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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 54 Records
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1964 (7) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ently find it difficult to complete the investigation within a period of six months and to put up a charge-sheet against police officers within that period. The difficult in the way of the prosecution putting up a charge sheet within six months need not deflect the Court from arriving at a correct conclusion on the basis of the wordings of the statute. If the difficulties are genuinely felt, it would be for the legislature to step in and amend the law as was remarked by his Lordship Mr. Justice Bhagwati in paragraph 17 of the Supreme Court decision in Behram Khurshid v. Bombay State, (S) 1955CriLJ215 . (40) In the result, the appeal is allowed, the convictions and sentences of the three appellants are quashed and set aside and the prosecution of these three accused under the several sections of the Indian Penal Code is dismissed in accordance with the provisions of S. 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The bail bonds of the appellants shall stand cancelled. (41) Appeal allowed.
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1964 (7) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lthough they held that the notification under Section 17(1) was bad. In the view we have taken upon other points, we do not feel called upon to decide this question regarding the severability of the proceedings. Moreover we have in this case also held that the notification under Section 4 is bad for other reasons. In that view it is unnecessary to decide whether the principle of severability applies here. (114) In the result, we allow the petition and quash the notifications issued by the first respondent under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. We also quash the notifications so far as Section 17 has been applied in this case and hold that the possession of the petitioner's land taken under those notifications under Section 17 was illegal and must be restored to the petitioner. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioner. The order restoring possession is at the request of Mr. Setalvad for the State stayed upto 1st October 1964. (115) Petition allowed.
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1964 (7) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... affected by that order. Until such communication is made, it could be varied as many times as is necessary. 2. In the present case, the order of appointment had been made by the Director of Panchayats who was the competent authority under the Notification. But before it was communicated to the petitioner, it was recalled and cancelled. The mere fact that one official handed it over to another does not mean that there was communication of the order. The order is effective only when it is communicated to him, so that he receives it or must be presumed to have received it. It is not disputed that this was not done at any point of time. In my opinion, therefore, the order was never completed and therefore never became effective. Consequently the petitioner has no legal right to maintain an application for a Writ. The result is that this application is misconceived and must be dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (7) TMI 57 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ned counsel for the parties, and in the circumstances I would hold that the power to make law with respect to the Gift-tax Act is covered by Entry 97 of List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule read with article 248 of the Constitution which gives the residuary powers of legislation to Parliament and reads as under "Entry 97.--Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. Article 248.--(1) Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. (2) Such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists." It would follow from the above that Parliament was well within its power in enacting the Gift-tax Act. The petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. A.N. GROVER J.--I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (7) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... part of the owner, or after such duty or charges are levied they have been wrongly refunded. In such cases the person who is liable to pay such duty or charges which are so short-levied or wrongly refunded has to pay the deficit or the amount so refunded on a demand made therefore within three months from the date of on which the duty or the charge was paid or adjusted, in the owner's account-current, if any, or from the date of refund. The demand made in the instant case -was not found on the ground of short-levy or refund as envisaged by this rule on an assessment having already been made. The demand in the present case was made under rule 9(2) on the contravention of clause (1) of that rule i.e., on the goods having been removed clandestinely without there having been an assessment and with out the duty chargeable on them having been paid. No question of the demand being time-barred can, therefore, arise and rule 10 clearly has no application. (33) Petitions dismissed.
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1964 (7) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n was largely vitiated by the concession made by the Advocate General, which was contrary to the record, we think there should be no order as to costs in appeals Nos. 533-538 of 1963. 15. Correctness of the view taken by the High Court in appeals Nos. 960 to 968 of 1963 has not been challenged by the Attorney-General appearing in this Court and the question having become academic, we direct that those appeals be dismissed. The State will pay costs in those appeals to the Respondents. 16. By writ petitions 61, 62 and 152 of 1963 the Petitioners challenge the validity of the appointment of ten candidates selected for promotion on the ground that the appointment infringes the fundamental right of the Petitioners under Article 16. For reasons already set out in dealing with the first group of appeals petition No. 62 of 1963 must fail. There will be no order as to costs in that writ petition. Petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 61 and 152 of 1963 desire to withdraw their petitions.
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1964 (7) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... behalf but entirely on behalf of the buyer. We cannot fairly say therefore that a sale of the chemicals and raw material for match manufacture was anything more than a winding up sale, not with a view to trading in chemical and raw materials, but to close down the business and to realise the assets. There was in fact no identifiable price for the chemicals and raw materials except by comparing the two prices offered to be paid by the buyer, that is to say, the price without the chemicals and raw materials were sold in the ordinary way of business, or that the assessee was carrying on a trading business........" If at all, the facts of the present case are even clearer. It follows that the question has to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. (6) Learned counsel withdraws the other question from the reference. They are accordingly not answered. The assessee will be entitled to is costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. (7) Question answered in negative.
