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Showing 1 to 20 of 76 Records
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1968 (12) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion by reason of the existence of the other class. 20. The arguments that no opportunity was given to oppose the acquisition on the ground that no public purpose was subserved, must fail because a notification has already been issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is too late for this court to enter into the question of public purpose. 21. It remains to consider the argument based on estoppel which is claimed in C.A. No. 111 of 1966. There is no doubt that the High Court has not decided that issue. The writ petition must therefore be remanded to the High Court for the consideration of that ground. 22. The result therefore is that all appeals are allowed. All writ petitions (except 114 which is to be compromised and C.A. No. 111 of 1966 in which there is a remand) will be dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Writ Petition No. 1076 of 1959 (C.A. No. 111 of 1966) shall stand remanded to the High Court but there shall be no order about costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 112 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... judicially may also in some cases, be inferred from the scheme of the relevant statute and its material provisions. In such a case, the authority or body must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its powers; the obligations to follow the principles of natural justice need not be expressly imposed. Power to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice." For the aforesaid reasons I am of the view that the said purported extension dated 3rd November, 1966, was illegal and bad and must be quashed. I direct that the rule be made absolute. Although the petitioners succeed in this application inasmuch as the petitioners were smuggling in goods of foreign make in violation of the provisions of Customs Act I do not make any order as to costs. Operation of the order is stayed for 8 weeks from today.
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1968 (12) TMI 111 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rded by him, was not called, in the exercise of my discretion, I decline to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution on that account under S. 114 of the Evidence Act as Mr. Jethmalani has urged upon the court. In view of the facts and circumstances proved by the evidence to which I have just referred, I hold that there is abundant corroboration for the retracted extra-judicial confessions of the accused persons (Exs. 17 and 18) in the present case, and the trial court was right in relying upon those confessions which, taken with the other evidence in the case, establish the guilt of accused Nos. 1 and 2 beyond reasonable doubt in regard to the offences of which they have been found guilty. 7. In the result, this appeal must be dismissed, and the conviction of both the accused as well as the sentences passed upon them by the lower court confirmed. The accused to surrender to bail within two weeks. N.D. Kamat, J. 8. I agree and have nothing to add. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 110 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Government for settlement of the fishery with it under Rule 12 of the Fishery Rules. But the Government settled the fishery with opposite party No. 4. Hence the writ petition. 11. The points of law raised in this petition are similar to those raised in Civil Rule No. 68 of 1968 and hence the said points are covered by what is stated above. It is, however, pointed out that the Petitioner in this case withdrew his application before the settlement was made by the Government. But I do not think that it makes any difference. When the Petitioner withdrew the application he did not question the right of the Government to settle the fishery under Rule 12. Nor in his petition before us does he make any direct averment that no special circumstance existed for the Government to make settlement under Rule 12. In the circumstances, both the petitions are dismissed and the rules are discharged. There will be no order as to costs. K.C. Sen, J. 12. I agree. M.C. Pathak, J. 13. I agree.
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1968 (12) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... slation should be subject to them. The true inference is that the power to make law belonging to both Parliament and the State Legislatures can be exercised only subject to the aforesaid two restrictions not by reason of anything contained in the legislative entries themselves but by reason of positive provisions contained in Article 31(2). But as legislation falling within Article 31A cannot be called in question in a Court of law for non-compliance with those provisions such legislation cannot be struck down as unconstitutional and void. In our opinion, counsel on behalf of the petitioners is unable to make good his argument that the impugned Act was beyond the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature at the time when it was enacted. 17. For these reasons we hold that the petitioners have made out no case for grant of relief under Article 32 of the Constitution. These writ petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee.
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1968 (12) TMI 108 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Criminal Reference on 5th April 1968. In my opinion, in order to secure the ends of justice, it is necessary that the order passed by me on 5th April 1968, accepting the reference made to this Court by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, be set aside and the reference be rejected and the order made by the learned Magistrate be upheld and the land be ordered to be released in favour of Chitawan and others and I hold accordingly. 39. I, therefore, allow the application under Section 561-A, Criminal P. C., and set aside my order dated 5th April 1966 and reject the reference made by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge and up-hold the order passed by the learned Magistrate. 40. Before parting with this case I must observe that Sri T.P. Asthana has argued this case after a very detailed study of law and after thorough preparation and has been of great assistance to me. He has taken great care in preparing the case and in placing it before me in a very lucid and forceful manner.
