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Showing 1 to 20 of 48 Records
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1968 (1) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 27 of the Specific Relief Act are taken possession of the property . The omission of the words any part thereof in s. 27 of the Specific Relief Act when compared with the provision in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act clearly brings out the position that the former section is only applicable when possession of the entire property, which is subject-matter of the contract, has been taken, while the latter section is made applicable even if the lessee takes possession of any part of the property. Consequently, on the facts of the present case, the firm could not claim specific performance of the contract under s. 27 of the Specific Relief Act, even if such a claim had been put forward in the plaint. This alternative contention also, therefore, fails. 13. The appeal is, consequently, dismissed, but, in view of the circumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties relating to the contract, we direct parties to bear their own costs of the appeal. 14. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (1) TMI 61 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd the tribunal's decision would be a nullity and, there fore, even though the decision is not challenged on merits, there is no question of substantial justice being done as the tribunal was not the tribunal at all which could dispose of these cases. Therefore, this petition must be allowed and the decision and the order of respondent No. 1 at Ex. A must be quashed. 12. In the result, a writ of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order at Ex. A by respondent No. 1 and the matter shall go back to the respondent No. 1, the Regional Transport Authority, for disposing of these two applications in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. Rule accordingly made absolute with costs. Respondent No. 2 Corporation shall pay the costs of the petitioner. There will be a stay of this order for a period of fortnight from the date when the certified copies are ready for delivery to the respondents, but in the meanwhile the stay order granted by this Court shall continue.
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1968 (1) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this case the Government, because the medical colleges are Government colleges affiliated to the University. In these circumstances, the Government was entitled to frame rules for admission to medical colleges controlled by it subject to the rules of the university as to eligibility and qualifications. This was what done in these cases and therefore the selection cannot be challenged on the ground that it was not in accordance with the University Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 18. We therefore partly allow the petitions and strike down Rule 8 of the Rules for admission to medical colleges, which deals with district wise allocation. The appeal is also allowed to the same extent. We have already indicated that so far as the selection for the current year is concerned, it will stand; however, r. 8 will not be enforced when selection is made hereafter. The petitioners/appellant will get their costs, one set of hearing fee. R.K.P.S. 19. Petitions and Appeal allowed in part.
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1968 (1) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d subject to well-recognized limits in order to guarantee security to tenure to industrial employees.... 34. As we have reached the conclusion, after considering all the provisions of the Act, that the intention of the legislature, in providing for statutory standing orders and laying down the only made in which they could be modified and attaching penal consequences to violations of standing orders, was necessarily to prohibit terms of contract which clash with any of the standing orders, any terms of a contract which contravene a standing order would be struck by Section 23 of the Contract Act also. This provision in validates an agreement the object of which is, inter alia, "of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law." 35. For all the reasons given above, our answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is that the terms of a standing order would prevail over the terms of a contract which conflicts with the standing order.
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1968 (1) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e oath or affirmation can be taken and subscribed on the date fixed for scrutiny. It seems to us that the nomination paper does not provide for the statement about the oath because the oath or affirmation has to be taken after a candidate has been nominated. 18. Our attention was invited to an unreported decision of the Patna High Court in Shiva Shankar Kanodia v. Kapildeo Narain Singh Election Appeal No. 4 of 1965; judgment dated September 22, 1965 . That decision proceeded on the basis that "one can be said to be so nominated only when, after scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer finds him to be validly nominated, as provided under Section 36(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951." With respect, the High Court proceeded on a wrong basis. The form of oath does not say 'having been validly nominated" but only "having been nominated." 19. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (1) TMI 57 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... preceding paragraph is in relation to subordinate legislation of a general character. There may however be subordinate legislation concerning individuals or confined to small local areas. In such cases publication or promulgation by other means may be sufficient. I am not venturing to go into that question at all. In the present case, the Andhra Pradesh Transport Service Rules, 1967, is subordinate legislation of a general character. G.O.Ms. No. 375, dated 1st March, 1967 by which the Rules are made begins with the sentence 'The following notification shall be published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette'. The Subordinate legislating authority has thus clearly, prescribed the manner of publication. The Rules therefore become effective on the date of publication in the Gazette, i.e., 6th April, 1967. The promotion of the third respondent was therefore under the old rules and hence valid. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100.
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1968 (1) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner factory. The minutes of such a meeting filed by the petitioner do not show that any such decision was recorded. Further, any such decision would not have the force of law. It will not be enforceable in a court of law. An order passed in exercise of the statutory authority flowing from the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, could not be held invalid on the ground that it infringes the informal decision of the Joint Sugar-cane Board. No cause of action for the setting aside of these orders or for passing consequential mandamus would arise on this basis. 11. In the result, no part of the cause of action for the reliefs claimed in the present petition arose within the territories of Uttar Pradesh. The present petition is hence not cognizable by this Court. It is accordingly dismissed on that pre liminary ground. The petitioner will pay one set of costs to respondents nos. 1 and 2 and another set of costs to respondent No. 9. The other parties will bear their own costs.
