|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 68 Records
-
1963 (3) TMI 88 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... pon the evidence in the case even if the plaint does not contain a specific prayer for that relief. I, therefore, allow to the plaintiffs as damages a sum of Rs. 90,977-3-0 under this head, but the plaintiffs will not be entitled to execute the decree under this head without paying court fee on the amount of Rs. 90,977-3-0. As the plaintiffs are being allowed a decree for damages for Rs. 90,977-3-0 they cannot claim along with it the sum of Rs. 4,200 on account of use of the factory at the rate of Rs. 30 per day per saw when it was given by respondent No. 1 for use for a period of four months three weeks from 18th of August, 1949, the date of taking over, till the date of the suit, 10th of January, 1950. The plaintiffs cannot simultaneously have relief by way of damages and also compensation for use and occupation for a particular period. The result, therefore, is that the plaintiffs suit is decreed for Rs. 2,97,694-12-0 with proportionate costs. D. Falshaw, C.J. 28. I agree.
-
1963 (3) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ing criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. This power extends to expunction or ordering expunction of irrelevant passages from a judgment or order of a subordinate court and would be exercised by it in appropriate cases for securing the ends of justice. Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers such as by passing comment upon a matter not relevant to the controversy before it and which is unwarranted or is likely to harm or prejudice another. 46. In the case before us, as we have already indicated, the remarks are not such as are likely to cause harm to the appellant nor are such as should cause any harm to him. We, therefore, hold that this is not a fit case for the exercise of the extraordinary power of the High Court under s. 561-A. For these reasons we dismiss the appeal. 47. Appeal dismissed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 86 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t that judicial decorum no less than legal propriety requires that a Single Judge differing from a decision of another Single Judge in a previous case on a question of law should refer the case to a larger Bench instead of deciding the case in accordance with his own view and that the same procedure should be followed by a Division Bench if it is inclined to disagree with an earlier decision of another Division Bench on a question of law. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that under Sections 496, 497 and 498 of the Code bail cannot be granted to a person who has not yet been arrested for any actual charge of any offence or even on suspicion of his complicity in any offence and who is not required to surrender to any custody under any order of arrest but who apprehends that he may sometime be arrested by the Police as a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence. The case will now go before the Learned Single Judge making the reference, for disposal.
-
1963 (3) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n the land. The mere presence of subsequent operations without there being the basic operations referred to above, as in the case of forest produce and spontaneous growth, could not be agricultural operations. In other words, if there are no basic operations as referred to above, there cannot be an agricultural operation. Mr. Ramamurthi Aiyar appearing for the respondents contends that as the coconut trees had already been in existence when the lease was made to the appellant, what he did or was expected to do in relation to them during the period of the lease could only constitute subsequent operations and the lease granted in favour of the appellant could not therefore be an agricultural one. We are, however, unable to agree with the contention. It is net necessary for the purpose of an agricultural lease that the lessee should do both the basic as well as the subsequent operations. It would be sufficient if the basic operations has been done by somebody else even years ear
-
1963 (3) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... other three circumstances would be sufficient to justify the registration of the mark. 33. It was faintly argued that the respondent has not discharged the burden of establishing that there was no reasonable probability of confusion. This question cannot arise in a case of honest concurrent use. However, we may point out that the High Court, after observing that the burden was undoubtedly on the respondent to establish that there was no reasonable probability of confusion, has held that that burden is discharged by the eloquent fact that throughout there has not been a single instance of confusion. In our opinion there is hardly any likelihood of confusion or deception here because the respondent's goods are confined to contraceptives for use by women which can only be used with medical assistance while the appellant's contraceptives are essentially for men. Upon this view we uphold the order of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. 34. Appeal dismissed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
... ...
... ... ..... s for transport out of the country by land or sea. In other words, the true test is whether the sale occasions the export, and whether the sale and the resultant export form parts of a single and integrated transaction. As we have already stated, the present case comes within the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in 1952 3 STC 434 pat AIR 1952 SC 366. It follows, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to exemption from sales tax to the extent of ₹ 50,015.55 nP. claimed by it, being the value of the goods exported by it to Nepal parties. 5. Acting, therefore, in exercise of our authority under Article 227 of the Constitution, we set aside the order of assessment of the Superintendent of Sales Tax, dated the 22nd February, 1960, and remand the case to him for making a fresh assessment of sales tax in accordance with law and in accordance with the directions given in this judgment. 6. We accordingly allow this application, but there will be no order as to costs.
