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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 79 Records
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1964 (4) TMI 144 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed, Mr. P. R. Daga is only concerned. The claim in the plaint is only a money claim and not enforcement of the lien. Therefore the plaintiff's claim as against P. R. Daga also stands on the same footing. The cause of action arose either on the date of lien or at most when demand was made in respect of the lien on 20 March 1957 and 26, March 1957 according to the particulars supplied, by the plaintiff by its letter dated 22 November 1961. It is well settled that a party is bound by his particulars. Thus it appears that limitation in each case would be three years and therefore the claim of the plaintiff on the letter of lien is also barred by limitation. 20. That disposes of the issue of law and the suit. 21. For the reasons stated the suit is bound to be dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, of the case I do not feel called upon and/or required to consider the other issues which were raised in the suit. 22. The suit is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel.
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1964 (4) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt to retain in possession any of the documents which notionally he would be deemed to have returned to the owner on the expiry of the four months and to have got fresh possession over those documents not by virtue of a search warrant but by virtue of an order of the Central Government under sub-s. (2) of s. 19. 26. We therefore hold that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction over the articles seized in execution of the search warrant issued under s. 19(3) of the Act and that he cannot permit the retention of such documents by the Director of Enforcement after the expiry of the period he is entitled to keep them in accordance with the provisions of s. 19-A. In the special circumstances of the case, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and order that the documents mentioned at items Nos. 2 and 7 of the Seizure Memo can be retained by the Director of Enforcement till the final conclusion of the proceedings commenced under s. 23 of the Act. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 142 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... eable expressions. In our opinion, therefore, the posting of these drafts in payment of the bills by the Government of India cannot be said to be by post either on the express or implied request of the assessee. The post office, therefore, was not an agent of the assessee in receiving the payment. It is not in dispute that if the post office is not an agent of the assessee, then the payment has been received by the assessee in Ujjain, a place outside the taxable territories. The profits included in these sale proceeds falling under category 2, which amount to ₹ 8,33,378, are, therefore, not received by the assessee in the taxable territories. The answer to the question relating to the sale proceeds falling under category 2 will, therefore, have to be in favour of the assessee and against the department. 41. For reasons stated above, we answer questions (a) and (c) in the affirmative and question (b) in the negative. Assessee shall pay two-thirds costs of the department.
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1964 (4) TMI 141 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pinion about the merits of that controversy. No serious argument was advances with regard to the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge on the other issues, by learned counsel on either side. Even otherwise we are satisfied that the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge on those issues are correct. (22) In the result, we confirm the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss the appeal. We are of the clear opinion that this appeal is a frivolous one and the first defendant, out of spite and vindictiveness is protracting the proceedings, putting every obstacle in the plaintiff getting his one-ninth share in the suit properties. The first defendant is taking sides with his second wife and her son as against the plaintiff. The first defendant should therefore pay the plaintiff his costs of the suit and the appeal out of his share of the assets but not personally. The other respondents shall bear their own costs of the appeal. (23) Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 140 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his argument. No doubt the complaint on which the cognizance had been taken is not happily worded, but it has been signed by the Executive Officer Municipal Board and it mentions the accusation against the respondent to the effect that he had constructed a khokha without the permission of the Municipal Board on its land. Schedule II to the U. P. Municipalities Act which deals with the scheduled powers of an Executive Officer read with Section 60 of the Act makes it clear that it is within the competence of the Executive Officer to institute the prosecutions by making complaints and giving information, and to authorise other persons to make such complaints and to give such information. 15. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate is set aside and the respondent is convicted under Section 299 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, read with bye-law 2 of the Municipal Board of Saharanpur and sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 25/- only.
