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Showing 1 to 20 of 80 Records
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1967 (8) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t in the transferor, Kapurthala Estate had to join in the suit as a co-plaintiff. From October 10, 1954 the bar was removed and the appellant became entitled to maintain the suit in her own right and the withdrawal of Kapurthala Estate as plaintiff No. 1 did not affect the maintainability of the suit. The contention of Mr. Shukla that the withdrawal must be deemed to date back to the institution of the suit has in our views no force. No such order was made by the Trial Court which ordered the withdrawal. The withdrawal therefore took place after the bar under clause (b) against recognition of the appellant's rights was deleted and the appellant therefore had the right to maintain the suit. 15. The appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside, the suit is restored and the Trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law. The respondent will pay to the appellant costs through out. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (8) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... picture. It is obvious that the enquiring officer and the Manager relied upon the evidence of those who loaded the tyres supported as it was by the admission several times repeated by Subramaniam that he had checked the tyres at the time of loading. In other words, the Management refused to believe Subramaniam even though he was supported by Das. This the Management was entirely within its right in doing and the Tribunal was in error in exercising appellate powers by coming to a different conclusion. All that the Tribunal could do was to see that the enquiry was properly conducted. As in our opinion the enquiry was so conducted the decision of the Tribunal cannot be supported. 15. The appeal therefore succeeds and will be allowed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order about costs. On behalf of the Company it was stated that the amount paid to the workman during the pendency of the appeal as part of the wages will not be asked to be returned. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (8) TMI 132 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... as caught with 260 tolas of gold at the Olavakode Railway Station on 6.2.1957 and (2) that the assessee's story that the gold belonged to a Mohamed Koya of Kozhikode and that he had borrowed a sum of ₹ 3,500/- from a Subramania Iyer for payment to him as an advance has been disbelieved. In these circumstances we cannot but hold that the burden of proving the source of the amount expended for obtaining the 260 tolas of gold has not been discharged by the assessee and that the Income-Tax Officer was justified in treating the value of the gold as income from undisclosed sources. It follows that we should answer the question referred against the assessee and in favor of the Department. We do so; but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1967 (8) TMI 131 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the shebait he would be enjoying some beneficial interest in the properties dedicated to the deity. This would attract the mischief of section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, because it cannot be said that a shebait after dedication ceases to have any benefit or enjoyment in the dedicated property. In the view that we take, we find that the Board of Revenue did not err in holding that the dedicated properties were such as should be deemed to have passed on the death of the deceased. Even if the deceased did not reserve the right of residence in one of the properties, even then, in law, he would be deemed to have retained some beneficial interest in the property dedicated to the deity and such retention of interest would have the effect that the dedicated property would be deemed to be property which passed on his death. The question referred to this court should thus be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Controller is entitled to the costs of this reference.
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1967 (8) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court of Maharashtra has also taken in V. R. Gokhale v. State of Maharashtra(I.L.R. 1963 Bom, 537) the same view which we are inclined to take of the nature of function under R. 152 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959, a rule in terms identical to those of F.R. 54 before us. In our view, F.R. 54 contemplates a duty to act in accord- ance with the basic concept of justice and fairplay. The authority therefore had to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to show cause why cls. 3 and 5 should not be applied and that having not been done the order must be held to be invalid. The appeal is allowed and the High Court's order is set aside. The competent authority is directed to consider the question de novo after giving to the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him. The respondent will pay to the appellant costs of this appeal as also the costs of the petition in the petition in the High Court. G.C Appeal allowed.
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1967 (8) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onstitution. 9. The High Court's view that the grant made in favour of the appellant by the State Government by its order dated April 23, 1963 was a "nullity" proceeds on the assumption that an application for a mining lease under Rule 22, which is defective is non est, and an order made on such an application may be ignored. It is, however, difficult to appreciate the validity of the conclusion that an order passed by an authority which is subject to correction by a higher authority may be ignored, merely because it appears that there was some defect in the proceeding which initiated it. 10. The appeal must be allowed and the order of the High Court dismissing the petition filed by the Appellant set aside. The order passed by the Central Government on February 3, 1966 is also set aside, and it is directed that the Central Government do deal with the revision application filed by Respondents 2 and 3 according to law. Parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1967 (8) TMI 128 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder section 50 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, was an income receipt. 35. It was contended before us that even though the interim payments are by way of income receipts, further question will arise as to whether any tax can be levied on that income. Two contentions arise in this context. First, whether that income is taxable as a whole in the hands of the assessee having regard to the provisions that it was apportionable among the assessee and other persons as provided for in the Abolition Act and (2) whether that income is an agricultural income. As these questions have not been referred to us, we do not express any opinion on the same. We merely hold that the interim payments under section 50 of the Abolition Act are income receipts and not capital receipts. The reference is answered accordingly. The Commissioner of Income Tax shall have costs of this reference. Counsels fee is fixed at ₹ 500. Reference answered accordingly.
