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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 67 Records
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1968 (3) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... with law, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the judicial power of the State for relief. We are not unaware of the fact that the interest of the society is no less important than that of the individual. Our Constitution has made provision for safeguarding the interests of the society. Its provisions harmonise the liberty of the individual with social interest. The authorities have to act solely on the basis of those provisions. They cannot deal with the liberty of the individual in a causal manner, as has been done in this case. Such an approach does not advance the true social interest. Continued indifference to individual liberty is bound to erode the structure of our democratic society. We wish that the High Court had examined the complaint of the appellant more closely. 14. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is allowed and the order of detention impugned herein is set aside. The appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. 15. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 122 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lity of the principal for the wrongs of his agent is a joint and several liability with the agent. The injured party may sue either or both of them. 48. We hold that on 5th July 1963, flood water entered the premises of the plaintiffs. The execution of the work by constricting the nullah and by putting a slab on it, was carried out with wilful and wanton negligence without good faith causing damage to the plaintiffs' property. The said damage has been proved at Rs. 54,560. The suit is not barred by S. 167 of the Bombay District Municipal Act. In the result, we set aside the decree of the lower Court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendants for Rs. 54,560 with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the decree of the trial Court till payment. The defendants will also pay the plaintiffs proportionate costs throughout. Defendants will bear their own costs in both the Courts. 49. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 121 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s a threat to private trading in cattle in markets which do not constitute fairs. It is not necessary to elaborate this argument further as in our opinion the petitions must succeed on the ground that the legislation is vague, uncertain and ambiguous. While in the course of his arguments Mr. Majithia, for the State, has projected a concept of conventional fairs to which alone the statute applies, he had to concede frankly that the intention of the Legislature has not been made clear in the impugned enactment, The State Government not having concealed their object of encompassing cattle markets in the scope of cattle fairs, we see strength also in the fourth argument of the learned counsel that the impugned Actis one which may be utilised to eliminate private cattle markets which ostensibly do not come within the ambit of the statutory prohibition. 14. In the result, the petitions are allowed, but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Gurdev Singh, J. 15. I agree.
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1968 (3) TMI 120 - ENGLAND AND WALES (CIVIL DIVISION)
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... ... ..... wn the person in question for "some time", that he regarded him as all right for the conduct of a bank account, and that he believed that he intended starting a restaurant. All this fitted in with the possession by the person who was supposed to be Eliaszade of the cheque, and his dosire to open an account at the defendant bank. I am unable to see anything to suggest that the man was not Eliaszade and in that case why should the bank make further inquiries? They were dealing with a well dressed man of acceptable appearance known to a customer of the bank, and I cannot see why suspicion should have been aroused in the officers of the bank. The circumstances of this case seem to me to be quite different from those of the reported cases to which we were referred. In my opinion the bank were not negligent, and are protected by section 4 of the Cheques Act 1957. I also would dismiss the appeal. RDER; Appeal dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to House of Lords refused.
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1968 (3) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... wealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales 1950 A.C. 235. but the present legislation cannot be sustained even on the above interpretation of the word "restriction", as s. 3 (1) of the Act deals with moneys and money cannot be likened to diseased cattle or noxious drugs so as to attract the exercise of police power under Art. 19(5). It appears to us that whether we apply Art. 31(2) or Art. 19(5), the impugned Act cannot be upheld and it must be struck down." 14. If Article 19(5) is interpreted to mean that State can take by authority of law anyone's property for the purpose of increasing its assets or revenues, the guarantee given by Art. 19(1)(f) would become illusory, a proposition to which this Court cannot subscribe. 15. For the reasons the mentioned above we are unable to uphold the validity of Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act. These appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs with one set of hearing fee. 16. Appeals dismissed.