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1968 (12) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act existed. In Bahadur Singh's case this Court held that the decree passed on the basis of an award was in contravention of Section 13 of the Act because the Court had passed the decree in terms of the award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed. Bachawat, J., speaking for the Court, observed that “on the plain wording of Section 13(1) the Court was forbidden to pass the decree. The decree is a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution.” This Court, accordingly, declared inter alia that “the decree in so far as it directs delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord is a nullity and cannot be executed.” 8. The present case is also governed by the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act and, as we have said before, this appeal must fail, in view of the judgment of this Court in Bahadur Singh's case. In the result the appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 106 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... may also point out that, in the instant case before us, both the parties fill the character of merchants and traders and the transactions in question also relate to the selling of goods, apart from the fact that the same may also relate to the construction of the mercantile document,--the document of commission agency, in this view, the instant suit would also come under Clause (iv) of the said Item 4 of the First Schedule of the City Civil Court Act and the claim here, admittedly, being above ₹ 5,000 the instant suit would be outside the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court both under Clause (iv) and under Clause (v) of Item 4 of the First Schedule of the City Civil Court Act. 10. We would, accordingly, make this Rule absolute, set aside the impugned order of the learned trial Judge and direct him to return the plaint to the plaintiff's lawyer for presentation to the proper Court. 11. There will be no order for costs in this Rule. S.K. Chakraborty, J. 12. I agree.
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1968 (12) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rity under Section 15. Nor could the Authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such a claim questions arising under the proviso to Section 25FF. In our view it would be the Labour Court in such cases which would be the proper forum which can determine such questions under Section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which also possesses power to appoint a commissioner to take evidence where question of facts require detailed evidence. Mr. Shroff, however, drew our attention to the decision in Uttam Chand v. Kartar Singh a decision of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab, taking a view contrary to the one which we are inclined to take. But that decision contains no reasons and is, therefore, hardly of any assistance. 12. In the result we agree with the High Court that the Authority had no jurisdiction under Section 15(2) of the Act to try these applications. The appeal consequently must fail and is dismissed. But we make no order as to costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 104 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fessional misconduct much less that he has been guilty of such professional misconduct as renders him unfit to practise as a Notary. If the Government intended to come to such a conclusion it was its duty to say so expressly in the charge or charges levelled against the petitioner so as to afford him an opportunity to show whether or not the allegations on the basis of which it is sought to come to that conclusion even if established would lead to such a conclusion. In so far as that opportunity has been denied to the petitioner it must be held that in coming to the conclusion the opposite party has arrived at, it has violated the principles of natural justice. Hence the petition must succeed. 11. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs and the impugned order (Annexure 9) is quashed. As prayed by the learned Standing Counsel it is clarified that this order does not disentitle the State Government to proceed against the petitioner according to law if it is so intended.
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1968 (12) TMI 103 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore, the plaintiff succeeds in proving that he reasonably and bona fide requires the suit premises for renovation. It is apparent that such renovation cannot be carried out without asking the tenants to vacate the premises. The plaintiff, therefore, is in our opinion, entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(h) of the Saurashtra Act. The decision of the lower appellate Court is, therefore, correct. 23. In the result, therefore, both the appeals fail and are dismissed with cost. After the judgment is pronounced, Mr. M.C. Shah, learned advocate for the appellant asked for certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. The certificate is refused. 24. On Mr. M.C. Shah for the appellant undertaking to apply for urgent certified copy of the judgment, by consent, decree for eviction not to be carried out for a period of two weeks from the date on which the certified copy is ready.
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1968 (12) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ss. 463 and 464 I.P. Code. that they are two distinct offences which are capable of being Committed with different intentions by different sets of persons and it, could not be contemplated that the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra intended to repeal pro tanto the provisions of S. 465 I.P. Code by enactment of s. 146 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It is unnecesary in the circumstances to consider the question whether the Maharashtra State Legislature was competent to repeal the provisions of s. 465 I.P. Code. The law relating to Co-operative Societies may be enacted in exercise of the power under List II Entry 32 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but if s. 146 is directly intended to trench upon a provision ,of the Indian Penal Code-falling within List 11 Entry 1, sanction of the President under Art. 254(2) would apparently be necessary. Both the contentions raised by counsel for the appellants fail. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... him, was not called, in the exercise of my discretion, I decline to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution on that account under S. 114 of the Evidence Act as Mr. Jethmalani has urged upon the court. In view of the facts and circumstances proved by the evidence to which I have just referred, I hold that there is abundant corroboration for the retracted extra-judicial confessions of the accused persons (Exs. 17 and 18) in the present case, and the trial court was right in relying upon those confessions which, taken with the other evidence in the case, establish the guilt of accused Nos. 1 and 2 beyond reasonable doubt in regard to the offences of which they have been found guilty. ( 7. ) In the result, this appeal must be dismissed, and the conviction of both the accused as well as the sentences passed upon them by the lower court confirmed. The accused to surrender to bail within two weeks. Kamat, J. ( 8. ) I agree and have nothing to add. ( 9. ) Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (12) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urious Loans Act, 1918. In view of the principle laid down by the Federal Court in this decision we are of opinion that in the circumstances of the present case the respondent should be granted interest on the principal sum due at the contractual rate till the date of the suit and simple interest at 6 per cent p.a. on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit till the date of the preliminary decree and also at the same rate till the date of realisation. We accordingly allow this appeal to the extent indicated above and modify the decree of the Calcutta High Court. The plaintiff-respondent will be awarded costs proportionate to his success in the present suit as between attorney and client. He is not entitled to the costs he has incurred in the previous suit i.e., suit no. 135 of 1948 in which be was made a party. The order of the High Court with regard to costs is also modified to this extent. There will be no order as to costs of this 'appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (12) TMI 99 - CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... pted for reproduction on our paper and fabrics. " I feel the force of this argument, but the section itself isolates the provision of the patterned wood block and poses the question What did the taxpayers spend on it ? To my mind, it cannot be right to include nothing for the cost of the design. I can well understand it being argued that, as so many of the designs are never actually put on any block, screen or roller, only some fraction of the total design costs should be allowed, and I do not think that Inland Revenue Commissioners v. George Guthrie & Son 1952 S. C. 402 ; 33 T. C. 327 would be an authority against such an argument, for in that case the car would have been used if it had been delivered. But what was argued before me was that not one penny of the design costs should be allowed. To my mind, that cannot be right, and, therefore, I shall dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue ; Lovell , White & King .
