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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 51 Records
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1964 (1) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... isdom not to move by any and every kind of complaint or information however frivolous it may be. Great are the responsibilities on the Council and the Disciplinary Committee in this respect and they must not so act as to become a convenient tool and an engine of oppression against the members of the profession. They must act with responsibility. That is why Section 21 imposes a preliminary duty on the Council to form a prima facie opinion before proceeding further. It will be a misfortune for the profession of the Chartered Accountants in India, if the Council chooses to let loose the whole machinery of Disciplinary Committee on any complaint or any information received by it, however old and however stale and whatever its source without examining it with at least some care to see if a prima facie case. exists or not. With respect, I agree with these observations. 12. In the result, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1964 (1) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the signatory would suffice. The decision of this Court in Murarka's case 1964 3 SCR 573 is authority for the position that the absence of a writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being a true copy. In the circumstances, we consider that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement of s. 81(3) in the petition that was filed by the appellant and the learned Judges were in error in directing the dismissal of the petition. 34. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court dismissing the petition is set aside. As owing to the filling of the Writ Petition there has been a considerable delay in the trial of the Election Petition, we express the hope that the petition would be heard and disposed of at an early a date as is conveniently possible. The appellant will be entitled to his costs here and in the High Court which will be paid by the contesting third respondent. 35. Appeal Allowed.
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1964 (1) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the said villages on assessment-free basis. The Revenue Officer of Keonjhar levied an assessment in respect of the said villages purporting to act under the Rules framed under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner then preferred appeals to the Board of Revenue against the said assessment orders but these appeals were dismissed. The assessment levied against the petitioner in respect of these lands is of the order of ₹ 9,000 and odd and it has to be paid by her from 1958 retrospectively. 3. The petitioner in W.P. No. 79/1963 is Smt. Rani Ratna Prova Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa. At the time when the State of Dhenkanal merged with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in five villages as a proprietor. In respect of these lands, assessment had never been levied; but purporting to give effect to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Revenue Officer Dhenkanal assess
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1964 (1) TMI 72 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... substitution of securites. Accordingly, there was only a remittance of capital. Giving the matter careful attention we are satisfied that the undisputed facts in the present case can lead to only one conclusion. The assessee had capitalised whatever surplus income was in his hands. The view of the Tribunal that such capitalisation was not effective or it was only of a passing nature is entirely opposed to the facts proved. There was no material upon which the Tribunal could reach such a conclusion. Though there may exist cases where such capitalisation is only a ruse to overcome the tax liability, in the present case, we see no vitiating features of that kind. The receipt of these moneys in our opinion represented only the receipt of these moneys in our opinion represented only the receipt of capital and none of income. The question is answered in favour of the assessee, who will be entitled to his costs. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1964 (1) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nment had considered the various clauses of r. 30(1) and had come to the conclusion that the only way in which the purposes of the Act and the Rules could be carried out was by the use of clause (b) of r. 30(1). In our opinion when the order says that it is necessary to make an order of detention in order to restrain the prejudicial activities mentioned therein it means that that was the only way which the State Government though was necessary to adopt in order to meet the situation. It will then be for the detenu to show that the order had gone beyond the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to s. 44. No such thing has been shown in the present cases and we are satisfied that the orders in question cannot be said to go beyond the needs of the situation, even assuming that s. 44 is mandatory as urged on behalf of the appellants and not merely directory as urged on behalf of the State. 12. The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. 13. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (1) TMI 70 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and the 13th September, 1958, instituting the suit at Patna, only because on the 12th of September it was desirous of sending its goods to Patna Ghat? The answer must, again, be in the negative. In my opinion, the cause of action in the instant case arose in the district of Shahabad, and no part of the cause of action, with respect to the stolen bags and the bags from which certain quantities were pilfered, arose within the Jurisdiction of the Munsif 1st Court at Patna. The decision reported in AIR 1953 Bom 46 was not a decision on the forum for the suit. It was a decision on the liability under Section 72 of the Railways Act. Therefore, neither Section 72, nor the decision which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner can be of any avail for the decision of the question that has arisen at this stage. 6. The application must be held to be without any merit, and it is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 64/-. S.N.P. Singh, J. 7. I agree.
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1964 (1) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he goods, under the first part of col. 3- (a) it is not necessary to establish further that the person from whose possession the goods have been seized, is concerned with the illegal importation, as it is necessary for awarding penalty under the second part of col. 3; (b) the question of bona fides of the person from whose possession the goods have been taken is immaterial, once it is shown that the goods, by whomsoever the importation may have been made, were imported in contravention of the statutory prohibition or restriction, referred to. 47. But the Customs Authorities are not relieved from their burden, in cases where Section 178A is not attracted, of establishing that the prohibition or restriction has been contravened in the importation of the goods, merely because they want to proceed against the goods and not against the person from whose possession the goods have been seized or any other person. 48. I, therefore, concur in the order pro posed by my learned brother.
