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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 107 Records
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1966 (9) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... correct in law. 14. Jamuna Singh's instigating Jodha Singh to set fire to Baishaki's hut is held established by the High Court and makes it an offence under s. 436 read with s. 115 I.P.C. The conviction of Jamuna Singh under s. 436 read with s. 109 I.P.C. can be legally altered to one under s. 436 read with s. 115 I.P.C. the latter being a minor offence. 15. The appellant was sentenced to eight years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 436 read with s. 109 I.P.C. and the offence under s. 436 read with s. 115 I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and with fine. Reduction in sentence is necessary. 16. In the result, we dismiss the appeal against the appellant's conviction under s. 323 I.P.C. and allow it with respect to his conviction under s. 436 read with s. 109 I.P.C. which we modify by altering it to one under s. 436 read with s. 115 I.P.C. and reducing the sentence to four years' rigorous imprisonment. 17. G.C. 18. Appeal allowed in part.
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1966 (9) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation of the value of the said machinery as on the date of acquisition. It follows that the impugned Act has not provided for "compensation" within the meaning of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, it is void. 1 5 . The mere fact that in regard to some parts of the undertaking the principles provide for compensation does not affect the real question, for, machinery is the major part of the undertaking and, as the entire undertaking is acquired as a unit, the constitutional invalidity of clause(b) of para II of the Schedule to the Act affects the totality of the compensation payable to the entire undertaking. In the context of compensation for the entire undertaking, the clauses of para II of the Schedule to the Act are not severable. In the result, the Act, not having provided for compensation, is unconstitutional and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct. 16. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 17. V.P.S. 18. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 166 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... pro forma defendant took upon himself the duty of paying up the plaintiff. Even if we apply the principle of construction of compromise decree, as laid down by P.N. Mookerjee, J. in AIR1953Cal676 , the decree may at most become executable by the plaintiff against the pro forma defendant in so far as regards ₹ 60,000, recoverable under the decree. The unpaid purchase price payable by the pro forma defendant to the principal defendant, under the independent contract between them, would not be part of the decree and executable as such. That is a matter wholly extraneous to suit and not in any wav related to suit. 13. In the view that we take, we find no substance in the appeal and dismiss the same. Since respondent Dayaram succeeds, for the present, in avoiding payment of sum of money due by him, under a technical plea, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs, here and in the Court below. 14. Certified for two Counsel. Syed Sadat Abdul Masud, J. 15. I agree.
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1966 (9) TMI 165 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... rgument appears to me desperate. A provision for seizure of suspected articles necessarily implies power in the seizing officer to retain them for a reasonable time to facilitate the purpose for which their seizure has been made. The provisions of Section 19-G which relates to custody of documents would be attracted only at a later stage of the proceeding, not immediately on seizure under Section 19-D. It is only after a preliminary investigation, the Enforcement Officer who seizes the documents can be expected to pass the result of his investigation to the Director of Enforcement, when, the latter may exercise his powers under Section 19-G. The length of time that may be considered reasonable for the Enforcement Officer to retain the documents in his custody to facilitate his investigations under the Act does not arise now, in these proceedings. 9. All the grounds urged by counsel in these motions are thus found to be without merit. The motions fail and are dismissed hereby.
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1966 (9) TMI 164 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... e our reply to the second question submitted by the Bombay Employees' Insurance Court will be that applications filed by the Corporation before 1st January 1964 are not subject to any period of limitation, and that those filed thereafter are subject to the period prescribed in the Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 1963. 28. Under the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of this reference. 29. Mr. Jani for the opponents applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from this decision. Mr. Bhabha for the Corporation opposes the application. As stated above, High Courts have differed on the main point at issue. Moreover, the Employees' Insurance Court, Bombay has stated in the reference that the questions submitted to us have arisen in a large number of pending cases. We are accordingly of that this case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Certificate to issue under the Article 133(1)(c) of the constitution. 30. Reference answered.
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1966 (9) TMI 163 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... Corporation directs its plan of distribution to the needs of the industry as a whole, and, having regard to the history and magnitude of the Corporation, there is reason to apprehend that the powers in the hands of the Corporation are liable to be abused unless the Government, at its topmost level, exercises some control over the activities of such a big middleman. Even though I am bound to dismiss the petition, I do believe that the petitioner may still obtain some consideration or relief if he approaches the heads of the Department concerned. I may also add that the problem created by such hybrid 'Government Companies' and public corporations has attracted the attention of the Legislatures in other countries and the need for controlling them has been acknowledged. I am not sure whether this problem has so far been placed before the Legislature of West Bengal. 24. With these observations, the petition under Article 226 is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1966 (9) TMI 162 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s abroad and owned by the taxpayer but occupied by a third party under a trading arrangement and on travelling expenses of a barrister." In any event, the hurdles in the way of the assessee, in claiming the composition fee of ₹ 2,50,000 under the stringent conditions laid down in section 10(2)(xv) that the expenditure should be one wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business are almost insuperable. They are (1) the earlier decision of this court in the case of this very assessee on a somewhat similar question in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 28 I.T.R. 78, 85, (2) the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in (i) Commissioner of Income-tax v. Calcutta Agency Ltd. 1951 19 I.T.R. 191; 1950 S.C.R. 1008, (ii) Commissioner of Income-tax v. H. Hirjee 1953 23 I.T.R. 427, 431; 1953 S.C.R. 714 and (iii) Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1961 41 I.T.R. 350; 1961 2 S.C.R. 651.
