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Showing 1 to 20 of 63 Records
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1966 (8) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sed we are of the opinion that the sanction of the State Government was not necessary for prosecution of the appellant under s. 409, Indian Penal Code. We accordingly reject the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant on this aspect of the case and dismiss this appeal. Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 1964 11. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Madras High Court dated December 3, 1963 in Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 1962 convicting the appellant of the offence under s. 409, Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. 12. The question of law involved in this appeal is the same as in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1964 and for the reasons given in that case we hold that the sanction of the Government is not necessary for prosecution of the appellant under s. 409, Indian Penal Code and the conviction of the appellant on that charge is not defective in law. This appeal also must be dismissed. R.K.P.S. 13. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nnot sue to recover the original debt. The post-dated cheque or the running bill, if it is duly met, operates as payment of the debt from the date of its delivery. For the purposes of s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 also, the date of the payment of the debt is the date when the post-dated cheque was delivered to the creditor and not the date which the cheque bore nor the date when it was cashed. I cannot subscribe to the novel view that the date of the payment is the date written on the cheque. In my opinion, the payment was made on February 4, 1954 and not on February 25, 1954 nor on the date when the cheque was subsequently cashed. It follows that the suit is barred by limitation and should be dismissed. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, the decree of the High Court is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored. ORDER 23. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Y.P.
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1966 (8) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... on the part of the Court to make an order as asked for. 10. The final contention on behalf of the respondent was that under the provisions contained in sub-section (7) of section 17 of the Companies Act proceedings may be adjourned in order that an arrangement may be made to the satisfaction of the Court for the purchase of the interest of dissentient members. There is no dissentient member at the relevant stage. The respondent cannot utilise proceedings for the collateral purpose of putting pressure on the Company to buy their, shares at this hour. Counsel for the petitioner in my view rightly characterised the attitude of the respondent as mala fide. 11. For all these reasons I am of opinion that the petitioner-company is entitled to an order asked for. There will be order in terms of prayer (1) of the petition. The 'applicants to pay costs of this application assessed at 10 Gold Mohurs to the Registrar of Companies. All other parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the words 'a Court executing a decree' as meaning, .. that the section only covers cases of proceedings initiated by the decree-holder and does not include applications (relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree) made by the judgment-debtor." 14. We are unable to hold that the dictum of the Punjab High Court in Mst. Bhagwani v. Lakhim Ram and Another that "as no execution proceedings (at the instance of the decree-holder) were pending, the Court (which was called upon to determine whether there was an adjustment of a decree by an executory contract) could not be regarded as one which was 'executing the decree'," is correct. There is, in our judgment, no antithesis between s. 47 and O. 21 r. 2 the former deals with the power of the Court and the latter with the procedure to be followed in respect of a limited class of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of decrees. 15. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 82 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... activity apparently so disconnected as confectionery, tailoring, selling of sports goods and photography, when these constitute component parts of the business of a huge organisation such as that of Selfridge's of Oxford Street or Harrods' of Knights-bridge in London, the very aim and object of which is to provide for a whole host of the needs of its customers and to run an all-embracing giant general stores. It could not be contended that this was the pattern of the assessee's business activities in the case before us. It is difficult to lay down an absolutely infallible test, although the application of the tests laid down by Rowlatt J. can be illustrated in the way indicated above. Our view is that the ratio decidendi of Standard Refinery and Distillery Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1965 55 ITR 139 fully applies to the case before us, and we, respectfully, adopt it. Hence, our answer to the question referred is in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1966 (8) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... On the finding recorded by the Trial Court which was not challenged in appeal before the High Court, Babuji did not separate in 1934 from the other coparceners. But he died in October 1937 and by the operation of Act 18 of 1937 as modified by Bihar Act 6 of 1942 Chando Kuer was invested with her husband's interest in the coparcenary property agricultural as well as non-agricultural. When she instituted a suit for partition that interest became defined, and vested in her free from all claims or rights of the coparceners of her husband. The right of the coparceners to take that interest by survivorship on Chando Kuer's death was then extinguished. On her death, even though the interest was not separated by metes and bounds, and was not in her exclusive possession it still devolved upon the nearest heirs of her husband, her daughters. The suit was therefore rightly decreed by the High Court. 13. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 14. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 80 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the duty payable and the duty paid. It is, therefore, contended that any question of penalty can be determined by the officer only after the estate duty payable has been determined. We are inclined to accept this contention. In the penalty proceedings, it is always necessary to quantify the penalty and that by section 56 has been related to the duty payable, though in certain cases a lump sum is provided for. We cannot conceive the quantum being determined by the officer concerned on a date earlier to the date on which the estate duty payable is fixed. In these circumstances, the order of penalty imposed in this case cannot be sustained. We hold that the order is unsustainable. We answer question No. 1 referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the accountable person and against the department. In view of our answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 calls for no answer. We answer the questions referred to us in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 79 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d except by parties to the transaction or by those who claim through those parties. It was, therefore, not open to the defendant to question the passing of consideration until the defendant established some sort of title in her as the successor-in-interest of Mt. Bifla. The aforesaid passage lays down the correct law and has my respectful concurrence. 7. Defendant 2 has failed to prove that he has derived any interest from the rightful owner, defendant No. 7. He cannot file a suit for specific performance of the alleged agreement under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and cannot take resort to the protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. He is a rank trespasser and stranger to the contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 7 and cannot question the non-passing of consideration under Exs. 4 and 5. 8. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to the costs of this Court.