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1964 (4) TMI 139 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is witness was not speaking the truth when he changed his version during the time of cross-examination. It was no doubt then open to the defendant's counsel to treat him as a hostile witness and cross-examine him. Probably he did not want to do so as it will be dangerous experiment with such a witness. We are of opinion that no inference against the due execution of the will can be drawn from the fact that this witness did not support the will. Although there are certain infirmative circumstances like the letter to the Municipality, Ex. B. 62, we are satisfied, on the whole, that the will must have been a true and genuine one. Its execution has also been satisfactorily proved. The disposition under it will be operative to convey all the properties possessed by Bagirathi to Sivaprakasa, except the western house, in respect of which there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. In other respects the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. (20) Appeal partly allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 138 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... its present form, as amended in the year 1948, in so far as it enables the dismissal of an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for default of appearance of the appellant, will, therefore, be ultra vires, as being in conflict with the provisions of section 33(4) of the Act. We may also point out that if the Appellate Tribunal should have a power of dismissing an appeal for default of appearance of a party, such power can only be given by the legislature itself; it cannot be done by a mere rule promulgated under section 5A(8) as any rule made in that behalf will be contrary to the existing provision in section 33(4) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the question set out at the beginning in the affirmative. The result is that the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal has not yet been legally disposed of. Inasmuch as it has not been disposed of, occasion has not yet arisen for this court to answer the second question referred to it. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (4) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tween the appellant and M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a question incidental to the industrial dispute which has been referred under s. 10(1)(d). This dispute is a substantial dispute between the appellant and M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as incidental in any sense, and so, we think that even this ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party which can be added and summoned under the implied powers of the Tribunal under s. 18(3)(b). 20. The results is, though we accept Mr. Chatterjee's argument that s. 18(3)(b) postulates the existence of an implied power in the Tribunal to add parties and summon them, in the present case that power cannot be exercised, because having regard to the limited nature of the implied power, M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. cannot be regarded as a necessary party under the provisions of s. 18(3)(b). The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. 21. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his duty and detain the letter instead of sending it by the next mail in the ordinary course of his duties. His act, therefore, in detaining the letter, amounted to his detaining it wilfully. 42. The failure of the prosecution to establish successfully that he himself opened the letter, tempered with its contents and removed the half currency note, facts which have been proved to have been committed by someone, does not mean that his detaining the letter was not on purpose. 43. A person may do an act with a certain purpose and yet may not succeed in his purpose. Even if he succeeds it may not be possible for any other person to establish that he did that act for that purpose and did succeed in achieving that purpose. 44. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. ORDER BY COURT 45. In accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal is allowed, the order of conviction and sentence set aside and the appellant ordered to be acquitted of the charge against him. 46. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 135 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es not arise out of the order of the Tribunal; and, secondly, as the Income-tax Officer has, in paragraph 10 of his order dated March 7, 1955, held that the motive in selling shares and transferring the managing agency was to make a profit and that this motive had existed all along while the shares were being acquired." Mr. Palkhivala says that the Tribunal is wrong in saying that the question whether the shares were acquired by the assessee-company to support the managing agency does not arise on its order. The assessee had, as a matter of fact, raised the said argument before the Tribunal, and in the reference application which it had made it had referred to having raised the said point and having cited even authorities in support of the said point. Although Mr. Joshi for the revenue has objected to our taking these documents on records, in view of the submissions urged by Mr. Palkhivala we have acceded to his request to take the documents on record as desired by him.
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1964 (4) TMI 134 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the imposition of penalty under section 28(1)(c). Here the finding given by the Income-tax Officer was that the explanation offered by the assessee was deliberately false. This court has held in Lal Chand Gopal Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 48 ITR 324 that "If a receipt is income but is disguised in the accounts or in the return as a non-assessable receipt, it is clearly a case of concealment of the particulars or of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and a penalty under section 28(1)(c) can be imposed on the assessee." Thus both the grounds on which it was contended that no penalty could be imposed fail. We answer the question in the affirmative. We direct that a copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax shall get his costs which we assess at ₹ 200 from the assessee.
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1964 (4) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the factory was agreeable to increase the wages of the workers from, ₹ 1/14/ - to ₹ 2/- per thousand bidis. In the other case also a similar letter was addressed showing that whenever there was increase or decrease in wages of the workers who, work under the so-called independent contractors the real decision was taken by the appellants. This conduct on the part of the appellants is clearly inconsistent with their plea that the workers are not their employees and there is no privity between them and the said workers. We are therefore of opinion that on the facts found in these cases the appeal court was right in holding that the conclusion reached by the tribunal that the intermediaries were merely branch managers appointed by the management and the relationship of employers and employees subsisted between the appellants and the bidi rollers is correct. In this view the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed with costs-one set of hearing costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (4) TMI 132 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... I.T.R. 7 rested. There are also the decisions in Jummarlal Surajkaran v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 47 I.T.R. 809, Sree Hanuman Investment Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 48 I.T.R. 915 and recently in Joseph John v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1964 51 I.T.R. 322. In all these cases the learned judges largely relied upon the considerations which prevailed in Keshavlal Premchand's case 1957 31 I.T.R. 7. In our judgment, for the purpose of computing the profits and gains from business under section 10, the proviso to section 24(1) under consideration can have no application. Accordingly, the question referred must be answered in the affirmative. We direct that a copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee shall be entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is also assessed at ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (4) TMI 131 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kalipada Maity v. Sukumai Bose AIR1962Cal639 . Kunhamed Kutti J while referring the present case for consideration by this Bench has expressed that he found himself more in agreement with the view taken in the two cases cited above, than with the one that found acceptance with Kailasam J. We share that opinion. In our view, the words "any person appearing before it as a witness" employed in Section 479A are not words of article but are only intended to convey the idea of a witness physically appearing in court and giving evidence or producing documents It follows that the procedure adopted for filing the complaint against the petitioner under Section 479A cannot be accepted as being in accordance with law. The proper procedure will be the one prescribed by Section 476 Cr.P.C. In the absence of such a complaint the prosecution cannot stand. The order of the lower court will, therefore, be set aside and this revision case allowed.
