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Showing 1 to 18 of 18 Records
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1963 (6) TMI 40 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ution. 19.Point No. 4 --The complaint made by the petitioners that the representations which they had made, had not been duly considered by the State Government before the latter issued the notification under Section 4 of this Act, is devoid of force for the simple reason that the allegation is not factually correct. On a perusal of the relevant records, I am satisfied that the objections and suggestions made by the petitioners and others were fully and objectively considered by the Government and they had issued the notification under Section 4 declaring the area within the limits of the Guntur district to be a notified area for the purposes of this Act in respect of chillies, only after they were satisfied that chillies were a commercial crop and the trade in it required to be controlled and regulated. 20. Thus there are no merits in any of the contentions advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Hence all these Writ Petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1963 (6) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... he petition has not been rendered meaningless or infructuous by reason of the retirement of the petitioner because if the impugned order be quashed, he would get relief in respect of arrears of pay and pension on the footing that , he has never been reverted from the post of Deputy Superintendent, West Bengal Police. In this respect, I would like to refer to the observations of the Division Bench in Rabindra v. General Manager, Eastern Railway, 59 Cal WN 859 at p. 869 18. In the result, the petition be allowed and the impugned order be quashed by a Writ of certiorari. Let a Writ of mandamus be also issued upon the respondents not to give effect to the impugned order so as to revert the petitioner from the post of Deputy Superintendent, West Bengal Police, which the petitioner was holding of the time of the impugned order. Since the petitioner's representation and demand for justice were not heeded to, he shall get his costs, hearing fee being assessed at five gold mohurs.
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1963 (6) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om and the expenditure incurred on them were brought into the business accounts..." 10. The test propounded by the learned Chief Justice in the latter part of the paragraph has been satisfied in this case. 11. The judgment of a Division Bench of this court to which one of us was a party in Varada Reddy v. Commissioner of Income Tax does not lay down any proposition different from the one enunciated in A. Trisulapani v. Commissioner of Income Tax. The rule stated there is in consonance with the ruling in A. Trisulapani v. Commissioner of Income Tax. 12. It follows that the conclusion of the department as affirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is not in disharmony with the principle adumbrated in both the cases cited above and it could not, therefore, be successfully challenged. 13. The question referred to us is answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. The assessee will pay a sum of ₹ 100 (one hundred) by way of costs to the respondent.
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1963 (6) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elf of the undertaking given to this Court and has thus offended against public justice. We should not allow such a person to escape without a penalty. At the same time we feel the petitioner was not always alert and by granting a rent receipt in place of a money receipt for mesne profits and by entering into a settlement in Misc. Appeal No. 71 of 1961 gave opportunities to the opposite party to put up a fight against her. 68. We think that the ends of justice will be satisfied in this case if we punish the opposite party to pay a fine of ₹ 500/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. We order accordingly. 69. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this Rule, which we assess at 5(five) gold mohurs. 70. The opposite party is at liberty to pay the fine in the hands of the Deputy Sheriff, who is present in Court to-day. 71. Let the Deputy Sheriff act on a copy of the ordering portion of this judgment signed by the Bench Clerk. A. Roy, J. 72. I agree.
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1963 (6) TMI 36 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing authorities may be noticed AIR 1935 Sind 62, Sudhangsu Bhattacharjee v. Ruprekha Pictures AIR 1954 Cal 281, Abdul Quddoos Dost Mohammad Momin v. Abdul Gani Abdul Rahman AIR 1954 Nag 332 etc. etc. 18. But in this case we find that the subject-matter of the dispute between the parties is based on the claims and the counterclaim arising out of the agreement. Even if a small portion of the claim of the Plaintiff is outside the terms of the original contract, that by itself is no ground for refusing stay. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Defendant, Union of India, has made out a clear case for stay of the suit and for this reason we cannot uphold the order of our brother Ali, J. 19. The result is that this appeal succeeds and the suit instituted by the Plaintiff against the Respondent, Union of India, in the Court of Ali, J. shall be stayed in terms of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. Janki Nath Wazir, C.J. 20. I agree.