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1966 (8) TMI 78 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... p should not be dissolved until the pending contracts are completed. We are therefore, of the view that there was no implied agreement between the partners for the determination of the partnership. (6) The partnership was, therefore, clearly a partnership at will and it was validly dissolved on 18th December 1956 by the plaintiff giving the notice dated 15th December 1956 to the defendants. The learned trial Judge was, therefore right in taking the view that the partnership was dissolved on 18th December, 1956 and passing a preliminary decree on that basis. (7) These were the only contentions urged in support of the appeal and since in our view there is no substance in them, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal to respondent No. 1 respondents Nos. 2 and 6 and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in three separate sets. Respondent No. 5 shall not be entitled to any costs of the appeal since he has supported the appellant. (8) Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 77 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er the scheme prepared under Chapter IV-A of the Act. That function, as observed by the Supreme Court, is ministerial or administrative in nature. Therefore the function of the Regional Transport Authority of issuing permit in pursuance of the direction under Section 43 (1) (iii) is .... purely an administrative function which, under the changed scheme of the Act, is permissible. In these circumstances, we do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Agarwal that the Regional Transport Authority cannot issue permits to the displaced operators without following the procedure prescribed in Chapter IV of the Act. The permits issued by the Regional Transport Authority in this particular case in obedience with the directions of the State Government under the provisions of Section 43(1) (iii) of the Act are, therefore, legal and do not suffer from any infirmity 29. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any force in this writ application and it is, therefore, dismissed.
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1966 (8) TMI 76 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anesh Ketkar and Achyut Dattarya Phatak figure as delinquent directors in those proceedings. The Managing Director of the company against whom also misfeasance proceedings are taken is the father of Achyut Dattatraya Phatak. It seems to us clear that if the creditors and shareholders were apprised that misfeasance proceedings were taken against the Directors of the company, they would not have approved the scheme under which the affairs of the company are once again relegated into the hands of the self-same directors. 38. For these reasons, we are of the view that the learned District Judge was in error in giving his sanction to the scheme. We accordingly allow the appeal and direct that winding up proceedings will continue. 39. The respondents will pay to the Liquidators the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the District Court. 40. Receiver will stand discharged. 41. Rule in Civil Application No. 2793 of 1965 stands discharged with costs. 42. Order accordingly.
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1966 (8) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... mmons on defendant no. 2 as on other defendants When such attempts failed. the order dated the 17th July 1953 on the application of the plaintiff was passed by the trial court There is. therefore, sufficient material to presume that High Court was satisfied as a matter of fact as contemplated under Rule 20 before it directed a substituted service effected by publication of the summons in the Bengal Gazette. Mere absence in the order sheet to the effect that the Court was satisfied or mere absence of any reference to the reasons for such satisfaction in the order sheet cannot be taken advantage of by the appellant to challenge a valid order as made under Rule 20 Such record is not called for under any provision of law In absence of any other material to the contrary. we have to presume that the court had been satisfied before it passed the order on the 17th July, 1955 for substituted service. We do not therefore find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 74 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 1 who was carrying on the whole show and was responsible for whatever fraud or misrepresentation had been committed and that in any case the seizure of the goods by the police during and in connection with the criminal case started against the defendants by the Bank was illegal and without jurisdiction. From the content of the written statement as also from its general tenor it, accordingly, appears that no case whatsoever of any claim against the Bank was made out; and if by the amendment sought for now such a case will be allowed to be introduced, it will obviously he a new case altogether. Upon the authorities on which so much reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and to which elaborate reference has been made in the judgment delivered by my learned Brother, it is clear that the defendant cannot be permitted to make out a new case at this stage, specially when it involves a case which is otherwise barred under the law of limitation.
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1966 (8) TMI 73 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ose contained in the pleadings for fixation of issues." That was a case under Sections 397, 398, 399, 401 and 402 of the Companies Act as to whether there was oppression on share-holders. I am unable to hold that the decision is of any aid to the petitions for winding up. The petition for winding up is to follow the settled practice in the light of well-established decisions. That which is alleged is to be proved. It has to he alleged as a fact and it has to be proved as a fact. The company had no notice of such allegations. I am unable to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioners that there is any case that the substratum of the company is gone. Assuming it was open to contend that the substratum of the company has gene, on the present affidavit evidence in my opinion no conclusion could have been arrived at in favor of the petitioners. For all these reasons I am of opinion that the petitions fail. The petitions are dismissed with costs. Certified for counsel.
