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1967 (5) TMI 81 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ct, would not apply to immoveable property." 9. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the word 'property' as defined in the Act is not capable of being construed in the manner suggested by the non-petitioners and does not include immoveable property and as such under Section 25 of the Act the Police is not authorised to take charge of immoveable property and consequently the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to deal with it under Section 26 of the Act. 10. This being so the order of appointing receiver for the management of Immoveable property by the District Magistrate in the present case must also fall on the same ground. 11. This would however, not effect the proceedings so far as they relate to moveable property. 12. As a result this revision application is allowed and the order of the District Magistrate appointing a receiver for the immoveable property is set aside and the proceedings relating to such property are qua shed.
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1967 (5) TMI 80 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot be different when the employer is the State. Even the pay and allowances for the period between 1953 and 1956 which were due to the petitioner was not paid to him. As a result the petitioner has been deprived for seven years of the use of the money due to him and the State has retained this amount. This is not the first case in which bureaucratic indifference has resulted in several years' delay in payment of dues to a citizen. I think it is just and equitable that Government should pay compensation by way of interest for monies which it illegally retained for several years. I therefore direct that Government shall add to the sum found due to the petitioner interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from October 25, 1960 till the date of tender of payment. 33. The petitioner shall get his costs from the respondents. This petition was strongly opposed by the respondent State and the hearing lasted for several days. I assess the petitioner's costs at ₹ 400.
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1967 (5) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... text in which that Court expressed its opinion about suits for accounts, it clearly intended to lay down that the dismissal of the suit on plaintiff's withdrawal is not to be necessarily permitted, if the defendant has become entitled to a relief in his favour. But such it right, if at all, can in no circumstances be held to accrue before a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts is passed. In fact, in mentioning suits for partition and suits for accounts, the Court was keeping in view the circumstance mentioned in the earlier sentence which envisaged that a preliminary decree had already been passed defining rights of parties. In any case, we do not think that any defendant in a suit for rendition of accounts can insist that the plaintiff must be compelled to proceed with the suit at such a stage as the one at which the respondent in the present case applied for withdrawal of the suit. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (5) TMI 78 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e raised or to so alter the character of the petition as to make it in substance a new petition. 6. The Supreme Court case in my opinion has no application to the facts of the present case. So far as the word 'trial' used in Section 88 (3) of the Representation of the People Act is concerned, it was construed by the Supreme Court in the context of the various provisions contained in Chapter III of the said Act and the analogy could not be extended to a suit which has been stayed under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. 7. I am of the view that an amendment impleading a party to the suit does not in any way determine rights or liabilities of the parties to the suit, nor is it a matter relating to the trial of the suit. Consequently the order of the Civil Judge impleading defendant No. 2 as a party to the suit did not amount to a trial of the suit and was well within the jurisdiction of the Court. 8. This revision must, therefore, fail and is dismissed with costs.
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1967 (5) TMI 77 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ose modifications and directions. There will be a further order in terms of prayer (2) of the petition transferring the properties and assets of the company to and vesting the same in the new company, The Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited, free from the mortgages and charges in favour of the Chartered Bank. There be a further order directing that the liabilities of the company in favour of the State Bank of India and the Government of India be also transferred to and become the liabilities of the said Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited. There will also be a consequential order in terms of prayer (3) of the petition granting liberty to apply. This liberty to apply will also be available for the new company Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. and the Government of India in determining any question relating to the working of this company or arrangement and for dissolution without winding up of this applicant company. No order is made as to costs.
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1967 (5) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction all suits where injunction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under Clause (a) of Sub-section (iv) of Section 7 and in that view Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7 would be superfluous. The contention urged by Mr. Bishan Narain, therefore, cannot be accepted. 6. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that neither Clause (a) of Sub-section 7 nor Sub-section (in-A) of Section 7 would apply and the court-fees payable on the plaint were under Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7. The appeal, therefore, has to be allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the trial court is restored. The respondent will pay the appellant-company the costs of this appeal. 7. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (5) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... sition of Roshan Lal, defendant No. 2, it is clear that he was throughout acting for the defendant-firm., which admittedly is a joint Hindu family firm. In a vaka-latnama filed in a case he signed the document as 'karta of the iamily. It is true that the father of Roshan Lal is alive but he is an old person and, in such circumstances, the son could act as the 'karta', i.e., manager of the joint Hindu family firm. I, therefore, agree with the lower Court that Roshan Lal functioned as the 'karta' of the joint Hindu family business and as such the transactions undertaken by him shall be binding on the detandant-firm. Such transactions shall also be deemed to have been entered into by or on behalf of the defendant-firm and the disputes can be referred to arbitration. 29. The learned Civil judge has thus taken a correct view of the law and also of the facts of the case, The F.A.F.O. has no force and it is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.