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1967 (8) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t be provided with wages which are fixed at certain minimum rates. It would go against such a principle if the courts were to uphold that persons who cannot work for more than half a day should receive what others working a full day get. However, that is a matter which the appropriate government may consider. 28. We therefore hold that the orders of the defendant No. 1 dated June 2, 1954 were not binding on the plaintiffs-appellants. We declare that the subnormal workers of the tea estates (commonly known as Letter a challans) were not entitled to full minimum wages without performance of a normal day's task or without working the prescribed number of hours. We also direct a perpetual injunction to issue against the defendant No. 1 restraining him from enforcing the orders dated June 2, 1954. The appeals are therefore allowed and the decrees passed by the Subordinate Judge and the High Court of Assam are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. 29. Appeals allowed.
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1967 (8) TMI 126 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave, therefore, to be quashed. In view of the invalidity of all the three notices namely, Ex. P/5, Ex P/6 and Ex. P/7, we are unable to uphold the validity of the seizure of the goods as well. We may observe that on the stay application of the petitioner we had ordered the return of the account books to the petitioner and it is common ground between the parties that the account books were returned on 24-7-67. It is, therefore, not necessary now to give any fresh direction to the respondents for the return of the account books. 30. We may, however, make it clear that it will be open to the respondents to take any fresh proceedings against the petitioner that they may be entitled to take according to law. 31. The result is that we allow this writ petition and quash the notices Ex. P/5, Ex. P/6 and Ex. P/7 and hereby direct the respondents to return the goods seized by them from the Petitioner on 19-9-06. The Petitioner shall get the costs of this petition from the respondents.
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1967 (8) TMI 125 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rect that the winding-up order made by me be advertised in the "Times of India", the "Bombay Samachar" and the "Nava Kal", and also in the Maharashtra Government Gazette. 11. Costs of the petitioners to come out of the assets of the company. Costs of the company, as between attorney and client, also to come out of the assets of the company. 12. Mr. Buch and Mr. Bharucha have applied for one set of costs being granted out of the assets of the company between them as supporting creditors. I am afraid, in view of the fact that the whole endeavour of Mr. Buch, which was supported by Mr. Bharucha, was to see that an adjournment of the hearing of this petition was granted with a view to preventing an ultimate winding-up of the company, I do not think they could be said to be in the position of those supporting the petitioning creditors before me to-day. I have, therefore, declined to make any order for costs in their favour. 13. Winding up order made.
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1967 (8) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ate an offence under the Act. Hence if the cases before us had been investigated by such an officer, there is no difficulty for the magistrate to take cognizance of those cases. Otherwise it is open to him to direct fresh investigations by competent police officers before deciding whether the facts placed before him disclose any cognizable offence. In the result, we hold, for the reasons mentioned above, that the proceedings taken by the learned magistrate against the respondents are not in accordance with law as he has proceeded against them under s.18 without first taking action under s.3. For that reason we uphold the conclusions reached by the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court but on grounds other than those relied on by them. But this conclusion of ours does not debar the learned magistrate from taking fresh proceedings against the respondents in accordance with law as explained by us earlier. In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1967 (8) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nable to accept this submission. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under s. 21 should be gone into by the Court. This leaves only the two points regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court. In our view, the High Court is quite right in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge, dated April 9, 1962, were not awards within s. 54 of the Act. The awards had still to be made. If no appeal lay, then the revisions were competent and the High Court was right in entertaining the revisions because the Civil Judge had either refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs in favour of Respondent No. 1; one hearing fee. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (8) TMI 122 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Appellate Controller was right. We are also of the opinion that in determining the break-up value of the shares, the proposed dividend of ₹ 74,740 as provided for in the balance-sheet was not an allowable deduction. This point is now covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax 1966 59 I.T.R. 767 (S.C.), and also by a decision of this court in Gift-tax Officer, Calcutta v. Kastur Chand Jain 1964 53 I.T.R. 411. In the view that we take, we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in valuing the goodwill of the company at ₹ 50,000 and in allowing, as a deduction from the assets, the proposed dividend of ₹ 74,740 as provided for in the balance-sheet. The question must be answered in the negative and against the accountable person. Since there was no appearance on behalf of the accountable person, we make no order as to costs. K.L. ROY J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1967 (8) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... likely to occur during the period of apprenticeship of the apprentices under training as on 1-4-66 should also be taken into account. In other words, it would be necessary to keep in reserve only the number of posts equal to the number of apprentices under training as on 1-4-66, who cannot be absorbed in the anticipated vacancies which will arise by the time they qualify." The application is accordingly allowed, but there will be no ,order with regard to costs in this case. Writ Petition No. 203 of 1966 The material facts of this case are parallel to those in Writ Petition No. 154 of 1966 and for the reasons already given we hold that the petitioner is entitled to the grant of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned part of the notification dated October 27, 1965, Annexure 'D' to the Writ Petition. The application is accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as to costs in this case. Petitions allowed.