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1964 (7) TMI 53 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... obiter dicta. The above-mentioned Calcutta authority was also cited before the Supreme Court in Shivram Poddar's case 1964 51 ITR 823 and the observation made in the Calcutta authority was held to be obiter. In any case the matter should be deemed to have been set at rest by the two Supreme Court authorities referred to above. In the present case there is also the additional fact that the assessee-firm was in existence at the time notice under section 22(2) of the Act was served and the dissolution of the firm took place after the service of the aforesaid notice. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to dilate on this aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the case is otherwise covered by the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. I would, accordingly, answer the question referred for decision in the affirmative. Looking to the circumstances of the case, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. A.N. Grover, J.-I agree.
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1964 (7) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ke them into parts of an engine, carry them to a particular place, and put them together, and fix parts to the soil, and so convert them into a fixed engine on the land itself, so as to pump water out of a mine. 41. We think it unnecessary to refer to any further cases. We are of opinion that the special features and the incidents in this contract are such that it should be regarded as a works contract. We, there fore, uphold the claim of the assessee-petitioner with regard to this item. 42.As regards the third item, the learned Additional Government Pleader fairly conceded that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mathra Parshad & Sons v. State of Punjab 1962 13 S.T.C. 180, the claim will have to be allowed even though the amendment that a dealer is not bound to pay sales tax upon sales tax collected by him came in the middle of the year. In view of this, the claim of the assessee also should be upheld. 43. We, therefore, allow the tax revision case. No costs.
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1964 (7) TMI 51 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ding to the wordings of sub-section (1B). In that sub-section, there is no restriction to the effect that, in spite of notices served under section 34(1)(a), there would be any time-limit if the cases could have come within sub-section (1A). It is also dependent on the earlier argument that in cases of assessees who had been proceeded against under the Income-tax (Investigation Commission) Act, notice could only be issued under sub-section (1A) or that sub-section (1A) was the only provision intended to deal with cases against assessees whose cases had been referred to the Income-tax Investigation Commission. Neither of these arguments are acceptable, and, consequently, the argument relating to sub-section (1B) also fails. These are the only points taken on behalf of the petitioner and have failed. For the reasons given above, the application cannot succeed and must be dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (7) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... s, therefore, futile to consider the cases cited on behalf of the appellant. viz., Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra,(S) (1957) ILLJ 477 SC and National Shipping Co., v. Haripada Saha, AIR 1958 Cal 597 , for the proposition that the Collector and the Tahsildar when they acted under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act are not really the servants of the Central Government, but only the servants of the State Government. 48. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to give a finding on the quantum of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. 49. No other point has been argued before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. 50. Inasmuch as the Government had not raised the contention in the written statement that it is not vicariously liable for the tort committed by the Tahsildar, nor taken an issue on the point, we think it just that the Government shall be allowed costs only in the trial Court, but not in the appeal. 51. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (7) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... first schedule under which, according to the petitioner, it would fall. That serial number deals with vegetable oil. The word "vegetable" has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as meaning (1) a living organism belonging to the vegetable kingdom or the lower of the two series of organic beings; a growth devoid of animal life; a plant and (2) a plant cultivated for food; especially an edible herb or root used for human consumption and commonly eaten sandalwood oil will certainly fall within the first of the meanings above, and, therefore, there appears to be no difficulty in classifying it as a vegetable oil falling within serial No. 20 of the First Schedule of the Sales Tax Act and excluding it from both Serial No. 51 of the First Schedule and Serial No. 6-A of the Second Schedule. The revision case is allowed and the assessing authority will revise the assessment in the light of our findings above there will be no order as to costs. 10. Revision allowed.
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1964 (7) TMI 48 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ns of law or fact arise or that they are by or against the same person. We are not prepared to lay down that the practice of uniting in one petition several causes of action against the same opposite party is reasonable merely because it is permitted by Order II Rule 3 and, there-fore, must be permitted as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience in a proceeding under Article 226. One safeguard against the abuse of the practice namely that contained in Section 17 of the Court-Fees Act is not available in a petition under Article 226 and that itself is a sufficient reason for not allowing it. 9. Our answer to the question is that one writ petition for the quashing of two assessment orders pertaining to two assessment years or one petition for the quashing of two assessment orders under two different taxing statutes, even though the assessee is the same and the assessing authority is the same, cannot be entertained. List the case before the learned Judge with this answer.