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1966 (9) TMI 161 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... liquor. (4) Miscellaneous discarded items such as hessian, oil, chemicals, colours, lime etc. 2. In. Appeal No. 608 of 1965 which relates to the period April 1, 1953, to March 31, 1954, there was sale of 20 items of the total value of ₹ 1,09,300. The goods sold were of the same description and classes as set out in Appeal No. 605 of 1965. 3. For reasons mentioned in the judgment of the principal appeal No. 603 of 1965, the answer to the question submitted will be in the negative, except as to waste caustic liquor. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals.
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1966 (9) TMI 160 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... favour of their joint possession is not irregular. 18. In the present case the finding of the civil court is that the first party has no possession in the disputed plots which are possessed by the members of the second party The separate possession of the second party members in the individual plots was in the circumstances of the case not a question which falls for decision and the failure of the learned munsif in that regard is not a matter which might affect the validity of the finding. 19. Considering all that I have stated above I am of the view that there are no grounds whatsoever for interfering with the order passed by the learned Magistrate in the case. The Rule accordingly stands discharged. On verbal prayer let the operation of the order be stayed for two weeks. Let the operation of the order passed on 12th September 1966 be stayed till the 4th day of October, 1966 as prayed for by the Learned Advocates for the parties. There will be no further extension of time.
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1966 (9) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... contract to sell shares. On the question of readiness and willingness of the buyer to perform the contract, Lord MacDermott observed at p. 91 of the Report "It is true that the first plaintiff stated that he was buying for himself, that he had not sufficient ready money to meet the price and that no definite arrangements had been made for finding it at the time of repudiation. But to prove himself ready and willing a purchaser has not necessarily to produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction." 27. In my opinion, the respondent is entitled to specific performance of the contract, and the High Court rightly decreed the suit. 28. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the decree passed by the trial court restored. There will be no order as to costs in this Court and in the High Court. R.K.P.S.
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1966 (9) TMI 158 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gard to the aforesaid factors, on the facts of the present case. It cannot be held tasty petitioner has established that the tax in question was expropriatory or confiscatory. On the above grounds, we purpose to reject the ninth and the final submission of Mr. Nanavati also (31) In view of our aforesaid conclusions, it is quite clear that the two petitions must be dismissed with costs. Rules discharged with costs. Costs quantified at ₹ 500/- in each petition in separate sets. (32) Mr. Vin on behalf of petitioner prays for certificate in each petition under Article 132, clause (1) and Article 133, clause (1), sub-clause (c), learned counsel for respondents have no objection. Accordingly, we direct that, certificate in each petition should issue under the aforesaid Articles. Mr. Vin also prays for the continuance of the injunction already granted to petitioners. However, we see no proper reason for doing this. Therefore, that prayer is rejected. (33) Petitions dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he time when the plaint was filed. The statement in the plaint was made not in relation to the said mortgages but with reference to their own rights under the said deed of sale of mortgage rights in their favour. The fourth document is the written statement in Suit No. 50 of 1903 where the right of the plaintiffs in that suit to redeem has been specifically denied. The statement, therefore, cannot be availed of as an acknowledgment of a subsisting jural relationship or of a subsisting right and a corresponding liability of being redeemed. 12. In the light of the tests laid down in Khan Bahadur Mazda's case, (Supra) none of these statements can be regarded as acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to treat these statements or any of them as acknowledgments and was equally right in its conclusion that the appellants' suit was barred by limitation. 13. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1966 (9) TMI 156 - HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
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... ... ..... clearly of the opinion that the provisions of section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act are mandatory, and we accordingly record our respectful dissent with the authorities taking a contrary view. We hold therefore the Amendment does not apply to proceedings which were pending before coming into force ( 12. ) Of the Act ; nor would it apply to the lands which had been acquired before the Amendment was passed. ( 13. ) For these reasons, therefore, we would answer the question of law, referred to us in the affirmative and hold that the amendment in section 28 by virtue of Act No. XXXIV of 1960 is prospective in character and would not apply to the proceedings out of which the cases before us arise, and that the rate of interest to be awarded in the cases should be at the rate of six percent per annum that is to say in accordance with the provisions of section 28, as it stood before the amendment. The cases will now go back to the division bench for hearing in accordance with law.
