterers advanced the sum of ₹ 6,000. It was this sum which was later repaid by the assessee to the charterers and claimed as a business loss. The reasons which we have given above in relation to the sum of ₹ 27,500 apply with equal force to this amount as well. We agree with the Tribunal that the deduction is not allowable under section 10(2)(xi) of the Act. We accordingly answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
-
1961 (7) TMI 78 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that the test of jurisdiction (for this purpose) was whether or not the authority in question 'had power to enter upon the enquiry, no whether its conclusions in the course of it were true or false'." In C.A. Abraham v. Income-tax Officer, Kottayam 1961 41 I.T.R. 425; 1961 2 S.C.R. 765, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held "The Income-tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment of tax and imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper order passed by the income-tax authorities. The tax- payer cannot be permitted to abandon resort to that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution when he has adequate remedy open to him by way of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal." In view of what I have said above, I would dismiss this appeal. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 77 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d the Road Transport Corporations Act, we hold that the income of the Road Transport corporations is liable under the Income-tax Act. On the question whether the Income-tax Officer was justified in refusing to deduct interest payable to the Government on the capital, the learned Solicitor-General fairly conceded that he has not got the necessary material to say that that should be allowed or not. His contention was that, since the interest was payable on the capital invested by the State in much the same way as payment dividend on the shares held by the State, that cannot be treated as an expenditure under the Income-tax Act. Since the learned Advocate-General also has not seriously pressed for its determination at this stage, this matter may be left to the income-tax appellate authorities to determine on the facts and materials on record in accordance with law. In the result, the petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250 in each. Petition dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 76 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the appeals. The propriety of the expenditure in regard to the salary of the directs for the year with which this reference in concerned will undoubtedly depend upon the adjudication as to whether the amounts claimed for the three years are to be allowed in their entirety or to limited extent. It may be that the Tribunal itself allowed what is claimed by the assessee in regard to those years and it may also be that subsequently the assessee might have secured more routes entailing more expenditure in regard to the work of the management of the company. In such a case, the question as to what is the extent of the expenditure that could be taken as coming within the purview of section 10(2)(xv) of the Act will have to be decided after deciding the previous year's case. Under the circumstances, we consider that it is not necessary to call upon the Tribunal to submit a fresh statement of the case in regard to the years now in question. Questions answered in the negative.
-
1961 (7) TMI 75 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ssistant Commissioner has applied an arbitrary procedure for fixing the valuation of the goodwill, and the Appellate Tribunal has also committed an error of law in upholding the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We have already shown that the Appellate Tribunal has addressed itself on this point to irrelevant considerations and has not applied its mind to relevant considerations. It is manifest that the Appellate Tribunal has committed an error of law. For these reasons we hold that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, no portion of the sum of ₹ 50,000 mentioned as the price of the goodwill of Das and Company in the deed dated 22nd August, 1951, is liable to be taxed by the income-tax department. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the income-tax department in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. The assessee is entitled to costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
-
1961 (7) TMI 74 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ee as the balance of the unspent money after his trip to Pakistan. At an earlier stage the assessee stated that he had spent the entire balance on charities. His evidence on this part of the case is prevaricating and unconvincing the Tribunal had ample materials to draw the inference that his agricultural income could not have been higher than ₹ 15,000. Deducting that amount from the deposit of ₹ 45,000 referred to above ₹ 30,000 would be income from other sources. There was ample justification for the Appellate Tribunal to sustain the addition. We answer the second question in the affirmative and against the assessee. Having regard to the fact that the assessee has failed in regard to his case as to the amount of consideration for the sale and that the second question has been answered against him we consider that he should be directed to pay the costs of the department. There will be an order accordingly. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Order accordingly.
-
1961 (7) TMI 73 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... inciples of natural justice, and, in particular, the petitioners in O.P. Nos. 684 and 824 of 1959 have contended that the assessments on them are null and void on the ground that they are contrary to the prescriptions, and were made without following the provisions, in section 20 of the Act. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary for us to canvass these questions. We hereby order, that the assessment of the petitioner in O.P. No. 674 of 1958 be quashed on the ground that the Act is not applicable to him, that the assessments of the petitioners in O.P. Nos. 538, 684 and 824 of 1959 and the demands on them be quashed and that the respondent in O.P. No. 1155 of 1960 be prohibited from imposing the levy and making the collection on the petitioner therein, on the ground that the provisions in the Act as against Hindu undivided families violate article 14. As the petitioners have succeeded only partially in their contentions, we order that all parties shall bear their costs.
-
1961 (7) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e option of delivering foodgrains at an railway station F. O. R. in the Province of Bihar, and there is no evidence on the record whether orders similar to Ex.M-2 were issued by the authorities in other districts of the Bihar State. But if the grains were supplied in the district of Arrah, the appellant could evidently not seek to recover price for the goods supplied and accepted on and after October 1, 1943, at rates exceeding those fixed by the notification; for, by the issue of the control orders, on the contracts must be deemed to be superimposed the condition that foodgrains shall be sold only at rates specified therein. If the grains were to be supplied outside the district of Arrah, the case of the appellant suffers from complete lack of evidence as to the ruling rates of the foodgrains in dispute on October 1, 1943. The High Court was therefore right in declining to award damages. On the view taken by us, this appeal must stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
|
