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Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1961 (8) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lders of such inams cannot be described as intermediaries, or that they comprised both the melwaram and the kudiwaram rights. Such a distinction would have significance, if the law abolished only intermediaries and not inams which it did. Section 3 of the Abolition Act says 3(1) The State Government may, for time to time by notification, declare that the estate specified in the notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. 17. If the definition of the word estate was wide enough to include a minor inam and a notification was issued, the consequences of section 3 of the Abolition Act must follow. Such a law is not capable of being called in question on the ground that it abridges any fundamental right conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31, if it has been assented to by the President. The notification was thus valid, if the law was valid. 18. In the result, the appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs, one set only. 19. Appeals dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Act, 1947 was unconstitutional. We consider that that ground is not correct and the application of the tenant-appellant for fixation of standard rent must now be determined in accordance with law. It would be for the competent authorities to consider now the effect of s. 46 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 or of any other law, bearing on the question which may have come into existence since then. 51. We would, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller, the District Judge and the High Court dismissing the application of the appellant. The application must now be dealt with in accordance with law by the authority competent to do so in the light of the observations made above. 52. In the result the appeals in all three categories are allowed as indicated above. The appellants in all the appeals will be entitled to their costs, but there will be one set of hearing fee for each of the three categories of appeals. 53. Appeals allowed.
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1961 (8) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... (b) it is clear that the amount of unabsorbed depreciation allowance of the previous year assumes the same character and colour of the depreciation amount determined for the assessment year and the question whether the unabsorbed depreciation amount of the previous year is to be adjusted against the total income or total world income would depend on the determination of the question as to whether the depreciation amount determined for the assessment year is deductible against the total world income of the assessee. It is not in dispute that in the instance case the amount of depreciation determined for the assessment year 1942-43 was deductible against the total world income of the assessee. That being the position, in our opinion carried forward depreciation allowance of ₹ 5,98,482 has to be allowed against the total world income of the assessee. 5. The reference is answered accordingly. Assessee shall pay the costs of the department. 6. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (8) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f fact which fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have carefully, considered the reasons given by the High Court in its judgment under appeal but we are unable to accept the contention pressed before us by Mr. Sinha, for the respondent, that the conclusion of the High Court is right when it says that the Tribunal's findings against the respondent were based on no. evidence. Whether or not the High Court or this court agrees with the conclusions of the Tribunal is another matter. The question to be considered is whether the said conclusions could be set aside on the narrow ground that they are not supported by any evidence. In our opinion, it is difficult to accept the view that there is no. evidence in support of the conclusions recorded by the Tribunal against the respondent. 16. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. There would be no. order as to costs.
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1961 (8) TMI 67 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT OF
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... ... ..... this case only sold properties but did not purchase any, cannot, in our view, take this sum out of revenue. To be a trade it is not necessary that there must be simultaneous sales and purchases. If a real estate company such as the assessee company here sells a portion of its properties to make a profit in a rising market it cannot be said that these profits were not part of their trading when they are justified by their memorandum of association simply because they had made no corresponding purchases of properties also at the same time or contemporaneously. 35. For these reasons we are of opinion that on a true construction of the memorandum of association of the company as well as the facts and circumstances of the case the sum of ₹ 1,00,673 was liable to assessment under section 10 of the Act as income under the head "business" and we answer the question in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference. Subodh Kumar Niyogi, J. I agree.
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1961 (8) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wed under article 226 of the Constitution under which relief only in respect of post-Constitution matters can be granted. This argument is misconceived. It is true that the amount was paid on the 1st September, 1946. But it became refundable only by reason of the fact that the petitioners' appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court on the 23rd September, 1953. Clearly what the petitioner wants by this petition under article 226 of the Constitution is that effect be given to the order of the Supreme Court dated September 23, 1953. This was refused by the Excess Profits Tax Officer by his order dated May 28, 1956. There is therefore no question of the petitioner desiring relief in respect of a pre-Constitution matter. There is no force in this point also. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. A writ of mandamus will issue requiring the respondents to refund the amount of ₹ 11,175-9-0 to the petitioner. The petitioner shall be entitled to his cost of this petition.
