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1963 (9) TMI 83 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee" as suggested by Mr. Nanavaty can possibly arise. We are clear in our minds that the legislature has used the expression "held by the assessee" as meaning certificates which are registered in the name of the assessee and which stand in his name and not the certificates of which beneficial ownership is vested in him, but which stand in the name or names of his nominee or nominees. In that view, the Wealth-tax Officer and the Assistant Commissioner were right when they came to the conclusion that it was only those certificates which stood in the names of the two assesses, and in one case in the name of the assessee and his wife, which were entitled to exemption under clause (xvi) and not the rest of the certificates, and the Tribunal was therefore in error in coming to the conclusion which it did. In the result, we answer the question in the negative. The assessees will pay to the commissioner the costs of this reference. Question answered in the negative.
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1963 (9) TMI 82 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n or an association of persons with the object of benefiting either himself or his wife or his minor child. Whether such transfer results in the transfer of assets or only the income of such assets is not either material or relevant. What is relevant under this sub-clause is whether such assets are transferred for the benefit either of the assessee or his wife or his minor child. There can be no doubt that the object of clauses 3 and 5 of the deed of trust is to benefit Chaitanya, the minor son of the assessee. In the result, it is not possible to say that the properties of the value of ₹ 11,59,137 were not held by a person or association of persons to whom such assets had been transferred by the individual otherwise than for adequate consideration for the benefit of the minor child. 11. Our answer to the question, therefore, has to be in the affirmative. 12. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference. 13. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (9) TMI 81 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing a profit out of it. The favourable terms on which the properties to sale constituted an adventure in the nature of trade. The venture, looked at as a whole, bore clear indicia of a trading activity. The fact that the profit represented the fruits of an isolated transaction is immaterial for Income Tax purposes, since the profit arising from an isolated transaction is assessable to tax, provided an adventure in the nature of trade has been embarked upon. The profit arising from even an isolated adventure may be taxable as business profit, for business includes a single adventure in the nature of trade. In our opinion, therefore, the profit in question was properly assessed to tax under section 10 read with section 2(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. 39. For the forgoing reasons, we would answer the question referred to this court in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner of Income Tax. Advocates fee is fixed at ₹ 250.
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1963 (9) TMI 80 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ort the contentions found in the counter-affidavit. It follows, therefore, that there was a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Income Tax Officer to make the best of judgment assessments in these cases. 4. I am not impressed by the further contention that as the petitioner has a right of revision to the Commissioner, she ought to be denied the writs prayed for. The grant of a writ is within the discretion of this court and whether the alternative remedy is an effective one may no doubt be matter for consideration; but where a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the assessing authority is established, I do not think that this court would be justified in declining to issue the writs. 5. The petitions are accordingly allowed. The rules are made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 6. It hardly requires to be stated that the department is not without a remedy for the period of limitation for making a proper assessment has not run out. 7. Petitions allowed.
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1963 (9) TMI 79 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... indicate, that the assessees had not accepted any donations and/or contributions to which there were attached any conditions contrary to the objects of the trust and, therefore, so far as the relevant assessment years were concerned, no objection could possibly be taken by reason of the provisions of clause 13 of the trust deed. In our view, on a proper construction of clause 13, the trustees are not entitled to accept any donations and/or contributions on conditions or terms which would be contrary to the objects set out in clause 5 of the trust deeds and the power conferred on them by clause 13 is limited by the other provisions of the trust deeds including those contained in clause 5. For the reasons aforesaid, it is not possible for us to accept the contention urged on behalf of the Commissioner by the learned Advocate-General. Our answer consequently to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the assessee the costs of this reference.
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1963 (9) TMI 78 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the time of repayment and interest, if any. By taking a loan, a settlor does not exercise over its subject-matter power or dominion which, but for the trust or the settlement, he would have been able to exercise. Therefore, on this ground also, it cannot be held that, if the settlor were to give a loan to himself or to his firm, he would be exercising control over the trust fund or its income as he would have had over the fund or its income before he settled that fund upon the trust. Besides, a loan still remains an asset or the income of the trust and it is a subject-matter still governed by and is subject to the provisions of the trust. For these reasons, section 16(1) (c), proviso 1, is not applicable to the facts of this case. 13. Our answers to the question referred to us are as follows Question No. 1 - In the affirmative. Question No. 2 - In the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay to the opponent the costs of this reference. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1963 (9) TMI 77 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conferred by Section 33A of the Income Tax Act seems to stand apart from the elaborate procedure laid down for appeal first to the Appellate Income Tax Commissioner, then to the Income Tax Tribunal and on the question of law to the High Court and ultimately to the Supreme Court. That being the position it is difficult to hold that the functions of the Commissioner under either of the sub-sections of Section 33A of the Income Tax Act are quasi-judicial. We therefore hold that the appeal is liable to be dismissed also on the preliminary objection, viz., that the order passed by the Commissioner under Sub-section (2) of Section 33A of the Income Tax Act being administrative in nature is not liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 26. As we have already expressed our opinion that the appellant is not entitled to any relief on merits the present appeal cannot succeed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 27. Certified for two Counsel. H.K. Bose, C.J. 28. I agree.
