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Showing 1 to 20 of 51 Records
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1963 (7) TMI 106 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ficer under those circumstances to issue notice under sub-section (1A). I am unable to accept any of the contentions made on behalf of the petitioners in connection with the notice issued under sub-section (1A). As I am in favour of the respondents on the merits of the case, I deem it unnecessary to deal with the diverse contentions made on behalf of the respondents. There are some other contentions made in the petition, but the same have not been argued. The first prayer in the petition relates to the sum of Rs. 8,89,000. That sum has now been adjusted against the petitioners' liability to pay the amounts mentioned in the reassessment order dated July 29, 1961. The petitioners are, therefore, not entitled to any relief in connection with that sum of Rs. 8,89,000. Contentions have not been made to support the first prayer in the petition. The petitioners are not entitled to any relief. Petition is dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed. Rule discharged.
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1963 (7) TMI 105 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... ssification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established, that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure". 9. I do not think anything in the statute impugned violates the principle so succinctly, if I may say so with great respect, and clearly stated in this decision. 10. I dismiss this writ application with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 200/-.
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1963 (7) TMI 104 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
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... ... ..... d (vi-a) of the Income Tax Act so that 'machinery' if it is new, though it does not constitute 'plant', is entitled to initial and extra depreciations. The term 'machinery' has net been defined in the Income Tax Act and in the absence of a statutory definition the word has to be given the ordinary meaning. Further, the term 'machinery' should be given the same meaning throughout Section 10(2) (vi) and (vi-a). The term 'machinery' is not restricted In the application only to a self-contained unit capable of being put to use in the business." I need hardly say that I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Madras and Kerala High Courts. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, my answer to the question submitted is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessed. The Revenue to pay costs. Advocate's Fee, ₹ 250/- (Rupees Two hundred and fifty). Ahmad Ali Khan, J. 14. I agree. 15. Reference answered in affirmative.
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1963 (7) TMI 103 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is unequal; similarly, different kinds of property may be subjected to different rates of taxation, but so long as there is a rational basis for the classification, made. Article 14 will not be in the way of sucb classification resulting in equal burdens on different classes of properties." 14. Courts have repeatedly laid down that no provision in a Statute should be struck down unless it is clear that the provision in question is bad in law. If two views are possible about the validity of a provision, then reliance should be placed on the presumption that it is valid. As noticed above, several learned judges of the Supreme Court and that of the High Courts have expressed divergent views on the point under consideration. That itself is a sufficient ground to rely on the presumption mentioned above. 15. For the reasons mentioned above, these petitions fail and they are dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. 16. Petitions dismissed.
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1963 (7) TMI 102 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d is in excess of the limit provided under section 28(1) of the Act. All that is said on behalf of the assessee is that if the Income-tax Officer had come to the conclusion that the concealed income was only ₹ 21,900 very probably he would have not imposed a penalty of ₹ 5,000. This may or may not be. Whether the penalty imposed is expressive or not was a matter for decision by the Tribunals below. Quite clearly when the Tribunal affirmed the imposition of a penalty of ₹ 5,000 it was aware of the fact that the concealed income was only ₹ 21,900. If after knowing the fact, it thought fit to affirm the order of the Income-tax Officer it cannot be said that any question of law arises from its order. In our opinion, question No. 2 should not have been referred to this court. Hence we decline to answer that question. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative (in favour of the Revenue) and we decline to answer the second question. No costs.
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1963 (7) TMI 101 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that their plain meaning is that the party making the alleged acknowledgment should himself have been under a liability at the time of the alleged acknowledgment, and if that is not the case, the person actually finable must have made the acknowledgment and that person must be the predecessor in title of the person against whom the alleged acknowledgment is finally sought to be fastened in the later suit. Thus the different parts of the section only emphasise the same idea in its different facets. According to this criterion, it is clear that the statement of Sivasankaran Thampi in O.S. No. 1161 of 1106 cannot amount to an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19(1). This apart, there is also a minor difficulty in the way of the appellant and that is, that the actual plaint in that case proceeds on the footing that Sivasankaran Pillai alone was the exclusive owner of the hypotheca. 23. In the result, I respectfully agree that the appeal may be dismissed without costs.
