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1968 (8) TMI 206 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e law are equally shared by me, but I feel that the law Courts, in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Hiralal's case, AIR 1953 SC 225 are unable to extend any protection to the illiterate debtor. It is for the Legislature to take a note of this situation and to provide protection to the illiterate debtor by enacting law on the pattern of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act. Courts, however, are bound to follow the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 66. With these observations, I agree with the judgment of Bhandari J. BY THE COURT 67. According to the majority view, the appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the trial Court is restored with this modification that instead of ₹ 6215/-, the decree is passed for ₹ 6022/- only. The plaintiffs shall get interest at eight annas per cent per mensem on this amount from the date of the filing of the suit instead of at ten annas per cent per mensem as awarded by the trial Court.
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1968 (8) TMI 205 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iction to entertain the petitions in so far as they purport to be under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner has however succeeded on the merits of the matter, which occupied nearly eight out of the ten days. 300. Mr. Paranjpe says that costs must follow the event and therefore the petitioner would be entitled to full costs of the hearing before us. He says that if costs are properly calculated under Chapter XIV, Rule (v) and Chap. XXVII, Rule 11 of the High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, the petitioner would be entitled to a sum of ₹ 20,000/- by way of costs. This claim seems to us to be highly exaggerated. 301. Taking into account the facts mentioned above and all the circumstances of the case, the fairest order, in our opinion, would be that the 2nd Respondent shall pay a sum of ₹ 3,000/-to the author and a sum of ₹ 1,000/-to the publisher by way of costs. The other respondents will bear their own costs. 302. Order accordingly.
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1968 (8) TMI 204 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ate act towards the commission of the offence which may be made punishable but that act may be any act during the course of the series of acts that go to constitute an offence under Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code. In my opinion, the act of Shantilal inviting Prahlad Ram to purchase diesel from his pump which did not contain sufficient quantity to fulfil the demand of Prahlad Ram and the act of the other accused persons of mixing kerosene with the diesel to deliver that admixture to Prahlad Ram do attract the application of Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code in which the word 'attempt' has been used in a larger sense so as to include any one or the series of acts committed by the accused persons which may go to complete the offence as described in Section 511, Indian Penal Code. 9. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to accept the revision of the State and send the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. The revision is accordingly allowed.
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1968 (8) TMI 203 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gust 21, 1957. At any rate the same point was raised before Badkas, J. Further, as held by this Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Devi, 1960 3SCR590 , "an interlocutory order which did not terminate the proceedings and which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken, could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order." Section 105 (2), C. P. C, does not apply in this case, and, therefore, the Letters Patent Bench was entitled to go into the validity of the order passed by Vyas, J. 14. The learned Counsel then urges that this was a new point and the Letters Patent Bench should not have allowed it to be taken. But we agree with the Bench that the point had been raised before the learned Single Judges. In view of this it is not necessary to decide whether a new point can be taken up in a Letters Patent appeal or not. 15. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1968 (8) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or being referred for the decision of the Mamlatdar under Section 85-A of the Act We are accordingly of the opinion that the High Court was in error in referring any such issue to the Mamlatdar but instead should have granted a decree to the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the lands and also as to damages and mesne profits as decreed by the trial court. 9. For the reasons expressed we hold that Civil Appeal No. 312 of 1966 must be allowed and the judgment of the High Court dated February 5, 1963 should Be set aside and the decree of the 5th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division at Ahmedabad dated July 30, 1960 should be restored. Civil Appeal No. 313 of 1966 is dismissed. The plaintiff will be entitled to the costs of this Court (one set of hearing fees) but we do not propose to make any order with regard to the costs incurred by the parties in the High Court. 10. The application filed by the defendants for leave to produce additional evidence in this Court is rejected.
