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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 66 Records
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1969 (10) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ar was created to the ejectment of these sub-lessees whose continuance had become precarious under the existing law. The bar was to operate during the continuance of that Act which was for a definite duration notwithstanding anything contained in Section 76 and 78 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act barring exceptions contained in Section 74 of that Act. The observation that protection was given to sub-lessees, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 78 was apparently made through oversight; it is contrary to the express provisions of the Act. 7. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in holding that the defendants had acquired the status of occupancy tenants by virtue of Section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Act 20 of 1959). 8. The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the decree passed by the District Court is restored. There will be no order as to costs in this Court and in the High Court.
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1969 (10) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... land in one State but no such remedy in another. -The rule, therefore, is that a plea of lis alibi pendens will not succeed and the court will not order a stay of proceedings unless the defendant proves vexation in point of fact. He must show that the continued prosecution of both actions is oppressive or embarrassing, an onus which he will find it difficult to discharge if the plaintiff can indicate some material advantage that is likely to result from each separate action. Each case, therefore, depends upon the setting of its own facts and circumstances. In the facts of the present case I am of opinion that no case for injunction -has been made out and the order of Ramamurti. J., dated April 12, 1968 allowing the application of respondent in No. 106 of 1968 should be set aside. I would accordingly allow the appeals Nos. 1208 of 1969 and 1833 of 1969 with costs. 50. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (10) TMI 95 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vidence adduced by the plaintiff ought to have been accepted in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. This Court ordinarily does not interfere with a finding of fact in revision, but as the finding of the trial Court is vitiated by 'ignoring the aforesaid presumption in favour of the plaintiff it must be set aside as not only unreasonable but perverse. I, therefore, hold that it has been duly established by the evidence on record that the defendant non-applicant had purchased a bullock-art for Rs. 170 on credit and he failed to pay the price thereof. The plaintiff ap-pliant is, therefore, entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs. 170, 8. The revision petition is, therefore, allowed and the decree of the trial Court is hereby set aside. The plaintiffs claim for Rs. 170 is decreed with costs against the defendant non-applicant. The non-applicant shall bear his own costs and pay, that of the plaintiff in both the Courts. Counsel's fee according to state, if certified.
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1969 (10) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e much difficulty in upholding the maintainability of a joint appeal by the State against several accused persons acquitted at a joint trial. There being no legal bar (at least we are aware of none either in the Cr.PC or elsewhere), such an appeal cannot be held to suffer from any serious legal infirmity. And then the matter being one of mere form it calls for a liberal approach requiring the appeal to be heard on the merits. To hold it to be unmaintainable on this ground would defeat the larger cause of justice. Unfortunately, we did not have the advantage of arguments on behalf of the respondents because they were unrepresented, but on considering the scheme of the relevant provisions of the CrPC, we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in holding the joint appeal not m be maintainable and in summarily rejecting the same. 8. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the case back to it for decision of the appeal on the merits.
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1969 (10) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er verifying them and in the circumstances of the case, the railway could not be held responsible for any shortage so long as there was no proof of tampering with the seals. The decision in the Nagpur case was followed in Madras and it was held that the endorsement to the effect that the consignment was 'said to contain' a certain number of bags did not amount to any admission on the part of the railway administration that the said number of bags had in fact been loaded. 12. It appears to us that the false representation made by the appellants in obtaining the railway receipt in the form in which it was issued did not cast any additional liability on the railway and the issue of the railway receipt therefore was not likely to cause any damage or harm to the railway. No question of cheating the railway or the Station Master therefore arose in this case and the appeal must be allowed. The appellants are directed to be set at liberty. The fine, if paid, must be refunded.
