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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 59 Records
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1965 (9) TMI 79 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... osha Nadar v. First Additional Income Tax Officer. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the voluntary return of income was submitted by the assessee long after the expiration of the period of four years from the end of the assessment year 1946-47, and the submission of the voluntary return could not, therefore, have the effect of precluding the Income Tax Officer from proceeding to take action under section 34(1)(a). 3. Turning to the questions that have been referred to us, we find that the first question is not properly framed and we would reframe it in the following manner "(1) Whether the Income Tax Officer was bound to act on the return filed by the assessee on December 20, 1954, for the assessment year 1946-47 under section 22(3) of the Act ?" 4. Our answer to this question is in the negative. Our answer to the second question will be in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner.
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1965 (9) TMI 78 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ween the date of the judgment and the date of signing the decree shall not be excluded, if the appellant applied for a copy of the decree after the decree had been signed. Thus, the view taken in Umda v. Rupchand, AIR 1927 Nag 1 (FB), has been accepted by the legislature. 5. Learned counsel has applied for condonation of the delay on the ground that he had been relying on the Full Bench decision in Bhagwant, 1955 Nag LJ 286 (FB) (supra). But their Lordships have recently observed in A.D. Partha Sarathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1965 SC (Notes) 240 Page 186 (AIR 1966 SC 38) that the Limitation Act of 1963 having been in force for more than a year the delay could not be condoned. The delay cannot, therefore, be condoned in this case. 6. If is also reported by the office that deficit court-fee was paid on 9th July 1965, so that the appeal was barred by 107 days. The deficiency was of ₹ 8. That question need not be gone into. 7. This appeal is dismissed as barred by time.
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1965 (9) TMI 77 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to give a comparatively brief judgment, a correlative duty is impliedly cast on that Judge to make his judgment sufficiently intelligible to enable this Court to perform its duty in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In my opinion the provisions of rule 4 of Order 20 have to be applied only to something which is first a "judgment" within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. I hold that the judgment of Shri T. R. Handa, Judge. Small Cause Court. Amritsar, dated 30-4-1964 in this case is not in accordance with law and is no judgment at all. I, therefore, accept this revision petition set aside the judgment of the Court below and direct that the case may be heard and decided afresh by the Judge, Small Cause Court, Amritsar in accordance with law As the respondents have not appeared to contest this petition and to support the judgment under revision in spite of personal service on them for an actual date, there will be no order as to costs.
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1965 (9) TMI 76 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ue appearing in the books of the assessee-firm and has not therefore permitted depreciation allowance on ₹ 62,000 and odd. This is quite correct, for, as stated in Rogers & Co. ( supra), the written down value does not change and remains the same although in the agreement of sale the parties may put down the sale price at an amount higher than the written down value in the transferor's books. We understand that this matter is still pending before the appellate authority. Mr. B.G. Thakore appearing for the assessee firm assures us that the company will be content with the written down value of the machinery as appearing in the assessee-firm's books of account, namely ₹ 9,962. This is correct, as the assessee, who claims that the transaction was not a sale in the commercial sense, cannot have it both ways. For the reasons aforesaid, our answer to the question is in the negative. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee-firm the costs of this reference.
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1965 (9) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not applicable to a Hindu undivided family. Nothing turns upon the fact that the notices under section 13 of the Excess Profits Tax Act were served before the disruption. The members of the erstwhile Hindu undivided family do not become liable to be assessed to the excess profits tax merely because of this fact. There was no provision in the Act laying down that whoever was the person upon whom a notice under section 13 was served was liable to be assessed and to pay the assessed tax regardless of all subsequent events. My answer to the question is in the negative. A copy of this order should be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Income Tax Act. The assessee should get its costs of the reference, which are assessed at ₹ 400, from the Commissioner of Income Tax. Counsels fee may be assessed at ₹ 400. MANCHANDA, J. - I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1965 (9) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pect of stage carriage or a motor bus on its return journey if the return journey is completed by midnight of the following day and the toll receipt for the outward journey is produced Since respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have been recovering toll from the petitioners at the rate of ₹ 5.62 P per vehicle while they were entitled to recover toll only at the rate of ₹ 3.75 P per vehicle, the petitioners have become entitled to a refund of the amount of toll paid in excess On July 13, 1961, the Junior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had given an undertaking that, if these writ petitions were allowed, the Respondents would refund the amount of toll which would become refundable The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall now refund the amount of excess toll collected by them from the petitioners upon their applying for the same. Since the petitioners have partly succeeded and partly failed. I direct parties to bear their own costs of these petitions.
