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Showing 1 to 20 of 80 Records
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1968 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... owner would be to vest the property in the Central Government. It may be that insofar as the title vested in the displaced person the case would come within Article 31(2A), but then the section is not severable and it has to be declared void as a whole. We need not consider the point that even if the section is severable, it would be void under Article 19(1)(f). The points we have mentioned above would also be relevant in considering the reasonableness of the restrictions. 1 7 . We may mention that the learned counsel on behalf of Lachhman Dass and others, the displaced persons to whom the shops had been purported to have been transferred under the sanads, tried to attack the validity of the order of the Custodian- General under Section 27 of the Evacuee Act on the ground that they were not heard. This point was not taken in the High Court and we cannot allow it to be raised before us at this stage. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs; one hearing fee.
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1968 (2) TMI 130 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... within two months from to-day the balance of the sale price with interest due as per the terms of Exhibit A-1 after giving credit to the sums of ₹ 2,000 and ₹ 10,000 already paid after giving notice of the same to the 1st defendant. (2) Within one month of such notice, the 1st defendant shall execute the sale deed in respect of the suit property as per the terms and conditions of Exhibit A-I. The 1st defendant will execute the sale-deed on the stamp papers, Exhibit A-6, or new stamp papers in lieu thereof to be supplied by the plaintiff, and also register it at the plaintiff's expense. (3) If the 1st defendant commits default in executing the sale-deed, the plaintiff shall have the sale-deed executed in the aforesaid manner through Court. (4) The suit as against the 2nd defendant is dismissed. (5) The appellant shall have his costs here and in the Court below from the 1st defendant. (6) The 2nd defendant shall bear his costs here as well as in the Court below.
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1968 (2) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... succeeded only in respect of 1032 tons - 400 tons which have been already delivered, and 632 tons remaining to be delivered. The order of the learned Single Judge and the High Court was not clear and it would have led, if allowed to stand, to considerable litigation. Before us, counsel for the petitioner did not seek to press his case for delivery of goods exceeding 632 tons. The High Court had also given no directions with regard to the exclusion of goods which by virtue of the direction given by the Customs Authorities, the Port Trust authorities were not bound to give delivery of and in respect of which claims had been made. In the circumstances we think that there should be no order as to costs of the petition out of which these appeals arise throughout. 26. The order of the High Court is therefore affirmed with the clarifications set out hereinbefore. The appeals are dismissed subject to the directions hereinbefore given. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1968 (2) TMI 128 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in annual general meeting was made up. It is not clear when the profit and loss account of the company was laid before the annual general meeting of the company in this case. But what matters is the period in respect of which such accounts are placed before the annual General meeting. It seems to me therefore, that Section 1(4) will enable the provisions of the Act to operate in respect of the accounting year commencing on any day in the year 1964 and in respect of every subsequent year. To that extent, the Act would have retroactive effect. 3. Quite apart from that, I am of the view that bonus, having regard to recent developments in the law relating to labour relationship, would be included in wages. Payment of bonus is a method of payment of wages. No doubt, payment of bonus is conditional upon payment of wages. But once bonus is paid, it has the true attribute of wages (See P. Nathmal v. Dhasarath, AIR 1959 Mys 96 ). 4. On that view, the petition is allowed with no costs.
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1968 (2) TMI 127 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... right, if any, of the Clerks to oust the Stenographers from their cadre. The Petitioner has, however, failed to prove the existence of separate cadres for Clerks and Stenographers, in rebuttal of the statement in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit that both clerks and stenographers belong to Class III ministerial service. The Pay Commission's observations as to the difference in the nature of their work have no legal force but only matters for consideration of the administrative authorities. The Petitioner may carry on its activities at that level so long as they are not convinced, but this Court cannot interfere under Article 226 unless some legal right is infringed. So long as such legal right is not established there is no question of a violation of Article 14 or 16 either. 18. The Rule is accordingly discharged, but without any order as to costs. 19. As prayed for by Mr. Chatterjee, let the operation of this order be stayed for a period of four weeks from this date.
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1968 (2) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is case, but for the supervening insolvency the accused might have paid back the money to the J. R. Firm. The fact that they were on this occasion and also in the High Court willing to pay shows that if the matter had not been concluded against them by the insolvency they might even have attempted to satisfy the J. R. Firm. There were influenced by the case with which they could borrow money and therefore tempted to depart from the strict path of honesty to meander into an offence of cheating. Taking this into consideration we think that although we cannot condone such offences there is room for reduction of the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon these two appellants. We reduce their sentence to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The sentence of fine imposed on them shall stand. With this modification the appeal of the second and the third accused will stand dismissed. Their bill is cancelled and they shall surrender forthwith. 10. Sentence reduced and Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (2) TMI 125 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th the order at Annexure P for removal of the petitioner and for setting aside the resolution delegating powers of the competent authority to the respondent No. 1. The petitioner, therefore, succeeds only to the extent that the order at Annexure 'R' is set aside, disqualifying him for a period of four years under Section 49(2). Rule is made absolute only to the limited extent in so far as the order at Annexure 'R' under Section 49(1) disqualifying the petitioner is concerned while the rule is discharged in so far as the order of removal at Annexure 'P' under Section 49(1) and in regard to the resolution of delegation are concerned. As success is equally divided, there shall be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. 13. In view of our decision no order is necessary on C.A. No. 389 of 1968. Mr. Vyas made an oral request for a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) for appeal to the Supreme Court. We reject the said request for a certificate.
