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Showing 1 to 20 of 60 Records
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1964 (12) TMI 76 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er the Court had taken cognizance of the offence, was held as not amounting to abatement of the proceeding. This decision can have no application to the facts of the present case since the question in this case is whether the Magistrate could, in law, take cognizance of the case and commence the proceedings. This is not a case in which the wife died after her relative had filed a complaint on her behalf. As stated earlier, the complaint was filed several months after her death. Similarly, the decision in Nathu v. Sheopal, AIR 1963 MP 47 cited by Mr. Srinivasan was also a case where the aggrieved party died after the commencement of the proceedings. Hence that decision also cannot help Mr. Srinivasan. (19) In the result, this reference is accepted, the order of the learned Magistrate dated 25-2-1964 is hereby set aside and the complaint filed before the Magistrate is dismissed as not being cognizable under Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (20) Reference accepted.
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1964 (12) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... pany intuit behalf of secure the amount of ₹ 25/- lakhs and odd to the Income -tax authorities to the satisfaction of those authorities. In these circumstances we do not feel that the there is any substances I the contention urged by Mr. Banaji that the petition is actuated by Mala fides and therefore, the suit ought by to have been admitted by the learned trial judge. (16) In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. (17) Having regard to the fact that the inspector to look into the affairs of the company was appointed somewhere about 1955 and all attempts of investigation had been defeated by one method or the other, we do not think that the advertisement can be stayed any longer, we direct that the advertisement shall be published on Wednesday the 16th December and the petition to be heard on 11th January 1965. The Court Receiver to beat liberty to with draw the amount of ₹ 500/- deposited by the company towards his costs. (18) Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 74 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... speculation and trafficking in a new species of gambling Such a right to compensation due to its vague ness may be bought up by a handful of persons throughout the State to promote rampant speculation and the purchasers would not know what actually they are buying nor the sellers would get the value which has any relation to the reality. 20. On the authority, therefore, of the decisions noticed above and specially of the Supreme Court and for reasons stated both legal and practical, I am of the opinion that this appeal must succeed. 21. The appeal is, therefore, allowed The order and judgment of the lower appellate Court are set aside and I hold that the right to the compensation money cannot be sold under the mortgage decree. This is without prejudice to the rights of the respondent to proceed and take appropriate legal steps for satisfaction of his mortgage debt from the compensation money. 22. There will be no order as to costs. Let the records he sent down expeditiously.
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1964 (12) TMI 73 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir former jobs in the Calcutta branch or by suitable transfer to other branches cannot be given effect to in view of the agencies in Calcutta being given up and as it is not clear what is meant by the expression 'suitable transfer' as used in the Order. But it appears to us that there is no force in this contention as the directions given by the Tribunal are quite clear and specific. The direction is that it is not possible to reinstate the employees to their former jobs in Calcutta branch, they can be provided with a suitable employment by means of transfer to other branches of the Company. We do not see how it can be said that such directions are incapable of implementation. 60. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and Order of the learned trial Judge are set aside and the Award of the Tribunal is upheld. . There will be no order as to costs. 61. The operation of this Order will remain stayed for four weeks from today, as prayed for. 62. I agree.
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1964 (12) TMI 72 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on them, having regard to the scheme of the Act. Learned counsel for the department also urges that in effect and in substance the tax liability of each partner is really that of the firm and whatever may be the mode of distribution of that liability under the Act, no partner can avoid tax in respect of any portion of the firm's income. We have no hesitation in rejecting this argument as it is quite obvious that once the income of the firm is computed and each partner is assessed to tax with regard to his share of that income, the liability of the firm to tax is at an end and the only liability is that of the partner, who has been assessed and who suffers the tax." It is manifest, therefore, that the ratio of those two decisions cannot be pressed into service in the present case, as the assessment itself was made after the discontinuance of the business of the firm. It follows that there are no merits in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1964 (12) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpossible' has been applied by this Court in Emperor v. Ganpat 40 Bom LR 820 AIR 1938 Bom 427 in a criminal case. The Division Bench in its judgment observed as follows - "In construing the provisions of a statute, regard must be had to the express terms of any limitation contained therein. If in the interpretation of a statute, the Court finds duty enjoined by it either impossible of performance and beyond the normal capacity of a reasonable or prudent man, or when performance in the strictest language of the enactment is either idle or impossible, then the enactment must be understood as dispensing with the strict performance of that duty." (16) I would, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge for the offence under Section 36 read with Section 47 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and acquit him. Fine, if paid, be refunded. (17) Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the additional remuneration that the workmen asked to be computed in terms of money. It was therefore not a case of non-monetary benefit. Apart from that, in our view, there is no reason to limit the scope of the word "benefit" in S. 33-C(2). If sub-section (2), is, as has been held by the Supreme Court, of a wider scope than sub-section (1) of S. 33-C, the word "benefit" as it seems to us, would include also money but requiring computation. The word "computed" is not to be understood only as involving a complex process of arithmetic or calculation. If, for instance, a workman claims salary at a particular rate per month and on that basis makes a claim for arrears of salary, we do not see why it is not a benefit which can be computed in terms of money. The word "computed" merely means, as we think, calculation, whether simple or otherwise. 5. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100/-. 6. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 69 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e business which would necessarily mean the securing, possessing and selling of excisable articles in question. 10. Mr. Misra then contended that there is no clear finding on this point by the lower authority and a further statement of the case may be called for from the Tribunal as to whether all the partners or the licensee alone actually carried on the business of possessing and selling excisable articles. In my opinion there is no ambiguity in the findings of the Tribunal quoted above and it is unnecessary to call for a further statement of the case. 11. For these reasons I would following the Madras, Kerala and the Punjab decisions referred to earlier, hold that the agreement of partnership was unlawful and consequently the Income Tax Authorities were justified in refusing registration of the partnership. 12. The question is therefore answered in the affirmative. The applicant should pay the costs of this reference to the opposite party. Raj Kishore Das, J. 13. I agree.
