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Showing 1 to 20 of 71 Records
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1966 (2) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... roceeding or (ii) intentionally fabricate false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding. The first refers to an offence under Section 191/193 and the second to that under Section 192/193 of the Indian Penal Code. In respect of such offences when committed by a witness, action under Section 479-A alone can be taken. The appellant were witnesses in the inquiry in the High Court and they had fabricated false evidence. If any prosecution was to be started against them the High Court ought to have followed the procedure under Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Not having done so, the action under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not open because of Sub-section. (6) of Section 479-A and the order under appeal cannot be allowed to stand. 9. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order for the prosecution of the appellants is set aside. The complaint, if filed, shall be withdrawn. 10. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 102 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , Indian Penal Code is upheld and the sentence of death imposed on the accused by the trial Court is confirmed. The conviction and sentence of the accused under section 379, Indian Penal Code is also confirmed. (94) In conclusion, we would like to place on record our appreciation for the valuable service rendered by Mr. Rane, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, for the State, in unravelling the intricacies of this case. He has devoted considerable industry to the task. The case has lasted for twenty-two working days and has covered an entire month. The State Government should, therefore, consider the question as to what adequate remuneration should be awarded to him for the work done by him in this case. We have already referred to our sense of appreciation for the manner in which this case was conducted by Mr. Kode assisted by Mr. Nair for the defence. Mr. Kode has argued the matter with his usual fairness and ability and has left nothing unsaid. (95) Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itable loss. The cancellation was done at a time when no one could say with any degree of certainty that the houses were in such danger that the loss had commenced or became inevitable. There is no evidence to establish this. This case, therefore, falls within the rule of the Sun Fire Office (1889) 14 A.C. 98 and the Hartford Fire Insurance Co. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 1288 cases. The assurers were, therefore, within their rights under condition 10 of the policy to cancel it. As the policy was not ready they were justified in executing it and cancelling it. The right of the plaintiff to the policy and to enforce it was lost by the legal action of cancellations. 31. In the result the appeal must succeed. It is allowed. The decree passed by the Divisional Bench is set aside and the judgment of G. K. Mitter, J. dismissing the suit is restored. Although costs must follow the event, we think in the special circumstances of this case we should make no order about costs. 32. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 100 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd to answer the question and the proceedings cannot be stopped simply because of the death or absence of one of the parties interested before it. In the case of the death of such a person an application for substitution is not necessarily of the nature as understood under the Code of Civil Procedure. The principle is that in such a case the court requires the presence of all parties interested as a matter of convenience and, where any such party dies, the court can direct the Registrar to bring before it the legal representatives of the deceased. The order made in such proceedings is advisory and the parties are there merely to assist the court. There is, therefore, no question of a technical abatement under the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons aforesaid, this application should succeed and an order should be made in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. There will be no order as to costs of this application. Sen, J. - I agree.
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1966 (2) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ilar point was raised before the High Court and although the High Court found some substance in the point it chose to so into the merits of the case and not dismiss the application on this ground. It must be remembered that the application was also under art. 227 of the Constitution, and although ordinarily art. 227 should be used sparingly, on the facts of this case we are satisfied that the High Court was right in not throwing out the application on this ground. 13. In the result the appeal succeeds. We set aside the orders of the High Court and of the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court and of the Judge Small Causes Court, and remand the case to the Court of Small Causes Calcutta, with the direction that it will dispose of the suit in the light of this judgment. The parties would be at liberty to lead evidence before the Court of Small Causes on the question of apportionment of rent. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs. 14. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 98 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... n, well-founded. The bad debts, which could have been taken into account at the time of the deed of assignment, were the debts which had then become bad and could not be debts which would in subsequent years become bad. At any rate, the contention raised again is one of fact and had not been raised at the proper stage. The department, therefore, is not entitled to raise it at this stage. The only contention, which was raised before the Tribunal, was that the outstandings purchased by the assessee were not stock-in-trade in his hands but they represented only a part of the fixed capital of the old partnership taken over and, therefore, any loss in their realisation, d was a capital loss. This contention of the department has not been accepted by the Tribunal and, in our opinion, for reasons already stated, rightly. 21. In the result, we answer both the questions in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. 22. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (2) TMI 97 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sider whether the immunity was continued by Article 2 of the Merger Agreement. T need not, therefore, enter upon the question whether the provisions of Article 363 of the Constitution prohibit the Court from considering the provisions of the Merger Agreement. 48. As, in my judgment, the assessee tails in his claim that as Ruler of the State of Rampur he enjoyed international personality before the State merged into the Dominion of India and was immune under international law from taxation under the Indian Income-tax Act, T answer the question referred in the negative. 49. By The Court For the reasons contained in our respective judgments, we answer the question referred in the negative. 50. A copy of the judgments with this order under the seal of the Court and the signa ture of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income- tax Appellate Tribunal, The Commissioner of income-tax is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 300.