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1965 (9) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the matter of appointment including dismissal and removal and posting and promotion of District Judges. Within the exercise of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold inquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject however to the conditions of service, to a right of appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to the given of an opportunity of showing cause as required by Clause 2 of Art 311 unless such opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under the proviso b and c to that clause. The High Court alone could have held the enquiry in this case. To hold otherwise will be to reverse the policy which has moved determinedly in this direction. 39. The High Court was thus right in its conclusions. The appeal fails and is dismissed. It is clear that the conduct of Bagchi may not now be inquired into but that is a result which we can only regret. In the circumstances we make no order about costs. 40. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (9) TMI 72 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion is that the suit promissory note is void under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and it cannot, therefore, be enforced in a Court of law. In, Herman v. Dickinson, (1828) 130 ER 1031. It was held as follows -- "...... where an alteration appears upon the face of a Bill the party producing it must show that the alteration was made with consent of the parties, or before issuing the bill." To the same effect is C.S. Pillay v. K.K. Konar, AIR 1935 Rang 131. I am, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to offer any explanation, and also failed to prove that the material alteration appearing on the face of the promissory note was made with the consent of the parties, or was made in order to effectuate the common intention of the parties. His suit, therefore, was rightly dismissed on the ground. This revision petition, therefore, is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs of both the Courts.
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1965 (9) TMI 71 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent had an adverse record, though in its view it was not so bad as to lead to the conclusion that its operation was unsatisfactory. Their Lordships held that the Tribunal's order was based upon assumption of the relevant factors and the High Court could not in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction set it aside.Even here, Mr. Chowdary, contends that one bad mark on the history sheet does not disentitle the petitioner from applying. But even so, the appellate authority as well as the government could consider the comparative merits of the record as a relevant consideration for preferring the 4th respondent to the petitioner. As I said, this is a matter which this Court cannot in exercise of its writ jurisdiction interfere with the order of the Appellate Authority. (17) The result is that these writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee in W. P. 749/65 ₹ 100/- and in the other writ petitions ₹ 50/- each. (18) Writ Petitions dismissed.
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1965 (9) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 214 (P.C.). Whatever might have been the position without the existence of the second proviso, the position is incontestable after the addition of the second proviso in section 34. This is also the view taken by a Division Bench of this court in Kantan v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Ootacamund 1965 58 I.T.R. 53. In the light of the second proviso, it is not necessary for us to dilate upon this point any further, having regard to the clear and unambiguous language of the second proviso which, in our opinion, applies to all kinds and classes of orders falling under sub-section (1) of section 34 whether passed suo moto or on invitation. It follows that the preliminary objection is substantial and effect must be given to it. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the merits of the controversy raging round section 9(2)(a)(iii). In the result, the revision is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fees ₹ 100. Revision dismissed.
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1965 (9) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the Indian Succession Act. I therefore hold that Natverlal is entitled to receive the amount of compensation in respect of the acquisition in this Reference. (9) At this stage the parties inform me that they are agreed that the S. L. A. O. should pay the sum of ₹ 7,384 as and by way of additional compensation, inclusive of the 15 percent solatium with interest thereon at the rate of 4 per cent per annum from 12th January 1960; the S. L. A. O. to make such payment on or before 1st March 1966. (10) By and with such consent, I there fore order that the S. L. A. O. do pay to Natverlal, the claimant herein, on before the 1st of March 1966, the said sum of ₹ 7,384 with interest thereon at the rate of 4 per cent per annum from 12th January 1960 till the date of payment. There shall be no order as to costs. Natverlal shall be at liberty to withdraw the amount deposited in this Court by the S. L. A. O. to the credit of this Reference. (11) Reference answered accordingly
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1965 (9) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... amendment sought. Leave under O. 2, r. 2 can be sought by the plaintiff and can be given by the Court with respect to a plaintiff s not suing for certain relief arising out of the same cause of action as sub-r. (3) provides that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs. But if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not, afterwards, sue for any relief Omitted. It has been shown above that the cause of action for the relief, of declaration was different from the cause of action for the claim of money. The relief for the money due did not arise from the cause of action on which the relief for declaration was based. 50. I am therefore of opinion that the High Court was right in not allowing the amendment sought by the plaintiff. The appeal therefore fails and I would dismiss it with costs. 51. The appeal is allowed in accordance with the majority judgment.
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1965 (9) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... s been unable to show that the Income-tax Officer, when he made the original assessment, was possessed of the fact that the initial depreciation under consideration in the instant case had been allowed. In my judgment, upon the facts before me, the excessive depreciation allowance was computed in the original assessment by reason of the omission or failure of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for that assessment. The notice issued under section 148 by the Income-tax Officer cannot be declared invalid. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the submission of the respondent that the petitioner should be denied relief because of the existence of an alternative remedy. The petition fails, and is dismissed with costs, which I assess at ₹ 150. Writ Petition No. 969 of 1965. For reasons given in my judgment in the connected Writ Petition No. 971 of 1965, the instant petition is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.