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1964 (4) TMI 130 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... association of persons. But strangely enough, while referring to the demand notice served on Kalyanasundara Nadar, it described him as one of the "partners." We are unable to see how the Tribunal without arriving at a finding on the two questions namely, (1) whether the partnership between Thiagaraja Pillai and Kalyanasundara Nadar was legal, and (ii) if not, whether Kalyanasundara Nadar was recognised as the principal office of the association of persons, can sustain the rejection of Thiagaraja Pillai's application under S. 27 of he Act. 11. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in this manner, namely, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the application of Thiagaraja Pillai under S. 27 was out of time without deciding the question whether the notice to Kalyanasundara Nadar would be sufficient notice to bind Thiagaraja Pillai. We consider that, in the circumstances of the case, there should be no order as to costs. 12. Answer accordingly.
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1964 (4) TMI 129 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that case does not lay down the proposition that a partner in an unregistered partnership in his individual assessment cannot adjust the share of the losses suffered by him in the unregistered partnership, which has not been assessee, in computing his profits and gains from business. That question, as we see from the last observations referred to above, was not decided by their Lordships in that case. 22. Mr. Joshi, therefore, cannot press into service the said decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muthuraman Chettiar for the proposition which he has contended. 23. In the result, therefore, in our view, the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the appeal preferred before it by the assessee is correct and the question, which has been referred to us on the present reference, must therefore, be answered in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly. The department will pay the costs of the assessee. 24. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (4) TMI 128 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... n we fail to see how the rate of exchange in the year 1945 would be relevant for this purpose when the finding of the Tribunal clearly is that the loss occurred to the assessee in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1942-43. In making an assessment, the income-tax authorities have to consider the position as it emerges at the end of the accounting year. It is not in dispute that the equivalent in the Indian currency according to the rate of exchange prevailing in the accounting year of the loss of 1,79,311 Yens would be ₹ 1,46,130. In our opinion, there is no error in the finding of the Tribunal on the aforesaid third issue also. In the result, our answer to the first issue is in the affirmative subject to the modification of substitution of the figure "Rs. 1,46,130" in place of the figure "Rs. 1,94,495". Our answer to the second issue also is in the affirmative. The department shall pay 3/4th costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1964 (4) TMI 127 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g to the coffee delivered to the Coffee Board in the years 1955-56 and 1956-57. The respondent has included that amount in his order and taxed the same. In this writ petition, the correctness of that inclusion is challenged. For the reasons mentioned above, that amount should not have been taken into consideration in ascertaining the tax liability of the petitioner. The other contentions raised in the petition were not urged at the time of the hearing. Therefore it is not necessary to refer to them. In the result, we issue a writ quashing the impugned order of assessment, i.e., the order passed by the respondent on September 30, 1959, in Assessment No. 88-(3)/59-60 in so far as it imposes any tax on the "dividends" above-mentioned. It is open to the respondent to correct the order of assessment to make the same conform with the requirements of law, as interpreted in this judgment. The respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate's fee ₹ 100.
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1964 (4) TMI 126 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , which was held by the Supreme Court as discriminatory under article 14 of the Constitution, provided for a different treatment involving different consequences to some of the persons who belonged to the same class to which the provision of section 34 of the Income-tax Act applied. The same was also the ratio of the decision in the other case, viz., M. Ct. Muthiah v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 29 I.T.R. 390 ; 1955 2 S.C.R. 1247. As we have already pointed out, in the present case before us, the provision being applicable to all cases, which are pending before the Income-tax Officer, will have no discriminatory effect in its application. In the result, therefore, the view taken by the income-tax authorities and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is correct and the question, which has been referred to us on this reference, must be answered in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (4) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... arned Counsel for the appellant. The decision of the High Court that the proviso is bad is therefore, set aside and the question is left open for decision if and when it becomes really necessary to do so. In view of our decision that the High Court erred in thinking that s. 31 of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act had to be applied the High Court’s order quashing the abolition of posts and the notices of termination cannot be sustained. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court quashing the Government resolution of the 29th May, 1961 directing the abolition of posts and also its order quashing the notices of termination. As we have set aside the High Court’s decision as regards the validity of the proviso to sub-cl. 3 of cl. 9 of the Order and left the matter open, the High Court’s direction that no action should be taken under the proviso is also set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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