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1968 (3) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... order was passed. Hind Lamps had submitted several representations to the Government of U.P. regarding inadequate and irregular supply of electrical energy. The Company was informed about the complaints made by Hind Lamps. Meetings were held in which certain steps to be taken by the Company to make the supply regular were agreed upon, but they were not carried out, presumably because the Company had not the requisite equipment for that purpose. The Company was asked to supply electrical energy as released in favour of Hind Lamps; it failed to do so. Representations made by the Company, after the order was passed, requesting that the order dated December 26, 1961, be with-drawn, were also considered by the Government and rejected. Adequate opportunity of making a representation was afforded to the Company to satisfy the State Government that it was not in the public interest to supply electrical energy directly to Hind Lamps. 16. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1968 (3) TMI 116 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... served upon the petitioner after he was suspended. There is no suggestion of any prejudice having been suffered by the petitioner in consequence of the suspension order having preceded service of charge-sheet Moreover, the executive instructions are not mandatory but regulatory. The instructions referred to above are administrative and have not the force of statutory rules. Even if there has been any breach of such executive instructions, the breach does not become justiciable and would not justify the issue of a writ, vide G. J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753, R. Abdulla Rowther v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, AIR 1959 SG 896 and Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398. 26. There is no merit in any one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner. For reasons considered in details above, this petition deserves to fail and is consequently dis missed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1968 (3) TMI 115 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... y not to charge revised rates was in respect of the rates fixed in Ex. 69. There is nothing on the record to show that the company continued the said assurance in respect of the rates fixed by the umpire on September 3 1952 Ex. 72 clearly shows the intention of the appellant company because It was stated therein in categorically terms that the company had the right to make a demand as per rates mentioned in the notice Ex. 83. Thus the argument of Mr. Nanavati that the appellant company was not entitled to charge the revised rates from the municipality of consumption for electrical energy for water works as well as for the street lights because of the assurance given by the company cannot be accepted. The result is that the lower Courts erred In decreeing the suit of the municipality and granting injunctions against the appellant company. ( 12. ) For the reasons stated above the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed and the appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed
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1968 (3) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... plying it by 35 tines The High Court has slightly reduced the multiple. It cannot be laid down as a general rule applicable to all situations and circumstances that a multiple approximately equal to the return from gilt-edged securities prevailing at the relevant time forms an adequate basis for finding out the market value of the land. But in this case the trial court and the High Court were' of the view that a multiple based on a return from the gilt-qedged securities was the appropriate multiple for determining the value of the prope under acquisition, and no ground has been suggested for not lepting the basis and the rate of capitalization adopted by them. It is relevant to note that the same multiple which has been adopted in other cases relating to lands and buildings acquired under the same notification under which the land of the respondent was acquired has not been challenged by the State. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (3) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... scribed as proprietors of Ambika Stores. We have already dealt with this, document and for the reasons already mentioned we hold that the description of the executants was only given for the purpose of borrowing from the Bank and it had not the legal effect of making the appellant. co-owner of the partnership business. There is no evidence of any assertion by the appellant during Muniswami Raju's life-time of his being a co-owner of the partnership business, nor is there any evidence of recognition by Muniswami Raju of any such right of the appellant. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that whatever the appellant did in connection with the business was only done with the Authority conferd by Muniswami Raju. In our opinion the High Court has rightly rejected the claim of the appellant that he was a co-owner of the partnership business. For the reason expressed we hold that this appeal has no merit and it must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (3) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot acquire any prescriptive title to the kudiwaram rights either against the inamdars or against the Government. The Government could, therefore, resume the inam lands made under s. 44-B(2) and dispossess the inamdars and the plaintiffs claiming as lessees under them. The question whether an alienee from the inamdar can acquire prescriptive title to the kudiwaram rights in the inam lands against the Government and thereby defeat the latter's right to resume the inam does not, therefore, arise for decision, and we express no opinion on it. It, may be noted that in Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras 1966 3 S.C.R.283,299 this Court held that there is no limitation barring imposition of assessment on the land after resuming the melwaram. It follows that both the kudiwaram and melwaram rights were rightly resumed under s. 44-B(2)(4)(i). In the result, the appeals are dismissed. In all the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1968 (3) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to seek the assistance of the court, and to prove by evidence which is in law admissible that the goods transported by him fell within the order issued under s. 157(3) of the Act. The rules framed by the Government relating to the procedure to be followed in giving effect to the exemptions on April 15, 1939, do not purport to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court if the procedure is not followed. In our judgment, the Civil Judge and the High -Court exalted what were merely matters of procedure, which the Municipality was entitled to require compliance with in granting refund, into conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction of the civil court. It is impossible on a bare perusal of the order issued -by the Government and the rules framed by it to give to the order and the rules that effect. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the decree passed by the trial court is restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h had been put into court to obtain stay of execution of the decree as but for the order, the decree-holder could have levied execution and obtained satisfaction of the decree even before the disposal of the appeal. The last contention raised on behalf of the respondent was that at any rate the decree-holder cannot claim any amount by way of interest after the deposit of the money in court. There is no substance in this point because the deposit in this case was not unconditional and the decree-holder was not free to withdraw it whenever he liked even before the disposal of the appeal. In case he wanted to do so, he had to give security in terms of the order. The deposit was not in terms of Order 21 rule I C.P.C. and as such, there is no question of the stoppage of interest after the deposit. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored, The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on Office and all other railway offices which are not enumerated above. Schedule I does not apply to the case of railway servants employed in the zonal railways. As regards them, provision is made in Sch. III. From that Schedule it is seen that though a head of the Department can impose on Class III officers censure as well as some other punishments detailed therein, he is not competent to impose on them the punishment of removal from service, compulsory retirement or dismissal from service. Those punishments, as seen from the Schedule,can be imposed on them only by thE appointing authority or any other higher authority. P.W. 1 is not shown to be the appointing authority. On the material before us it is not possible to come to the conclusion that P.W. 1 was competent to grant sanction under s. 6 (1)of the Prevention of Corruption Act. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellant. He is on bail. His bail bond stands cancelled. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , on the other hand, in Ram Autar v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1962 All. 328, F.B.) has taken a view, contrary to the one, expressed by the Mysore High Court. We are of opinion that the latter, represents the correct view. But, even the Allahabad High Court has not given due importance to the mandatory words, used in the concluding part of the proviso to Art. 309, that the rules made, by the authority mentioned therein, 'shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'. This aspect has been emphasized by us, in the earlier part of this judgment. To conclude, on this aspect, 'we are satisfied that the Scheme, Annexure 4, as modified by Annexure 7, framed by the 2nd respondent, Railway Board, such as it is, must have effect, as it does not suffer from any defect in its making and does not offend against the Constitution. In the result, both the -writ petitions are dismissed; but, in the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (3) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
The initiation and continuance of criminal proceedings in good faith cannot amount to contempt of the criminal court.