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1968 (12) TMI 98 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In this view, the Court was bound to exercise a jurisdiction to review which it possessed but, perhaps, was not pointedly aware of. Under the circumstances, the only course open to me is to allow the revision petition and set aside the Order of the learned District Judge in I. A. No. 1326 of 1967. Since the error of law is clear there is no need for a further hearing of the matter in O. P. No. 102 of 1966 so far as the entertain ability of the appeal is concerned. Therefore, I would direct the learned District Judge to take the appeal on file as a pauper appeal and proceed to dispose it of on that footing, without further ado about the decree appealed from being contrary to law or otherwise erroneous on unjust. The proper course for the revision petitioner would certainly have been to challenge the Order passed by the District Judge in O.P. No. 102 of 1966 instead of seeking a review of that Order and then come up in revision. For taking this devious route I deny him costs.
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1968 (12) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lation of the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. We desire to express no opinion on the legality or illegality of the arrests made on November 6, 1968, of these persons with reference to the first point, namely, that the police officers purported to have effected the arrests for the offences under Section 188, Indian Penal Code and under Section 151 as also in respect of proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr. P.C., as these matters are sub judice. We may also proceed to add that any expression of opinion or observation in these proceedings shall not affect the course of the enquiry or trial of the arrested persons concerning the occurrences on November 5 and 6, 1968, which may be pending in the Courts in the State of Bihar and such proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with law. Madhu Limaye and other arrested persons have already been ordered to be released by this Court and no further directions are necessary in the matter of their setting at liberty.
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1968 (12) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... siding. It follows, therefore, that the respondent railway is not entitled to levy any charge, in addition to the freight already levied, for the handling of the complainants' goods at the assisted siding at this station which involves only a portion of the service which the railway is obliged to render in handling these goods at the goods shed siding. In other words, the claim for the, haulage 8 2 charge for the shunting operation done at the assisted siding is unjustified and unsustainable." This is a finding of fact made by the Tribunal and no reason has been shown for displacing this pure finding of fact. The Tribunal has mentioned ample evidence from which it could reasonably come to the conclusion arrived at by it. It must be remembered that we are not sitting as a regular court of appeal from decisions of the Tribunal, and in such cases we do not ordinarily go into questions of fact. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed
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1968 (12) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nds in his hands. 33. We see no justification for allowing accounting in this case from the date the official Trustee took charge of the trust estate. Till the institution of the present suit from which this appeal has arisen there was no knowing that the plaintiff would challenge the second Trust deed executed by his father. He did not challenge it during his father's life time. On the faith of the order of the High Court, the Official Trustee must have been disbursing the trust income to the various beneficiaries. It will be inequitable to, reopen all those transactions. We think the end,,; 1 07 of justice will be met if accounting is ordered as from the date of the institution of the present suit. The plaintiff- respondent is entitled to his costs in all the courts. But he shall get the same from out of the Trust Estate. 34. Subject to the modifications directed above in the decree of the High Court this appeal is dismissed. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed and decree modified.
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1968 (12) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to affact the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, P.W. 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was nora simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood as also his books, his exercise book and his belt and shoes. More than that the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the postmortem report this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these there being enough evidence to reject the. exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Ex. 6 the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piecing the same with the other evidence to come to. the conclusion. that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime. The appeal therefore fails and the conviction and sentence are upheld- Appeal dismissed.
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