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1966 (2) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under Article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that Article 14 has been violated must make out that not only he had been treated differently from other but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made--See Ramchand Jagdish Chand v. Union of India, 1962 3SCR72 . It is manifest in the present case that the petitioners have not furnished sufficient particulars to justify the plea of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. We accordingly hold that the case of the petitioners on this point should be rejected. 9. For the reasons expressed, we are of opinion that the petitioners have not made out a case for the grant of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1966 (2) TMI 95 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ies. I agree with Mr. Bhabra's contention that the arbitration clause is unenforceable and that there is no valid arbitration agreement between the parties. If there be no valid arbitration agreement between the parties there can be no question of filing the same in Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. 21. Having regard to my conclusion that there is no valid arbitration agreement between the parties, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the other point argued by Mr. Bhabra as to the maintainability of the action under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act in view of the plaintiff-respondent having previously issued a notice under Section 8 of Chapter II of the Arbitration Act. 22. I, therefore, allow the appeal. The order of the trial Court is set aside and the suit is hereby dismissed. In the facts of this case I direct that the parties will pay and bear their own costs of the appeal as also of the proceedings in the Court below. Chattekjee, J. 23. I agree.
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1966 (2) TMI 94 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r importation. In fact, it is a precondition. 26. For the reasons aforesaid I am of the opinion that the second point raised has not been substantiated. In other words, in my opinion, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947 read with the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 and the schedule thereto, have laid down that the importation of horses into India could only be done subject to the obtaining of a valid licence or a customs clearance permit. This is a prohibition with a condition and where the condition has not been fulfilled the goods are "prohibited goods" and comes within the mischief of Section 125 of the said Act. That being so, the adjudging officer had a discretion to impose a fine or not and was not bound to give to the appellant an option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation. 27. In the premises this appeal tails and should be dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Syed Sadat Abdul Masud, J. 28. I agree.
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1966 (2) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iff. 21. Now coming to C Schedule lands, the position is simple. It was concurrently held by the courts below that the C Schedule property was not the subject-matter of the lease. The title to the property, therefore, clearly vested in the plaintiff. It is also found by the lower courts that the said property is a waste land in regard to which there can be no effective enjoyment. The High Court, therefore, rightly drew the presumption that possession followed title. 22. In this view the question of limitation raised by the appellant does not call for a decision, for in the case of the A schedule property the 2nd respondent loses on the question of title and in regard to the C Schedule property he will be presumed to be in possession. In either view, the question of limitation does not arise. 23. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed and the decree of the High Court is modified. The parties will pay and receive proportionate costs throughout. 24. Appeal allowed in part.
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1966 (2) TMI 92 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urb the public peace. When the prosecution witnesses have deposed that A-3 played specific part in the attack and when the learned Magistrate found P.Ws. 2 and 3 to be reliable and accepted their evidence, the ground given by the learned Magistrate for acquittal that she was probably a passive witness is not convincing. The reasoning given for the acquittal of A-2, A-3 and A-4 by the learned Magistrate is not sound. The view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that there was no illegality, impropriety or anything wrong in the appreciation of the evidence by the learned Magistrate is also not correct. But, all the same, as the occurrence is stated to have taken place on 25-6-1964, a long time of one year and eight months has elapsed and the parties had been put to considerable worry and expense over the trial and the revision. I do not, therefore, think it a fit case for granting special leave. (15) I, therefore, dismiss Crl. M.P. No. 2036 of 1965. (16) Special leave refused.
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1966 (2) TMI 91 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... worked on it. From the facts stated by us above, it is abundantly clear that nowhere in clear terms it has appeared on the record that the sale transaction has resulted in the assessee obtaining a price for the building, plant and machinery in excess of its written down value. It might be that that fact could have been ascertained by correlating the various documents on record, working on them, making arithmetical calculations and thus ascertaining the resultant position. The mere failure on the part of the Income-tax Officer to correlate these various materials could not entitle the assessee to claim that assessment could not be reopened under section 34(1)(b). It is for these reasons that, in our opinion, the answer will have to be given on both the questions in favour of the department. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative, and answer the second question, as reframed, also in the affirmative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner.
