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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 95 Records
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1966 (10) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mediately. From this, it is impossible to spell out any agreement between the parties with respect to the bonus for the year 1964-65 or the allocation of capital and reserves of the company to the two units in calculating the bonus statement. 37. In our view, therefore, the parties were not bound by any agreement with regard to issue No. 1 and the Tribunal will have to take evidence to come to a finding on that issue. 38. In the result, the preliminary objection of the Management with regard to issues 3 and 4 succeeds while it fails on issue No. 1. 39. Appeals Nos. 2101 and 2102 of 1966 which are from the orders of the High Court are dismissed without any order as to costs. So far as Appeal No. 2100/1966 is concerned, the matter will go back to the Tribunal for decision in the light of the observations made above. In view of the divided success in this Court, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. V.P.S. 40. Appeal No. 2100/66 remanded 41. Other Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed with the encashment of the cheque were acting bona fide. There was no negligence on the part of the customer according to whose resolution, the cheque had to be signed jointly by two persons. The fraud could only be perpetrated because of the complicity of the employees of the bank, no doubt, with the help of one of the officers of the Union. The dishonesty of a particular officer of the Union was not the proximate cause of the loss to the bank. In our opinion, the case of G.C. Kurbar & Another v. Balaji Ramji Dange A.I.R. 1941 Bom 274 referred to in the judgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of this case. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the Patna High Court is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The appellants do not want a decree against respondent No. 7. Consequently, there will be no decree as against the said respondent. The other respondents must pay the costs of this appeal. V.P.S. 18. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 0(1)(f), the fact that the husband cohabited with the wife even after the knowledge that she had been guilty of cohabiting with another person would in our opinion be sufficient to constitute condonation, particularly, as in this case, the first respondent knew of the alleged adultery in May/June 1958 and still continued to cohabit with the appellant thereafter upto October 1958. Further the statement of the first respondent to the effect that he kept his wife after May/June 1958 at the instance of his friends is a clear indication of condonation even in the sense of forgiveness confirmed or made effective by reinstatement. We are therefore of opinion that the first respondent is not even entitled to a decree of judicial separation. 14. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the trial court rejecting the petition of the first respondent. The appellant will get her costs throughout from the first respondent. 15. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 166 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gislature has chosen to impose tax on urban property only, it cannot be held that there has been discrimination between "urbanities" and "ruralities" contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. On this point also, the petitioners have not chosen to place before us any material to show that the burden of property-tax under the Act falls unequally, in violation of article 14, on the owners of the urban property. We, therefore, decline to express any opinion on the plea of unconstitu-tionality of the Act resting on Article 14 of the Constitution. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the Madhya Pradesh Nagarlya Sthawar Sampatti Kar Adhiniyam, 1964, is held to be valid and constitutional, and all these petitions are dismissed with costs of the Respondent-State. Counsel's fee for the respondent-State in each case is fixed at ₹ 200/-. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner in each case.
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1966 (10) TMI 165 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ediately before the death of the deceased coparcener. The share may now be determined on the aforesaid principle. In the notional partition, Joydeb, plaintiff No. 2, plaintiff No 1 and defendant No. 1 would be each entitled to Rs.-/4/ . On Joydeb's death his Rs. -/4/- interest would devolve upon the heirs being the relatives specified in Class 1 of the Schedule under Section 8 of the Act and the division among the heirs shall take place in accordance with the rules laid down in Section 10. The Rs -/4/- interest of Joydeb would thus be divided amongst all the eight persons (Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 6 and defendant Nos. 1 and 2). Each of plaintiff No. 1 plaintiff No 2 and defendant No. 1 would get Rs. /4/6 and each of the rest would get Rs. -/-/6 interest. The learned trial court took the correct view. Rangubai v. Laxman AIR 1066 Bom 169 also takes the same view 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs throughout. Das, J. 8. I agree.
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1966 (10) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed out that it had no intention of giving retrospective effect to the linkage for the following reasons (1) it had substantially increased the wages; (2) a long retrospective effect would unduly increase the burden on the Company; and (3) the workmen had been getting handsome bonuses. But, having regard to the fact that the Poona index figures had been published from April 1964, it held that the linkage should be from April 1, 1965 and not from the earlier date; that is to say, it had given, having regard to the aforesaid circumstances, a limited retrospective operation to the linkage. The employees have not made out any case for giving a further retrospective effect to the linkage. 65. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 406 of 1964 preferred by the Company is dismissed with costs; and Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1964 preferred by the Workmen is dismissed with costs, except that the Award is modified in regard to the age of retirement. G.C. 66. Appeals dismissed and award modified.
