|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 92 Records
-
1962 (4) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it was observed that assuming that there was no accord and satisfaction in the strict sense of the law in England, it could still be held that the creditor had ceased really to be holder of the negotiable instrument on which he sued. With the niceties of English law in the matter of accord and satisfaction we are not concerned. The position in the present case is that the appellants must have known that they could receive the second installment and retain the first installment by accepting the condition on which the sum of Rs. 20 lacs was offered to them, namely that they must record a full satisfaction of their claim. They accepted the money on the condition on which it was offered and it is not now open to them to say, either in fact or in law, that they accepted the money but not the condition. 17. For these reasons we are satisfied that the appellate court was right in the view which it took. Therefore, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 140 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f s. 162, it must not merely be made during the period of investigation but also in the course of investigation. The two things, that is, "the period of investigation" and "course of investigation" are not synonymous. Section 162 is aimed at Dagduas recorded by a police officer while investigating into an offence. This is clear from the opening words s. 162. They speak only of Dagduas made to a police officer during the course of investigation. This implies that the statement sought to be excluded from evidence must be ascribable to the enquiry conducted by the investigating officer and not one which is de hors the enquiry. A communication like Ext. 6 will not fall within the ambit of such statements. In this view we hold that the document in question is not hit by s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the High Court was right in admitting it in evidence. 14. There is no substance in the appeals and they are, therefore, dismissed. 15. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . (5) The plaintiff and her mother-in-law were in enjoyment of the property as they were enjoying it even before the execution of the document. (6) The defendant had not examined either Babu Ramnath Singh or other important witnesses who could have proved the fact that the plaintiff and her mother-in-law had the knowledge of the nature of the document. (7) The defendant managed to get this document by fraud to facilitate mutation of the property in his name. And (8) the plaintiff gave acceptable evidence in support of her case. The finding of the both the courts is supported by evidence, and there is no permissible ground for interference with it in second appeal. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the learned Judge of the High Court had erroneously interfered with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the first two courts. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the High Court and decree the suit with costs throughout. 24. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 138 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
... ...
... ... ..... nsibility either for loss or damage during the course of transit. There is a specific condition which provides that the buyer should make all claims for damage or loss against the common carrier. Under the circumstances, the common carrier was constituted the bailee of the buyers and cot of the seller. 20. Having regard to the finding reached by us that there was no contract between the parties that the cement purchased by the several consumers, both private and public, should be delivered at a place other than factory site, we hold that after the goods were consigned to the railway wagons, the sale was complete within the State. On this conclusion, it follows that the transactions in question do not constitute inter-state trade or commerce, which would come within the prohibition contained in Article 286(2) of the Constitution. 21. As a result of the foregoing conclusions, this Revision case must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
-
1962 (4) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... corresponding portion of the paragraph of the notification based on it must be held to the ultra vires and unconstitutional. In that view of the matter, we issue a direction calling upon the first respondent to entertain the applications of the petitioners and to deal with them in accordance with law. We were told by the learned Solicitor-General that the Public Service Commission has already conducted the test in respect of a large number of candidates and amongst them, the petitioners' cases have also been considered. If that be so, out present decision will not affect the procedure followed by the Commission. The effect of our decision is that applications of the person like the petitioners cannot be rejected on the preliminary ground that they are not persons practising as Advocates in the Andhra High Court and that they should be considered on the merits along with the rest of the applications. The petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. 19. Petitions allowed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 136 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ction as it stood during the assessment year in question. The impugned assessment was completed on March 15, 1954, which was within the period of eight years from the end of the assessment year. As such the assessment was completed within time. There is another way of looking at the matter. This is a case to which the provisions of section 28(1)(c) were held to be attracted. Under section 34(2) as it stood at the time, it was provided that in a case to which the provisions of section 28(1)(c) were attracted assessment could be completed within eight years. Thus even without reference to section 34(1)(a) reassessment can be justified as an assessment under section 23. The answer to the reference must, therefore, be in the affirmative which should be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allaha- bad, under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. The department should be entitled to its usual costs of ₹ 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (4) TMI 135 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... riods. The salary paid to them in respect of these periods must, therefore, be held to represent the amount which they were entitled to claim by virtue of their conditions of service and such payments made to employees in respect of rights earned by them by doing work for an employer must necessarily be held to be expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. In the circumstances, we consider that the Tribunal committed an error in disallowing the amount representing leave salary for these periods as a deduction claimable under section 10(2)(xv). As a result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, except with regard to payment of amounts representing leave salaries of H.P. Pasari for a period of 29? days and of Madanlal Singhania for a period of 24? days. Since the question is being answered mainly against the assessee, the assessee shall pay the costs of the department. Fee of counsel is fixed at ₹ 200 (Rs. Two hundred).