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1968 (2) TMI 124 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 6. The next question, that has been raised by Mr. Mittal is that only defendants 1 to 4 could raise this objection, namely, that no suit for redemption is competent. We are unable to agree with this contention. Defendants 5 to 20 derived title from defendants I to 4 and they could defeat the suit if the suit could have been defeated on that ground by defendants 1 to 4. The mere fact that defendants 1 to 4 are siding with the plaintiffs will not affect the matter. 7. In the last resort, Mr. Mittal has railed the contention that he should be permitted to amend the plaint so as to convert the suit for redemption into a suit for possession. As the two causes of action are different we see no reason to allow this request, especially when this point was contested in the trial Court. 8. For the reasons recorded above, we set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit, but there will be no order as to costs. Gurdev Singh, J. 9. I agree.
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1968 (2) TMI 123 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bour Court in Rohtak. 10. The instant reference, which awas registered at No. 4 of 1964 by the Labour Court, Rohtak, and at No.145 of 1966 by the Labor Court, Jullundur, is a "proceeding" within the meaning of Section 93 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. (2) The Labor Court, Jullundur, or Industrial Tribunal. Punjab, Chandigarh is "corresponding Court, tribunal, Authority or Officer" within the meaning of Section 93 of the punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. (3) The reference stands transferred to the Labour Court, Jullundur, by virtue of Section 93 of the punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, with effect from 1st November, 1966, when that Act came into force. 11. In my view, therefore, the industrial dispute is to be deemed as validly referred under Section 93 of the punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, to the Labour Court, Jullundur, which has jurisdictiion to proceed with the case. 12. The reference is answered accordingly. VGW/D.V.C. 13. Answer accordingly.
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1968 (2) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... professional misconduct is established against respondent No. 1 falling under cl. (o) of the Schedule to the Act. The only question which now remains is the final order to be passed against respondent No. 1. In our opinion, the conduct of respondent No. 1 is wholly unworthy of a Chartered Accountant who is expected to maintain a high standard of professional conduct. The proper punishment would have been the removal of the respondent No. 1's name from the Register for a limited period but in view of the fact that the proceedings have been pending against respondent No. 1 for a long time, we think that the ends of justice will be served in this particular case if respondent No. 1 is severely reprimanded for his misconduct under s. 21(2) of the Act. We also direct respondent No. 1 to pay the cost of the appellant in this Court and in the High Court. We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court dated December 5, 1962 and allow this appeal with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (2) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o be found in the impugned Act. It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the purpose of s. 4 is to fill in the lacuna pointed out in Sharma’s Case( 1966 3 S.C.R. 557) nor with the view that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation. The section under the guise of validating the acquisitions, orders and notifications camouflages the real object of enabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the basis of values frozen by notifications under s. 4 which by part acquisitions thereunder had lost their efficacy and therefore required the Test of the land to be notified afresh and paying compensation on the date of such fresh notifications. In this view, it is not necessary to go into the other questions raised by the petitioners and we refrain from expressing any opinion on them. We would declare s. 4 as invalid and allow the petitions with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1968 (2) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of the compromise of May, 29, 1954 ,directing postponement of the execution of the decree on the term that the judgment-debtor would pay interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month until realisation. The prescribed period ,of limitation under Art. 175 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 for an application for payment of the decretal amount by instalments was six months from the date of the decree. The compromise petition did not ask for payment of the decretal amount by instalments. It asked for postponement of the execution of the decree for two months. Article 175 did no,- apply to the petition. Even if Art. 175 applied to the petition, the order passed on the petition is binding on the parties until it is set aside and may be enforced in execution proceedings, see Monmohan v.Khalishkhali Cooperative Bank(1). In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, and it is declared that the compromise of May 29 1954 can be enforced in the execution proceedings. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (2) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uch c confirmation, the, authority had no power to dispense with their services under r. 6(3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The' removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution. As the' procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Art. 311 was violated, the impugned orders' were rightly set aside by the High Court. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1968 (2) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... i Municipal Corporation. It is not necessary to rely on the-safeguards mentioned by the learned Chief Justice to sustain the delegation. There is no need to think that delegations of the present type will lead to arbitrary taxation or rules. First, we must have faith (1) 9 A.C 117. (2) 10 A.C. 282 (3) 1919 A.C. 935 in our representative bodies and secondly, I agree with the learned Chief Justice and Hidayatullah, J., that in suitable cases taxation in pursuance of delegated powers by a Municipal Corporation can be struck down as unreasonable by Courts. If Parliament chooses to delegate wide powers it runs the risk of the bye-laws or the rules framed under the delegated power being challenged as, unreasonable. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeals are allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside in so far as it is against the appellant and the writ petitions filed by the respondent are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs, throughout.