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1963 (6) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e may be treated as properly attributable to capital when it is made not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence as asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade. The expressions "enduring benefit" or "of a permanent character" were introduced to make it clear that the asset or the right acquired must have enough durability to justify its being treated as a capital asset. Applying the above criteria, we have no hesitation in holding that the departmental authorities were in error in regarding the expenditure incured year after year by the company under the head--hutting and camp expenses for labour, as a capital expenditure. It follows from the foregoing discussion that both the questions referred to us should be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee company, and we answer them accordingly. In all the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Questions answered in the negative.
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1963 (6) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ar ending on the 30th September, 1950, the decision of the managing agent, according to the Tribunal, was communicated to the managed company of the 15th March, 1951. For the accounting year ending on the 30th September, 1951, the resolution of the directors of the managing agent was passed on the 10th November, 1952. The facts are, therefore, clearly distinguishable from the facts in Chandulal Keshavlal & Co.s case. Mr. Meyer has also argued that the assessee gave up the aforesaid sums gratuitously and, as such, is not entitled to any deduction. It is not necessary to deal with this point as we have come to the same conclusion on the other ground indicated by us. In the premises, the answers to the questions referred to us shall be as follows (1) The loss suffered by the assessee in transactions of hessian and B-Twills was a business loss on the ground that these were adventures in the nature of trade. (2) No. Each party will bear and pay its own costs of the reference.
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1963 (6) TMI 33 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... to be given to article 130. It is common ground that the articles of association contain not only the conditions of membership but also the contract of insurance between the members or assured and the mutual company. Some articles, such as 9 and 49, under which premiums are paid, and article 15, under which the indemnity is granted, belong purely to the contract. Others are concerned only with membership. In my opinion article 130 should be regarded as forming part of the contract of insurance. The surplus assets consist of the reserve fund, which is formed out of part of the premiums (see article 23c) and its divisibility in proportion to premiums paid shows that it is in the nature of a return and not of a distribution of profits, which indeed the company is assumed for tax purposes not to make. The position is exactly expressed in the passage from Donovan L.J.'s judgment 1962 1 W.L.R. 1195, 1205, which my noble and learned friend Lord Hodson has cited. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (6) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ding the coffee powder business. The assessee has maintained a number of account books in the regular course of business and it is not likely that he would have suppressed only accounts in respect of the sales in the stall. The accounts in respect of the stall section cannot be rejected on the mere ground that the sales are not capable of verification since the assessee has not issued chits for sales at the stall counter. We hold that the principle of adding 50 per cent. to the purchases should not be uniformly adopted in all the cases. It is a notorious fact that some of the hotels may be earning more than 50 per cent. gross profit and some hotels may be earning a lesser percentage. We think the department would be well-advised to carry out immediate investigation by conducting sample surveys of all types of hotels in order to fix the gross output in the absence of correct account books. The petitions are allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 one set. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (6) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the payment of tax according to the notice of assessment, the whole of the amount outstanding on the date of default shall become immediately due and shall be a charge on the properties of the person or persons liable to pay the tax under the Act. Sub-section (2) of this section lays down that any tax due under the Act could be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue or on application to any Magistrate by such Magistrate as if it were a fine imposed by him. It is, therefore, clear that the order passed by the District Magistrate without issuing a notice to the assessee concerned under section 24(2)(b) was clearly wrong. It was not open to him to have returned the application without taking the necessary steps contemplated under section 24(2)(b) of the Act. The order passed by the learned District Magistrate is therefore set aside and he is directed to take on file the application filed by the Assessing Officer and deal with it according to law. Petition allowed.