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1965 (9) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o the present suit. The suit is one by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant and is governed by Art. 139. The tenancy was determined in 1949, and the suit being instituted on November 1, 1954 is well within time. The contention that Peda Narasimhulu and his successors-in-interest acquired title to the suit lands by prescription and the suit is barred by limitation is therefore, rejected. The validity of the notice terminating the tenancy is not disputed. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover the suit lands. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside. There will be a decree in favour of the trustees of the temple for possession of the properties mentioned in the schedule to the plaint. The trial Court is directed to enquire into the mesne profits and to pass an appropriate decree for the same in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in this Court and in the Courts below. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (9) TMI 65 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be seen that he was in a minority. The Supreme Court was not therefore called upon to lay down the law on the point whether or no S. 397 avails the minorities only, and not the majorities. And it did not lay down the law at that either. The observations their Lordships made must be tuned to the facts befora them. And one important fact was that the appellant before their Lordships was a minority shareholder. 90. In vain have we been addressed on the possibility of a minority oppressing the majority. Speaking for myself, if I had ever any doubt in my mind on that score, though I confess I had none, it is completely resolved by all that the appellants did here down to the raid of the factory at Chasnala. 91. All the other matters argued at the Bar have been fully dealt with by my learned brother, if I may say so, with respect. So I have nothing more to add but to agree that this appeal should be dismissed subject to the modi fication proposed in the judgment just delivered.
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1965 (9) TMI 64 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decision by the Madras High Court was whether the expenditure incurred was a capital expenditure. It was not disputed that it had been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's profession. The High Court, differing from the Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the expenditure in question was not an expenditure of a capital nature. Therefore, in our opinion, this decision has no bearing on the point under consideration. 33. For the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to agree with the Tribunal that the expenditure with which we are concerned in this case was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business, profession or vocation. 34. Our answer to the question of law referred to us is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 10,483 is not an allowable expenditure under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act. The assessee to pay the costs of this reference. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1965 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... power to impose a tax including the fixation of rate to municipal boards. It would therefore in my opinion be right to hold that sections 128 to 135(2) indicate proper delegation of the authority of the legislature to impose taxes specified in s. 128 and that it is sub-s. (3) of s. 135 which should be struck down because it is the only provision which makes the delegation excessive. I would therefore hold that s. 135(3) inasmuch as it makes the delegation contained in ss. 128 to 135(2) excessive must be severed from the rest of the sections which are otherwise a proper exercise of delegation of legislative authority and should be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs and uphold the order of the High Court holding that the tax imposed by the appellant had not been validly imposed, though on a different ground. ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.
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1965 (9) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is sufficient indication in the letter of the assessee dated June 15, 1953, that there was an implied understanding between the assessee and J.L.P. Roche Victoria that the latter shall be paid the sum of ₹ 12,000 as remuneration for the year for the work done by him for and on behalf of the assessee. For the revenue, our attention was invited to section 12A but, in our opinion, this is not a case of apportionment of the managing agency commission. In our opinion the sum of ₹ 12,000 was income in the hands of the assessee and the payment of that sum by the company on the direction of the assessee to J.L.P. Roche Victoria was an expenditure laid out by the assessee within the meaning of section 10(2)(xv). The question referred to us by the Tribunal is answered in favour of the revenue and the question which we have framed as arising out of the Tribunal's order in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1965 (9) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e crime is one of absolute prohibition or one involving proof of a guilty mind. All that it involves is the principle that the act must be attributable to the accused, i.e., it must have been done intentionally and not accidentally." We are of the opinion that the entry made by the assessee in its books of account under the heading "Vellarmalai capital account" might have been made under the bona fide belief that as they were maintaining the estate for the time being, that is, till the formation of the new company, there was nothing wrong in making such an entry in their books of account. Further, the conduct of the assessee in transferring whatever amount that stood in its books to the newly formed company shows beyond doubt that the entry was made neither wilfully nor intentionally, but only accidentally. The reference is answered against the department and in favour of the assessee. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (9) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e recommended that the "present provision for the stay of disputed demands at the discretion of the assessing officer should continue, but the assessee should be provided with a right to approach" the higher authorities. The argument of the counsel was that this is what has been provided under the section in the Act above referred to. We are by no means sure as to this. But we think that this is all irrelevant in the view we have taken, that even without an express conferment, the appellate authority has the power to stay the proceedings and the collection pending appeal, as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal was wrong in thinking that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for stay. In the result, we quash the order of the Appellate Tribunal, and send back the case to it for disposal in due course of law. This petition is allowed, but without costs. Petition allowed.
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