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1964 (1) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ially and educationally backward classes. It is true that clause (4) of Art. 15 contains a non-obstante clause with the result that power conferred by that clause can be exercised despite the provisions of clause (1) of Art. 15 and clause (2) of Art. 29. But that does not justify the inference that castes have any relevance in determining what are socially and educationally backward communities. As my learned brother has rightly pointed out the Constitution has used in clause (4) the expression "classes" and not "castes". 61. Upon the view which I have taken on the two points I have discussed the appeals must be allowed and a direction be issued to the Selection Committee to make the selection of candidates solely on the basis of the result of P.U.C. examination. I would allow them with costs here as well as in the High Court. ORDER BY COURT 62. In view of the judgment of the majority, the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (1) TMI 67 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on 23(4), having regard to the fact that he by confirming the order of the Income-tax Officer refusing to reopen under section 27, upheld the assessment under section 23(4) for the year 1956-57. In our opinion, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was fully competent to go into the merits of the appeal against the order of refusal to grant registration whatever his view on the best judgment assessment might have been. Under the provisions of section 31(3)(c) of the Act after examining the merits of the appeal and testing the contentions raised on behalf of the assessee in the light of recognised judicial principles we have discussed in this judgment the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was free either to confirm the order of refusal, or cancel it and direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm. The answer to the question of law referred to this court is, therefore, in the affirmative. The respondent will pay to the applicant the costs of this reference. Sen J.-I agree.
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1964 (1) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uments go away, as also Exs. Al and A2, we are left with only Exs. A3 and A4. Some argument was advanced before us to the effect that the lands comprised in the transactions repre- sented by these documents have no direct access to the road and that, therefore, they could not have fetched a good price. Bearing in mind the fact that these are all agricultural lands a rate of ₹ 4,500 per acre at which they were sold cannot prima facie be regarded as inadequate. As regards access, it is sufficient to say that they are parts of the same field which abut on the road, though the portions sold do not themselves abut on the road. Since the lands sold under these sale deeds were part and parcel of the same field which abuts on the road those who purchased these lands would naturally obtain a right of way over the land unsold so as to have access to the road. In the circumstances we hold that the appeal is without substance. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (1) TMI 65 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pugned sale deed. Apparently they did not keep in view the tests in the light of which a document is to be construed in such a case. In this view of the case the plaintiff purchaser's claim to the suit land as based on the impugned document Ext. A /1 must fail because no title passed under the same. 7. As regards the plaintiff's cross appeal against the decision of the courts below which disallowed his claim for damages, in view of my holding that the plaintiff's claim of title to the suit land must fail there is no question of damages as claimed by the plaintiff. 8. In the result, therefore, defendant No. 1's appeal is allowed and the decision of the court's below declaring the plaintiff's title to the suit land is set aside. The plaintiff's cross appeal for damages stands dismissed. Accordingly the plaintiff's suit stands dismissed. As the plaintiff has failed both in the appeal as also in the cross appeal, he is to pay the costs throughout.
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1964 (1) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the fact that they were not allowed to ply their buses on the routes under the respective permits granted to them. The learned Advocate-General further undertakes that this amount of compensation will be determined in the present proceedings themselves. No order as to costs." 58. The learned Counsel requested us that we should give some directions in terms of this undertaking. In view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964 "In view of the order passed by this Court on June 10, 1963, when the interim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the State that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court, there will be a declaration to that effect, and the High Court will determine the amount so payable and pass suitable directions for the payment thereof."
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1964 (1) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ld be said to have been kept in force by the provisions of the Application of Laws Order, 1949 made by the Province of Bombay. My brother Ayyangar J., has largely on the basis of the decision of this Court in Madhorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1961 1 S.C.R. 957) held that it is law. On the other hand my brother Hidayatullah J., has come to the opposite conclusion. My brother Shah J., has also held that the Tharao is not a law. I agreed with the view taken by my brother Hidayatullah J., and brother Shah J., that it is not a law and that the decision in Madhorao Phalke's case(1) does not justify the conclusion that it is 'law'. I do not think it necessary for the purpose of this case to examine further the question as to what are the indicia of a law. For these reasons I would allow the appeals with costs throughout. ORDER SINHA C.J.--In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are allowed with costs throughout--one set of hearing fees.
