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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 41 Records
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1965 (7) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods, and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably." (Constitutional law of the United States, page 587). 11. To the same effect is the statement of the Supreme Court in Sakhawant Ali v State of Orissa (A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 166.) The Supreme Court said It is for the Legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution In the light of what is stated above we have no hesitation in holding that the Act impugned is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, that the decision in the O. Ps. has to be sustained, and that these Writ Appeals have to be dismissed. Judgment accordingly. No Costs.
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1965 (7) TMI 66 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reported in 1965 K. L. J. 438and hold that the revisional power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner by Section 15 cannot be exercised after the expiry of the period mentioned in Rule 33, namely, three years after the end of the assessment year. This restriction on the revisional powers of course will apply only to matters which fall under Rule 33, namely, escaped turnover. There is no dispute in this case that what has been done by the Deputy Commissioner on 28--1--1960 in relation to the assessment year 1955-1956 which ended on 31-3-1956 related to escaped turnover. All that we wish to add is that the revisional power conferred by Section 15 can be exercised by the revisional authority only in such circumstances where the Sales Tax Officer himself could have taken action under Rule 33. After the lapse of three years from the end of the assessment year the Sales Tax Officer cannot and should not Act under Rule 33. We allow the tax revision case but make no order as to costs.
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1965 (7) TMI 65 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... service till retirement and thus would facilitate the carrying on by the employer of his business without any break or interruption. If, over and above such practice and knowledge, there is proof that the employees would have stipulated for a salary higher than the one which they accepted, because of the expectation, the character of the payment as a business payment is all the more stronger." (Law of Income-tax, fifth edition, volume II, page 1092). 12. Every ex gratia payment to an employee cannot be supported on grounds of commercial expediency. Something more is required ; something which postulates a clear nexus between the payment and the future conduct of the business. It is that nexus that is lacking in this case, and as a result we cannot but answer the question referred in the negative as regards both the sums concerned, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. We do so, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
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1965 (7) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re and, therefore, deductible. When it has been found that the payment was not made wholly and solely for the purpose of the company's business, it would be immaterial even if the payment were found to be of non-capital nature; even then it would not have been deductible. What I have said about the sum of ₹ 18,90,000 applies also in respect of the amount of ₹ 13,300, because the facts of the two amounts must be the same. In the result question No. 4 must be answered in the negative and against the assessee. Other questions are left behind unanswered. The Commissioner of Income-tax should get his costs of this reference, which we assess at ₹ 1,000. Counsel's fee also is assessed at ₹ 1,000. I direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P., as required by section 66(5) of the Act. Manchanda, J.-I agree.
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1965 (7) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aimed by him out of the funds in his possession. He has to form his “opinion” on this question of course, in forming his opinion he must act judicially and not arbitrarily. As the tribunals below have determined the claim raised before them only on the question of jurisdiction to entertain it and not on the merits, we are unable to pass any effective order in favour of the appellant. The orders passed by the Custodian and the Custodian General must therefore be set aside and the proceeding remanded to the Custodian to determine the question whether in the opinion of the Custodian the appellant is entitled to any sum of money out of the funds in his possession and whether for the purpose of administration and management of the evacuee property or for enabling him to satisfactorily discharge his duties under the Act the amount claimed should be paid. 10. The appeal is therefore allowed. The appellant would be entitled to his costs in this appeal from the Custodian.
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1965 (7) TMI 62 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... ure was made to preserve rather than to create turnover wrong to say that no fresh asset was created ; the contrary is clearly the cast this evidence does not deal with the question of transience at all. So I cannot obtain any guidance from accountancy considerations. I would add that in Bolam's case (supra) also some reliance was placed on accountancy evidence but that evidence was inconclusive and, as I read the judgment of Danckwerts, J., he did not rely upon it. I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the indications derived from the nature of the payments, the commercial and legal nature of the advantage gained, and the use to be made of the advantage, all point in the direction of capital and that they do so with a clarity which is more than sufficient to countervail such slight indication in favour of revenue (and I repeat that in this case the indication is slight) as is to be derived from the possible recurrence of the expenditure. I would dismiss the appeals.
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1965 (7) TMI 61 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that matter.' If the Tribunal has to make a fresh enquiry leading to the admission of fresh evidence on the record, then this direction offends against the ruling of this court in Jehangir Vakil Mills case 1959 37 I.T.R. 11 ; 1960 1 S.C.R. 249. If, however, the direction be interpreted to mean that the Tribunal in giving the finding must confine itself to the facts admitted and/or found by it, the direction cannot be described as in excess of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It would have been better if the High Court had given directions confined to the record of the case before the Tribunal; but, in the absence of anything expressly to the contrary, we cannot hold that the direction would lead inevitably to the admitting of fresh evidence." See also Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1965 56 I.T.R. 365 (S.C.). We make it clear that the Tribunal should not admit any fresh evidence and that it should confine itself to what is already on record.