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1963 (9) TMI 76 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ill of the assessee and that by itself must destroy the argument that the contract effected was an insurance on the life of the assessee, for, if such insurance was already effected on the date when the policy was issued, there was no question of the assessee exercising the option and entering into a novatio effecting thereby only insurance on his life. That being the position, it is impossible to say that the contract entered into by the assessee's father, or the policy issued by the Life Insurance Corporation, effected an insurance on the life of the assessee, or that the premium paid during the accounting period was a premium paid by the assessee to effect an insurance on his life. In these circumstances, section 15(1) would not apply to the present case and the Tribunal was right in the conclusion it arrived at. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, will have to be in the negative. The assessee will pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference.
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1963 (9) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... istrator and April 1, 1950, when the compensation for the loss of the Jagir first became payable. The payments were, therefore, by way of compensation for the loss of income in the interim period. In the words of Jenkins, L.J., as will appear later, they were ' income compensation ' and therefore of the income nature. o p /o p We have said enough to indicate that the judgment of the Supreme Court does not apply to the instant case. o p /o p 6. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and will therefore have to be allowed. o p /o p 7. The allowance of the appeal does not mean that the respondent will not be entitled to any portion of the interim payment. Since the interim payments represented the compensation, the respondent will be entitled to a portion of the compensation in the same ratio as was decided by the Estates Abolition Tribunal by its order dated 9th June, 1953, when the advance compensation was distributed. o p /o p 8. There shall be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1963 (9) TMI 74 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iance was placed on a decision of this High Court in Murlidhar Tejpal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1961 42 ITR 129 and also in Bhagwandas Shyamsundar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1962 45 ITR 566 , but, in our opinion, the material facts of the present case are different and the principle laid down in those cases cannot govern the present case. For the reasons we have attempted to state we are of opinion that there is not sufficient material in the present case to hold that there was wilful suppression by the assessee of the particulars of his income within the meaning of section 28(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. We accordingly hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case no penalty can be imposed upon the assessee under section 28(1)(c) of the Act and the question of law referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. In the circumstances of this case we do not propose to order any costs of this reference.
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1963 (9) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... Sea Customs Act apply unless it were shown that the goods had not been imported contrary to the statutory prohibition or restrictions. It will then be the duty of the Collector to proceed forthwith under the provisions of that section. A criminal prosecution on the other hand might take comparatively a longer time. To hold that the administrative action should not be taken till the authorities decide not to take any action under Section nfba 23 /nfba , will undoubtedly cause inconvenience. In the present case, the grievance of the appellant is about the personal penalty, and not against the confiscation of the goods. Penalty itself is not a fine as contemplated by Section nfba 23 /nfba . We are, therefore, in agreement with the learned Judge that the Collector had jurisdiction in justifiable cases to impose a personal penalty in cases arising under Sections nfba 23 /nfba and nfba 23-A /nfba of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alleged dishonest misappropriation by Manohar could not be attributed to company even though the company may have reaped the benefit of the use of the diesel engine fitted to its other bus. Consequently, it would not be possible to uphold the contention of Mr. Hardas that the Magistrate should be directed to proceed against the company with the alternative charges under Section 406 or 403 of the Indian Penal Code. I am, however, making it clear that the above expressions of opinion on facts are for the purposes of this order with regard to the Company only and the trial Magistrate will be at liberty to arrive at his own conclusions or findings of facts as may be found on the evidence adduced before him. 20. In the result, the reference is accepted. The charge framed against the accused No. 1 Messrs. Syndicate Transport Company (Private) Limited is quashed. The record be sent back to the Magistrate for proceeding with the trial in accordance with law. 21. Reference accepted.
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1963 (9) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... I failure of public justice has been occasioned by such order of acquittal. In the present case though the two respondents who were guilty persons have escaped legal punishment, the offence was only under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code which was committed not for any personal gain or interest of the accused persons but only as busy-bodies who meddled in other man's affair without any justification. The inconvenience occasioned to the passengers in the bus was not intended by the two respondents though the act was done 'voluntarily' as defined in Section 339 of the Indian Penal Code. 16. Upon examination of the evidence in the case and in consideration of all the facts and circumstances established thereby t am inclined to think that though the order of acquittal has been illegal and erroneous, it has not occasioned such failure of justice as would require it to be set aside in exercise of revisional powers of this Court. The Rule Is, therefore, discharged.
