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Showing 1 to 20 of 76 Records
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1965 (4) TMI 137 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aramana. AIR 1956 Mys 37 25 CLT 545). The amendment is therefore allowed. Allowing amendment of the plaint does not, however, mean that the plaintiff's suit on the original cause of action, if proved, must necessarily succeed. If on the evidence the Court would come to the conclusion that there was an agreement between the parties that on the promissory-note being dishonoured or becoming inadmissible in evidence, the plaintiff cannot bring a suit on the original cause of action, then alone the plaintiff's suit would fail and not otherwise. 7. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside and the amendment is allowed. As the defendant has been unnecessarily put to harassment for plaintiff's delay, the petitioner is to pay a consolidated costs of Rs 50 within three weeks from to-day to the opposite party as a condition precedent, failing which the prayer for amendment would stand dismissed. Subject to the aforesaid condition, the Civil Revision is allowed.
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1965 (4) TMI 136 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... him of his right to possess the jagir, then there would not have been in its very nature a provision for stop page of interest resulting in the reduction of the compensation amount because of the amount remaining unpaid for any default of the jagirdar. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the amount awarded to a jagirdar under section 8(2) of the Act as interest is not any amount of compensation or damages for the loss of his jagir but only compensation payable by the State for keeping back the amount of compensation from him. The interest amount paid to the jagirdar only represents the profit which the jagirdar might have had if he had been paid the compensation money on the date of the resumption of his jagir if he had the use of the money from that date. Out answer to the question propounded is, therefore, in the negative. The Commissioner of Income Tax shall have the costs of this reference. Counsels fee is fixed at ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (4) TMI 135 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ities in Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Narsee Nagsee & Co. that, where assessment proceeding had failed to result in a valid assessment owing to some lacuna other than that attributable to the assassin authorities, there was a case of chargeable income escaping assessment and not a case of mere non-assessment of Income Tax. In our view, there is considerable force in his not necessary to examine this contention in greater detail as it appears to us that the Income Tax authorities came to have knowledge of some facts after the assessment in 1952, which were not known before, and consequently. There were within their rights top serve the notice under section 34 (1) (a). The answer to the question passed will be in affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of the reference. Syed Sadat Abdul Masud, J. - I agree Question answered in the affirmative.
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1965 (4) TMI 134 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the defendant has had experience in the Engineering Department of one of the mills under the management of the plaintiffs for a short period but nothing has been shown on the affidavits as to how the plaintiffs would be prejudiced if the defendant is not restrained from serving any other employer. This application is only for an interim injunction and it may be that at the hearing of the suit the plaintiffs may be able to lead evidence to show that it is necessary for the protection of the interests of the plaintiffs that the defendant should be restrained from serving in any other textile mill in the same capacity or even with any other employer but to day there is no material before us which would warrant the grant of an injunction even in a limited form The test which we have formulated above is not satisfied and we cannot. therefore, issue an injunction in any form against the defendant. 15. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1965 (4) TMI 133 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tirely out of place. Nor are we able to appreciate the observation of the Tribunal that the conduct of the assessee had aggravated the default. How the subsequent conduct of the assessee can aggravate the offence which was principally one of failure to submit the return in compliance with section 22(2) we are unable to see. If by this observation the Tribunal meant that the assessees subsequent explanation for the default did not appear to be true and for that reason proceeded to hold that there was aggravation of the default, that approach to the question is wholly erroneous. It seems to us that, in these circumstances, there has been no consideration of the question in the light of the requirements of section 28(1)(a) of the Act, the order imposing the penalty cannot be therefore justified in law. We accordingly answer the question in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (4) TMI 132 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Officer. A quarry permit, it appears to me, can be in relation to any land which may or may not conic under the definition of 'quarry'. The words "any specified land" in Rule 25 are with reference to the description of the land which the permit-holder is required to state in his application. I cannot find any justification to challenge the notices calling upon the petitioners to lake quarry permit for extracting brick-earth from the lands which may not have been declared and set apart by the Government as a quarry. 21. The result is that in all these applications, the notices issued by the Assistant Mining Officer calling upon the petitioners to pay royalty for the period 1958 to 1964, on account of brick-earth at the rate of ₹ 1.50. per 1,000 bricks are quashed and the opposite parties are directed not to lake any action on and following those notices. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs. A.B.N. Sinha, J. 22. I agree.
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1965 (4) TMI 131 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder of the certificate officer that the certificate officer thought and the Commissioner of Presidency Division also thought that the certificate case was restored. We have no doubt there is a slip of pen and the Board of Revenue really restored not the certificate which was never cancelled but the certificate case which was dismissed by the Commissioner when he observed that the proceedings are set aside. Before leaving this subject we may say, considered from another point of view, it may appear to be simple. The certificate-debtor was a firm. It is dissolved after the debt accrued and then execution was started against the partners without adding them as certificate-debtors. The Board of Revenue has said that execution against partners can proceed after the partners are added as certificate-debtors. The order is perfectly right. All the objections of Mr. Jyotish Chandra Pal are overruled and the rule is discharged with costs. Hearing fee being assessed at 10 gold mohurs.