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1964 (7) TMI 47 - PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e for any employer to make that if the delay of two or three days has been condoned in the past it will not be taken account of in the future. It is certainly not in consonance with the purpose and object of the Act to choose a date six years after the default to exercise the power to levy damages in respect of all payments made after the scheduled lime. The purpose of Section 14B is as much reformative as punitive. A defaulting employer, in my opinion, is given a chance to amend himself when a penalty up to 25 per cent becomes leviable. The exercise of discretion in the present case, in my opinion, is certainly arbitrary and has resulted in the operation of law very harshly. 9. For these reasons, I would allow this petition and holding that the order Exhibit Rule 1 has been passed in excess of the powers vested in the first respondent would direct that it be quashed. As the petitioner has been in default on some occasions, I would make no order as to costs of this petition.
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1964 (7) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... t. The Punjab High Court in Dewan Chand v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1951 20 ITR 621 no doubt held that any dismissal of an appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the ground of limitation would not fall under section 31 of the Act, because the scheme of the Act contemplated a determination of the appeal on the merits of the assessment. This view was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court in Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 29 ITR 607 ; 1956 SCR 1. Thus, neither in principle nor on authority, is it possible to uphold the petitioner's contention in the instant case that a dismissal by the Tribunal of an appeal, after its being admitted, on the ground of limitation or on any kindred ground must lead to the conclusion that no appeal in the eye of law was preferred by the assessee making the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order the subject of the appeal. In view of the foregoing, this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1964 (7) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and charcoal fall in this definition, they would automatically be assessable as agricultural income, without any question as to whether they were received in the process of winding up as a result of a realisation sale, or after a sale partaking the nature of a trading activity. But, in the view we have taken, of the scope of the official liquidator's sales in the present case, being of a pattern which followed the same pattern as the sales before liquidation and, consequently, that there was nothing to infer that they were realisation sales and not sales in the course of the normal activity of the company, it appears to us to be unnecessary to give any decision on this point raised by the Government pleader regarding the scope of section 2(a) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. We, therefore, hold that the order of the Tribunal is right and calls for no interference in revision. The revision case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Revision case dismissed.
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1964 (7) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd those 10,000 skins are found non-existent, it may be presumed that the assessee had disposed of those skins in some way or other, thereby deriving income which he has suppressed. But where the skins are there, not having been disposed of by the assessee, it is unreasonable to say that upon the notional sale value of those skins, profit could or should have been derived which should be brought in as taxable income. The orders of the authorities below do not say that the assessee has dealt with these rejections at all, and, in the face of that irrefutable circumstance, there can in law be no addition on this head. We are accordingly satisfied that there was no justification whatsoever for making the additions of ₹ 30,000, ₹ 47,717 and ₹ 18,000 in respect of the three assessment years. The question is so answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1964 (7) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... need not be interfered with. (f) Even if an assessee be absent at the hearing, the Commissioner of Income-tax must not proceed against him on undisclosed grounds or on undisclosed basic materials collected against him. He must give further notice to the absent assessee, if it becomes necessary for him to proceed on the basis of new grounds and new undisclosed basic materials. (g) If the Commissioner of Income-tax discloses one or more grounds in the notice, but revises the order on an entirely different ground, not disclosed to the assessee, that order cannot be sustained. For reasons already stated, the order of revision in the present case cannot be condemned for violation of the principles of natural justice. I, therefore, discharge this rule with costs. I make it clear that I do not dissent from the judgment of Sinha J. in Matter No. 158 of 1963 Rampiyari Khemka v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1966 61 I.T.R. 600. That case may have been correctly decided on its own facts.
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1964 (7) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rket fell off, the Income-tax Officer cannot ask the assessee why he could not have sold the skins in other foreign countries. That is virtually the stand taken by the Tribunal. As we have also pointed out, if the assessee should gain an initial advantage by valuing his closing stock at "nil", he is bound to value these goods at the same value in his opening accounts of the succeeding year of account, so that any sale of the goods in that year would result in the entire sale price being treated as profit liable to tax, clearly an advantage to the revenue. Even apart from that, it is settled law that the assessee has a right to value his closing stock at cost price or market price, whichever is lower, and, in the present case, there is no doubt that the market price was "nil". The question is therefore answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee, who will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1964 (7) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... u) of the Act. It is urged that owing to the failure on the part of the assessing authority to serve such a notice, the respondents had no opportunity for urging their objections to being assessed as an "association of individuals". The respondents' counsel urged that without a separate notice under section 16(2) of the Act on the principal officer of the association of individuals, the assessment itself is invalid. We see considerable force in this argument, but, however, in the circumstances of this case, we prefer to rest our decision on the finding given already, that the data adduced are not sufficient for constituting the four persons, who have submitted separate returns, into an association of individuals. We, therefore, dismiss the revision case, though for reasons different from those given by the Tribunal below. It will be open to the assessing authority to assess the different persons on the basis of their return and in accordance with law. No costs.
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