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1966 (8) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ect to his appearance. A contrary view was taken by a larger Bench in Kanpur Hosiery Workers' Union v. J. K. Hosiery Factory, Kanpur 1952 - I L.L.J. 384 , but for reasons aforesaid we do not agree with that view. 32. In the result, we are of the opinion that the provisions contained in S. 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are not exhaustive. It is, therefore, open to an employer to seek to be represented in a proceeding under the Act by a person other than those mentioned in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (2). We might only add that the exercise of this right is subject to the discretion of the authority concerned to deny to a particular person the right of audience. This discretion which flows from S. 11 of the Act, which gives to the tribunal the right to regulate its procedure must of course be used judicially. 33. We accordingly confirm the decision of the industrial tribunal and discharge the rule in this petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1966 (8) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ression "the service" in Art. 233(2) can only mean the judicial service. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the Rules framed by the Governor empowering him to recruit district judges from the "judicial officers" are unconstitutional and, therefore, for that reason also the appointment of respondents 5, 6 and 7 was bad. In this view, it is not necessary to express our view on the last two questions. In the result, we hold that the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules providing for the recruitment of district judges are constitutionally void and, therefore, the appointments made thereunder were illegal. We set aside the order of the High Court and issue a writ of mandamus to the 1st respondent not to make any appointment by direct recruitment to the U.P. Higher Judicial Service in pursuance of the selections made under the said Rules. The last respondent will pay the costs of the appellant. The other respondents will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (8) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arming land deprived of its vegetation. That too cannot necessarily mean that the land had lost its agricultural character. The test, as we have already indicated, should be whether a prudent owner would embark on an adventure in agriculture in respect of the lands concerned. The prudent owner is the common man of the common law, sane and sensible, reasonable and responsible, averse to gambling and speculative experiments, but none the less prepared for normal risks and legitimate expenditure. The statement of the case is insufficient to apply the test we have mentioned above and we cannot but require the Appellate Tribunal to modify the statement of the case by incorporating therein a clear finding as to whether the lands concerned are of such a character that a prudent owner would undertake in respect thereof any of the processes of farming in its widest sense. We do so in exercise of the power of this court under sub-section (5) of section 64 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.
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1966 (8) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and it completely overweighs the circumstances on which the appellant relies. In this view of the matter we hold that Basudeo Narain died after the death of his father Ramruch and it was one month or so after his death that Ramruch left the village as he was greatly grieved on the premature death of his son and afterwards disappeared. As Ramruch has not been heard of for more than seven years after he disappeared from the village, he must be presumed to be dead and the plaintiffs-respondents would in the circumstances be entitled to the property of which he was the last maleholder. o p /o p The appeal therefore must fail except with respect to one item of property to which we shall refer just now. o p /o p His lordship then held that in so far as this item of property was concerned the appellant was entitled to half share. o p /o p The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs subject to the modification indicated above. o p /o p Y.P. Appeal dismissed with modification. o p /o p
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1966 (8) TMI 68 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 958 34 I.T.R. 807 (S.C.), Lakhmichand Baijnath v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1959 35 I.T.R. 416; 1959 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 415, Mansfield & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 48 I.T.R. 254 and S. Hastimal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 49 I.T.R. 273. These presumptions are of the nature dealt with in section 114 of the Evidence Act. They are presumptions of fact. Presumptions, when they arise at all, fill up gaps in evidence. They can be employed when absolutely clinching evidence may be lacking. Unless it could be shown that the income-tax authorities acted unreasonably in raising a presumption in such a case, we cannot hold that they erred in law in arriving at a finding of fact by employing the presumption. It has not been shown to us, as already indicated, that the income-tax authorities acted unreasonably in the present case. I am, therefore, in complete agreement with the answer given by my brother to the second question and concur in the order as to costs also.
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1966 (8) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sed from Bhagwano Kunwar 1 bigha 5 kathas of land under the deed dated March 14, 1958, and he can claim only the rights of an alienee of a specific property from a co- owner on a general partition of the undivided properties. All the parties appearing before us conceded that on such a partition the appellant is entitled to allotment and separate possession of the lands purchased by him under the deed dated March 14, 1958. The deed is not printed in the Paper Book. It will be the duty of the trial Court now to ascertain full particulars of the aforesaid lands. The appeals are allowed with costs in this Court and in the High Court. The decree passed by the High Court is set aside. There will be a decree in favour of the appellant allotting to him the lands purchased by him under the deed dated March 14, 1958 and awarding to him separate possession thereof. The trial Court will draw up a suitable decree after ascertaining the particulars of the aforesaid lands. Appeals allowed.
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