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1967 (8) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that it was only just and reasonable that tour-in- mechanics should be given a day off if they travelled on two consecutive days for reaching a place of work and also over- time wages at double the wages for the work done on holidays. It appears to us that with the limitation as to jurisdiction noted above, the occasion for a mechanic spending two consecutive nights for reaching a place of work will arise very seldom, but if it does, there is no reason why he should not get overtime wages as awarded by the Tribunal and we see no reason to interfere with this portion of the award. In the result, the matter will go back to the Tribunal for disposal of the issue as to the revision of wage scales and adjustment of workers in the revised scales. The scheme for gratuity will stand modified as indicated in our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 2105 of 1966 delivered today. The rest of the award will stand. The appellant will pay the respondent the costs of this appeal. A ward modified.
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1967 (8) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e remain with them always for the future, for nothing has been brought to our notice which takes away that minimum qualification deemed to be conferred on the teachers by sub-rule (6). We are therefore of opinion that the order dated February 18, 1963 passed by the Chancellor requiring the governing body of the Pandaul College to give the appellant a year or two to appear at an examination to enable him to obtain a second class Master's degree, otherwise his services might be terminated, is not valid, for the appellant must be deemed to have the minimum qualification of a second class Master's degree by virtue of sub-rule (6) of the Statutes and as such he was qualified A for appointment as Principal of Pandaul College. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and allowing the writ petition quash the order of the Chancellor dated February 18, 1963 in respect of the appellant. The appellant will get his costs from the respondent University.
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1967 (8) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g at the time when the statute was enacted. We cannot further overlook the fact that modifications to the final development plan were not beyond the range of possibility. We cannot therefore hold that the limit of time fixed under s. 4 read with s. 11(3) forms an unreasonable restriction on the rights of a person to hold his property. Towards the end of the hearing counsel for the petitioners submitted that s. 17 of the Act might be left out of consideration for the purpose of these petitions and learned counsel for the respondents were agreeable to this course. We therefore do not express our views about the validity or otherwise of this section. In our opinion the objections raised as to the invalidity of ss. 9, 10, 11, 1.2 and. 13 cannot be upheld. As the petitioners have failed in their attempt to establish any violation of their fundamental rights under the Constitution, the petitions will all be dismissed. The petitioners will pay one set of costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1967 (8) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioner was entitled, as of right, to be promoted as Deputy Inspector General of Police in 1955 or as Inspector General of Police in 1966 merely on the ground that his name stood first in the Gradation List prepared under Rule 6 of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954?
Held that:- As a matter of long administrative practice promotion to selection grade posts in the Indian Police Service has been based on merit and seniority has been taken into consideration only when merit of the candidates is otherwise equal and we are unable to accept the argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that this procedure violates, in any way, the guarantee under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. For the reasons expressed we hold that the petitioner has been unable to make out a case for the grant of a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed
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1967 (8) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the resignation of the drivers and cleaners and the setting up of the contract system amounts to an unfair labour practice and exploitation of labour because by this device these and other transport workers are being victimized?
Whether the salutary and beneficial legislation conceived in the best interest of the transport workers is being deliberately set at naught?
Held that:- The matter of dispute no doubt referred in the second part to ex-drivers but it referred generally to the new system in the first. The Tribunal was wrong in thinking that the first part also referred to the ex-drivers (now operators). On the whole, however, it is clear that the Company has not done anything illegal. A person must be considered free to so arrange his business that he avoids a regulatory law and its penal consequences which he has, without the arrangement, no proper means of obeying. This, of course, he can do only so long as he does not break that or any other law. The Company has declared before us that it is quite prepared, if it was not already doing so, to apply and observe the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act in respect of its employees proper where such provisions can be made applicable. In view of this declaration we see no reason to interfere, because Parliament has not chosen to say that transport trucks will be run only through paid employees and not independent operators. The appeal fails
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1967 (8) TMI 115 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and batteries) adapted for use as parts and accessories of motor vehicles, not being such articles as are ordinarily also used for other purposes than as parts or accessories of motor vehicles. We are inclined to think that the contention for the assessee that bus-bodies do not fall within any one of the goods in this item is correct. Bus-bodies cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as component parts of motor vehicles or even as accessories thereto. In fact, that appears to be the view of the Government themselves in the subsequent year, as the department did not charge the turnover for that year to additional tax. In the 1959 Act bus-bodies have been specifically included in the relative item in Schedule I thereto. We are of the view, therefore, that the additional tax charged cannot be sustained. T.C. No. 51 of 1965 is partly dismissed and partly allowed and the other tax revision case is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in either of them. Ordered accordingly.
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