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1966 (10) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n and their pronouncement with regard to the rate of interest prior to the date of the suit ought not to be disturbed. We also find no reason to interfere with the scaling down of the rate of interest to 6 per cent from the date of the filing of the suit. Although the reasons are not indicated, it seems fairly plain that their Lordships were using their discretion as regards interest pendente lite. We cannot overlook the fact that the mortgages -were executed as far back as 1936 and 1938 and that the creditor who had waited till 1950 for the institution of the suit would, in any event, get interest substantially exceeding the principal amount of the loans. In this view of things we are not prepared to interfere with the exercise of the discretion exercised by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court even though they have given no reasons for the reduction of rate of interest pendente lite. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. G. C. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 162 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mulated and a consolidated single assessment was made on the best of judgment basis, on the ground that certain defects were noticed at an inspection and there was material that some of the returns were defective. Srinivasan, J. held that the procedure adopted was illegal, and that S. 7-A and the Rules would go to show that each return was independent of the rest and had to be assessed separately from the rest. In this case weekly returns were filed, accepted, tax levied and also collected from the petitioner. When such is the case, the petitioner cannot be called all of a sudden, may be after inspection, to pay accumulated tax, on the materials alleged to have been unearthed during a search of the premises. Unless the statute is amended, the taxing authorities will have no jurisdiction to call upon the petitioner to pay tax on escaped income or escaped turnover. The result is the petitioner succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will however, be no order as to costs.
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1966 (10) TMI 161 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at page 243 ). In the last mentioned case the disposition was for the benefit of a single member of the family who was given only a right of residence therein, and it was held that the instrument would fall within the definition of a settlement. The present is a stronger case where the document provides for annuities to be paid to the unborn children of the two daughters of the settlors and in a certain contingency for sale of the property and distribution of the sale proceeds among the children of the two daughters in equal proportion. ( 13. ) We are satisfied that the document in question was a settlement and correctly assessed to stamp duty by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. The questions referred are accordingly answered as follows - (a) Yes. (b) Yes. (c) Doest not arise. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. The settlors shall pay the costs of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. ( 14. ) Answered accordingly.
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1966 (10) TMI 160 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ade by the Crown free from restrictions as to alienation should not be the subject of a sale at the suit of a mortgagee." 12. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided AIR 1914 All 120, I do not see how the decision in (1906) 3 All LJ 628 was at all applicable to the facts of the case before them. At any rate it was not brought to their notice that Section 2 of the Crown Grants Act was applicable to a transfer of land or interest in land made by or on behalf of the Crown. A lease of immovable property is certainly a transfer of an interest in land. 13. The decision in Akram Mea v. Municipal Corporation Secunderabad, AIR 1967 Andh Pra 859 is of no help as it is based on the finding that the lease in question was not executed by or on behalf of the Government. 14. I am accordingly of the opinion that the decision of the court below is correct and dismiss the revision application. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of it.
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1966 (10) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pecific performance did in fact provide that all the defendants in that suit that is, including Kanji should sign the deed of conveyance. But it appears that through some misconception Kanji was not made to join in that conveyance and was only made to attest that document. But that would not, in our view, make any difference in the conclusion that as between Kanji and Lalji on the one hand and respondents 1 and 2 on the other the possession of the former could not be adverse and therefore there was no question of the suit of respondents 1 and 2 for redemption being barred by limitation. Further, being an attesting witness, Kanji both for himself and on behalf of Lalji was made fully aware that the sale deed conveying the title of the property was being passed in favour of respondents 1 and 2 and that the only right henceforth in them was to receive the mortgage amount and no more. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 957 Orissa, 112., the Orissa High Court held, on a consideration of the relevant conditions of employment, that a temporary extra- departmental branch post-master was not a person holding a civil post, but the observation in that case that a part- time employee cannot be the holder of a civil post outside the regularly constituted services is too wide and cannot be supported. In Sher Singh v. State of Rajasthan I.L.R. 1956 6 Rai. 335, 339-340, the Rajasthan High Court held that a chaudhari appointed under the Land Revenue Act of Bikaner is not entitled to the protection of Art. 311. The report of the case does not disclose the functions of the chaudhari and the regulations governing his employment. In Bindu Nath v. State of Assan A.I.R. 1959 Assam. II S. , the Court found that the applicant was never appointed to the post of a Mauzadar, and no question of the protection of Art. 311 could arise in the circumstances. The appeal is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 157 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heless the limitation would be saved by the provisions of Act 1 of 1959. No such question was raised at any time before the income-tax authorities or the Tribunal, and the questions referred are not couched in terms of sufficient amplitude to cover any such enquiry on the basis of the amended law. In fact, as already observed, the questions are extremely narrow and relate specifically and directly only to the second proviso to section 34(3) of Act. In any case, the question of the applications of the amendment effected by Act 1 of 1959 would certainly require investigation of some facts. In these circumstances, we are not called upon to express any opinion on the applicability of the amendment effected by Act 1 of 1959. For the reasons given above, we would answer the questions in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs of the assessee, which we assess at ₹ 350. Counsels fee is also assessed at ₹ 350. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1966 (10) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o have passed upon the death of the father under s. 5 of the Act. The question was examined by the Board which found that the property was purchased entirely out of the funds of the deceased that for the purpose of income tax the deceased had declared the entire property as his own, and that the income therefrom was exclusively assessed in his hands. On these facts the Board held that though the property stood in the joint names of the deceased and his wife, she was merely a name-lender and the entire property belonged to the deceased and was rightly included in his estate for the purpose of estate duty. In view of this finding of fact it is not possible to accept the argument of the appellant that only half the share of the property should be taken for the purpose of estate duty assessment. o p /o p For the reasons expressed, we hold that the decision of the High Court is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with, costs. o p /o p G.C. o p /o p Appeal dismissed o p /o p
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1966 (10) TMI 155 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... agreement between himself and A.V. George, that he did not pay any advance to him, and that he had nothing to do with the finding of purchasers for the 22 plots. A reading of the sale deed--quite apart from the other evidence available--is sufficient to demonstrate the falsity of the assessee's statement. The fact that the assessee did not have the resources to buy even an estate worth a lakh of rupees when he entered into the agreement for the purchase of the Kuttikal Estate for ₹ 6 lakhs is of equal importance. In the light of what is stated above, we must answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. We do so with costs; advocate's fee ₹ 100. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (10) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re was an implied surrender of the lease, if any, created by the document dated March 2, 1939. There is no force in this contention. The lease dated November 3, 1951 was not granted in accordance with the Rules made under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 and by s. 4(2) of that Act was void and of no effect. The lease dated December 2, 1939 is the only subsisting lease and could properly be modified by the Controller. o p /o p The lease was for excavating white clay. In order to bring it in conformity with the Act and the Rules, its period could be cut down to 20 years from December 2, 1939. Actually, the Controller cut down the period to 25 years from December 2, 1939. The appellant can have no just grievance against this order. For the reasons given in our judgment in C.A. Nos. 172-174 of 1963, the other contentions of the appellant are rejected. o p /o p The appeal is dismissed with costs. o p /o p Y. P. o p /o p Appeal partly allowed. o p /o p
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1966 (10) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ese words show that document filed is a true copy of the award and as it bears the signature of the umpire, it is a signed copy thereof. It may be added that the words "now I hereby reproduce a true copy of the said award which is as follows" which appear at the beginning of the document and which are signed by the umpire Sri Dildar Hussain also in our opinion are sufficient to show that what was produced in court was a signed copy of the award as required by s. 14(2). In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the alternative argument raised on behalf of the appellant. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below and, holding that a signed copy of the award has been filed as required by s. 14(2), direct that further proceedings will be taken in the matter as required by law by the Subordinate Judge in whose court the signed copy of the award was filed. Costs of this Court will abide the final result. G.C. Appeal allowed
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1966 (10) TMI 152 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his or her "total income during the previous year exceeded the minimum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax". Apart from the sum of ₹ 24,500 which the Income-tax Officer took to be her income from an undisclosed source and also took the same amount as income from an undisclosed source of the husband, the only other income was of ₹ 669. Therefore, so far as the assessee is concerned, it was open to her to argue that she was not obliged to file any return under section 22(1) of the Act. It is also not necessary to decide whether the primary facts in the shape of her account books were disclosed to the Income-tax Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings taken against the Hindu undivided family in respect of this very sum of ₹ 24,500. For the reasons given above, we would answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 250.
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1966 (10) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for sale of the mortgaged property. We therefore partly allow the appeal and declare that the amount due to the bank on April 9, 1953, the date of the suit, would be ₹ 15,956/7/- plus compound interest at the rate of ₹ 6/- per cent per annum with monthly rests up to that date minus the two sums, namely, ₹ 1,498/10/3 and ₹ 100/- shown as paid on May 14, 1948 and November 24, 1949, and thereafter ₹ 6/- per cent per annum simple interest will run. The trial court will modify the preliminary decree passed by it accordingly and give the appellants three months’ time after the preliminary decree has been so modified to pay the amount failing which the bank would be entitled to pray for a final decree for sale of the properties mortgaged. ’Mere will be no personal decree. The bank will get proportionate costs in the two courts below. As the defence of the appellants has failed on the main question, they will bear their own costs throughout.
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1966 (10) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re fail. In our view, the High Court was in error in allowing the appeal of the respondent only on the ground that the said alterations did not appear to have caused any harm to the premises or that there was no such finding by either of the two courts below. The basis of the High Court's judgment was on the interpretation which it sought to put on clause (c)an interpretation commended by Mr. Desai for our acceptance. As already stated, even if the alterations did not cause any damage to the premises or did not substantially diminish their value the alterations were material alterations and on that basis alone the appellants were entitled to evict the respondent) We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree passed by the First Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi, whereby he directed the eviction of the respondent. The respondent will pay to the appellants their costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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