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1963 (7) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... octroi because it had already been imposed nor the cancellation of an exemption because the Municipal Committee had not granted an exemption to the appellant-company. The resolution only indicated that on and from a particular date, the Municipal Committee would recover octroi which it had already imposed a long time ago upon all and sundry and to which the appellant company was also subject and which was no longer affected by the will of the quondam sovereign. The agreement of the Ruler bound the Municipal Committee only indirectly, because the Ruler to whom the amount recovered would have gone, had agreed to forego it, but the Ruler's desire that octroi should not be collected ceased to operate from the moment he ceased to be the Ruler. The Resolution of the Municipal Committee was thus in order and the demand was rightly made. The point about limitation was properly abandoned because it has no substance. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (7) TMI 99 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt held that the amount of the dividends was properly included in the appellant's assessments to surtax. From the foregoing, it is seen that for income-tax purposes what is relevant is the real income and not the nominal income. In other words, the person liable to pay tax on any item of income is the real owner and not the nominal owner. The above principle is in no manner impaired by the provisions contained in section 18(5) read with section 16(2) of the "Act", though those provisions have introduced some inconsistencies in the matter of the application of that principle. For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the question submitted to us is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the dividend income from the shares standing in the name of Kishanchand Lunidasingh Bajaj-shares acquired from the funds of the Hindu undivided family of which the said Kishanchand Lunidasingh Bajaj was the karta-was assessable in the hands of the assessee family.
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1963 (7) TMI 98 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e by the obligation income is diverted before it reaches the assessee, it is deductible ; but where the income is required to be applied to discharge an obligation after such income reaches the assessee, the same consequence, in law, does not follow. It is the first kind of payment which can truly be excused and not the second. The second payment is merely an obligation to pay another a portion of one's own income, which has been received and is since applied." With respect, we have been unable to see how this principle comes into play on the facts of the present case. Here Marotirao represents the family in the partnership and whatever is received by Marotirao is received by him for and on behalf of the family. There is no question of any diversion of the income at the source arising in the circumstances. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, the answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department.
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1963 (7) TMI 97 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly one of fact. The question that the High Court has to decide in such a case is whether the finding of the Tribunal that the two businesses were separate was one supported by the evidence placed before it. If there was evidence, the sufficiency of that evidence or other evidence contra, will not justify a refusal to accept the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal in the reference before us has stated that, on the facts as they are on record, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the two businesses were the same business within the meaning of section 24(2). We have also felt the same difficulty in dealing with this reference and are inclined in the premises to uphold the Tribunal's finding. In any event, we are unable to say that this finding is without evidence. In the result the answer to the question is in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Certified for counsel. Sen J.-I agree.
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1963 (7) TMI 96 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and then try to take benefit of the exemption for the entire accumulation. The contingency of a higher accumulation than one year's rent as arrears is due to the negligence on the part of the owner of the property. There is nothing in law which prevents an owner to take effective steps within a year and then have recourse to the exemption on the basis that the rent had become irrecoverable. In that way no hardship could ever accrue to any assessee and, therefore, the argument on the basis of the hardship in the present case has no significance. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the Tribunal came to the right conclusion that unabsorbed part of the irrecoverable rent cannot be carried forward to the subsequent years. Therefore, our answer to the first question in the first reference and third question in the second reference is in the negative. These petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed. The department will be entitled to the costs of both these petitions.
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1963 (7) TMI 95 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommissioner of Income-tax 1959 35 I.T.R. 1 ; 1959 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 10., it has been held that the word "information" in section 34(1)(b) included information as to the true and correct state of the law, and so would cover information as to relevant judicial decisions. Of course, it is not necessary in the present case to go as far as that. But we have cited this decision to show that even an unconnected judicial decision giving information as to the state of the law would itself amount to "information" within the meaning of section 34(1)(b); much more so then would a judicial decision in a connected case and between assessees who have common partners be "information." If it amounted to information, there was no dispute raised that the officer would have "reason to believe." In the result, therefore, we answer the question posed in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (7) TMI 94 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d not in furtherance of public policy. But, we find that it does not affect the present case in view of the substantial similarity of the relevant provisions of the M.C.D.C. Order with the relevant provisions of the C.P. and Berar Food-Grains Control Order. The principle of the decision of the Supreme Court directly applies to the present case and the position mains unaffected by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in (S) AIR1957Cal336 . It is clear that the partnership was illegal and that the suit was not maintainable. 29. Though the decision of the Supreme Court is direct authority which is sufficient and ample to decide the present case, we have dealt with the various other decisions as they were cited and relied upon by the learned Advocates in the course of their arguments. 30. We, therefore, hold that the suit partnership is void and that the suit is not maintainable. Consequently, we uphold the judgment of the Court below and dismiss the second appeal with costs.
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1963 (7) TMI 93 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see how any direction given by the Court can help the petitioner Company in the matter of launching the contemplated misfeasance proceedings. On the contrary, in my opinion, any such direction is bound to cause anxiety to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 and can be made by them a legitimate ground for complaint. 14. However, in order not to create any complications for the petitioner Company in the matter of taking out of misfeasance proceedings against respondents Nos. 2 to 4 or any other persons, I order that the present petition should be adjourned for a period of three months within which period the petitioner Company or any other person interested in the matter may take such steps as it or he may be advised in regard to the acts of misfeasance alleged to have been committed by respondents Nos. 2 to 4 or arty other person. The petition shall be posted for final orders Immediately after three months from to-day. The costs of the hearing so far Incurred shall be costs in the cause.