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1961 (8) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Under sub-section (1) of section 280 of that Act it is provided as follows "As soon as an arrear of land revenue has become due a writ of demand may be issued by the Tahsildar on the defaulter calling upon him to pay the amount within a time to be specified." It follows that annexure "A" to the affidavit accompanying the writ petition, which is a notice by the Tahsildar, is in fact a writ of demand under section 280(1) and is quite in order. It is, however, very different from saying that the date of this writ of demand is the date of the commencement of the recovery proceedings. This writ of demand is issued in the course of recovery proceedings but does not commence or initiate those proceedings. As stated earlier, those proceedings commence with the request by the assessing authority to the Collector to realise the amount. There is no force in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing found with a jacket with six pockets on him, may give rise to suspicion, the evidence in our opinion is not sufficient to establish that the accused Wang Chih Kaw was himself the direct smuggler or did any act in connection with the process of smuggling, and had the intension of evading the restriction Order as to the import of gold into India. Hence he must also be given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. 17. Accordingly, both these appeals are allowed and the conviction of the appellants under Section 167 (81) of the Sea Customs Act and the sentences passed thereunder are set aside. The appellant Wang Chih Kaw is discharged from his bail bond. The fines, if paid, will be refunded. 18. Let the sum of money which was seized from Sitaram Agarwalla and deposited in the Malikhana of the Court be returned to the appellant concerned after the period of two months, unless in the meantime any other order to the contrary is passed by a competent Court. N.K. Sen, J. 19. I agree.
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1961 (8) TMI 63 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he change is not a mere change of venue of trial. The right to be tried by a Court with such other rights as may still be open to an offender can be frustrated by the Director by deciding to deal with the matter himself. In my view, where a vested right is affected, prima facie it is not a question of procedure. I must, therefore, hold that the provision as to an adjudication by the Director of Enforcement cannot have any retrospective operation. The impairment of a right by putting a new restriction thereupon is not a matter of procedure only. It impairs a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. 6. That being the position, the adjudication proceedings are without jurisdiction and must be quashed. I direct accordingly. The opposite parties are to pay the costs of this Rule,--hearing fee being assessed at ten gold mohurs. 7. Leave to appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution is granted.
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1961 (8) TMI 62 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te under section 46(2) was issued. After this Veera Sarabhaiah died. Notwithstanding the death of Veera Sarabhaiah the proceedings pursuant to the certificate under section 46 were continued and the properties of Veera Sarabhaiah in the hands of the petitioner were attached. It is to quash this attachment that the present petitioner is taken out. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as the petitioner was not served with notice it would be ineffective as against him, since there was violation of section 29 of the Indian Income-tax Act. We do not think that we can give effect to this argument. Section 29 contemplates only an issue of notice either to the assessee or other persons liable to pay such tax. In this case, the requirements of section 29 are satisfied as the assessee was served with the notice of demand. We, therefore, reject the contention based on section 29. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 61 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rst partner, Kylasa Sarabhaiah firm is specified as 0-6-9. In this case also, on a proper construction of the instrument of partnership, we hold that it purports to be the partnership between Kylasa Sarabhaiah firm and four other partners. Hence, it cannot be registered under section 26A of the Act. We also hold that, in this case also, the individual shares of the several partners are not specified and that, in any event, the instrument of partnership does not specified that the minors, who were admitted to the benefits of the partnership of Kylasa Sarabhaiah firm, are not liable for the losses. 17. Our answer to the question referred to us in this case also is that, on the facts an circumstances of this case, the assessee is not entitled to registration under section 26A of the Indian Income Tax Act. We make no order as to costs in this case. But in R. C. No. 37/59, the assessee shall pay the costs of the reference. Advocates fee ₹ 100. Question answered accordingly.
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1961 (8) TMI 60 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er. If the argument of the assessee were to be accepted there could only be a conditional assessment whenever a sole surviving Hindu coparcener's wife is enciente during the close of the year of account, it being valid if the child that is born is a female and invalid if male. In other words, all assessments made before the actual birth of the child would be conditioned in its validity on there being no son born to the assessee. There is no warrant for such a conditional assessment under the Act. In our opinion, what is contemplated by the Income-tax Act by the term "Hindu undivided family" is a family in its ordinary sense, namely, where there is more than one member in actual existence during the year of account. A son who has not come into existence will not be a member of the family for the purpose of levy and assessment of income-tax. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of the department.
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1961 (8) TMI 59 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 2-5-3 in the previous year. The fall in profit as compared to the previous year was due to reduction in business due to general slump in industrial activities. 6. Two directors, viz., Sri P.P. Khemani and Sri C.M. Sudhia, retired but are eligible for re-election. 7. The accounts of the bank were audited by Sri K. Ramachandra Rao, G.D.A., R.A., Chartered Accountant, Kakinada. This reference coming for hearing this day, after return of this statement of the case submitted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, upon perusing the statement of the case and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. B.V. Subrahmanyam, Advocate for the assessee, and of Sri C. Kondaiah, standing counsel for the income-tax department, the court made the following order . JUDGMENT Satyanarayana Raju, J.- In view of the fuller statement of facts submitted by the Appellate Tribunal, the reference must be and is answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee will have his costs of the reference.