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1966 (2) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ewed the evidence over again. The courts in effect held that the said presumption was rebutted by the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondents. We are not, therefore, justified in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution to permit the appellant to canvass the correctness of the said concurrent findings of fact. 16. The last argument raises a question of limitation. If, as we have held, the suit is outside the scope of the Act, the question of limitation turns upon the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. The suit was originally filed by the respondent for a declaration of their title to the suit property, but as they were dispossessed of the land on March 5, 1953, subsequent to the filing of the suit, the plaint was amended on July 24, 1954, praying for delivery of possession. To such a suit Art. 142 of the Limitation Act applies. The suit is, therefore, clearly not barred by limitation. 17. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (2) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n a civil case does not convert it into a criminal case, and the ordinary rules applicable to civil cases apply. The learned counsel has not been able to cite any other authority to show that there is any such well- settled proposition, as stated by Meredith, J. Coming to the next contention, the fact whether the plaintiff was a party to the intention of Govindram to bribe him has to be judged like any-other fact on the balance of probability. We are not satisfied that the Full Bench has misdirected itself in any manner in finding this fact. In the end Mr. Aggarwala urges that immorality within s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act is confined to sexual immorality, but we are not concerned with the question whether the consideration is immoral or not. The case of bribery is clearly covered otherwise by s. 23. In the result we hold that the findings of the Full Bench are, not vitiated and must be accepted. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 88 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e case has pointed out, and in our opinion rightly, that the question as framed assumes a fact, namely, that the machinery has been purchased by the assessee from the L.R.E. Works. That mistake must have crept in through inadvertence. However, it is not necessary for the purpose of this reference to amend the question and proceed to consider it. It has been stated at the Bar by counsel for the parties that, in view of our answer to the first question, this question should be left to the Tribunal to decide on the material before it. In view of this statement made at the Bar, it is not necessary to proceed to consider this question. It is, therefore, not necessary to answer the question. The Tribunal will consider it on the material before it. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. The assessee shall pay to the department the costs of the notice of motion. First question answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (2) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rd and the second defendants together. It has not been proved to have been even impliedly authorised by the owner or to come within any of the extensions of the doctrine of scope of employment which we have noticed above. The High Court would probably not have passed a decree against the owner if it had not been persuaded to hold the three pieces of evidence to be admissible and relevant. In the absence of that evidence the acts of the second and the third defendants viewed separately or collectively were not within the scope of their respective or even joint employment and the owner was therefore not responsible. We would accordingly allow the appeal, in so far as the appellant is concerned but in the circumstances of the case would direct that there should be no order as to costs throughout. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed in respect of the appellant. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs throughout.
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1966 (2) TMI 86 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onnection between the expenditure incurred in connection with the appeal filed by the assessee- company and the conduct of its business. The only purpose and object of that appeal was to maintain the correctness of the ruling given by the president and perhaps to maintain his prestige and dignity. In our opinion, therefore, the assessee-company will be only entitled to the expenses incurred by it by way of costs of the trial court in respect of the suit. It will, however, not be entitled to any part of the expenses which it has incurred in connection with the appeal. Accordingly, our answer to the question referred to us will be that such part of the sum of ₹ 18,050 as represents the expenditure incurred by the assessee-company by way of costs of the trial court in Suit No. 549 of 1952 will be a permissible deduction in the computation of the assesseecompany's income for the assessment year 1958-59. There will be no order as to costs. Question answered accordingly.
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1966 (2) TMI 85 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xed separately, then in many cases, the incidence of taxation is likely to be affected. The total tax payable by that assessee is likely to be lesser than that prescribed by law. There is no authority for such a procedure either under the Indian Income-tax Act or under the Mysore Income-tax Act. 7. The words "such income" in clause 5 of the Order, in our judgment, means the entire income of the assessee relating to the assessment year already brought to tax under the Mysore Act. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, our answers to the questions referred are (1) on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the refund granted by the Income-tax Officer under section 48 of the Mysore Income-tax Act amounted to an assessment; and (2) the interpretation placed by the Appellate Tribunal on the words "such income, profits and gains" in clause 5 (1) of the Order is not correct. 9. The department to pay the costs of the assessee. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1966 (2) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t based on these provisions in s. 16 and s. 17 can have no effect on the interpretation of ss. 4, 5-A and 6 for reasons which we have given when dealing with ss. 17(1) and 17(4). We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there can be no successive notifications under S. 6 with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under S. 4(1). As it is not in dispute in this case that there have been a number of notifications under s. 6 with respect to this village based on the notification under S. 4(1) dated May 16, 1949, the High Court was right in quashing the notification under s. 6 issued on August 12, 1960 based on the same notification under S. 4(1). The petition had also raised a ground that the notification under S. 6 was vague. However, in view of our decision on the main point raised in the case we express no opinion on this aspect of the matter. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs Appeal dismissed.
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