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1963 (7) TMI 92 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... emit this matter back to the special commissioners. Reliance was placed on Evans Medical Supplies Ltd. v. Moriarty 1958 1 W.L.R. 66; 1957 3 All E.R. 718; 37 T.C. 540, H.L. I do not think that that case ought to be regarded as a general prohibition against a judge ordering that a matter should go back to the commissioners. Power is given by a section in the statute enabling remission in appropriate circumstances. That particular case is explained by the fact that throughout the whole proceedings in relation to a sum of £ 100,000 the contention had been that it was "all or nothing." It was really too late to consider any sort of apportionment and there was no basis on the facts of that case for remitting it to the commissioners. I would not regard that as authority for depriving the court of power to send back an appropriate case. With much reluctance, I do not dissent. Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
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1963 (7) TMI 91 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e to make any return at all as required by section 22(2), or to produce the account books, etc., called for as required by section 22(4) would have to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of section 23 and, therefore, other provisions of sub-section (4) of section 23 will apply to the proceeding under section 34 of the Act". Similarly we are of the opinion that the decision of the Assam High Court in Tansukhrai Bodulal v. Income-tax Officer, Nowgong 1962 46 I.T.R. 325, does not bear on the point under consideration. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. In other words, our answer is that in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was not entitled to carry forward the losses held to be proved by the Income-tax Officer for the assessment years 1953-54, 1954-55 and 1955-56 under section 24(2)(iii) of the "Act". The assessee to pay the costs of the Revenue. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (7) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife vide sub- section (3)(b) ." That was a case where even though their Lordships reached the conclusion that the third proviso to section 16(1)(c) would be applicable yet the assessee, the husband, could not get out of the application of section 16, sub-section (3)(a)(iii). It is plain that their Lordships were not inclined to read the proviso as in any way delimiting the operation of section 16(3)(a)(iii). On principle the same rule should apply even in construing the provisions of the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955, section 9 particularly, because, as stated already, the words in the two enactments are completely identical in terms. We do not think we would be justified in referring to other decisions cited before us by learned counsel for the petitioner. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (7) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on is similar with regard to the other connected objection that in the notice under section 34, the Income- tax Officer had only mentioned that there had been an "escapement" of assessment but not that there had been an "under assessment" as was in fact the case. The petitioner knew full well that the notices under section 34 were issued as a result of the assessment which was made for the assessment year 1959-60. The notice, therefore, cannot be said to be misleading and even if it was misleading no prejudice having been shown to have been caused to the petitioner any interference under article 226 of the Constitution would be wholly unjustified, particularly, as the petitioner has all his remedies open to him under the Income-tax Act, in respect of reassessment proceedings which have yet to take place. For the reasons given above the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1963 (7) TMI 88 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d February 8, 1963, has to be quashed by certiorari. Regarding the other three years 1953-54 to 1955-56, I think it is necessary to issue a writ of prohibition as asked for by the petitioner to restrain the Income-tax Officer from proceeding further. None of these cases really fall within the scope of section 35(5); final assessment orders have been sought to be amended in respect of an alien matter in the guise of taking action under section 35(5) which, as I stated before, is not permissible in law. The Income-tax Officer purported to act clearly in excess of his jurisdiction. The result is that the petitioner succeeds in all the five writ petitions but as they have been heard together, I do not think I should award costs in each of them. I think it is sufficient if costs are awarded in Writ Petition No. 191 of 1963 which is for certiorari and Writ Petition No. 206 of 1963 which is for prohibition. In each of these two petitions counsel’s fee is fixed at ₹ 250.
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1963 (7) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rofits ascertained by the Tribunal is only ₹ 61,483. However, we would proceed on the footing that the commercial profits ascertained by the Tribunal amount to ₹ 61,483 plus ₹ 24,375, which together would come approximately to about ₹ 86,000. The tax liability on this amount would be about ₹ 35,000. It is not disputed by the revenue that the tax liability on ₹ 86,000 would come to about ₹ 35,000. The previous losses admittedly are over ₹ 30,000. If ₹ 65,000 are deducted from ₹ 86,000, available distributable profits would only be to the extent of ₹ 21,000. The company has distributed a dividend of ₹ 29,000. Even on this footing, with respect, it is not possible to sustain the order under section 23A of the Income-tax Act. For the reasons stated above, in the result we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The department shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
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