-
1962 (4) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e Bank could be a judge in its own cause, was neither raised nor decided there. The decision, therefore, does not cover the present controversy. In my view, there are no real differences between Patiala Bank and other banks vis-a-vis their claims against their constituents, which could reasonably sustain the special treatment mated out to the former under the Act. Discrimination is writ large on the face of the Act. In this view, no other question arises for consideration. 69. In the result, I hold that the provisions of the Act, in so far as they relate to the Patiala Bank, are constitutionally void and I issue a writ of mandamus directing the Bank not to proceed to recover the debt alleged to be due from the appellants under the provisions of the Act. The appeals and the writ petitions are allowed with costs. 70. BY COURT In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed with costs, one hearing fee. 71. Appeals and petitions dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 133 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... im but that is an argument based on assumption. Not until an enquiry officer has been appointed and not until it is clearly known who is the punishing authority and not until the petitioner is able to make any such allegations when any one or more of such authorities is or are known can this question ever arise for consideration. It appears that this is premature. Apart from this, it has already been stated that the allegations by the petitioner are disputed and on such disputed matters of fact it is not possible to find, in the circumstances, of this case, that the petitioner has succeeded in showing that the orders in regard to him and the action taken against him have been made and taken mala fide. 45. The consequence is that the petitioner fails on all the grounds urged by him and the petition is dismissed, but in the matter of costs some controversial matters have been raised during the hearing, and so the parties are left to their own costs. S.B. Capoor, J. 46. I agree.
-
1962 (4) TMI 132 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... pany". There was no evidence that the company had any scheme for payment of gratuities not did it pay gratuities as a matter of practice. There was nothing to show that the employees had accepted low salaries in expectation of gratuities on retirement or that gratuity was paid for the purpose of facilitating the carrying on of the business of the company or as a matter of commercial expediency. In the circumstances, it was held that the amount of gratuity was not an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv). The present case is very similar to the Madras case. It has not been argued that if the payment was under the agreement dated July 23, 1947, on account of the liabilities incur red by the predecessor firm it was not in the nature of a capital payment and was deductible under section 10(2)(xv). The answer to the question should, therefore, be in the affirmative. The department should get its usual costs assessed at ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (4) TMI 131 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... with a view to reduce an assessment cannot be said to have been laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for purposes of the business. In S.D. Sharma v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, the expenditure incurred in the preparation of statements and accounts for Income Tax purpose and the engagement of an Income Tax consultant to satisfy the tax authorities with regard to the statements and accounts was held to be not expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of carrying on the business. It is not necessary to examine the other ground on which the claim was disallowed by the Tribunal. The answer to the question should be in the negative, i.e., the sum of ₹ 8,600 was in the circumstances not a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv). The reference should be returned to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, with the above answer. The department will get its usual costs of the reference assessed at ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (4) TMI 130 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as rejected this contention. Section 26 of the Act gives protection only in respect of the full name of an individual. An abbreviated name or expanded name of the individual cannot obviously come within the terms of the Section. In Shorts Limited v. Short, 1914 31 P. P. C. 294 a company called Shorts Ltd. obtained an injunction against the defendant Greer Louise Short starting a new firm under the name of Shorts. There is therefore no substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. The result is that the appellants will be entitled to a decree restraining the respondents from selling their Confectionery under labels containing the words Perry's or Perry and Co. An injunction will issue accordingly. But it is made clear that this will not prevent the respondents from using that name in relation to biscuits manufactured by them or even in relation to biscuits in which there is superficial coating of confectionery. The appeal will stand allowed with costs.
-
1962 (4) TMI 129 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s no right to any payment until the corporate body has determined that the money can properly be paid away. It is urged that this puts the preference shareholders at the mercy of the company, but the preference shareholders came in on these terms, and this argument does not carry much weight in an action such as this; when bona fides is conceded. The opposite conclusion might enable the preference shareholders to ruin the company, and would, certainly lead to great inconvenience in enabling them to compel the payment out of the last penny without carrying forward any balance' ". 27. The result accordingly is that the contention that the proposed dividends are classifiable as debts as on the valuation dates though there had been no declaration of the dividend by the general body fails. The questions referred to us are thus, answered in the negative and against the assessees. The assessees will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 75 in each case.
-
1962 (4) TMI 128 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as we have seen above, is a new premises, though not constructed or newly constructed after the above 1956 Act. The instant case, then cannot, obviously, come under any of the clauses of the aforesaid Section 8 (1), except Clause (e), and the proviso thereto would be excluded as, obviously, the tenant's present premises would be different from the original premises and there would be no "existing rent" of this new premises. En this view, it will not be necessary to comment on the correctness or otherwise of the decision of this Court, reported in 65 Cal WN 207. 24. In the circumstances, I would, on the instant occasion, leave the above cited decision untouched but, as, in any view the proviso to Section 8 (1) (e) would be inapplicable, the instant Rule must be discharged and the order of the learned Appellate Officer should be affirmed and upheld, and this Reference should be answered accordingly. 25. In the premises, I agree in the order, proposed by my Lords.