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1968 (8) TMI 201 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt as the winding up court to entertain a suit the court-fee payable in respect of it has necessarily to be calculated under the Mysore Court-fees and suits Valuation Act, 1958. 90. The decision of the Supreme Court in Dhirendha Chandra Pal v. Associated Banks of Tripura Ltd. dealt exclusively with the position as under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act now called the Banking Regulation Act, and held that the proceedings thereunder are not proceedings in the nature of a suit but summary proceedings specially provided for expeditious disposal of winding up proceedings in the case of banking companies with liberty of power to the court to frame its own procedure for the disposal of such applications. 91. I, therefore hold that the present application as well as similar applications in the nature of suits which the liquidator or may file in winding up have to be treated as regular suits for purposes of court-fee and the court-fee paid accordingly thereon under the Mysore
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1968 (8) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... res in a Limited Company. The membership is fluid. A person retains rights as long as he continues as a Member and gets nothing at all when he ceases to be a Member, even though he may have paid a large amount as admission fee. He even loses his rights on expulsion. In these circumstances, it is clear that the Club cannot be treated as a separate legal entity of the nature of a Limited Co. carrying on business. The Club, in fact, continues to be a Members' Club without any shareholders and, consequently, all services provided in the Club for Members have to be treated as activities of a self-serving institution. 15. For these reasons, we consider that the Order made by the Tribunal, holding that the Club is an 'industry' is incorrect and must be set aside. The appeal is allowed, and the order of the Tribunal, dismissing the preliminary objection of the Club, is set aside. In the circumstances of this case, we direct parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1968 (8) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It seems to us that, in view of the above authorities, in order to determine the situs of the trust, which consists of a Math and a subordinate so-called math or maths, it is the situs of the principal math which will determine the applicability of the Act. We need not here decide the position of an independent real math though connected with another math. The High Court has found in this case that in the Nasik Math no religious instructions are imparted and no spiritual service is rendered to any body of disciples. Further no member of the public is allowed to enter the place of worship without permission although worship is carried out by the Pujaris according to vedic usage. In view of these findings the Nasik Math cannot be held to be a real math or temple within the definitions set out above. In our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the Nasik Math is not liable to be registered under the Act. 16. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1968 (8) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e the High Court and asked to show cause why he should not be so named and if he chose to appear, he was to be given an opportunity of crossexamining any witness already examined by the High Court and of calling evidence in his own defence and of being heard. This provision, to our mind, only enjoins upon the High Court to give an opportunity to a person sought to be held guilty of a corrupt practice if he was not a party to the petition, but it does not apply to a person who is a necessary party thereto. An obvious case for the use of powers. under s. 99 would be that of an agent guilty of commission of a corrupt practice with the consent of the candidate. Such a person would not be a necessary party to the petition but he must have an opportunity of showing cause and of being heard before the High Court can name him as guilty of a corrupt practice while making an order under s. 98. In our opinion, the appeal has no merits and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (8) TMI 197 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o lack or orders or demands for the products of the company and if a further initial capital outlay of ₹ 60 lacs to 80 lacs could be made, the company could be turned into a profit making concern. No private financiers would be willing to undertake such a big risk and it is only the Government who can bear this burden. I am also not unimpressed by the fact that the State Bank of India, though a secured creditor, has not proceeded to realise its security, but proceeded by way of an application for the winding-up of the company. I would therefore make an order for the winding-up of the company, but the operation of this order would be stayed till the 15th October, 1968 to allow for negotiations with the Central Government as I am informed that such negotiations are already going on. 34. The petitioner and the supporting creditors would be entitled to add the costs of this application to their claim while the other parties would bear their own costs. 35. Liberty to apply.
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1968 (8) TMI 196 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the military authorities. Counsel submitted that this document was a pay order. Now there is an essential distinction between a pay order and an assignment. A pay order is a revocable mandate. It gives the payee no interest in the fund. An assignment creates an interest in the fund and is not revocable. Read in the light of the power of attorney the endorsement on the bill dated July 19, 1948 created an interest in a specific fund and was irrevocable. There was thus a sufficient equitable assignment of a specific fund in favour of the appellant. The High Court was in error in holding that there was no equitable assignment. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the decree passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, is restored. The respondents who are the legal representatives of Takhatmal shall pay out of his assets in their hands the costs of this appeal as also the costs in the courts below. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (8) TMI 195 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... om the principal. The very object of the guarantee is defeated if the creditor is asked to postpone his remedies against the surety. In the present case the creditor is a banking company. A guarantee is a collateral security usually taken by a banker. The security will become useless if his rights against the surety can be so easily cut down. The impugned direction cannot be justified under O. XX r. 11 (1). Assuming that apart from O. XX r. 11 ( 1 ) the Court had the inherent power under s. 151 to direct postponement of execution of the decree, the ends of justice did not require such postponement. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the direction of the court below that the "plaintiff-bank shall be at liberty to enforce its dues in question against defendant No. 2 only after having exhausted its remedies against defendant No. 1" is set aside. The respondent Dr. Paras Nath Sinha shall pay to the appellant costs in this Court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (8) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... can be an object of charity and when a dedication is made in favour of a tank, the same is considered as a charitable institution. It is not necessary for our present purpose to decide whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person. Once we come to the conclusion that the Inam with which we are concerned in this case was an Inam in favour of the "uracheruvu" (tank) that tank must be considered as a charitable institution under the Act. Consequently after the abolition of the Inam, the Inam property gets itself converted into Royatwari property, of the "uracheruvu", to be managed by its Manager. Admittedly the appellant is its present Manager. Hence the property in question has to be registered in the name of the tank but it will" continue to be managed by the appellant so long as he continues to be its Manager. In the result subject to our observations as regards the management of the property, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1968 (8) TMI 193 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uiry Officer on both the charges were perverse in the sense of not being supported by any legal evidence, of course, with the exception of the finding recorded to the effect that on 14-1-1960 the respondent, after doing some work in the Naya Bazar Branch of the Bank, left for Muzaffarnagar and was seen in Muzaffarnagar on that day. It was to this liraired extent that the first charge only could have been held to have been proved before the Enquiry Officer against the respondent. On this limited proof and on holding that the Enquiry Officer's findings were correct in respect of this part of the charge only, the Tribunal would be fully justified in withholding its approval of the order of dismissal which was passed by the Bank on the basis that all the elements of both the charges had been proved. The order of the Tribunal refusing to grant approval was, therefore, not vitiated by any error and must be upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (8) TMI 192 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to respondents Nos. 1-2. Bachawat, J. 39. I agree that the dispute concerning the property purchased by the society from one of its members is not a dispute touching the business of the society. I also agree that the court of small causes has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Rent Act to entertain a proceeding by a landlord for ejectment of a tenant. A dispute concerning the ejectment of a tenant by a landlord is outside the purview of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It has also been argued that, as the lease under which the contesting respondent is claiming was not executed by the owner in his capacity as a member of the society, there is no dispute between the society and a person claiming through a member. On this last question, I express no opinion. Having regard to our findings on the other two points, the appeal must fail. I, therefore, agree to the order proposed by my learned brother.