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1965 (4) TMI 130 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alised. In the circumstances we do not think it was improper on the part of the Income-tax Officer to take note of these losses while making provisional assessment for the assessment year 1963-64. As observed by us, all the three writ petitions present common features and the only difference in them is that they relate to different assessment years. The imposition of the penalty in the assessments was also challenged but the ground for the challenge being the same as for challenging the assessment itself and also for the reason that an appeal could have been filed against the imposition of penalty, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders for the imposition of penalty as well. Thus, whatever we have said regarding the facts of Writ Petition No. 51 of 1964 will mutatis mutandis apply to other writ petitions. The result is that we do not find force in the writ petitions and hereby dismiss them. In the circumstances of the case, we order parties to bear their own costs.
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1965 (4) TMI 129 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d agreed to lake Chhotahhai as a partner and "agreed to carry on the business of bus plying and Cinemas in partnership" The underlined there into ' ') words "agreed to carry on" only show that according to the deed the business was to he carried on by Dayabhai and that Chhotabhai was not to participate in the working of the permit by taking actual part in the business. The present case is, therefore. fully governed by the decision of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1917 Bom 250 affirmed by the Privy Council in AIR 1921 PC 137 and the decision in ILR (1956) Nag 774 AIR 1956 Nag 225. For the foregoing reasons, our conclusion is that the assessee-firm wax not illegal and was entitled to registration under Section 20A of the Indian Income tax Act. 1922. for the assessment year 1950 57. The question propounded by the Tribunal is. therefore, answered in the affirmative. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order about costs of this reference.
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1965 (4) TMI 128 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as "solatium" and that in fact the amount which may become payable and did in this case become payable under that provision is a part of the amount paid for the sale of the undertaking. We, therefore, hold that the word "amount" used in section 10(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act includes the total amount paid by the Government to the assessee by virtue of paragraph 9 of the licence and in pursuance of section 7 of the Electricity Act including what is called "their fair market value" under the first proviso and the added value up to 20 per cent. by virtue of the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Electricity Act. In these circumstances we answer question No. 2 also in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue. All the three questions referred to us are, therefore, answered in favour of the Commissioner of Income-tax. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs in this case. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1965 (4) TMI 127 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion purchaser shall have to bring a separate suit claiming them on such basis as she thinks fit. I am, however, clear that she could not claim to retain the crops reaped by her in lieu of her claim for mesne profits, if any, in these proceedings. So many years have elapsed since the crops were cut, and there has also been no proper investigation as to the value of the crops grown so far. The case shall, therefore, have to be remanded to the original Court for the purpose of determining the value of the crops grown on the lands to which the judgment-debtor would be entitled. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fees ₹ 300/- for all the Courts. BY COURT The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NAIK J. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 300/- for all the Courts. The case shall now go back to the original Court for the purpose of determining the value of the crops grown on the suit lands to which the judgment-debtor would be entitled.
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1965 (4) TMI 126 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and when no information was received she asked her sons about 8 or 9 years ago to file a suit to assert her rights. Question would consequently arise as to when the petitioner actually came to know of the forfeiture and sale of her shares. The Court would also have to decide as to whether the claim of the petitioner in respect of her shares, which were forfeited and sold in 1947 and 1948, is within time, and this question may itself hinge upon the decision on facts. As all these are complicated matters which can only be adjudicated after recording evidence, it would, in my opinion, be not proper to go into them in the summary proceedings under Section 155 of the Companies Act. I would, therefore, decide the preliminary issue against the petitioner. 9. As a result of the above I would dismiss the petition and direct the petitioner, if she so deems proper, to establish her claim in a regular suit. The parties, in the circumstances of the case, are left to bear their own costs.
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1965 (4) TMI 125 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he financial agreement the commission to be paid to the foreign collaborators and what was expected of them. The resolution was carrying out the objects with which the authorised share capital had already been increased at the annual general meeting dated 23rd September, 1963 which has not been challenged in any court of law. In our opinion, all material facts have been disclosed in the relevant Explanatory Statement and this point accordingly fails. 13. We must however make it clear, as has been done by the learned Judge in the court, below, that our observations in this case must be taken to be observations made at an interlocutory stage and should not be treated as conclusive and binding upon the Court when finally disposing of the suit or the appeal. Subject to this, we consider that the application has no merits and should be dismissed. The cost will be cost in the appeal, certified for two counsel. 14. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. A.K. Mukherjea, J. 15. I agree
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1965 (4) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e amendment to Order 37, Rule 2 made by the Bombay High Court contemplates that even in cases where an apparently triable issue is raised the Judge may impose conditions in granting leave to defend. Thus this is a matter in the discretion of the trial Judge and in dealing with it, he ought to exercise his discretion judiciously. Care must be taken to see that the object of the rule to assist the expeditious disposal of commercial causes to which the order applies, is not defeated. Care must also be taken to see that real and genuine triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit. In a matter of this kind, it would be undesirable and inexpedient to lay down any rule of general application. 7. For these reasons we uphold the order of the trial Judge and affirmed by the appeal Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. At the request of the counsel appellants we extend the time for depositing security by a period of two months from the date of our judgment.