To constitute contempt of court, something "calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the courts"
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1968 (3) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant was entitled to the 39 shares purchased by him from the partners owning them?
Whether by reason of the prior oral agreement the 1st respondent was entitled to a conveyance in respect of the shares?
Held that:- There was evidence given on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the women partners had authorised the men partners to represent them at the meeting but none of the women partners entered the witness box to deny such authorisation. On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed upon the circular letter, Ex. A-15 purported to be written by one Gopi Setti Venkata Subba Rao, one of the shareholders. The document is not signed by respondent No. 1. It appears to be a notice prepared by one of the shareholders to be circulated inter se among them and refers to the mode of payment of the purchase money agreed to between respondent No. 1 and the persons selling the shares. The High Court has observed tive. The mere omission to settle the mode of payment does no, case of respondent No. 1 and we see no reason to take a different view as regards the effect of Ex. A-15.
The evidence adduced on behalf of respondent No. 1 does not show that the drawing up of a written agreement was a pre-requisite to the coming into effect of the oral agreement. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention of The appellant that the oral agreement was ineffective in law because there is no execution of any formal written document. As regards the other point, it is true that there is no specific agreement with regard to the mode of payment but this does not necessarily make the agreement ineffective. The mere omission to settle the mode of payment does not affect the completeness of the contract because the vital terms of the contract like the price and area of the land and the time for completion of the sale were all fixed. We accordingly hold that Mr. Gokhale is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.
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1968 (3) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Looking at the language itself, assuming that charges for packing include the service charges, there is no reason to suppose that the charges do not include the cost of the packing material. It is also noteworthy that by the rule as amended by the Government Order dated 9th March, 1964, the position was further clarified. As amended, the rule says that there shall be excluded from the taxable turnover charges for packing, that is to say, cost of packing materials and cost of labour and other such like services . That, in our opinion, was precisely the scope of the earlier rule as it stood. On this view as well, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. In our opinion, the turnover relating to the value of packing materials in the form of gunny bags for each of these years was not liable to tax. It follows that the levy of penalty cannot be justified. The petitions are allowed with costs, one set. Counsel s fee fixed at Rs. 250 payable by the first respondent. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e made to an officer other than the assessing authority having jurisdiction. The next argument is that section 2(1) of the 1964 Act picks out the periods between 1st April, 1955, and 31st March, 1959, for removing the bar of limitation for reassessment and leaves out the period prior to 1st April, 1955, and that this is discriminatory. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention. One possible reason for the difference is that the Sales Tax Laws Validation Ordinance, 1956, and the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, validated the levy and collection of tax made by various States during the period from 1st April, 1951, to 6th September, 1955. On our view of the invalidity of sub-section (1) of section 2 as pointed out by us in this judgment, these petitions are allowed but with costs only in W.P. No. 3536 of 1965, W.P. No. 1800 of 1966 and W.P. No. 1907 of 1966. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each of them. No costs in the rest of the petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1968 (3) TMI 103 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the oil is sold should be included in his turnover. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that deduction equal to the value of the groundnut and kernel purchased by him and converted into oil and cake is permissible. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was not right in its view, that the instant case should be decided on the basis of the decision in The Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Ranganatha Rice Mill Contractors, Eluru, and OthersT.R.C. No. 53 of 1961 dated 11th November, 1963. While affirming the remand of the case to the assessing authority, we direct that the case should be decided by that authority in the light of the observations made and the principles laid down above. To this extent the tax revision case is partly allowed and the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is accordingly modified in part. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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