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1968 (1) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ded to apply the clause to new establishments the words 'is set up' would have been sufficient. The construction Sought to be placed would render the words 'has been' otiose. Further the scheme of Paragraph 26 quoted earlier relates to a period of service and this qualifying period may be in the past as well as in the future. The intention behind s. 16 read with paragraph 26 quite clearly shows that the period is intended to give a breathing time to new establishments. That reason does not hold when the establishment is already old and well founded. The use of the participle is therefore immaterial. Whether a present perfect tense or a participle be used the meaning is the same. Clause (b) of s. 1(3) which uses the participle and clause (a) of the same section which employs the present perfect tense both merely describe the establishments and convey no different meanings. The conclusion of the High Court was thus right. The appeals fail and will be dismissed.
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1968 (1) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tution was defective, and no opinion on the merits of the dispute between the parties was expressed. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioner was held not to operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the parties to the previous suit, because the dispute was not decided on its merits in the previous suit expressly or even by implication. It is unnecessary on that view to adjudicate upon the question whether Mr. Kane had authority to determine the employment of Nanak Singh. The appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is set aside. The decree passed by the Court of First Instance is restored. When special leave to appeal was granted to the Union, this Court passed an order that the Union of India will pay the costs of the appeal in any event. The Union of India must, therefore, pay the costs of the respondent in this appeal. There will be no order as to costs in the Court of the First Instance, the District Court and the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (1) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... der Art. 32 was absolute and the rule by providing security for costs impaired such an absolute right. Furnishing of security in the case of persons without means to do so would obviously obstruct such persons from vindicating their rights under Art. 32 and would, therefore, curtail the right under that Article. That obviously is not so in the case of the rule with which we are concerned in this appeal. The contention, therefore, that rule 7 curtails the right of appeal under s. 38 or contravenes that section must be rejected. The appellant cited a number of authorities but it is not necessary to deal with them as they have no bearing on the questions before us. He also tried to question the correctness of the order passed against him by the Bar Council of India but we did not allow him to reagitate it as it stood concluded on the dismissal of the appeal and the review petition filed by him in this Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (1) TMI 52 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of" is of wider connotation than the word "in" or "on". Hence, a class of municipal tax, though not a tax on the premises or buildings, may nevertheless be a tax in respect of the premises or building used for the business. Hence, the payment of the impugned amount of ₹ 125 as professional tax under Section 150A read with Section 82(1)(ff) of the Municipal Act is in substance a municipal tax in respect of the business premises, and is covered by Clause (ix) of Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Income-tax Act. The assessee is entitled to get allowance for the same under Section 10(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Appellate Tribunal was right in giving allowance to the assessee for a sum of ₹ 125 paid by Mm under the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922. 9. In the circumstances stated above, the question is answered in the affirmative. 10. The assessee is entitled to costs Hearing fee ₹ 100. Narasimham, C.J. 11. I agree.
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1968 (1) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ttee in Someshwar Dutt v. Tirbhawan Dutt, 61 I.A. 224 in which it was held that the limitation of a suit to set aside a deed of gift on the ground that it was obtained by undue influence was governed by Art. 91 of the Indian Limitation Act, and the three years period runs from the date when the plaintiff discovered the true nature of the deed, and not from the date when he escaped from the influence by which be alleged that be was dominated. For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal must be allowed and the appellant must be granted a decree that the, gift deed, Ex. 45 is not binding on her so far as plots 9". and 92 of Lingdahalli village are concerned and she is further entitled to recover possession of the said two plots from the defendant respondents with mesne profits. We accordingly set aside the decree of the High Court, restore the decree of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bijapur dated January 29, 1953 and allow this appeal with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (1) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n depends. If this were not so, the right to apply to the Court would be illusory." For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30, 1966 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 183 of 1965 and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding it afresh in accordance with the directions given. It will be open to the High Court to take such further evidence-oral and documentary-as the parties may decide to give on the points at issue. The parties will bear their own costs upto this stage. Civil Appeal No. 1244 of 1967 The material facts of this case are almost similar to those in Civil Appeal No. 1245 of 1967 and for the reasons given in that judgment, we hold that this appeal should be allowed and the case should be remanded to the High Court for being decided afresh in accordance with the directions given in that judgment. The parties will bear their own costs upto this stage. Appeals allowed and cases remanded.