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1963 (6) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s dealt with the identical question and has reached the same conclusion. Srinivasan, J., observes thus Reading all of these rules together, it seems to us to be clear that the option that is given to the dealer under section 7(1) of the Act has to be exercised at the commencement of the year at the time the dealer submits the return. It is made dependent upon the permission being granted by the assessing authority and on the further condition that he pays the tax in advance. The conclusion therefore seems to be inescapable that it is not open to the dealer to wait till the end of the year and to ask at the time of his final assessment that his tax liability should be computed on the basis of section 7. We respectfully agree. In the result the revision petition is allowed, and the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is set aside in so far as it directed the department to levy tax under section 7 of the Act. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1963 (6) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y Galiokotwala and Co., the import became completed after Galiokotwala and Co. took delivery of the consignment and cleared the goods from the harbour. The sale was subsequent to the taking of such delivery and was effected after the goods were taken out beyond the customs barrier. The Tribunal observes as follows in its order The import was occasioned by the sale between the Sudanese shipper and the appellant s sellers at Bombay. It is not the appellant s case that in respect of the disputed transactions there was a sale in the course of import by transfer of documents of title to the goods. Admittedly the cotton was cleared out of the customs by the sellers and then delivered to the appellant at Gudiyatham within the State. We accept this view of the Tribunal and it follows that the transaction is not hit by the constitutional ban under Article 286 of the Constitution. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (6) TMI 28 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the Dargah Committee caseA.I.R. 1962 S.C. 574. was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the High Court in Diwakar s case 1963 14 S.T.C. 625 1962 Mys. L.J. 912. Further the specific question as to whether a revision application under the Code of Criminal Procedure was maintainable in respect of an order made by the Magistrate who was merely a persona designate under the Act and was not exercising any authority or power under the Code of Criminal Procedure was not considered or even raised in that case. Therefore, Diwakar s case 1963 14 S.T.C. 625 1962 Mys. L.J. 912.cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that such a revision application would be competent, particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dargah Committee caseA.I.R. 1962 S.C. 574. In the result, the reference made by the District Magistrate is rejected, without expressing any view on the merits of the order passed by the Deodurg Magistrate. Reference rejected.
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1963 (6) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lete as soon as by the application of one or more processes, the raw material undergoes some change. To say this is to equate processing to manufacture and for this we can find no warrant in law. The word manufacture used as a verb is generally understood to mean as bringing into existence a new substance and does not mean merely to produce some change in a substance, however minor in consequence the change may be. In my opinion, the observation quoted above will not help Mr. Bhattacharya. When planks are sawed out of logs, what is produced is a different thing from logs capable of being put to different uses. Therefore, when planks are made from logs or damaged wood, a new kind of commodity is manufactured because plank made out of timber is not timber in its nascent state. In the view I take I find no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Bhattacharya and I decline to interfere with the order. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
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1963 (6) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors, Power of court to declare dissolution of company void
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1963 (6) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... he reasons for the court summoning the parties to give evidence have been briefly indicated and it is further stated that further and fuller reasons will be given in the final order, because to discuss them now is likely to embarrass one or the other of the parties during the remaining stages of the trial. It is clear from a perusal of the order that it does not purport to be one made with the consent of the parties. The appropriate stage, to set out and deal with the objections urged at the hearing, would be when the learned judge makes the final order. In the circumstances of the case, we do not consider that the reasons given are inadequate. The appellants have a right of appeal against the final decision if it goes against them and we do not find any reason to interfere at this stage with an interlocutory order made by the learned company judge. For the above reasons, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (6) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... submitted mdash apparently on the instructions of his client who was present in court mdash that the company has already secured the minimum subscription, that it is in a position to comply with the provisions of section 149(1) and commence its business, and prayed for an opportunity for his client to file an affidavit stating those facts as well as the particular reasons for not commencing business within a year of incorporation. We feel that this prayer should be granted. The appellant will file the affidavit on or before the 25th May, 1963. If the affidavit is filed within that time, this appeal will be posted for further hearing on the 27th May, 1963. If now affidavit is filed within the time specified, this appeal will stand dismissed, but without any order as to costs as we have already awarded costs in our judgment. Copy attached in Writ Appeal No. 44 of 1963 (Malabar Iron and Steel Works Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies, Kerala ) which was heard along with this appeal.
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1963 (6) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Demands, short-levy - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... lished in any of the above grounds, then only the occasion arises for issue of a notice under the section. In the instant case, the notice under section 39 was issued in anticipation of determination that Customs duty had been short levied on the imported paper. I have, therefore, to hold that the notices dated January 19, 1953 were premature notices and should be ignored. If those notices be ignored, then the show cause notice (either the earlier ones or the later ones) were both issued beyond the period of limitation and the petitioner must not be proceeded against on the basis of such belated notices. 11.In the view taken I hold that this Rule must succeed. Let a Writ of Certiorari issue quashing the adjudication order and let a mandate issue on the respondents restraining them from giving effect thereto. 12.On the basis of this judgment, the petitioner company will be at liberty to make prayer before the appropriate authorities for refund of the sums already paid by them.
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