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1964 (12) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 I.T.R. 311, where certain book entries were relied upon to postulate the formation of a trust and it was admitted that no funds corresponding thereto had been set apart or allocated at any time, it was held that such entries did not operate as valid gifts or trusts. But here again, the position in the present case is certainly different. If the validity of the gifts cannot be challenged and the subsequent conduct of the parties does support the formation of a genuine partnership, the circumstances that the two partners were the daughters of the assessee, or that they took no active part in the conduct of the business, are irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the question. The Tribunal was not, in our opinion, in law justified in refusing registration of the firm. The question is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee, who will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1964 (12) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... adopted in this case. In view of this, it is unnecessary for us to give a finding on the abstract question whether the Central Income Tax Officers computation should be legally binding on the Agricultural Income Tax Officer. 21. We allow the revision case (T. C. No. 146 of 1963) for the reasons aforesaid, and set aside the order of the authorities below. We also make the rule nisi in each of the three writ petitions (W. P. Nos. 698 to 700 of 1963) absolute. The result is that the assessments concerned in these writ petitions are not susceptible to the revision as now proposed by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer will be directed to make a revised assessment in the case T. C. No. 146 of 1963, in the light of our observations above, on the basis of the Central Income Tax Officers computation, which in the circumstances of the case, has to be accepted as the proper basis for the assessment of agricultural Income Tax. No order as to costs.
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1964 (12) TMI 66 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... les made thereunder." In this connection the slight difference in language in the corresponding provision of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 (see Section 23) may be seen. There, the words used are "unless the enactment or rule otherwise provides". In the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 (see Section 22) and in the Bihar & Orissa General Clauses Act (see Section 23) the language used is similar to that used in the Orissa Act. Hence by merely providing in a rule for a different method of publication, a notification required to be made under the provisions of the Act cannot be deemed to have been validly made unless there is actual publication in the Gazette. 8. For these reasons, I would, in agreement with the lower Court, hold that there was no valid notification under Section 290 (1) of the Orissa Municipal Act and consequently the question of contravention of that section does not arise. The order of acquittal is maintained and the appeal is dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 65 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the matter, namely, whether the specified amounts allotted to the beneficiaries are indeterminate or unknown. From the analysis of the relevant provisions of the deed of endowment as stated above, it appears that the fixed sum payable to the beneficiaries may be variable in different years in different situations. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respective shares of the beneficiaries are determinate and known. Dr. Pal has referred to Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bhim Chandra Ghosh 1956 30 I.T.R. 46. and the Official Trustee of West Bengal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1954 26 I.T.R. 410. Both these cases do not give material assistance inasmuch as they do not deal with the second part of the first proviso to section 41(1) and, as such, we do not intend to discuss them at length. For the reasons stated above, the answer to the question of law referred to us will be in the affirmative and against the assessee. Each party shall bear and pay the costs of this reference.
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1964 (12) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nion, the conclusions reached by the learned Judge are correct on that point and must be upheld. In the facts of this case it must be held that there was no arbitration agreement and no valid reference to arbitration. Mr. Basak has pointed out that the learned Judge has considered an argument advanced by Mr. Mukherjee that the award was vague and unenforceable. The learned Judge has held that clause (e) of the award may be somewhat vague by itself but read with the other provisions, the vagueness disappears. The learned Judge has said that if necessary he might have remitted the award. In view of the findings of the Court below and of ourselves upon the main point, it is unnecessary to consider the question as to whether any part of the award is vague or not. The award is invalid and has been rightly set aside. 6. The result is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed. Costs of all parties, both of the Courts below and in this Court of appeal will come out of the estate.
