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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1968 (7) TMI 90 - THE CHANCERY DIVISION
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... ... ..... the Crown to treat that as a finding of fact with which I ought not to interfere. The relevant finding of fact is, I suppose, contained in the words " we are unable to find . . . that the . . . " surrender of the royalty agreement " represented anything other than the best method of exploiting the former Borneo and Brunei concessions of the appellant. " If that is intended to be a finding that the royalty agreement had at no time become convert- ed into a fixed asset, it is far from happily expressed. But in any case such a finding cannot, in my judgment, be supported on the evidence. In my judgment, the only inference which is consistent with the evidence is that at some time which cannot be pinpointed, but long before 1964, the company had appropriated the royalty agreement as a fixed capital asset. I can see no evidence to displace that inference. In these circumstances, I allow the appeal, and with it the profits tax appeal. Appeal allowed with costs.
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1968 (7) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of the House present and voting, consideration of the business shall be completed within the time specified in the motion as so adopted and for that purpose, the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business (including the standing orders, if any) relating to that House shall have effect subject to the modifications thereof, if any, specified in the motion, and any such motion may be moved without giving any prior notice thereof and shall, unless the majority of the members of the House present and voting determine otherwise, be taken into consideration, and voted upon on the same day on which it is moved. 4. Financial Statement not to lapse. For the removal of the doubts it is hereby declared that if an annual financial statement has been laid before a House under Article 202 or a statement showing the estimated amount of any supplementary or additional expenditure has been laid under Article 205 such statement shall not be necessary to relay such statement before the House.
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1968 (7) TMI 88 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he village. The distance may be at best 300 feet or so as averred by the Land Acquisition Officer himself. We can also take into account that nearby the land under acquisition as many as four transactions had taken place whereby some persons of the village had purchased some small plots from the claimant himself, just before the land came to be acquired. The development can, therefore, be said to be on that side and that it cannot therefore, be said to be a case where no demand could be made to respect of any such land under acquisition. No doubt one cannot expect any active development in a village of this character as we may find in urban areas. In that view of the matter, it is difficult to say that there could not have been any demand of such plots out of the acquired land in question in the near future. The learned Judge was, therefore, right in talking into account the potential value of the land under acquisition in the sense that it can be used for building purposes.
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1968 (7) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... irm and notices were being given in the name of that partnership firm. It cannot therefore be said, on a comparison of the notices in this case with the plaint that there is identity of the person who issued the notice with the person who brought the suit." Further in that case the defendant challenged the validity of the notice right from the beginning. 12. In the present case the Union of India could not have been left with the impression that the notice had been issued on behalf of a partnership firm. There are clear indications in the notice showing that the plaintiff was the sole proprietor of the concern known as "Ragkunath Dass Mulkraj". Hence the decision in S. N. Dutt's case does not govern the case before us. 13. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The Union of India shall pay the costs of the appellant both in this Court as well as in the High Court.
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1968 (7) TMI 86 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... make or change the law, although it might correct previous erroneous views of the law, a review on the basis of a subsequent binding authority would not be a review of a decree which, when it was made, was rightly made, on the ground of the happening of a subsequent event so as to bring it within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v, Vellanki Venktarama Rao ILR. 24 Madras and accepted by the Supreme Court in A C. Estates v. Serajuddin & Co. AIR 1966 SC. 935. It is needless to point out that if (as I think I have) I have succeeded in showing that I did make an error falling within the phrase, "error apparent on the face of the record" there would be nothing in Chhaiju Ram v. Neki AIR 1922 PC. 112 or Bisheshwar v. Parath Nath AIR 1934 PC. 213, to preclude a review. I allow this application for review. CRP. No.675 of 1967 in which I rendered the erroneous decision will be re-heard. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r determined by, any settlement officer or court and, therefore, the bar of s. 1 1 cannot apply to the present suit. That being the position, we do not see any merit in the contention raised by counsel on the basis of S. II. For the reasons aforesaid, the High Court was in error in interfering with and setting aside the decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the District Court. The District court was also right in holding that in view of the appellants being entitled to Sch. B properties, they were not entitled to their alternative claim in respect of Sch. E properties and that consequently the successors-in-title of the said Premmoyee Dasi would be entitled to Sch. E properties. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the District court. The respondents will pay to the appellants the costs of this appeal and in the High Court. Appeal allowed. G.C.