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1964 (1) TMI 62 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the deed produced, the revenue had contended that no partner had power to act as the agent of the other partners. This contention was negatived by the court. Clause 8 in that deed read "All activities connected with the business, etc., is to be conducted at the sole discretion of partner No. 1 and all his actions are binding on all the three partners equally." While this clause gave power to partner No. 1 to conduct all business activities of the partnership firm at his sole discretion, it did not limit the agency powers of the other partners. That is the crux of the matter. Hence, this decision is of no assistance to the assessee. For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the question referred to us is that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, Messrs. K.D. Kamath and Co. could not be granted registration under section 26A of the "Act" for the assessment year 1959-60. Assessee to pay the costs of the revenue. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1964 (1) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it professed to make an order under section 33(4) it is such an order even if it could not legally be made under that provision. Correctness of the order which includes correctness of the exercise of the jurisdiction to make it, is irrelevant. For these reasons we rejected the preliminary objection. The answer to the question is that the assessee firm had no right to renewal of registration and that it could be refused on the ground that it had not distributed a portion of its profits in accordance with the instrument of partnership in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1948-49. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income-tax as required by section 66(6) of the Act. The assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax his costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. zoo.
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1964 (1) TMI 60 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to insist upon a return of the advance amount. We are unable to find any thing in the decision in Calcutta Improvement Trust v. Surbarnabala Debi, 44 Cal WN 541 to support the contention that, notwithstanding the election by a party to a contract to accept the breach by another he could still revive, at his choice, the contract and insist upon a specific performance thereof. We are, therefore, of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was correct in his view that the appellant was not entitled to relief by way of specific performance. (10) The question whether the appellant will be entitled to a return of the advance amount paid, does not call for determination in this case, as the learned subordinate Judge has declined to grant him any relief in respect thereof, and no ground of appeal has been taken against the propriety of that conclusion (11) The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to cost. (12) Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (1) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e taken it follows that the decision of this court in Shri Ram Jha v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 31 I.T.R. 987 does not lay down the correct law, and, in any event, requires to be confined to the facts of that case and not to be taken or cited as a precedent. For the reasons given above I would answer the question referred in I.T.R. Nos. 190 of 1953 and 193 of 1955 in the affirmative and against the assessee. ORDER BY THE COURT.--For the reasons stated in our judgments our answer to the question is in the negative. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income-tax as required by section 66(6) of the Income-tax Act. We further direct that the assessee shall get its costs of the reference, which we assess at ₹ 100, from the Commissioner of Income-tax. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 100. Question answered in the negative.
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1964 (1) TMI 58 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Income-tax Act as it stood at the material time the partners of that firm would be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the penalty imposed under section 28(1) (c) of the Act. It is, however, not open to the income-tax authorities to impose the penalty upon the new firm constituted on the 28th April, 1952, by a fresh partnership deed and constituted of Baidyanath Roy and Bijali Kanti Roy owning 8 annas share each in the business. For these reasons we hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case imposition of penalty under section 28(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act upon the petitioner firm as it was constituted at the time of the levy of penalty, namely, on the 30th July, 1954, was not legally valid. We accordingly answer the question of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax department. There will be no order as to costs with regard to this reference. Question answered in the negative.
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1964 (1) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave been allowed." He argues that except for depreciation allowance, no other deduction was in the contemplation of the Income Tax Officer. We are unable to give this passage the interpretation contended for. Depreciation allowance stands on a different footing, as it is capable of being carried forward from year to year for a certain number of years and becomes exhausted after a period of time. The particular reference to deprecation cannot minimise the weight of the inference that can be drawn from the fact that it was an estimate of the net income which clearly means that all allowances which the assessee was entitled to, had been inferentially taken into account. 7. We are accordingly of the view that the conclusion reached by he Income Tax Appellants Tribunal is erroneous. The question has, therefore, to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the department. The department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. 8. Reference answered.
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1964 (1) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... leged that it is a part of planned development. We, therefore, find that subsection (1-A) is not applicable at all. As the land is now considered to be not waste or arable land Sub-section (1) also is not applicable. The consequence is that the direction mentioned in Sub-section (4) could not be issued and that consequently the declaration issued under Section 6 is illegal and the Collector has no power to take possession of the land in dispute. 8. 1m the result we allow this petition and quash the second paragraph of Notification No. 684-C/XXIII-PWA 35-1A (l)-62 dated March 5, 1962 and published on March 17, 1962 and the whole of Notification No. 684 (5)/CW/-XXIII-PWA-35-lA-(l)-62 dated March 30, 1962 and published on April 7, 1962, as amended by corrigendum No. 26180 /XXIII-PWA-35KA (l)/62, dated June 2, 1962, and prohibit the opposite parties from taking possession of the land in pursuance of these quashed notifications. The petitioner will get his costs of this petition.
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