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1967 (5) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
... ... ... ... ..... ems that are barred, we agree with the view of the court below that this application should succeed and that the appellant should be restrained from recovering the said amount. With regard to that portion which is not barred, we are unable to agree with the finding of the court below. In our opinion this portion cannot be the subject matter of a writ application. So far as this application is concerned, it ought to be dismissed in respect of that part of claim which is not barred, without prejudice to the rights of the respondents to agitate the matter in proper proceedings. ( 9. ) For the reasons set out above the order will be that the appeal succeeds in part and that the part of the order which relates to the portion, which is not barred, is set aside, and the application dismissed in respect thereof and the Rule discharged. The finding of the court below in respect of that portion which is barred, is upheld and the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1967 (5) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot; as being in any way different from the word "postpone" which is some times used. The Word "adjourn" means that the officer can postpone the meeting to a subsequent date. The High Court did not exercise its powers-under Art. 226 of the Constitution and we must not be intended to have meant that where the High Court has refused to exercise its discretion this Court Would always interfere. This case was admitted in this Court merely to clear a dispute about the law which seems to have evoked different interpretations in the High Courts. On a consideration of the whole matter we are of opinion that the petition was devoid of merit and although It was dismissed because the High Court did not choose to exercise its discretionary powers the result would have been the same if the High Court had gone into the matter elaborately and correctly. The appeal must therefore be dismissed. We order accordingly. The appeal shall stand dismissed with costs. One hearing.
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1967 (5) TMI 72 - COURT OF APPEAL
... ... ... ... ..... a necessary part of the computation. The copyright and other rights in the book now in question in no sence formed stock-in-trade of Mr. Innes, and before the assignment to his father they had no part in any computation of profits and gains. For tax purposes his annual profits were computed on a cash basis. It seems to me that the Crown is trying to impose tax, on the one hand, by computation on a cash basis and, on the other hand, by computation on an earnings basis, thus seeking to mix oil and water. But in the end I am entirely unable to see that the decision in Sharkey v. Wernher 1956 A.C. 58; 1966 29 I.T.R. 962 pushes us to the length suggested and I decline to travel that length without being forced to. Appeal dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to House of Lords, on condition that the Crown pay both sides' costs in the House of Lords and leave the orders as to costs in the courts below undisturbed. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue; Field, Roscoe & Co.
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1967 (5) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... r Most of the said watches which were seized as aforesaid had been dulv and legally acquired by our client in the usual course of his said business long prior to 1962 (8) The information and evidence furnished by our client as aforesaid conclusively show that the said watches were duly, legally and properly acquired by him and that he is the owner thereof." It is clear that they contain no admission, as argued by Mr. Kar 14. For. the reasons stated above this appeal must succeed and the order of the learned Judge in the court below is set aside. The Rule is made absolute and the notice dated 6th March 1064 given by the Assistant Collector of Customs and Superintendent Preventive Service, a copy whereof is set out at pages 25 and 26 of the paper book, is quashed and/or set aside. There will be no order as to costs. The seized watches should be re-turned forthwith 15. The operation of this order will remain stayed for three weeks from this date. as prayed for. 16. I agree
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1967 (5) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... , we do not find fault with the Tribunal. Lastly, in case of buildings, which are in possession of tenants and the tenants cannot either be evicted or the rent payable by them enhanced, except in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Act, the only appropriate method of valuation is to capitalise the annual rent by certain number of years' purchase. The method of valuing the land and the building separately and adding up the values would be improper in such cases, because that would ignore the impact of the Rent Control Act on the value of the land and the building. This is the view which was expressed by the Mysore High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. V.C. Ramachandran 1966 60 I.T.R. 103 and we respectfully agree with the view. The arguments made by Mr. Pal all fail. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The accountable person is entitled to costs of this reference. ROY J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1967 (5) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
whether the inherent power of tile High Court is conferred by or has the sanction of enacted law
- cancellation of bail in an bailable offence.
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1967 (5) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the said vehicles were-seized by the customs -authority, that between 1947 and October, 1951 when they were disposed off they were lying uncared for in an open space, that they were disposed of at the instance of the Police as unclaimed property, that when they were sold most of the valuable parts were missing and lastly that they were sold while the appeal against the order of seizure and confiscation was still pending?