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1963 (9) TMI 70 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he assessee in cash at Petlad and certain other sale proceeds were paid to the assessee in Calcutta. There is not even evidence of any demand made by the assessee requiring British Indian buyers to remit the sale proceeds. The mere posting of cheques and hundis from British India is, in our opinion, not sufficient to justify the inference, that there was an implied request by the assessee to British Indian buyers to send the sale proceeds by means of cheques and hundis through post and that the cheques and hundis representing the disputed amounts were sent by British Indian buyers to the assessee pursuant to any such request of the assessee. We may add that in taking this view we are considerably fortified by the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of Income-tax v. New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. 1960 39 ITR 427 . Our answer to the question referred to us will, therefore, be in the negative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1963 (9) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . I, therefore, hold and I put it in the words of Sir George Jessel, M.R., that this petition for winding up of the company presented by Amar Nath Sarma is a scandalous abuse of the process of the Court. 233. The winding up petition was admitted by this Court and directions for advertisements were given but the publication of advertisements was stayed until final disposal of this application. In my view, the winding up petition cannot be dismissed having regard to the orders already made, on this application. 234. I, therefore, make an order for stay of all further proceedings on the winding up petition presented by Amar Nath Sarma including the publication of advertisement. All ad-interim orders made in the winding up petition and in the stay application are vacated. A prayer is made on behalf of Amar Nath Sarma that each party should be made to bear its own costs, an order for costs is made accordingly, viz., each party is to bear and pay its own costs of this application.
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1963 (9) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... benefit for his share in the profits of the registered firm in the year in which there are speculative profits would stand reduced by reason of such profits being set off by the carried forward loss of the registered firm. But these are not relevant considerations to be borne in mind in construing a section. Merely because certain anomalies may arise on one construction or the other, that would be no ground for refusing to put upon the section a construction which the section must necessarily bear. Some anomalies are bound to arise whether we adopt one view or the other. Income-tax, as has very often been said, is not cast upon absolutely logical lines and this is certainly not a factor which should deter us in placing upon the section a construction which we think is the right construction to be put upon it. In this view of the matter our answer to the question referred to us will be in the affirmative. The assessee will get the costs of the reference from the Commissioner.
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1963 (9) TMI 67 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... istration was only pending ascertainment of the heirs and for the benefit of the ultimate heirs. The fact that the heirs of the late Nawab including Syed Abdulla and seven others, whose heirs are now called upon to pay the estate duty, could not deal with the properties or enjoy them during a particular period, would not make any difference for the operation of sections 5 and 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. Notwithstanding this disability, they must still be held to be having an interest in the properties of the late Nawab which on their death passed on to their heirs which became subject to payment of estate duty. For all these reasons, we hold that the department could validly assess the estate for the purpose of estate duty and the judgment of our learned brother, which upheld the right of the department to do so, cannot be successfully impeached. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs in W.A. No. 39 of 1961. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (9) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... should, notwithstanding all this, determine the market price, or, if there has been no proper determination by the department, direct a further enquiry into the matter by the Wealth-tax Officer. There is no presumption that the officer has arrived at the proper valuation and the Tribunal is in error in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the valuation has not been shown to be unreasonable. In all the circumstances of the case, we are of opinion that there has been no proper determination of the net value of the house properties of the assessee in accordance with section 7 of the Act. After this reference is returned to the Tribunal it would be open to it to dispose of the matter either by referring the matter to arbitration as provided for under section 24(6) of the Act, or by remitting the matter to the Wealth-tax Officer for the proper determination of the value. The question referred is therefore answered in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the case. In short, the Income-tax Officer cannot assess by keeping the assessee in the dark as to the materials against him. In the present case, the basis of reassessment is only Solomon Nadar's statement. There is nothing else to support it. Can his statement be accepted as true? This is for the department to decide. It is not an extraneous circumstance which ought to be excluded from consideration. The value or weight to be attached to it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the department and the Tribunal. This court cannot reweigh or reappraise the evidence leading to the assessment and reach a contrary conclusion. Such is the limited jurisdiction of this court. In our opinion Solomon Nadar's statement was sufficient evidence and there is no error in treating it as proper material to make the assessment. Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. Question No. 2 is answered in the negative. There will be no order as to costs.
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1963 (9) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... velling between Ahmedabad and Bhavnagar were incurred by the assessee not because the assessee held the office of part-time professor of accountancy but because he lived and practised his profession in Ahmedabad which was a matter of his own choice. The assessee was not obliged to incur the expenses of travelling between Ahmedabad and Bhavnagar by the very fact that he held the office of part-time professor of accountancy and had to perform his duties. If the assessee had shifted to Bhavnagar, he would not have had to incur these expenses and it could not, therefore, be said that these expenses were expenses which the assessee was obliged to incur by the conditions of his service. The claim of the assessee to have the amount of ₹ 1,434 deducted under section 7(2)(iii) must therefore fail. Our answer to the question referred to us will, therefore, be in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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