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1969 (10) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Judge at Arrah is undoubtedly senior to them all. We only hope that there will be no such misunderstanding between the High Court and the Secretariat in the future and if there ever be any difference of opinion attempts will be made to resolve them by mutual deliberation without one or the other making an order or giving a direction contrary to the views of the other before deliberation. 10. In the result we hold that the Government notification of October 17, 1968 was not in terms of Article 233 of the Constitution and consequently the question of quashing the High Court's order dated October 25, 1968 does not arise. We also hold that the Gradation List of Additional District and Sessions Judges prepared by the High Court has no legal sanction and that the seniority of the petitioner and respondents 3 to 5 can only be determined in the superior Judicial Service where they are now all holding officiating posts when the occasion arises. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (10) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... liest when the trees are felled. But before that happened the trees had vested in the State. 22. This brings us. to the last point, namely, whether a new contract was concluded between the Government and the plaintiff. It is extremely doubtful whether the letter, dated February 1, 1955, is an offer. It seems to be an invitation to the plaintiff to make an offer. Be that as it may, even if it is treated as an offer there was no unconditional acceptance by the letter, dated February 5, 1955. The plaintiff expressly reserved his right to claim a refund of ₹ 17,000. According to the letter of the Divisional Forest Officer, dated February 1, 1955, the plaintiff had to give up his claim to Rs, 17,000 which he had already paid and had to pay a further sum of ₹ 17,000. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the alleged acceptance of the offer made on February 1, 1955, was conditional and qualified. 23. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (10) TMI 90 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
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... ... ..... t, but were for the usual purpose of shifting of the Factory itself from old premises to new premises. 55. Thus, even the special work assigned to respondents 2 and 3 during the period of shifting of the Factory, cannot be said to be a work which was incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process so as to make respondents 2 and 3 come within the definition of workers even during this period. 56. The finding of the Labour Court that respondents 2 and 3 were workers as defined in Section 2(1) of the Act, is the result of relying on irrelevant circumstances, and is manifestly erroneous. Consequently, the conclusion based on such finding, that respondents 2 and 3 are entitled to over-time wages under Section 59 of the Act, cannot stand. 57. In the result, we allow this petition and quash the order of the Labour Court. But in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own COStS. 58. Petition allowed.
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1969 (10) TMI 89 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... made freely and not under duress, and the word is defined generally as meaning the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession, or position." From the facts before us, it is incontestable that Ejaz Ahmed was functioning as Sarpanch on October 15, 1968. The result of the above discussion is that the Collector was right in his order dated October 14, 1969, but his order dated November 4, 1969, cancelling the notice calling the election and fixing its programme, was erroneous. The petition is allowed. The order of the Collector, Guna, dated November 4, 1969, (by which he cancelled his previous order dated October 14, 1969) is quashed. A mandamus shall go to the Collector to give effect to his order dated October 14, 1969, and to hold a fresh election after fixing a fresh programme. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1969 (10) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... the 2nd accused arranged with ASSAB to have the difference between the over-invoiced price and the actual price credited to the personal account of the second accused in Ovenska Handels Banken and the statement of account sent to A-1". These allegations merely make out that Schussler was an accessory after the fact and not that he was a conspirator. If a person agreed with a robber to receive the stolen property and arrange for its safe keeping, he does not become. a co-conspirator with the robber in the commission of the offence of robbery-. On the facts alleged it is clear that Schussler had nothing to do either with the acquisition of foreign exchange by Pratap or in the matter of Pratap's failure to repatriate the same to this country. The accusation against him is that he provided facility for its retention in Sweden. In the result I allow these appeals and acquit the appellants ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, these appeals are dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reement of 1889 to be paid ₹ 1,000/- p.m. out of the income of the Venkatagiri Zamindari. Out of the compensation amounts so paid to plaintiffs 1 to 4 interest shall be calculated at 5 1/2% per annum. If the interest so calculated falls short of ₹ 1,000/- per month, plaintiffs 1 to 4 are entitled to the payment of such additional sums as would enable them to be in receipt of a total income of ₹ 1,000/- per month. If for any period subsequent to 7th September, 1949 plaintiffs 1 to 4 have not received allowance of ₹ 1,000/- p.m. they are granted liberty to file an application for the recovery of such sums as may be needed to make up the allowance to ₹ 1,000/- for that period. For such decree as may be passed on such application a charge would be created on items 1, 14 and 16 of plaint B Schedule properties. The suit is dismissed so far as plaintiffs 5 to 9 are concerned. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above with proportionate costs.
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1969 (10) TMI 86 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of the offence does not fall under proviso to section 16(1). If that be so, the trial Court will necessarily consider it and pass appropriate order in accordance with the interpretation placed by me on the Act. It is not a case where a firm cannot be prosecuted or convicted at all because admittedly one of the offences alleged falls under proviso to section 16(1). (16) In other writ petitions besides the common points regarding the validity of the appointments of public analysts and the Food Inspectors, liability of the firm to be prosecuted and punished, validity of the standards prescribed vis-à-vis Article 19, the other points relate only to the merits of the controversy, which will again be a matter for the trial Court to decide. (17) In this view, these petitions must fail and are dismissed, with no order as to costs. The parties to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on Nov. 15, 1969. October 10,1969. --- --- M.R.A. Ansari, J. (Concurring) (18) I agree
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1969 (10) TMI 85 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t 31, 1967. The Petitioner further threatened that if the letter was not withdrawn, the Petitioner would file a suit in this Court. According to the Petitioner, the letter of March 8, 1968, was thereafter written to the Distributors' Section of the Association for withdrawing and superseding the earlier letter of February 21, 1968. 28. In my view, the Petitioner's contention seems to be prima facie acceptable. In any event, the letter of March 8,1968, speaks of the right of the Plaintiff of exclusive booking at the Defendant's cinema 'as per arrangement with them'. On the materials before me, I do not see what this arrangement can mean except the contract dated August 31, 1967, on which the Petitioner relies. This contention on of Mr. Das is, therefore, rejected. 29. All the contentions raised on behalf of the Defendant, therefore, fail. 30. In the result this application succeeds. The ad-interim injunction granted herein is confirmed. Costs in the cause.