-
1962 (4) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat Deoli-Kotah part of the Ajmer-Kotah route is common to Jaipur-Kotah route from Deoli to Kotah and the necessary orders for exclusion of permit-holders have been passed in connection with the Jaipur-Kotah route. The scheme with respect to that route was quashed by the High Court and the matter sent back for re-hearing the objectors in accordance with the decision of this Court in Malick Ram's case ((1962) 1 S.C.R, 978). Therefore, the question whether the permit-holders can ply on the DeoliKotah portion of the Ajmer-Kotah route will depend on the decision of the Jaipur-Kotah scheme. If that scheme is upheld, on re-hearing, the exclusion will continue. But if that scheme is not upheld, the position may have to be reviewed in connection with this portion of the Ajmer-Kotah route. In the circumstances no relief can be granted to the appellants of the Ajmer-Kotah route at this stage. The appeals are hereby dismissed with costs--one set of hearing costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1962 (4) TMI 126 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ievance in this special appeal that the learned Single Judge has quashed the order of the State Government, dated February 8, 1960, and made orders the result of which is that either the valid order of January 17, 1959, or the order, dated March 19, 1959, to which the appellant had submitted, would now be the effective order. The effect of either of those orders is that the appellant ceases to be recognised as a lessee of this accommodation and against such a decision the appellant has no right to be heard, particularly in view of the fact that the appellant purported to obtain rights in this accommodation through an act amounting to a criminal offence and then lost possession of it by committing another criminal act of executing sublease in contravention of Section 7 (3) of the Act. In these circumstances, the appellant, at least, has no right to claim any relief in this special appeal. 9. The appeal, for all the reasons given by us above, fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1962 (4) TMI 125 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... second case was entirely different from the business of the assessee in the first case. In the first case it was not the business of the assessee to construct ships but to use ships as an apparatus for profit-making by carrying goods and passengers. It was, therefore, that in the first case the amount of £60,000 was held to be in no way related to the carrying on of the business of the assessee. From the two cases the principle deducible is that where a receipt or an expenditure is related to the actual carrying on of the business of an assessee, its nature is that of income or revenue; whereas if it is related not to the actual carrying on of the business but to the means of carrying on a business it may partake of the nature of capital. Accordingly the view taken by the Tribunal was correct and the question referred to this court should be answered in the affirmative. The reference should be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, with this answer.
-
1962 (4) TMI 124 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... neral Commissioners held that the sums so paid by the assessee were wholly and exclusively laid out for purposes of the business and were therefore allowable as deductions. The decision of the General Commissioners was upheld by the High Court (King's Bench Division). Here also, as in our case, the act of the assessee was voluntary and in the nature of a concession by the assessee giving up its, legal rights under the agreement for considerations of business expediency. The payment was not made to secure any direct or immediate benefit but to secure future benefit. The payment was also made for carrying; on the business and for preserving the confidence of the clientele and for maintaining the goodwill of the business. We are, therefore, of the view that the two amounts of ₹ 48,891 and ₹ 1,21,760 in the two assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 were allowable as deductions under section 10(2)(xv). Let the reference be returned to the Tribunal with this answer.
-
1962 (4) TMI 123 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lling oil quite apart from his business as a miller. This is not disputed and the assessment order clearly shows that in addition to the oil produced in the assessee's oil mill he was also selling oil purchased by him. In the background of the trade and the figures available we are inclined to agree with Mr. Sambamurti when he says "It does not appear to me that the transactions in question amount to anything but genuine hedging. The quantity involved in these contracts is well within reasonable limits." It follows that we must answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative, or, in other words, both the questions in favour of the assessee. We do so, though in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
-
1962 (4) TMI 122 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... loss for the assessment year 1955-56. He carried on the same business in beedi leaves during the accounting year 1955-56, i.e., the assessment year 1956-57, though in partnership with others. Entering into partnership with another in one case and three others in the other case was only the mode of carrying on business but the business is the same business, viz., trade in beedi leaves. Section 24(2)(ii) does not require that the business should be continued to be carried on for the assessment year in question by the same concern or partnership or firm as in the previous year when the loss was originally sustained by the assessee. The only condition prescribed by that clause is that the same business must be continued to be carried on by "him" (the assessee). For the above reasons, the question referred to the High Court is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee. The assessee will have his costs of this reference. Advocate's fee ₹ 150.
|