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1968 (2) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of mesne profits and improvements in relation to L(1) (b) will be reconsidered in the light of the finding regarding the second Kuthakapattom but the, rate ’of mesne profits as already determined shall not be altered. The plaintiff will, of course, be entitled to mesne profits till the date of the grant of- the second Kuthakapattom. There is no doubt that the Society was wrongly advised. and allowed the question of,. amendment to be delayed. At the sane time by not allowing the amendment the plaintiff forces the Issue regarding possession of L (1) (b). In our judgment the Society must pay the costs thrown away, that is to say’, that it must bear the costs incurred in the High Court and the court of first instance by the plaintiff in Addition to costs on its own account. ’In so far as the costs of this Court are concerned parties will bear the costs as the case is being sent to the trial court for further trial. G.C Appeal allowed in part and case remanded.
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1968 (2) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eks restitution has a duty to account to the defendant for what he has received in the transaction from which his right to restitution arises. In other words, an accounting by the plaintiff is a condition of restitution from the defendant (See ’Restatement of the Law of Restitution’, American Law Institute, 1937 Edn., p. 634). The appellant did not produce sufficient evidence to show to what extent he worked the contract and what was the profit made by him in the year 1951 and the succeeding year. In the absence of reliable evidence on.this point the appellant was not entitled to restitution or refund of the deposit he had made. The case of the appellant with regard to this part of his claim was therefore rightly disallowed both by the trial court and the High Court and the respondent is therefore not liable to refund the amount of deposit. For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (2) TMI 115 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as to obtain possession of the vacant premises for starting his own business as a manufacturer and seller of surgical appliances and that the recitals in that connection in the transfer deed were false, the answer to the first question is obvious. If there was no intention on the part of either of the parties to transfer business because there was no business to transfer, then the conclusion that the respondent is not a transferee of any business as a result of the transaction dated 2nd December, 1954, within the meaning of section 26 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, must follow. We must, therefore, answer the first question in the negative. The result is, the first question is answered in the negative, and the second question is answered in the affirmative. As the answers to the reference are in favour of the assessee, we direct that the applicants shall pay the costs of the assessee. We fix the sum of Rs. 250 as the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (2) TMI 114 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the evidence could not have been properly admitted to record at that stage, it was free to ignore that evidence and proceed to adjudge the merits of the order under revision, and, in that view of the matter, the Tribunal has not committed any error in exercising that jurisdiction. The result is that we answer the question referred to us in all these applications in the negative, and hold that the Tribunal has not committed any error in law in refusing to look into the further evidence which the Deputy Commissioner had permitted the applicant to produce before him, because, in the opinion of the Tribunal, that evidence should not have been admitted in the proper exercise of discretion. As the references are answered against the applicant, the applicant would be liable to pay the costs of the opposite side but only in one set. We fix the costs at Rs. 250. The fee paid by the applicant in each of the applications is forfeited to the State. References answered in the negative.
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1968 (2) TMI 113 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the said plant was to be sold as a chattel to be set up by any other agency, a process which might involve the disclosure of the applicants own patented processes or trade secrets. Having considered the matter carefully, we have, therefore, come to the conclusion that it was never intended that the sprinkler installation was to be sold as a chattel by the applicants, nor was it intended that the transaction between the applicants and the Ginning Co. was intended to be divisible into two contracts, one for the sale of the materials, and the other for work and labour to be done, as Mr. Banaji has contended. In the result, we answer question No. (1) in the negative. As already stated by us, question No. (2) has not been pressed before us, and we need not, therefore, answer the same. The respondents must pay the applicants costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 250. We direct that the sum of Rs. 100 deposited by the applicants be refunded to them. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (2) TMI 112 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d turnover. There is, thus, no doubt that what the proper order in the case of the applicants would be is indicated in no uncertain terms in this passage. We have, therefore, no difficulty in answering the question posed by the Tribunal to the effect that on the facts and circumstances of the case the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was not justified in exercising his revisional powers under section 31 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act and he could not validly initiate proceedings for bringing to charge the escaped turnover which power is vested in another authority under the Act. We answer the question accordingly. We may mention in fairness that the learned counsel appearing for the State did not contest the reference, and therefore, we think that this is a fit case where, though the question is answered in favour of the assessee, there should be no order as to costs. The applicants, however, would be entitled to refund of the fees of Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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