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1964 (12) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent for seven years, and under the fourth paragraph to s. 201, the appellants are liable to be sentenced to a maximum of one-fourth of seven years of imprisonment. The facts of the case call for the maximum sentence. Accordingly, the sentence passed on the appellants for the offence under S. 201 should be reduced to a sentence of one year and nine months. Mr. Girish Chandra attempted to argue that the entire conviction of Roshan Lal under s. 201 was illegal. But it is not open to him to argue this point, as the special leave is limited to the question of the legality of the sentence only. We are also not disposed to grant him leave to challenge the legality of the conviction at this stage. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, and the sentences passed on the appellants for the offence under S. 201 of the Indian Penal Code are reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and nine months. In other respects, the judgment under appeal is affirmed. Appeal partly allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e obligation the moment the sums were paid to him to repay the same. It as rather in their contemplation that the amounts might be used in the business of the husband and would only have to be repaid on demand. In fact, that is the evidence of the respondent herself. She said that her husband wanted the moneys stating that he would keep them and whenever she demanded the same, he would return the amounts. (10) Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the fact that Abdul Gaffur Sahib needed the moneys and wanted his wife to advance the same indicted that the transactions were loans. AIR 1947 Bom 255 is relied on in support. But the point in that circumstance in itself, as we mentioned, is not conclusive on the nature of the transaction. We are satisfied in this case, on the facts we have just referred to, that the three sums constituted deposits. (11) On that finding it follows that the suit was within time. (12) The appeal is dismissed with costs. (13) Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y charge against the respondent. Under the conditions of service, the management was entitled to terminate the services of the respondent on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. In accordance with the conditions of service, the management terminated his employment. In no sense was this order of termination of employment a punishment within the meaning of sub-r. (3) of R. 6 of the Service Rules. The order of the management did not entail any evil consequences to the respondent; it did not deprive him of any right to which he was entitled. As the action of the management was not an order of punishment, the respondent was not entitled to appeal from this order to the State Government, nor was the State Government entitled to order his reinstatement. The appeal as also the order of the State Government passed on the appeal are both misconceived. The appellate order is not only erroneous but also without jurisdiction, and is liable to be set aside. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n, because her two sons were recently married. That requirement cannot be called as lacking in bona fides. No evidence is available to indicate that the landlady intends to let out the premises to some one else. The fact that recently some shop was vacated and was not occupied by the landlady but was let out, does not advance the case of the tenant because it is found that the shop could be used only for commercial purposes and was unfit for residential purposes. No other motive is attributed to the landlady. The Subordinate Judge has reached the conclusion on evidence that her requirements of additional accommodation are true and we see no reason to disagree with that conclusion. (12) For all the aforesaid reasons the revision petition must fail and is dismissed with costs. he tenant will vacate the building within three months from the date of this judgment and in case he does not so vacate, it is open to the landlady to put the order in execution. (13) Petition dismissed.
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1964 (12) TMI 59 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reopen the assessment was barred under the old Act at the date when the new Act came into force. The right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment of the petitioner in the present case was admittedly barred under section 34(1)(a) at the commencement of the new Act and it was, therefore, not competent to the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under section 148 in order to reopen the assessment of the petitioner and to reassess the income of the petitioner by relying on the provision enacted in section 297(2)(d)(ii). The notice dated 13th November, 1963, was, therefore, beyond jurisdiction and must be set aside. Along with that notice, the subsequent notice dated 9th January, 1964, must also fail. In the result we allow the petition and issue a writ of mandamus quashing and setting aside the notices dated 13th November, 1963, and 9th January, 1964, issued against the petitioner. The respondent will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... igation of mentioned in sub section 1 attaches and is created against all the previously existing companies. This date must for all the purposes continue of remain April 1, 1956. (30) In that view of the matter, we find it unnecessary to discuss the various arguments advanced in connection with the true construction of section 637A behalf of the petitioner company and the respondents. As we are in favor of the petitioner on the main grounds of the true construction and effect of sub section 90 of the companies act we deem it unnecessary to decide the further questions raised on behalf of the petitioner company. (31) The result is that we must strike down and we hereby declare the impugned order of revocation of the exemption dated March 24,1952 as invalid and of no effect. There shall be a mandamus against the respondents restraining the from enforcing a that order of the revocation of the this respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner - company. (32) Petition allowed.
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1964 (12) TMI 57 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of April, 1956. Sub- section (4) of section 34 cannot also apply because it is prospective, i.e., it applies to notices which were issued after that sub-section came into force. It cannot therefore apply in the present case as the notice was issued on December 16, 1958. Section 4 of the 1959 Act also cannot apply for the reasons given by Sarkar J. in Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas 1963 49 I.T.R. (S.C.) 1 and also in Omkarmal Meghraj v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1960 38 I.T.R. 369, because section 34(1) which was in force when the notice was issued was the one as amended by the 1959 Act and therefore the notice does not fall within the scope of section 4 of the 1959 Act. For these reasons, the contention urged by Mr. Kaji as regards the invalidity of the notice must be upheld. The petition, therefore, is allowed, the notice is quashed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b). The respondent will pay to the petitioner the costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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