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Case Laws
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1967 (12) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r a forfeiture to be effective. The other condition clearly related to notice. It may be observed that under S. 111 of the T. P. Act the requirement regarding notice has not been imposed in case of conditions for determination of lease specified in clauses (a) to (g) of that section. It would therefore, be clear that such a conduct of claiming title in himself on the part of the lessee would not ipso facto put an end to the lease thus enabling the landlord to obtain possession. On the other hand, it would confer a right on the lessor, if he so elects, to determine the lease by a notice as required by S. 111(g) of the T. P. Act. Indeed, the section expressly lays this down as a condition for the forfeiture to be effective. Hence this contention of Sri V. H. Ron should also fail No other question was raised and argued by either party. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds. The original application for eviction, therefore, stands dismissed. 14. No costs. 15. Petition allowed.
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1967 (12) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nate matter and disposes of the proceeding in which the subordinate matter is in controversy. For this reason, even an order setting aside an award is interlocutory, see Croasdell and Cammell Laird & Co., Limited v. In re 1906 2 K.B. 569. A similar test has been applied for determining whether an order in a criminal proceeding is final, see s. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King 1947 F.C.R. 180. For the purposes of this appeal, we do not propose to examine all the decisions cited at the bar and to formulate a fresh test on the subject. Whatever test is applied, an order directing the filing of a complaint and deciding that there is a prima facie case for an enquiry into an offence is not a final order. It is merely a preliminary step in the prosecution and therefore an interlocutory order. As the order is not final, the High Court was not competent to give a certificate under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed. 14. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 68 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of deciding whether the entries in the balance sheets really relate to the appellant's claim against the Company. That such parol evidence can be taken, will appear from the decision in (1949) 1 All ER 198. 23. The appellant's learned counsel has raised arguments to the effect that the debt owed by the Company is in a nature of a promoter's deposit so as to fall within the purview of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, and that there was also a novation of the contract. I do not think it proper to express an opinion on these new points and leave them also for decision by the Official Liquidator 24. In the result, I give judgment for the appellant, set aside the impugned order of the Official Liquidator dated July 22, 1966 and sent the case back to him for fresh disposal according to the law in the light of the observations made above As the appellant did not present its case properly to the Official Liquidator, there will be no order as to the costs of this appeal.
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1967 (12) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ble under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. He relies on Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR 752), But we are concerned with a customs officer and as far as customs officers are concerned this Court held in State Of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (1962) 3 SCR 338 that customs officers are not police officers for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The case of Raja Ram Jaiswal (1964) 2 SCR 752) is distinguishable because by virtue of the provisions of Section 77(2) read with Section 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, an Excise inspector or Sub Inspector in the State of Bihar was deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station and was entitled to investigate any offence under the Excise Act. There is no conflict between Raja Ram Jaiswal's (1964) 2 SCR 752) case and the State Of Punjab v. Barkat Ram ( (1962) 3 SCR 338). In the result the appeal of accused No. 2 and accused No. 3 also fails and is dismissed. They must now surrender to their bail.
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1967 (12) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a condition imposed on the respondent by the Government while giving him a lease of land on which the premises are situated. The notice of the conditions imposed by the head lease was sufficient notice for the purposes of clause (k). The ground of eviction under clause (k) was thus made out. The Courts below also held that the appellant caused substantial damage to the premises. We express no opinion on it, and this question is left open. 17. It follows that the respondent is entitled to evict the appellant on the grounds mentioned in cls. (b)(i), (c)(i) and (k) of the proviso to s. 13(1). 18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The execution of the decree is stayed for a period of six months from today. The appellant through Mr. A. K. Sen gives an undertaking that the appellant will hand over to the respondent, on the expiry of six months, vacant possession of the entire hotel premises except the portion in the possession of sub-lessees. 19. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 65 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... will in our opinion meet the ends of justice. 21. It was then argued that this interest should be calculated on the value of the property as on the date of taking possession, that is 30-11-1950. We have held that interest is payable on equitable principles by way of compensation for deprivation of possession without payment of the value thereof. In order to give effect to that principle completely perhaps the logical and proper course would be to calculate the value at the end of each year and award interest thereon up to the date of payment. That result is achieved in effect by the grant of interest on the value as on the date of acquisition, that is 1956 which is somewhere midway between taking possession and the award of compensation, and calculating interest at 6 on that date. 22. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below is correct in every respect and the appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. 23. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ost in the trial court and it was only in the court of appeal that this compromise was arrived at. 14. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the compromise deed did not create a lease. Therefore the judgment-debtor is not a tenant within Section 2(5) of the Act which defines "tenant" to mean "any person by whom or on whose behalf rent is payable for any house and includes every person who, from time to time, derives title under a tenant, or a person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than under the provisions of this Act, and shall include any person against whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction but not a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a Court." 15. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court set aside and that of the District Judge restored. The appellants will have their costs incurred in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (12) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r could not be defeated by him. We are not prepared to read in that judgment any decision that, if the auction-purchaser is not the judgment creditor but a stranger, the sale would be a valid sale, even though it was held in execution of a decree which was void. A sale is void ab initio if it is held in execution of a decree which is a nullity and, consequently, to be treated as non- existent. In the present case, therefore, no rights could be acquired by the purchaser Prabhu Dayal, the father of the 'appellant, when he purported to purchase the house in execution of the decree against Ram Lal. Ram Lal having died without leaving any heir, the property naturally passed by escheat to the Maharaja of Jaipur. That principle is clearly recognised in Hindu law. Reference may be made to Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edition, p. 133, para. 59. The decision given by the High Court, in these circumstances, was perfectly correct. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ; Mercantile Insurance Co. 1937 5 I.T.R. 349. If the interpretation which Mr. Rajgopal has suggested on the basis of the contents of column (15) of the income-tax return form were to be accepted, the allowance by way of ground rent would be claimable only on condition of its having been paid, which, as we have already pointed out, would clearly be contrary to the language of the provision. In our opinion, therefore, on a proper construction of the provision of section 9(1)(iv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the only amount which was claimable by the assessee in respect of the ground rent of the property was the ground rent for the period of the previous year and the extra amount, which was claimed by him in respect of the arrears for the prior 75 months, was clearly not permissible to be allowed to him. In the result, therefore, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1967 (12) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt case, however, the appellant was not suspended under any rule similar to rule 93A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1 and the decision of the Orissa High Court has therefore no rele- vance. We are therefore of the opinion that the order of suspension of the appellant made by the State Government on February 13, 1950 did not come to an end on the date of the order of acquittal made by the High Court and Counsel for the appellant is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to whether the suit is barred under Article 14 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act as we have held that the claim of the appellant is devoid of merit. For the reasons already expressed, we hold that the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 10, 1961 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed. In view of the circumstances of the case we do not propose to make any order as to costs ,of this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on in this case is not the abstract question as to what the purchaser could or might have done but what was in fact contemplated by the parties who were entering into the contract. For the reasons already given, we hold that on a proper construction of the terms of the contract and having regard to the surrounding circumstances there was an implied agreement between the parties that the rights and liabilities under the contract were not to be transferred and the Bill of Lading relating to the contract was also not to be transferred. It follows therefore that the contract in question was a non-transferable specific delivery contract within the meaning of s. 2(f) of the Act and the contract was not hit by the notification dated March 29, 1958 issued by the Central Government under s. 15(1) of the Act. For the reasons expressed we hold that the decision of the Calcutta High Court dated September 18, 1963 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 59 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... y be permissible, or even necessary, if a case similar to Burrell's case arises for decision, to consider whether, after the Arnholz case the new decision should be put on the same or on another ground what one cannot do is to force on those who gave the decision of the House of 1937 reasoning which they did not accept. The remaining authority is that of Attorney-General v. Power . I need say no more of this case than that I agree with the analysis of it by UngoedThomas J. and with his observations# that it shows that the Crown's contention in the present case would involve the consequence that duty could be claimed on the death under twenty-one of an infant contingently entitled, if there was a discretionary power of maintenance, a conclusion for which the Crown did not contend. I would allow the appeal and restore the judgment of UngoedThomas J. Appeal allowed. Solicitors Gregory Rowcliffe & Co. for John Taylor & Co., Blackburn; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1967 (12) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was held to offend Art. 14. But the case of the accomplice evidence is different. Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has already been held not to offend Art. 14 and the matter of taking accomplice evidence outside s. 337 by using s. 494 or otherwise is not very different. We do not hold that there was any breach of the Constitution in receiving Ethyl Wong's evidence, To hold otherwise would shut out accomplice evidence completely. There is thus no force in the appeals. Mr. Jethmalini argued that the High Court was wrong in enhancing the sentences of Balchand and Poonamchand appellants and the sentence of Laxmipat which is the maximum permissible under law was also too severe. Gold smuggling has become one of the major difficulties in maintaining our economic structure. The case evidences an international ring of smugglers. In view of this we see no reason to interfere. The appeals will stand dismissed. Appellants to surrender to their bail. Appeals dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hether we should not take it into consideration. Further Haroon himself was also served with a notice like others. He was unwilling to make a statement till he had seen what the others had said. This may well be regarded as peculiar conduct in a man who now claims that he was not concerned with the smuggling. The High Court has very searchingly examined the evidence of Kashinath and applied to it the checks which must always be applied to accomplice evidence before it is accepted. There is corroboration to the evidence of Kashinath in respect of Haroon from the confession of Bengali given independently and in circumstances which exclude any collusion or malpractice. Regard being had to the provisions of s. 133 of the Evidence Act, we do not think that we should interfere in this appeal by special leave, particularly as we hold the same opinion about the veracity of Kashinath. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Appellant to surrender to his bail. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reasons given in the decision of the Bench of this Court in R. S. Jhaver v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes are not valid, it will be open to this Court to adopt those reasons wherever they apply. From this point of view also, I am of the opinion that the attack on section 42 cannot be sustained since the facts indicate that a sale of the goods had taken place even according to the admission of the petitioner. It was open to the authorities to take the view that the clandestine features in the transport in this case, indicated a clear intention on the part of the petitioner to suppress information about the sales in collusion with the seller in Madras (or Nellore). In such circumstances, it can be held that the power to seize and confiscate is ancillary to the power to levy tax, as it empowered the authorities to take reasonable steps to ensure that the tax is not evaded. Therefore, these writ petitions must fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was bad. This decision was followed by a later decision of the Supreme Court reported in Khushi Ram Behari Lal and Co. v. Assessing Authority(1), which also arise under the same Act, namely, Punjab General Sales Tax Act. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the same analogy would apply to the present case prohibiting the department from assessing the members of a Hindu joint family after its dissolution in respect of the turnover of the joint family before the dissolution. As long as the Madras General Sales Tax Act contains no provision similar to the provisions in the Madhya Pradesh Act or the Indian Income-tax Act which will enable the authorities to assess such members after partition in respect of the turnover of business of the former Hindu undivided family before the partition, I am of the opinion that this argument is entitled to weight. Therefore, writs of prohibition will issue in these four writ petitions as prayed for. No order as to costs.
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1967 (12) TMI 54 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder of assessment, falls within the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority and no part of it can be said to constitute a collateral activity not specifically and expressly included in the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority as such. In the light of what has been stated by the Supreme Court as extracted above, it is clear that section 32 of the Act was a complete bar to the competence of the learned Magistrate to question the validity of the assessment made in respect of the transactions of purchase entered into by the respondent. It is clear that the learned Magistrate was in error in having taken upon himself the responsibility of ascertaining the validity of that assessment. 7.. It seems to me that it is sufficient that the above clarification has been made. As already stated, the view of the learned Magistrate that the applications had to be dismissed on the other ground, is correct. 8.. In the result, these revision petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1967 (12) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
FIRM — ONE TIME PARTNER APPOINTED AS AUTHORISED CONTROLLER PENDING SUIT FOR DISSOLUTION — TAX ASSESSED ON FIRM — WHEN CAN BE RECOVERED FROM AUTHORISED CONTROLLER.
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1967 (12) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... e of action . The cause of action is already there. The effect of the fulfilment of the requirements of one or more of the clauses is to remove the obstacle and make it possible for the landlord to recover possession. I must also state that the leave of the winding up court is granted to commencement or continuation of a suit or a legal proceeding. The suit in this case continues to be one for recovery of possession. The nature of the suit is not changed. Fresh grounds for ejectment do not necessitate any fresh leave under section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. For the same reasons, there is no impediment to the grant of the application under the provisions of Order 6, rule 17, of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, the trial court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. I set aside the order of the trial court dated 7th October, 1963, and allow the application dated 3rd July, 1963, for amendment. Costs to be costs in the suit. Rule made absolute.
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1967 (12) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Authentication of balance sheet and profit and loss account, Winding up – Exercise and control of liquidator’s powers
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