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1965 (7) TMI 60 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... continued, in an income tax sense, in other hands, after nationalisation and accordingly that the expenditure was incurred for the puprose of preventing a change of ownership." This amount was thus incurred for carrying on the business of the company and for no other purpose. It was, therefore, expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee-company and had, therefore, been rightly allowed by the Tribunal. That being so, and as conceded by the learned counsel for the department, the other item of ₹ 1,000 was also incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the company. In my opinion, the answer to the question of law referred to us is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the legal and traveling expenses amounting to ₹ 9,000 and ₹ 1,000 respectively were legally allowed by the Tribunal under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The respondent will get his costs.
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1965 (7) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the system of re- opening accounts does not fit in with the scheme of the Income-tax Act and, as far as the receipts are concerned, there can be no reopening of accounts and the position is the same in respect of expenses. The claim to deduction, therefore, is only admissible in the year when the liability under the award is finally determined. The Nagri Mills case 1958 33 I.T.R. 681, though not specifically considered by the Supreme Court, must be taken to have been overruled by necessary implication as that case proceeded on the basis that even though the final adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal might be for a particular year, yet it would relate back to the year to which the bonus related. For the reasons given above, both the questions are answered against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 100. Questions answered accordingly.
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1965 (7) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... v. Union of India 3 S.C.R. 718 that it is open to the Customs Authorities to impose any of the alternative penalties under s. 167(8) even though the amount of it exceeds the amount of the maximum in the other alternative. The amount of penalty was therefore not limited to ₹ 1,000 only. The penalty imposed is not said to exceed three times the value of the goods exported unauthorizedly. It follows that the amount of penalty imposed by the Additional Collector of Customs was legal and that its reduction to ₹ 1,000 by the High Court was not correct. 1, therefore, hold that the impugned orders of the Additional Collector were correct and would accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the orders under appeal and restore the orders of the Additional Collector dated December 21, 1957, but, in the circumstances, order the parties to bear their own costs. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeals are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.
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1965 (7) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... expediency. If the outgoing or expenditure is so related to the carrying on or conduct of the business, that it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and not for acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character, the possession of which is a condition of the carrying on of the business, the expenditure may be regarded as revenue expenditure." We have already pointed out that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the expenditure has no relation whatsoever to the carrying on of the business. In fact, part of the claim refers to a period even prior to the acquisition of the assets. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, the assessee is not entitled to claim the expenditure as a permissible allowance under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered by us in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (7) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the constitution of the firm has undergone any change after the issue of the quota certificate to the firm ? If so, quote No. and date of orders issued by the appropriate authority sanctioning transfer of quota rights in favour of the applicant?
Held that:- the approval of the Chief Controller under Instruction 71 is a mere recognition of the division made by the partners of a dissolved firm by agreement between themselves and in that view the recognition must clearly relate back to the date of the agreement. Further when the Chief Controller says in his letter that in future the division would be recognised in a certain ratio based on the agreement, it only means that the Chief Controller has approved of the division made by the parties and such approval then must relate back to the date of the agreement between the parties. We therefore hold that the view taken by the Madras High Court that the approval by the Chief Controller relates back to the date of agreement is correct.
The view taken by the Madras High Court is correct as the grant of approval in accordance with the agreement is obligatory on the Chief Controller if the evidence required under Instruction 72 has been produced to his satisfaction.
The High Court has found that no such order under S. 3 of the Act has been published. Nor has any such order by the Central Government been brought to our notice. All that has been said is that in the declaration of policy as to import, the word "nil" appears against fountain pens. That necessarily does not amount to prohibition of import of fountain pens unless there is an order of the Central Government to that effect published in the official gazette. We therefore agree with the High Court that unless such an order is produced it would be open to the licensing authority to issue a licence for the period of January-June 1957 even after October 1, 1957. The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.
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1965 (7) TMI 55 - KERELA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ell Oil Distributing Company. It cannot be said that the improvements that have been effected on the land consisting of filling up the ditches and raising the land and of constructing a wall are not of a capital nature. Even so, it is suggested that, because the assessee had only leave and licence over the land, the rule that expenses in the nature of capital expenditure should not be deducted in computing the assessable income should not be applied. We are unable to accept this contention. The changes effected were of an enduring nature and the conclusion reached by the assessing authorities that the money was expended for capital purposes is correct. We, therefore, answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In view of our answer to question No. (1), question No. (2) cannot arise and it is so agreed. This income-tax referred case is ordered on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.