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1968 (7) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ount of the process of registration not having been completed would, in our view, be sufficient compliance of the directory prescription so long as it furnishes information necessary for the Collector to proceed with the application. The fact that a copy of the registered deed was not furnished along with the application was, therefore, not fatal to the application nor did such omission deprive the Collector of his jurisdiction to entertain.. it nor did it vitiate the proceedings before him or the order thereon made by him. The Board of Revenue and the High Court were not right in dismissing the appellant's application. In the circumstances we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as also of the Board and restore the order passed by the Collector and confirmed by the Commissioner. The respondents will pay to the appellants the costs of these appeals as also their costs in the High Court. There will be only one hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged. In this case, no doubt there was some avoidable delay but as pointed out above it was the result of our system of transmission of orders of superior courts which must pass through several hands and not the product of design or defiance of the superior courts. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was contempt of the authority of the High Court or of the Sessions Judge and the several appellants could not be convicted or punished. In this view of the matter we set aside their convictions and order refund of their fines. We, however, caution all concerned that orders of stay, bail, injunctions received from superior courts must receive close and prompt attention and unnecessary delay in dispatching or dealing with them may well furnish grounds for an inference that it was due to a natural disinclination to deal with the matter born of indifference and sometimes even of contumaciousness.
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1968 (7) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bering this judgment if we record the incidents which relate to the election agent, except to say that the election agent Somani made similar speeches and the fact has been well established by reliable evidence. We are accordingly satisfied that the returned candidate was guilty of corrupt practice and the High Court was right in holding that the election of the returned candidate should be avoided. We may point out that ,there was a further statement that the congress candidate Manjula Bai ate beef. Manjula Bai did not appear in the witness-box to deny this. In fact she showed little interest in the election petition and is reported to have left the matter to the elector who filed this petition. No one on her behalf appeared to deny this fact and therefore we leave the matter there. We do not express any opinion that any corrupt practice in relation to that statement was committed either in fact or in law. In the result the appeal must fail. It will be dismissed with costs.
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1968 (7) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... warded by the Land Acquisition Officer having been substantially enhanced by 0those courts, they were bound to award his clients costs to the extent of their success. Costs are essentially in the discretion of the courts. Both the trial court as well as the High Court have given good reasons in support of their order as to costs. The claim made by the appellants was a highly exaggerated one. The bulk of the evidence adduced by them was found to be unacceptable. Under those circumstances, the courts thought that the appellants should not be granted any costs, We see no reason to interfere with that order. In the result this appeal is partly allowed. In addition to the compensation awarded by the High Court, the appellants will get the statutory allowance of 15 on the value of the trees standing on the acquired land i.e., they will get 15 allowance on a sum of ₹ 58,752/-. In other respects this appeal fails. There will be no order as to costs. Y.P. Appeal allowed in part
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1968 (7) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... putes Act or other corresponding Acts. Considering the history of the legislation, the background and the circumstances in which the Act was enacted, the object of the Act and its scheme, it is not possible to accept the construction suggested on behalf of the respondents that the Act is not an exhaustive Act dealing comprehensively with the subject-matter of bonus in all its aspects or that Parliament still left it open to those to whom the Act does not apply by reason of its provisions either as to exclusion or exemption to raise a dispute with regard to bonus through industrial adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act or other corresponding law. We are, therefore, of the view that the construction given to the Act by the Tribunals was not correct and the orders passed by them have to be set aside. The appeals are allowed, but as the question as to the scope of the Act is raised in these appeals for the first time, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bad an opportunity of making his defence. That being so, we think the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondent." There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quar- ters evidently influenced by the provisions in Art. 31 1 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law from that it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available to the person proceeded against or that another inquiry should be held thereafter. For the reasons mentioned above the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (7) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether ss. 3 and 4 are in conflict with cl. 12 of the Schedule of the Electricity Act ?
Held that:- We see no conflict between cl. 12 of the Schedule in the Electricity Act and ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Act. Clause 12 prescribes a procedure for settling the price of electricity supplied by the licensee for street lighting. It merely lays down the machinery for settling the price if there is dispute between the contracting parties. That clause does not fix the price to be paid or even the maximum price payable. We fail to see how that clause takes away the power from the State legislature to impose additional burden on the consumer. All that clause means is that the licensec cannot dictate his terms to the authority responsible for street lighting. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that in incorporating cl. 12 of the Schedule, the central legislature intended that under no circumstance the liability of the consumer can be increased beyond what is asked during the continuance of the contract. In our opinion it imposes no fetters on the powers of the provincial legislatures in the matter of hanging the price of the electricity supplied by the licensec for street lighting.
unable to agree with the High Court that either the suit is bad because of want of a valid notice under s. 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation or that the notification imposing surcharge is invalid for any reason.Appeal allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 77 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion, we do not think that the facts stated in the order of the Board justify the assumption that the assessee is a del credere agent vis-a-vis the transactions in question. We would, therefore, reframe the question in the following manner Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee is liable for sales tax on sales of sugar despatched from Lohat and Sakri factories outside the State of Bihar during the period in question, even though in respect of those despatches the sugar company itself had shown them as taxable sales in its return and had paid tax thereon? 7.. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question, as framed by us, against the assessee and in favour of the department and hold that the assessee is liable to sales tax for the sales aforesaid. The State of Bihar will get the cost of these references. The consolidated hearing fee for all the references is fixed at Rs. 150 (one hundred and fifty only). References answered accordingly.