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1965 (4) TMI 123 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... performance, and that too without the payment of any Court-fee. This contention proceeds upon a misapprehension of the real position. The applicant will not get any relief by way of specific performance in this suit and this he can obtain only in a separate suit of his own. He is impleaded only for the limited purpose of (a) establishing that the property is the separate property of his vendor, the first defendant, or alternatively (b) for suggesting to the Court that without prejudice to the interest of the plaintiffs the property agreed to be sold may be allotted to the share of the first defendant, so that in a separate suit of his own he can either obtain specific performance or enforce a charge under Section 55(6)(b) against the property in the hands of the first defendant after a final allotment in the partition suit. 29. For all these reasons I set aside the order of the trial Court and direct that the petitioner be impleaded as a supplemented defendant. 30. No costs.
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1965 (4) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t as to the erection of the building in so far as they related to buildings erected after the date of the lease-deed had been "in writing registered’. The leaseded is in writing but is not registered. By the first part of s. 12 the tenant is protected against his own contract. The landlord is protected by the second part, but the landlord here cannot seek the protection of the second part because the leasedeed is not registered. The appellants also claimed that the words "stipulations as to the erection of buildings" cannot take in a covenant not to construct at all, as laid down in N. Vajrapani Naidu and Another v. New Theatres Carnatic Talkies Ltd.(A.I.R 964 S.C. 1440). The ruling certainly is in the appellants’ favour but it is not necessary to rely on it for the disposal of this case. As at present advised, I would not like to rest my judgment on that point of view. I agree with the order proposed but for the reasons given here. Appeal allowed,
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1965 (4) TMI 121 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ence as lending support to the Tribunal's conclusion. The Tribunal itself stated that the fact that an old stamp paper was used for the partnership deed had no significance. When Tapubhai did execute the deed and, in terms of that deed, his loan account was transferred to his capital account, we do not see how the fact that he signed the deed at Junagadh lends any support to the conclusion that the partnership is not genuine. Upon a consideration of the circumstances, which the Tribunal relied upon for its conclusion that the partnership is not genuine, we are of the view that there is no material relevant to the matter on which that conclusion could be rested. Therefore, our answer to the formulated question is that there is no evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the partnership is not genuine and its refusal to register the firm under section 26A of the Act is unjustified. The assessee shall have its costs of this reference. Hearing fee, ₹ 100.
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1965 (4) TMI 120 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but which the continuing partner undertook to pay would have resulted only in a capital loss in the event of the continuing partner failing to pay and the assessee was called upon to discharge these liabilities. If we look at the facts in this setting, the mere circumstance that the assessee was carrying on a money-lending business is all that is relied upon in support of the plea that the balance, out of ₹ 23,500, became part of the money-lending transactions of the assessee, and the irrecoverable part, that is, ₹ 12,000, should be treated as one coming within the scope of section 10(2)(xi). We are not satisfied that the claim of the assessee can be accepted in the light of these features. It follows that the assessee succeeds in respect of the first item and fails in regard to the other two. The question is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, since the assessee has failed in part, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (4) TMI 119 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g a loss. The assessee may have acted as a prudent businessman, but the income-tax law does not allow as expenses all the deductions a prudent trader would make in computing his profits. The whole law has been summed up thus in Konstam's Law of Income Tax (twelfth edition) in paragraph 105 "....expenses in order to be deductible in ascertaining profits must have been incurred for the purposes of earning the gross receipts ; they must be wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of the trade, profession or vocation. It is not enough that the disbursement is made in the course of, or arises out of, or is connected with, the trade, or is made out of the profits of the trade." Such is not the case here. Therefore, we are of opinion that the Tribunal reached the right conclusion in disallowing this deduction. It follows that the question has to be answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
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1965 (4) TMI 118 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uch case, however, was ever put forward at any stage before and it is too late in the day for Mr. Hardy to agitate this matter. On the other hand, as in the Allahabad case(1), the argument has throughout proceeded on the assumption that the assessee was carrying on business in the area falling within the jurisdiction of the District Board and in order to carry on this business it became necessary for the assessee-firm to submit to the tax liabilities imposed by the District Board. The amount, therefore, which was expended by payment of the tax in question, was for the purpose of enabling the assessee to carry on its business within the jurisdiction of the District Board and such an expenditure must necessarily be held to be of the nature covered by section 10(2)(xv). For the reasons given above, the answer to both the questions must be returned in the positive. In view of all the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. S.K. KAPUR J.--I agree.
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