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1968 (8) TMI 191 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g that notice the licensec could not have been definite whether the State Electricity Board purported to exercise the power under the law as it was. on the date of the notice or as it was under the unamended Act. Rights and liabilities of the Electricity Board and the licensec before Act 32 of 1959 came into force are substantially different from their rights and liabilities under the Act. On reading the impugned notice it could not have been clear to the licensee that he had been called upon to sell the .undertaking in accordance with the law as it then stood. We are unable to accede to the request of the Attorney-General to read into the notice words which are not there. For the reasons mentioned hereinbefore we agree with the High Court that the impugned notice is'invalid and by virtue of that notice the appellant cannot compel the respondents to sell the undertalcing in question. Accordingly this appeal fails and the same. is dismissed with R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1968 (8) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Special Civil applications filed were to. be withdrawn. The application for compromise was considered by the R.T.A. at its meeting held on September 10 and 11, 1965. The private operators including respondent No. 1 assured the R.T.A. that they would withdraw the petitions pending in the High Court. Upon 'such assurance the R.T.A. considered the matter at the meeting and after hearing the parties decided that the appellant who was granted substantive permits by its order dated May 10, 1965, would commence operation on the routes described in Sch. 'A' from November 1, 1965. In regard to the routes mentioned in Sch. 'B' for which also the appellant had been granted substantive permits by the order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965, the appellant was to be permitted to coramence operation from July 1, 1965 and the private operators including respondent No. 1 were to be allowed to operate on these routes on temporary permits until June 30, 1967. This interval
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1968 (8) TMI 189 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... missing the writ petition on the ground that the appellant had an alternative remedy of statutory. appeal. It was contended by Mr. Chagla on behalf of the respondent that in dismissing the writ petition the High Court was acting in its discretion. But it is manifest in the present case that the discretion of the High Court has not been exercised in accordance with law and the judgments of the Division Bench dated March 27, 1964 and of the learned Single Judge dated February 13, 1964 summarily dismissing the writ petition are defective in law. For the reasons expressed we hold that this appeal must be allowed, the judgments of the Division Bench in Special Appeal no. 322 of 1964 dated March 27, 1964 and of the learned Single Judge dated February 13, 1964 should be set aside and Civil Miscellaneous Writ no. 2371 of 1962 should be restored to file and dealt with in accordance with law. There will be no order with regard to the costs of this appeal in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1968 (8) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ndent’s undertaking came to vest firsfly in the Bombay State Electricity Board subsequently in the appellant in view. of the various notifications referred to earlier. That right has to be worked on the basis of law as it stood on the date the notice under s. 7(4) of the Act was given. In this Court a new contention was taken on behalf of the respondent namely that in any case, the appellant’s right to purchase is conditional on the payment of the price as provided in s. 7 and hence the appellant cannot demand possession of the undertaking without paying the price after the same is determined according to law. This contention had not been taken before the High Court. The High Court may go into this question while deciding the writ petition. For the reasons mentioned earlier we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the case back to High Court for deciding the issues that were left open. Costs of this appeal shall be costs in the cause.
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1968 (8) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
Detention under the Preventive Detention Act (4 of 1950)challenged - Held that:- As regards mala fides and collateral purpose alleged to be the real reason, the averment is that the detention was ordered to prevent the detenus from actively campaigning for the Panchayat elections that were to take place on the 19th and 20th February, 1968. This has been denied and looking to the circumstances of this area which are notorious there is no doubt in our minds that the affidavit of the District Magistrate is reliable.
What we have to satisfy ourselves about is the satisfaction of the authority and the absence of mala fides and whether all the opportunities of making representation were given. There were enough instances cited of the conduct on which detention was ordered for the petitioner to make an effective representation. The situation in this area was already bad and the later activities would not make it any better. We do not think that the detention suffers from any defect. The petition will be dismissed.
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