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1968 (7) TMI 76 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... knowledge of the mistake of law only after the decision of this court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Oruganti Venkateswarlu and Bros.(1) on 31st March, 1967. The question whether paddy had been subjected to tax or not and rice was shelled out of such paddy will be a matter in controversy between the department and the assessee, and until that is decided, which can only be done by the hierarchy of tribunals under the Act, it cannot be said that the tax levied was levied under a mistake of law, entitling the petitioners to a refund in these petitions. This principle will be applicable to the other non-declared goods also. Both for this reason, as also for the reason, in respect of all the petitions including the three petitions dealing with assessments of 1957-58 as there has been a long and unreasonable delay without there being any exceptional circumstances, to condone it, we dismiss these writ petitions with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 25 in each petition. Petitions dismissed.
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1968 (7) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es Tax Act in the year 1964 and it provides that interest at the rate of 18 per cent. shall be charged from a defaulter if the tax remains unpaid after the expiry of the time mentioned in the notice of assessment and demand or the commencement of the U.P. Bikri-Kar (Dwitiya Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam whichever is later. Obviously it is only a defaulter who is liable to pay interest and a person cannot be held to be a defaulter unless a notice of demand for the payment of the sales tax is first served upon him and he commits a default thereof. Admittedly no notice of demand as required by section 8(1) of the Act had been served upon the petitioners. As such the recovery proceedings launched against them are unauthorised. The result is that this writ petition must succeed. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the recovery proceedings pending against the petitioners for the recovery of interest. The petitioners are entitled to their costs from the respondents. Petition allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en the property of the Railway there would have been no occasion for providing for payment to the petitioner in respect of the surplus taken over by the Railway. There would also have been no necessity for adding the further condition that if the material was not removed by the petitioner within two months from the date of service of a requisition by the Railway the petitioner would forfeit all right, claim and interest in the same. We are not satisfied that the finding of the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax is erroneous in law and accordingly, we hold that this is not a case of a works contract but of a sale of the ballast and boulders by the petitioner to the Railway. We answer the questions of law in all the references accordingly. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall be entitled to his costs in the instant reference which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 200. There is no order as to costs in the connected references. References answered accordingly.
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1968 (7) TMI 73 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of Mr. Mody. In each case, the Tribunal has added a certain percentage of the detected sales in order to arrive at its estimate of total suppressed sales in each year of assessment and it cannot be said that there is no reasonable nexus whatsoever between the estimated suppressed sales and the detected suppressed sales. Under these circumstances, this decision of the Supreme Court in C. Velukutty s case(2) cannot help the assessee. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the Tribunal was right in the view that it took, viz., that the principles of natural justice were not violated by the Sales Tax Officer in not recording statements of A. Alibhai and Co. and the Angadia and not giving opportunity to the applicant-firm of cross-examining them. In the result, we answer the questions as follows Question No. Answer. (1) In the affirmative. (2) In the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the State of Gujarat. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (7) TMI 72 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bed forms after the passing of the assessment order in question. 17.. Lastly, it was submitted by Mr. Tarkeshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the assessee, that in any view of the matter in regard to the sales of rupees ten lacs, in respect of which the declarations and the certificates had been filed before the Deputy Commissioner, the Board ought to have directed him to accept them, or the assessing authority to accept them, and make a fresh assessment. We are not prepared to accept this argument because according to the order of the Board, as we read it, no case in its opinion was made for acceptance of any declaration or certificate filed after the order of assessment was made by the assessing authority. 18.. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question of law reframed by us partly in favour of the assessee but finally and effectually against it in the manner indicated above. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1968 (7) TMI 71 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er in the other State and the purchaser was advised about it with the stipulation that the latter should pay the lorry freight and clear the goods, it is obvious that the movement is under the contract for transport of the goods from one State to the other. The fact that orders are collected outside the State, invoices are prepared there and collection also is made there, can make no difference to the position that under the contract of sale, though entered into with the Mysore depot, the goods moved from one State to the other and in this case directly to the buyer at least in one instance. We are of the view that the transaction in such a case is clearly inter-State in character. On that view the tax case is allowed and the appeal is remitted to the file of the Tribunal with a direction that it will examine whether all the transactions are like what we have stated and dispose of the appeal in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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