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1961 (8) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s the view that such interest was not to be extinguished by the operation of section 6(b) of Act 1 of 1951. 19. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in granting the application preferred by the respondent insofar as it related to the allowance of ₹ 30,612-13-0 granted as a consideration for extinction of the right of Harnarain Singh to 166 mahals but for reasons already stated, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was entitled to receive in respect of the 12 mahals the land revenue which was remitted. The order passed by the High Court will therefore be modified and the petition of the respondent in so far as it deals with remission of land revenue in respect of the 12 mahals of “Syudpore Bhettree” will stand dismissed. The order of the High Court in respect of the allowance of ₹ 30,612-13-0 will stand confirmed. Subject to the above modifications, the appeal will stand dismissed with costs. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (8) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the amount. If an assessee has so changed the character of the amount, then it is the use, to which that amount has been put, that would determine the issue. If the assessee has appropriated or employed the amount to uses other than trading operations of his business, then the amount would bear the character of fixed capital of the assessee. As already stated, the assessee had decided to use these amounts for the specific purpose of purchasing capital goods and had for that purpose put it in its account with its purchasing agents specifically earmarked for that purpose. The amount thus stood appropriated to the specific purpose of purchasing capital goods. As already stated, there is no evidence or any material on record to show that the assessee had thereafter taken any different or other decision. In the result, in our opinion, the answer to both the questions raised should be in the negative. We answer accordingly. Costs of the assessee shall be paid by the department.
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1961 (8) TMI 56 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... taxable profits is not itself an annual profit at all." It is not within the qualification of that statement made by Lord Macmillan in Dewhurst's case 1932 16 Tax Cas. 605, which, in effect, was that if the payment represented deferred or contingent remuneration for services performed, the payment does not necessarily cease to be remuneration for services because it is payable when the services come to an end. The fact here do not show that this agency was the only business carried on by the taxpayer company, but on the contrary show that the assessee company carried on five other managing agencies. For the reasons stated above we decide that the sum of ₹ 3,50,000 in the facts and circumstances of this case is a revenue receipt assessable to tax under Indian Income-tax Act and return an answer in the affirmative to the question asked. The commissioner of Income-tax will get the costs of this reference. NIYOGI J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (8) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o ₹ 3,13,306 are hardly distinguishable from those under the third category. The only difference is that, whereas in the third category, the merchants or other customers had gone to Indore to negotiate and place orders, in the case of these sales the merchants or their brokers on their personal visits to Indore have entered into the contracts. In our opinion, therefore, the view taken by the income-tax authorities and the Tribunal in respect of the profits on sales of the categories enumerated above, which in the relevant assessment year amounted to ₹ 14,80,059 is erroneous, and no part of the profits on the said sales could be said to have accrued in British India so as to make rule 33 of the Indian Income-tax Rules applicable to the same. The result, therefore, is that question No. 3 must be answered in the negative. In view of our answer to question No. 3, question No. 2 does not survive and need not, therefore, be answered. There will be no order as to costs.
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1961 (8) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ency of Parliament to enact the legislation in question, regarding agricultural lands, we express no opinion whatsoever on the various other contentions that have been raised. It is open to the respective petitioners in O.P. Nos. 323 and 1339 of 1959 and 117 of 1960 to raise all the other points before the appropriate Gift-tax Officers before whom proceedings for assessment are pending. With these observations, these three writ petitions will be dismissed and parties will bear their own costs. In O.P. No. 131 of 1961, as we mentioned earlier, there has also been an order of assessment made by the Gift-tax Officer in question. Here again, we make it very clear that, excepting considering the constitutional question that has been raised and argued before us and which point has been found against the assessee, we are not expressing any opinion in respect of the other matters. It is open to the petitioner to seek other remedies open to him. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1961 (8) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... p /o p (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. o p /o p x x x x o p /o p 3. Reading section 5 sub-clause (8) with section 6(1), it is manifest that Part II of the Act can apply in areas specified in Schedule II to lands (not being used for agricultural purposes) let for residence, education, business, trade or storage. The material date for ascertaining whether the plot is "premises" for purposes of section 6 is the date of letting and not the date on which the application for fixation of standard rent is made by the tenant or the landlord. We agree with the High Court that the plot in dispute could not be regarded as "premises" inviting the application of Part II of the Act. The application filed by the appellant under section 11 for fixation of standard rent was therefore not maintainable. o p /o p 4. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. o p /o p 5. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1961 (8) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was relevant to the allowance of interest on this sum in the computation of the profits of the business of the assessee, Dalooram. The conclusion reached was that a valid trust was certainly created by the execution of the instrument of trust on April 5, 1951. It was not necessary for the purpose of that reference to examine whether the trust could have come into existence at any earlier point of time. Reference was no doubt made in the judgment to the decisions which laid down the principle that mere credit entries in the books of account by themselves would not create a trust; but whether prior to April 5, 1951, there were other indicia of the creation of a valid trust besides the credit entries did not fall to be considered in the context of that reference. The conclusion that we have now reached in the present case is thus in no way inconsistent with the decision in Dalooram Jayanarayan v. Commissioner of Income-tax which was far limited in its scope. Order accordingly.
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