-
1963 (3) TMI 82 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... terests of any Scheduled Tribe." 6.. Nothing in Sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause." 13. Thus, the very Article provides that reasonable restrictions could be imposed in the interests of the general public. From what the respondent has averred in the counter-affidavit, which we have referred to supra, we are not left in doubt as to the reasons for the Notification in respect of 'Chloral; hydrate.' In our considered view, they are reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the general public. The objection thus fails . 14. For all the said reasons, we find that no case has been made out by the petitioners for interference. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 .
-
1963 (3) TMI 81 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sub-section (2) of that section. Their Lordships have held that the two sub-sections are complementary and operate in two different spheres. They have also laid down that under section 64(3) the question of determination as to the place of assessment only arises if an objection is taken by the assessee and the Income-tax Officer has any doubts as to the matter but the determination is to be made by the Commissioner of Income-tax or the Central Board of Revenue; the Act does not contemplate any other authority. Even though the question before their Lordships was not one of the scope of interference in such matters under article 226 of the Constitution, but the law as laid down is that it is for the income-tax authorities to decide this question in accordance with the provisions contained in section 64(3) of the Act of 1922 and not for the courts. In the result, the petition is dismissed but owing to the nature of the points involved I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1963 (3) TMI 80 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... quirement of the law that the amount for the security must be deposited at the time of the presentation of the application for setting aside of the sale under Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C. The proviso added by this Court only means that the application for setting aside of the sale would not be taken into consideration and adjudicated upon till compliance had been made with the proviso. It is not the law that if the compliance has not been made with the proviso before the limitation for filing of the application for setting aside of the sale has expired that application for setting aside of the sale would be treated as being beyond limitation. 2. I, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the Court below and send the case back to the executing Court for allowing an opportunity to the applicant for complying with the proviso and then consider the application under Order XXL Rule 90 on merits. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to the costs.
-
1963 (3) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... have taken on the first question raised before us, it is not necessary to deal with the second question, though we may add that as at present advised it seems to us that the High Court was in error in treating the application for withdrawal of the appeal as if it were an application for withdrawal of an election petition under s. 109 and referring the matter to the election tribunal. Even if the High Court had power to refuse an application for withdrawal of an appeal, the proper course for the High Court would be to consider all that is required by s. 110 itself. However in view of our decision on the first question we need not pursue the point further. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set side the order of the High Court and in view of the unconditional application for withdrawal made by Satrughna Sahu, the appellant before the High Court, order that the appeal before the High Court should stand withdrawn. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e an award will be maintainable only after the award comes into Court and not earlier and the time for filing such an application would be reckoned only thereafter. The decision in ILR (1942) Bom 452 AIR 1942 Born 101, and that of the Supreme Court in Kumbha Mawji V. Dominion of India, 1953 4SCR878 , make this clear. If, therefore, an sward has been sent to the Court by the arbitrators, it would be competent for it after following the prescribed procedure, to have it filed. The plaintiffs/respondents 1 and 2 will however have an opportunity to file an appropriate application within the time limited by law to have it set aside if they so desire and if according to them the award is invalid. The fourth question is answered in the affirmative. 26. The order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court is therefore sustained with a direction to the trial Court to dispose of the suit in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1963 (3) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play And equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the District judge restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 76 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to the revenue account either from the business or from the accountancy point of view. The Tribunal held that the payment was in the nature of a capital expenditure and it is not shown that on the facts found by the Tribunal its final conclusion is erroneous in law. I am, therefore, of the opinion that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of ₹ 21,798 was a capital expenditure, and as such not an allowable deduction under section 10(2)(xv ) and that the question asked should be answered in the affirmative. I agree with the opinion and conclusions of Sinha J. and I would respectfully record my dissent from the opinion and conclusions of Datta J. It is now my duty to return my opinion so that the referring Bench pronounce the final decision in the case. I pass the following order Let the matter together with my opinion be now placed before the Chief Justice for necessary action so that final orders may be passed by the appropriate Division Bench.
-
1963 (3) TMI 75 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aw if only some of the provisions of clause (2) of rule 46 are complied with. This argument equally holds good in the instant case. The language of Order XXI, rule 54, sub-rule (2), is somewhat similar requiring affixation both upon a conspicuous part of the property and of the court-house. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Narendra Prasad Sinha v. Maharani Janki Kuer AIR 1947 Pat. 385 , also expressed the view that the provisions of Order XXI, rule 46(2), being mandatory, the failure to comply with any one requirement thereof nullifies the whole proceeding. It cannot be seriously contended in this case that the requirements of Order XXI, rule 54, are directory and not mandatory. There has not been proper compliance with the requirements of Order V, rule 20, and the substituted service was bad in law. Therefore, the question “was the service of the notice of demand validly made on 29th March, 1957” must be answered in the negative. Falshaw C.J.-I agree.
