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Showing 1 to 20 of 94 Records
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1967 (3) TMI 124 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the plaintiff should no longer be allowed to continue in the case. The principal Munsiff, Gulbarga, is therefore directed to take this suit for trial from day-to-day and dispose of the same before the courts are closed for ensuing summer vacation. It is hoped that the parties in the suit would be diligent and co-operate with the lower court for the expeditious disposal of his suit. For the reasons stated above, C.R.P No. 577/1965 is allowed and the order passed by the Principal Munsiff that the 2nd defendant is entitled to restoration of possession of the suit lands and the amount in deposit on the criminal side is sufficient security for restoration of the possession of suit lands is hereby set aside. The principal Munsiff is directed to dispose of the application filed by the plaintiff afresh on the question whether the restoration of the suit revives the ancillary orders passed in the original suit. C.R.P No. 583/1965 is dismissed. 30. No costs. LGC/D.V.C Petition allowed.
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1967 (3) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... no jurisdiction to eject merely the sub-tenant. Thus the judgment of the appellate court is without jurisdiction on this ground in the alternative and is liable to be set aside. 10. As to the ground on which the High Court upheld the judgment of the appellate court, though it did not agree with the reasons given by the court, it is enough to say that there was a concurrent finding of the trial court as well as the appellate court that no arrears were due. In the circumstances we do not see why the High Court should have interfered with a concurrent finding of fact. It is also remarkable that there is no decree even by the High Court against the tenants-in-chief, for all that the High Court did was to dismiss the revision petition. 11. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court as well as of the appellate court and restore the judgment of the trial court. In the circumstances we order parties to bear their own costs throughout. 12. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (3) TMI 122 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mstances, even assuming that there was every possibility, and even probability bordering on certainty of the producer completing the picture as planned, and that in fact the distributor later secured his prints, the subsequent acquisition of the security cannot relate back so as to make the instrument for fiscal purposes, at the time of its execution. There is no need here to consider any other Article. For a pawn pretty either actual or constructive; a mere agreement to give possession cannot operate as a pledge and for the instrument to be a conveyance there must be transfer and here, there can be no transfer or delivery of possession. (9) We, therefore, hold that the instrument in question is not a mortgage deed as defined in S. 2(17) chargeable under Art. 40(a) or (b) of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act. It is only an agreement. The question is answered accordingly. No order as to costs. We thank Mr. R. Janardhana Rao, counsel appearing amicus curiae for his assistance.
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1967 (3) TMI 121 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nal, there can be no doubt about the petitioners' claim for refund of the court-fees paid. It is not for the Court, as already stated, to substitute Madras Act V of 1922 in the place of Madras Act XIV of 1955-But the refund claimed is limited only to the difference, and there will be an order for refund of the difference as prayed for. 106. On the writ petitions we hold that the levy of court-fees in the Original Jurisdiction of the High Court under Rule 1 of the Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1956, as statutorily provided for under Article 1, Schedule I of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, is invalid and unconstitutional. 107. It is not our province to indicate how the pending or proposed proceedings should be stamped. However, to enable the appropriate authorities to take the required steps in the matter and to avert administrative difficulties in the interregnum, we suspend the operation of our orders by two months. There will be no order as to costs.
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1967 (3) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... female on the date the Act came into force whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof. That provision makes a clear departure from the Hindu law texts or rules. Those texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain intendment of the provision. 7. In our judgment the learned judges of the Madras High Court were not right in limiting the scope of Section 14(1) by taking the aid of the fiction mentioned earlier. That in our opinion is wholly impossible. On the point under consideration the decision of the Bombay High Court in Yamunabai and Anr. v. Ram Maharaj Shreedhar Maharaj and Anr.A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 463 lays down the law correctly. 8. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the decree and judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. The 1st respondent will pay the Court fee payable by the appellant in this appeal.