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1968 (1) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nsidered to be dealers. If, on the other hand, it is found that the cinematograph films produced by them are a saleable or marketable commodity, then, in view of the answer we propose to give, they will have to be held to be dealers under the Act. Inasmuch as the question whether the films produced by the applicants are or are not a saleable commodity has not been decided, that question will have to be decided by the authorities on the material placed before them, before it is finally decided whether the applicants are or are not dealers under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. In view of what we have stated above, the answer to the question referred to us is that the applicants will be considered to be dealers within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, if the cinematograph films produced by them are found to be a saleable commodity. No order as to costs. The fee of Rs. 100 shall stand forfeited to the Government. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (1) TMI 48 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessment was on the department is of course clear, and that, that is so, was not controverted by Mr. Shantaraju who, however, asserted that once the basis for reaching the conclusion that the turnover had escaped assessment had been disclosed to the dealer it became the dealer s duty to produce materials in displacement. The acceptance of this argument would mean that all that the authority exercising the power under section 12-A has to do is to tell the dealer that his income has escaped assessment, and that it would then become the duty of the dealer to prove that it has not. This postulate which inverts the rule as to burden of proof cannot be sound. These are, therefore, cases in which the best judgment assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer was unsustainable, and so, we set aside the orders made by him and those made by the Deputy Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in all these three cases. We make no direction in regard to costs. Petition allowed.
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1968 (1) TMI 47 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee did not alter their character as timber or used them for the manufacture of other goods within the meaning of section 8(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. In our opinion, the goods sold by the assessee retained their character as timber and did not become other goods . It is true that in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Wasudeo(1), Bhutt, J. (as he then was), observed that, when standing timber trees were converted into logs or rafters, there was a distinct advance from their original form, but he did not say that they constituted other goods . With all due respect, we think that the so-called advance from the original form did not alter their basic character as timber and, therefore, purchase tax could not be levied under section 8(1) of the Act. 5.. We answer the two questions referred to us in the manner indicated above and direct that, in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (1) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and Co. s case(1) cited above. We have come to the conclusion that the contract between the parties in the present case was indivisible, that it was not capable of severance, that there was no separate contract for sale of the lifts as such and that being a composite contract which was not severable, no liability for payment of sales tax on the price in respect of the goods used in the execution of the contract could arise. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) in the negative. Question No. (2) in the affirmative. We hold that the contract dated 10th June, 1958, between the applicants and T. Manek and Co. was a composite but indivisible contract for work and labour, and that no sale of goods can be spelt out of the contract. As the applicants succeed, they will be entitled to the costs of the reference fixed at Rs. 250. The applicants will also be entitled to refund of the deposit amount of Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (1) TMI 45 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he right or liability to be assessed in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act in respect of turnover of sales effected during the time when that Act was in force. The repealed Act laid down what turnover was taxable, how it was to be computed, and at what rate the tax was to be charged. These provisions clearly created rights as well as liabilities of dealers. Those rights and liabilities were thus preserved by section 52 of the new Act. A fortiori, it must be held that the applicant acquired a right not to be reassessed in respect of a turnover which had been reassessed after expiry of the period mentioned in section 11A of the repealed Act. 8.. The result is that the application succeeds and is allowed. The notice issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax dated 8th January, 1965/ 4th March, 1965, is hereby quashed and he is further commanded to desist from giving effect to the same in the manner threatened. Hearing fee Rs. 100, if certified. Application allowed.
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1968 (1) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and associations. Societies like consumers societies which carry on activities of buying and selling by way of business are not unknown, and under those circumstances it cannot be said, the view which we have taken would render the last part of section 2(11) superfluous. We hold that the applicant-Club does not effect supplies to its members by way of business and is, therefore, not a dealer within the terms of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) In the negative. Question No. (2) The object of the Club in effecting supplies to its members was not one of earning profits. The word motive in question No. (2) is obviously a mistake for the word object , and we, therefore, answer this question as above. The respondent must pay the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 250. We direct that the deposit of Rs. 100 made by the applicant-Club be refunded to it. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (1) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of ice by it to its members. Since we have held that the applicant-Society was not a dealer within the definition of section 2(11) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, it is not necessary for us to consider the further question as to whether the supply of ice by it to its members constituted sale within the terms of section 2(28) of the said Act, or to answer question No. (2), referred to us, which embodies that point. We may also state that, in our opinion, the evidence on record is not sufficient to determine question No. (2). In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) In the negative. Question No. (2) Unnecessary. We order that the respondents to pay the applicant s costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 250. Under section 61(5) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, we order that the amount of Rs. 100 deposited by the applicant-Society along with their application for making this reference be refunded to it. Reference answered accordingly.
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