-
1963 (3) TMI 74 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ociation of individuals or any unit of income-tax assessment in this case. In the second place what is now being taxed as revenue receipt or income is not the whole sum of ₹ 6,00,000 but a portion thereof being only a sum of ₹ 2,00,000 which the assessee in this case had himself shown and included in his accounts and in his original return. So far as the assessee is concerned he only received this ₹ 2,00,000 and not the said sum of ₹ 6,00,000. Lastly, this point was never taken by Mr. Banerjee at any stage either before the Income-tax Officer or before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or even before the Tribunal. We have, therefore, no hesitation in overruling this objection. For these reasons we answer the second question in the affirmative and hold that the receipt in question was revenue receipt from an adventure in the nature of trade and was rightly brought to tax. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel.
-
1963 (3) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t is necessary to make some correction is in respect of the statement contained in the judgment of the trial Court in regard to items under issue No. 4. This statement is that items 33(b) and 98 were not identifiable at all. Mr. Kumaramangalam points out that it is not correct to say that item 33(b) is not identifiable and in this connection, he has invited our attention to the fact that his client has in fact made a claim before the Receiver for this item which is Daba Gardens and Bungalow. This position also is conceded by Mr. Pathak. Mr. Kumaramangalam also wants us to make it clear that in regard to properties in suit in respect of which no finding has been specifically recorded by the courts below, it would be open to the parties to ask the Court to deal with them and consider the rival contentions of the parties in respect of them. This position is also not disputed. 42. In the circumstances of the case, we direct that parties should bear their own costs in this Court.
-
1963 (3) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... der the composition deed, only a beneficial interest. This new liability had to be discharged by the trustees in whom the legal title to the property vested. Thus there were two different sets of persons who were liable, the defendants and the Trustees and their respective liabilities were distinct. What the defendant No. 2 has referred to is the liability of the Trustees arising under the terms of the deed of composition and could be enforced only against them. To refer to a liability resting on someone else is not to acknowledge one's own liability within the meaning of the word in s. 19. The defendant No. 2 has not even indirectly referred to the decree much less to the liability arising under any of them. In the circumstances we must hold that this letter does not extend the period of limitation. For these reasons we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss each of these appeals with costs. There will, however, be only one hearing fee. 22. Appeals dismissed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... efore 359 standard acres were the equivalent in value of the land left behind, regard being had to the circumstances we have indicated, there cannot be any complaint that there has been a departure from the method of adjustment specified in the proviso to S. 16(4) when the debt as ascertained and computed in accordance with S. 29 of the Act and other relevant statutory provisions was scaled down under S. 16(4) by multiplaying it by 51/359, or 1/7th. We are further of the opinion that when the provision in proviso to S. 16(1) spoke of "value" it must have had in contemplation the value as determined by the procedure for fixing the same under the relevant rules for the computation of equivalents of property of displaced persons left behind in Pakistan and the allotment of evacuee property to them in India. There is no substance, therefore, in this point either. These were the only points urged before us. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d in such a situation the only way to reconcile the two provisions is to withhold the publication of the award, as a binding settlement has already come into force in order to avoid possible conflict between a binding settlement under s. 18 (1) and a binding award under s. 18 (3). In such a situation we are of opinion that the Government ought not to publish the award under s. 17 (1) and in cases where government is going to publish it, it can be directed not to publish the award in view of the binding settlement arrived at between the parties under s. 18 (1) with respect to the very matters which were the subject-matter of adjudication under the award. We therefore allow the appeals and direct the Government not to publish the awards sent to it by the industrial tribunal in these cases in view of the binding nature of the settlements arrived at between the parties under s. 18 (1) of the Act. In the circumstances we order the parties to bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.
-
1963 (3) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... espondent on the 22nd of March, 1963. He has requested us that we should ask the respondent to consider the said application at any rate, which are now before him. We have no reason to assume that if there are any applications made before the respondent, he will not consider them in accordance with law. We, therefore, see no reason in the circumstances of the case to grant the second prayer of the petitioners in the present petition. In the result, therefore, we direct that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued against the respondent directing him to take up returns filed by the petitioners before him for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 and complete the assessments for the said years before 31st of March, 1963, and 31st of March, 1964. respectively. The second prayer of the petitioners, which relates to the applications for renewal of registration, which they had filed before the institution of the present petition, is rejected. There will be or order to costs.
|