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1967 (3) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o relies on Mohan Das v. Kessumal(A.I.R. 1955 Aim. 47). In that case the objection which was made more than 30 days after the service of notice was that the award had been filed by a person not authorised by the arbitrator to do so. The court held that such an objection did not fall within s. 30 of the Act and therefore Art. 158 of the Limitation Act did not apply. On these facts the decision in that case may be right. But-the court seems to have made a general observation that Art. 158 cannot apply to a written-statement by a defendant in reply to an application to have the award made a rule of the court. If by ,that general observation the court means that even if the objection is of the nature falling within s. 30 and is filed more than 3O days after service of notice, it would be open to the court to set aside the award on such objection, we are of the opinion that the view is incorrect. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (3) TMI 118 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessement of a firm. This conclusion of mine is in accord with the observations of Shah, J. in Habibullah's case which observations have already been extacted above. So far as Nagaraj's case (1962) 46 ITR 609 (SC) is concerned. I have already said that the enquriy inot the effect of assessment of the frim having been made after 1-4-1952 was expressly shut out by the High Court and not considered by their Lordships of the Surpeme Court. I am unable to read the words "in respect of any completed assessment of partner in a firm" in sub-section (5) to relate to assessment of a partner only when the same is completed after 1-4-1952 irrespective of the date of the assessement of the firm. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Income-tax Officer rightly applied section 35 (5) in rectifying the error. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Jagjit Singh, J. (3) I agree
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1967 (3) TMI 117 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ee on the said date. The interest, no doubt, he says, is related to the compensation payable to the assessee but this interest accrued only when it was awarded because it was in the discretion of the court and the court may as well have refused it. It appears to us that there is substance in this argument of Mr. Joshi and the amount which the assessee has received by way of interest by the order of the court made on the 17th November, 1955, and received by the assessee on the 15th December, 1955, will be liable to be taxed in the assessment year in question. Question No. 2 will have to be answered accordingly. In the result, therefore, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and as to question No. 2 our answer is that the amount of compensation of ₹ 2,34,000 will not be liable to tax, but the amount of interest thereon will be taxable under section 10(5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act in the assessment year 1956-57. The department will pay the costs of the assessee.
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1967 (3) TMI 116 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ned upon the materials and evidence on the record. I have already held above that the mistake became known to the plaintiff in no case earlier than November, 1957. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was instituted on the 30th June, 1960, which is well within three years of the date on which or the time from which the mistake became known to the plaintiff. It may be mentioned that under Article 96 of the Limitation Act time runs from the plaintiff's knowledge and there is no express requirement of diligence on his part, vide Kaikhusroo Manekshah v. Gangadas Dwarkadas ILR 38 Bom 712 AIR 1936 Bom 822. It follows that Article 96 of the Limitation Act is applicable and the suit is not barred by limitation 10. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is decreed. The judgment and the decree of the trial Court are set aside In the circumstances of this case, however, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. Anwar Ahmad, J. 11. I agree.
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1967 (3) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oners make a grievance that they have to pay fairly large amounts by way of contribution to the Scheme. No doubt, the petitioners' stand appears to be that the amount collected or demanded is really a tax, or fee, at any rate, which also the local authority has no right to ask for. Here again, the matter will have to be approached in an entirely different way. The amount that the petitioners have been asked to contribute is only towards the cost of the Scheme, which has to be incurred by the local authority. As to how exactly that contribution is to be worked out and the proportion in which the plots are to bear that burden, have all been indicated in the Act. Therefore, the liability of the petitioners to pay contribution has to be upheld, once we come to the conclusion that the Act, as a whole, will have to be sustained. Both the contentions of the petitioners fail, the writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed with costs of the respondents, one set. Petition dismissed.
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1967 (3) TMI 114 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... t the conduct of the Board of Inland Revenue in respect of these matters. Until 1958 they very rightly accepted the interpretation which I have placed upon this section without question; they caused an Act to be passed in 1954 on the footing of this interpretation (they now say that was all a mistake) and so the matter remained until in 1958 some question arose, not upon trading, but upon residence. This led, so your Lordships were informed, to a reappraisal of the section and the board then adopted a construction which, in my opinion, is quite untenable and incidentally introduced anomalies. If the board want to change the basis of taxation from the clear words which Parliament has used and to alter a clearly settled practice understood by Crown and subject alike, surely they should seek statutory powers to do so and not, by an internal change of practice, try to alter well-settled law. I would allow this appeal and restore the decision of the commissioners. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (3) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eable share from the proprietors and other right-holders for any common purpose including the extension of the village abadi. o p /o p It is also clear that the power of the State Government to make reservation of land for common purposes under s. 42 is coterminus with the power of the Consolidation Officer under s. 18(c) and it follows therefore that the order of the Director dated March 8, 1957 is illegal and ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. o p /o p For these reasons we set aside the order of the Punjab High Court dated November 8, 1960 and direct that a writ in the nature of certiorari should be issued to quash the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab dated March 8, 1957 with regard to khasra No. 3942 reserving it for extension of abadi for non-proprietors. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. o p /o p Y.P. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1967 (3) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . To hold that such an authority which is appointed by the State Government and holds office, entertains and disposes of appeals within the State is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court is to carry technicality beyond reasonable limits. One can hold reasonably that such an appellate authority is located within the territorial limits of the High Court for the purpose of disposing of the appeals under the Act. This is a converse case where legally and factually the appellate authority is located in the State though for convenience it also holds office in New Delhi, as presumbly the same officer has been appointed appellate officer by other States under different Acts. We, therefore, hold that the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ in appropriate cases against such an authority under Art. 226. In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside and the appeals are remanded to it for disposal in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result. Appeal remanded
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1967 (3) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot brought to the knowledge of the Magistrate concerned by the appellant at any time. Nor did he ever apply to the Magistrate to set aside the permission passed in ignorance in the interest of justice. In these circumstances, the appellant cannot challenge the permission as a nullity in the suit which has been brought on the basis of that permission. We may, however, add that what we have said above refers only to proceedings being carried on by courts or authorities after the stay order has been passed and before they have knowledge of it. But this may not apply in a case where stay is made for ministerial officers, as for example in the case of a court asking a bailiff not to sell and the bailiff selling without knowledge of the order of the court prohibiting it to carry on the sale. The position in such a case may be different, but as to that we express no final opinion in the present appeal. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (3) TMI 110 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le to avail of this provision in the case of indirect transfers effected by cross-transfers as in the present case. On the wording of this provision, it can apply only to the income of the assets, which are transferred by the assessee to the trustees for the benefit of his wife or minor child. In the present case the income has arisen not from the assets, which are transferred by the assessee in trust for the benefit of his minor son, but from the property which has been transferred in trust for the benefit of the assessee's son by the brother of the assessee. Since section 16(3)(a)(iv) is inapplicable to the present case and the case is not capable of falling under section 16(3)(b) also, we do not think that the said item of income is capable of being included in the assessment of the assessee. In the result, therefore, our answer to the question referred to us must be in the negative. The department will pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the negative.