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1966 (9) TMI 155 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o Sharadamma. In other words, even before the income of the partnership reached the hands of the assessee, the payment to Sharadamma had to be deducted. It is only the balance that could be considered as the income of the partnership. This is not a case where the payment to Sharadamma was to be made from out of the income of the assessees. The facts of the present case fall within the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Raja Bejoy Singh Dudhuria v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1933 1 I.T.R. 135 . (P.C.). Our above conclusion also receives support from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. D.R. Naik 1939 7 I.T.R. 362. For the reasons mentioned above, our answer to the question referred to us is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 2,400 did not form part of the assessee's income. The assessee is entitled to its costs of these proceedings. The advocate's fee, ₹ 250.
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1966 (9) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ituted under section 7A and includes an Industrial Tribunal constituted before the 10th day of March, 1957 under this Act." Obviously, the first part of the definition in s. 2(r) cannot be fitted in s. 7A(3)(b). The expression 'Tribunal' in s. 7A(3)(b), therefore, means "an Industrial Tribunal constituted before the 10th day of March, 1957 under this Act." Thus, a person who held the office of the Chairman or any other member of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under s.7 as it stood before March 10, 1957 is qualified for appointment under s.7A(3)(b), though he may not be qualified otherwise for appointment under s. 7A(3). But a Labour Court is not a Tribunal within the meaning of s. 7A(3) (b) read with s. 2(r). Shri Dutta was, therefore, not qualified for appointment under s.7A(3)(b). In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs against, respondent No. 1, the order of the High Court is set aside, and the writ petition is dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... etermine whether the inferior tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction or had not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. In this case the Board of Revenue had not gone wrong in law in taking into consideration Hazarika's conduct in rendering compensation for a forest offence. The Board was quite competent to take the view that Hazarika was not vigilant in observing the law even if it had found-when it did not-that Hazarika's explanation was not unconvincing. The Board cannot be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction under the law or committed an error apparent on the face of the record. It follows that the High Court was not justified in quashing the appellate order of the Board under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Board of Revenue is restored. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant. Y.P. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mplitude, transfer title to one having no title before the transfer. The cases relied upon by counsel are not authorities for the proposition that the operative words of a release deed must be ignored. In S. P. Chinnathambiar’s case (( 1953 2M.L.J. 387, 391), the document could not operate as a transfer, because a transfer was hit by s. 34 of the Court of Wards Act, and viewed as a renunciation of a claim, it could not vest title in the release. In Hutchi Gowder v. Bheema Gowder(( 1959 2 M.L.J. 324, 337)), the question was whether a covenant of further assurance should be enforced by directing the defendant to execute a release deed or a deed of conveyance, and the Court held that the defendant should execute a deed of conveyance. These decisions do not lay down that a deed styled a deed of release cannot, in law, transfer title to one who before the transfer had no interest in the property. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed .
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1966 (9) TMI 151 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 21. Unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any investigation, or legal proceeding and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted or continued as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1955) S.G.J. 25 A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84, it was held at page 88 as follows Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. This contention has therefore to be rejected. 22. In the result all the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner fail and this petition is dismissed with costs. For the reasons given in this judgment W.P. No. 1592 to 1594 of 1966 and 1601 of 1966 are also dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 in each writ petition.
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1966 (9) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... blic sittings were in a position to re-adjust the number of seats in the House of the People or the total number of seats to be assigned to the Legislative Assembly with reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the delimitation of constituencies. It was the will of Parliament that the Commission could by order publish its proposals which were to be given effect to in the subsequent election and as such its order as published in the notifica- tion of the Gazette of India or the Gazette of the State was to be treated as law on the subject. In the instant case the provision of s. 10 (4) of the Act puts orders under ss. 8 and 9 as published under s. 10 (1) in the same street as a law made by Parliament itself which, as we have already said, could only be done under Art. 327, and consequently the objection that the notification was not to be treated as law cannot be given effect to. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rvices had to be terminated by somebody else to whom the authority of the State Board was delegated (if such a delegation was possible at all) and that also we have shown is not done. We can see of no third way in which the resolution of November 20, 1962 could be implemented by a subordinate authority, unless that subordinate authority had power itself to terminate the services of teachers. We have already held that the Assistant Secretary had no such authority under s. 14(3)(iii) of the Act read with s. 18 of the 1915-Act. Therefore, the orders issued in the present case terminating the services of the respondent-teachers were invalid, for they were not orders of the State Board terminating the services of the respondents; they must be held to be orders of the Assistant Secretary who had no power to terminate the services of the respondents. o p /o p The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed with costs, one hearing fee. o p /o p V.P.S. Appeals dismissed. o p /o p
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