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1969 (10) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an identical. proviso, i.e. the character of the Representative Union the binding force of any agreement or action by the Representative Union. In this case the Labour Association has appeared before us and therefore of opinion that the proviso to Sections 32 and 33 do not entitle (sic) other employee to come before us and plead against the action of the representative Union in accepting the compromise; nor do we think that they can press their claim when once the representative union of the employees has entered into a valid compromise which has been accepted by this Court. The result is that there shall be an order in terms of the compromise in Civil Appeal No. 1605 of 1966. Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs in both the appeals. 3. The petition filed in court today by Mr. K.L. Hathi on behalf of the Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad for being impleaded as a party in Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966 is allowed in terms thereof.
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1969 (10) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1 S.C.R. 970. A restriction imposed under s. 3(1) of the Punjab Special Powers Act, 1956 was struck down by this Court in Virendra v. State of Punjab 1958 S.C.R. 308, on the ground that the Act did not provide for any time for the operation of an order made thereunder nor for a representation by the aggrieved party. Now adverting to the restriction impugned in this case, the power to impose the same is conferred on the executive Government and not to any judicial authority. There is no provision to make representation by the aggrieved party against the direction given by the Government; no appeal or revision is provided against that direction and the order made need -not be of temporary nature. Hence we agree with the High Court that impugned provision is violative of Art. 1 9 (1) (b) (c) and (d) and is not saved by Art. 19(3), (4) or (5). In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ome to a finding different from that of the High Court. The third consideration is the larger interest of the State, as pointed out by this Court in State v. Jagjit Singh. We feel that this interest was not adequately kept in view by the High Court and this requires that the respondents should be kept in custody for six months from the date of the order of the High Court dated August 1, 1969. We may mention that the State undertakes not to ask for remand to custody if it is no longer absolutely essential that the respondents be kept in custody. As already stated, the State will continue to apply for remand and if some facts which we have not taken into consideration or anticipated come to light the Chief Presidency Magistrate would be entitled to forward to us his recommendations that the order we have made should be modified in any respect. ( 18. ) In this result the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and order of the High Court upheld, subject to the above modifications.
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1969 (10) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... enough to achieve the legislative purpose, without doing violence to the language. The definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, therefore, does not seem to us to exclude those employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of the word "worker". Keeping in view the duties and functions of the respondents as found by the learned Additional District Judge, we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the, word "worker". Deletion of the word "whatsoever" on which the appellant's counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant. We have not been persuaded to hold that the High Court was in error in affirming the decision of the learned Additional District Judge. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d who seems to be an independent witness. We agree with the High Court that the Magistrate was not entitled to reject the evidence of the eye-witnessess. No reason has been shown to us why we should interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court. The learned counsel further contends that no offence was committed because the accused had a right of private defence of property. Assuming that he had a right of private defence of property he had ample opportunity of having recourse to the authorities and there was no need for the appellant to have taken the law into his own hands. The only question that remains now is the question whether the benefit of s.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act should be extended to the appellant. In spite of opportunity being given no good proof has been furnished to establish that the appellant was at the relevant time under the age of 21 years. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nding, it is desirable not to express any opinion on the merits and demerits of the charges as also the rival contentions of the parties because such an opinion may cause prejudice. The appellant raised a contention as to the vires of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the validity of the investigation. In view of the fact that sanction for the trial is pending pursuant to the investigation under the First Information Report dated 17 August, 1967 the appellant did not want a decision on this point in this appeal because the appellant would raise that contention in the criminal case. We have, therefore, left open the contention as to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 to enable the appellant to agitate that contention, if so advised, in the criminal trial. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. In view of the fact that there was no order as to costs in the High Court, we are of opinion that each party should bear its costs in this Court.
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1969 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (2) of Section 59 of the Government of India Act, 1935), are directory and substantial compliance with those provisions is sufficient - See P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore Cochin 1955 SCR 1011 and Chitralekha v. State of Mysore . In this case the impugned order was made in the name of the State Government. It was signed by the Chief Secretary. Therefore prima facie it is a valid order. We need not go further into that question in view of our conclusion that the respondent has failed to prove that he was appointed by an authority higher in rank than the Chief Secretary of the State. 18. For reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court restored. The respondent shall pay costs of the appellant both in this Court and in the High Court. The respondent brought the suit from which this appeal arises in forma pauperis. Hence he is liable to pay the Court-fees payable on the suit claim.
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