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1967 (3) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of very limited jurisdiction. It is in the interests of justice and administration of law that litigants should show the same respect to a court, no matter whether it is highest in the land or whether it is one of inferior jurisdiction only. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 does not define 'contempt' or courts' and in the interest of justice any conduct of the kind mentioned above towards any person who can be called a 'court' should be amenable to the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It must be borne in mind that we do not propose to lay down that all Registrars of all Co-operative Societies 'in the different States are "courts" for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Our decision is expressly limited to the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar like the one before us governed by "he Bihar and Orissa Co- operative Societies Act. The second point also fails and the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (3) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to speak. This is not possible. The guarantee in this form was accepted by the party concerned as well as this court and it is impossible to ignore the time limit which is an integral part of the guarantee. The contention of the bank that the guarantee is no longer enforceable is therefore right. Of course if the Bank can be made to part with the money belonging to Dr. M.N. Kaul under any other procedure open to the sales tax authorities, the bank would be bound legally to pay it over but the guarantee cannot be enforced. 11. As regards the sum of ₹ 1,341.44 np. which is sought to be recovered from the amount deposited by Dr. Kaul as security for costs, it is obvious that that cannot be ordered. The sum of ₹ 2,500 is available only to meet costs and as in this case costs have not been ordered that sum cannot be touched. In the result, the two notices of motion must fail and they are dismissed. The costs of the hearing shall be borne by the State of Maharashtra.
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1967 (3) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er the Prevention of Detention Act. where does not appear to be any reason why such a rule cannot be made under the Defence of India Act or the Rules made thereunder. It may be that in the present case the Government had materials before it which might justify the petitioner's detention. We do not know whether it had or not for the only thing that was said in the counter-affidavit was that there were materials on the consideration of which the Minister based his decision. If that be so, the proper thing to do was to give a chance to the petitioner to explain them. This not having been done the order of con- tinuation of detention was illegal, it being in breach of the principles of natural justice and has, therefore, to be quashed. In this view, it is not necessary to deal with the rest of the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petition is allowed. The order dated December 2, 1966 is quashed and the petitioner is directed to be set free forthwith. Petition allowed
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1967 (3) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... State Government. It is easy to see that an unsuccessful party may challenge the grant of a lease in favour of another by pointing out defects or demerits which did not come to the knowledge of the State Government. The order in this case does not even purport to show that the comments and countercomments, which were before the Central Government in this case, had been considered. It would certainly have been better if the order of 22nd June 1966 had shown that the Central Government had taken into consideration all the fresh material adduced before it and for the reasons formulated they thought that the order of the State Government should not be disturbed. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of the Central Government passed on 22nd June, 1966 are set aside. The Central Government is directed to decide the review applications afresh in the light of the observations made. The appellant will get his costs throughout from the 3rd respondent. Appeals allowed.
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1967 (3) TMI 104 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sing such a process. To spend money against a coercive process would be money laid out wholly or exclusively for business purposes, particularly when it was to result in saving of business profits, which was the property of the assessee-company, from belated efforts at taxation. Thus, although the Tribunal might have been right in holding that the expenditure was not justified in saving the fair name of the assessee's business, they were not right in negativing other justifications pleaded by the assessee, to which reference has already been made. The expenditure incurred by the assessee-company in opposing an illegal and coercive Governmental action with the object of saving taxation and safeguarding business were justified by commercial expediency and were allowable expenditure. In the result, we answer the question referred to this court in the negative. The assessee is entitled to costs. Certified for two counsel. MASUD J.- I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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