Held that:- The fact that an order for its disposal was passed by a Magistrate would not in an-,, way interfere with or wipe away the right of the owner to demand the return of the property or the obligation of the Government to return it. The order of disposal in any event was obtained on a false representation that the property was an unclaimed property. Even if the Government cannot be said to be in the position of a bailee, it was in any case bound to return the said property by reason of its statutory obligation or to pay its value if it had disabled itself from returning it either by its own act or by any act of its agents and servants. In these circumstances, it is difficult to apperciate how the contention that the State Government is not liable for any tortious act of its servants can possibly arise.
The High Court was right in conferming the decree passed by the trial court on the basis that there was an obligation on the State Government either to return the said vehicles or in the alternative to pay their value. The appeal is dismissed
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1967 (5) TMI 67 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... cannot be part of the sale price. So far as the purchaser is concerned, he pays for the goods what the seller demands, viz., price even though it may include tax. That is the whole consideration for the sale and there is no reason why the whole amount paid to the seller by the purchaser should not be treated as the consideration for the sale and included in the turnover. (page 484). The reasoning of the Nagpur High Court is thus confirmed by the Supreme Court. There is, therefore, no reason to take any other view of the matter. The answer to the second question is that it was legal on the part of the Sales Tax Authorities to add the sales tax collected separately by the dealer to the taxable turnover as the tax amount recovered by the assessee formed part of the sale price. The second question is thus answered in the affirmative. 11.. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Hearing fee Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1967 (5) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... obstacle imposed by section 21(2) of the Act. In the result, I concur with my learned brother that the answer to the first question must be in the negative and against the department. Upon this view of the matter there is no need to answer the second question which is so framed that we need answer it only if the additional evidence sought to be made part of the record is held to be part of the record. If a direction could be given validly, after bringing some additional material upon the record, the second proviso to section 21(2) would certainly remove the bar of limitation. I, therefore, prefer not to answer the second question upon a purely hypothetical basis. I also concur with my learned brother in the order proposed as to costs. Order of the Court (May 19,1967.) The questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. We direct the department to pay the assessee a sum of Rs. 100 by way of costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1967 (5) TMI 65 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ted. These are all, however, questions of fact, which were not at all agitated before the learned Single judge, and at the hearing of the writ petition before him the facts appear to have been admitted. Then Mr. T.S. Munjral maintained that during the pendency of the writ petition the facts were still being gone into by the Assessing Authority but that is putting in another form the preliminary objection initially raised by the learned Advocate-General but later on given up by him. Lastly Mr. T.S. Munjral urged that up to September, 1958, the company had been submitting returns under the Act and was being assessed to sales tax on the basis of notional and splitting up of the charges for food supplied and it could not change its position subsequently. It is, however, futile to argue that there is any estoppel in tax cases. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no substance in the appeal, which is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee rupees two hundred. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (5) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... and dealt with separately in the context of the language used In each of them respectively. The fact, therefore, that onion or garlic has been separately treated by another Legislature is not conclusive in the matter of interpretation of the word vegetable in the Act before me. Above all, if the words sabji and tarkari are capable of including green ginger or even if the connotation of these words be doubtful, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of such doubt, because the statute is fiscal. As I have held that green ginger is included or capable of being included in the exempted item No. 6 of the Schedule not only the appellate order but the entire proceedings for assessment of the sale of green ginger in these cases must fail. The Rules are made absolute but without any order as to costs in view of the nature of the problem raised. Let the operation of this order remain stayed for a period of two months from date as prayed for by the respondents. Rules made absolute.
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1967 (5) TMI 63 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... by the learned counsel for the assessee-dealer, more or less as an argument of desperation. He submitted that the local inspection reports were not shown to the assessee-dealer, the contents thereof were not divulged to him and, as such, the use of such reports against the assessee-dealer violated the principles of natural justice. We do not feel called upon to express any opinion on this argument, because the questions referred to this Court do not invite us so to do. We do not also have sufficient materials enabling us to uphold the grievance, if any, of the assessee-dealer in this respect. In the result, we answer questions Nos. 1 to 5, 8 and 9 in the negative and questions Nos. 6, 7 and 11 in the affirmative. Question No. 10 is answered partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative, to the extent indicated in the body of this judgment. In view of the divided success, we make no orders as to costs, in this reference. ROY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1967 (5) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
The turnover of Rs. 3,80,918 should, under the law, be deemed to relate to the quantity of gold which the assessee had purchased from other dealers and it was exempt from tax as turnover representing second sales of bullion - Appeal allowed.
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