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1965 (7) TMI 54 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to above the order to be passed in this case must proceed on the lines on which Civil Writ No. 2073 of 1964 was disposed of. It has already been held in the above-mentioned case that once a Sales Tax Officer issues a notice and returns are filed before him in pursuance of the said notice and he is then seized of the matter, no other Sales Tax Authority, even if he has inherent jurisdiction, can proceed with the assessment on the basis of those returns without first obtaining a formal order of transfer of the case from the Commissioner. This writ petition is, therefore, accepted, the notice issued by the respondent to the petitioner is set aside and quashed and it is directed that the respondent may give a fresh notice and may proceed further with the assessments in question only if and after an order of transfer of the case from the original assessing authority to his file has been passed by the competent authority. I make no order as to costs in this case. Petition allowed.
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1965 (7) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rst place this notification was issued by the Board of Revenue and not by the State Government and as such it was not a notification issued under section 6 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, which empowers the State Government by a notification in the Gazette to make an exemption or reduction in rate in respect of any tax payable under that Act. Even otherwise, the notification in terms applies only to non-resident dealers as are liable to pay the Andhra sales tax but in the instant case, the petitioner is not a non-resident dealer and as such cannot claim the benefit of the concession granted by that notification. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention. In the result, these Tax Revision Cases are allowed to the extent indicated above and the appeals out of which they have arisen, are remitted to the Appellate Tribunal for disposal according to law in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs in all these cases. Ordered accordingly.
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1965 (7) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ount as Government may, by Notification in the Gazette, specify from time to time shall, if they so direct, be levied on all liquors and intoxicating drugs permitted to be imported, exported, transported, manufactured, issued from any manufactory or institution or sold, under the provisions of this Act or any rule, notification, licence or permit issued thereunder. It is clear from the above that duty can be imposed under the Travancore-Cochin Prohibition Act, 1950, on medicinal and toilet preparations . So by virtue of section 4 of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, exemption is granted from liability towards sales tax on the turnover relating to the sales of medicinal and toilet preparations . 3.. In the light of the above, we hold that no sales tax be imposed on the turnover relating to the sales of medicinal and toilet preparations and confirm the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. We dismiss these tax revision cases but without any order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1965 (7) TMI 51 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... esent case is a typical instance of the arbitrary manner in which some Sales Tax Officers proceed in their zeal to recover sales tax from dealers in utter disregard of the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. In this case the Sales Tax Officer followed a procedure which, if it be the practice in the Sales Tax Department, has to be strongly condemned. This Court desires it to be understood that it deprecates and strongly disapproves of any Sales Tax Officer acting in the manner that the Sales Tax Officer did in the present case for compelling dealers to pay sales tax without first determining whether in law they are liable for the payment of tax-amount. 11.. In the result, this petition is allowed and the recovery proceedings initiated by the Sales Tax Officer against the petitioners are quashed. The applicants shall have costs of this application. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition allowed.
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1965 (7) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the judgment of the trial Court, beyond a submission of the learned advocate for the appellant, that the respondent No. 4 imposed the penalty without dealing with the grounds for extension of time to file the returns. The trial Court had taken that contention into consideration and had refused to interfere with the order of the respondent No. 4 regarding the penalty imposed. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court on the question of the penalty imposed. 17.. These are the only grounds which were urged before us in this appeal. It appears that certain other grounds were canvassed before the trial Court, namely, that the Commercial Tax Officer bore a grudge against the appellant and was biased. These points have not been canvassed before us and we, therefore, refrain from dealing with the same. 18.. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Each party to pay its own costs. BOSE, C.J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (7) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt year. It was held that the only notice required by the statutory provision was to enable the assessee to prove the correctness or completeness of the return filed by him, and not a second notice to participate in the enquiry, if any, made by the officer before passing the best judgment assessment. Section 7(3) and its proviso were held to specifically provide for an opportunity of hearing only at one stage of the proceeding. When there is a specific statutory provision, the principles of natural justice are not attracted. Rule 41(3) does not speak of any opportunity of hearing at all. The ratio of Qamruddin s case(1) will not be applicable. There being no specific exclusion of an opportunity of hearing, the principles of natural justice would be attracted. The petitions succeed. The impugned assessment orders dated 31st October, 1964, and 6th January, 1965, in each of the cases are quashed. The parties shall under the circumstances bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1965 (7) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uthorities, collecting the said tax for and on behalf of the State at multi-points. There has been considerable difference of opinion among the High Courts about the true construction of section 8(2), but none of them has relied on section 9 of the Central Act. Therefore, it is not necessary to refer to the cases cited before us. 8.. It is agreed that by virtue of the notification under section 6 of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125, the petitioner would not have been liable to sales tax under that Act if the sales in question were sales in intra-State trade instead of sales in inter-State trade. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court we must hold that the non-liability to taxation under the State Act if the sales were in intra-State trade postulates a non-liability to taxation under the Central Act even when the sales were in inter-State trade, and allow these petitions. We do so but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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