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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1969 (8) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had acquired in 1952 the same interest in the property of the joint family which her husband Hukan Singh had under the provisions of Act XVIII of 1937. The question arose, whether after the coming into force of the Act she got rights of full ownership and could alienate the properties in which she had acquired a limited interest without the consent of the male members of the family. This Court decided that she had become full owner by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act. This case is quite apposite for our purpose and we must hold that the respondent became a full owner of the suit properties when the Act came into force. The mere fact that there was a partition by means of arbitration which resulted in an award and a decree based on it would not bring the matter within Sub-section (2) as the provisions of Sub-section (1) became fully applicable particularly in view of the express terms of the Explanation. 8. This appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 97 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Ex. 2 and we are not in a position to infer any admission even by implication. In our view, the trial court was wrong in treating Ex. 2 as an acknowledgment for the amount of ₹ 6,000/- payable under the agreement (Ex. 1) on 1-4-1954 and passing a decree on that basis. 14. The appeal of the defendant must succeed so far as the sum of ₹ 6,000/- is concerned and for the rest, it must be dismissed on the view that Article 115 is applicable to the claim filed by the plaintiff. The appeal filed by the plaintiff has got no force. 15. The result is that the judgment and decree dated 29-11-1958 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Bundi, is modified to the extent that instead of a decree for ₹ 24,000/- awarded in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant, the former is only entitled to a decree for ₹ 18,000/-and interest thereon as mentioned by the trial court. The parties shall give and take costs in proportion to their success and failure in both the courts.
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1969 (8) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e decision of this Court in B.M. Ramaswamy v. B.M. Krishnamurthy and Ors. 1963 3SCR479 governs the facts of this case. But after some discussion he gave up that contention. The ratio of that decision has no relevance for our present purpose. In that case, the High Court came to the conclusion that the corrections in the concerned electoral roll had been made before the last date prescribed for filing nominations to the election but it came to the conclusion that the electors newly added to the list were not qualified to be registered as electors. This Court overruled that finding holding that every person whose name finds place in the electoral roll must be held to be qualified to be a candidate whether he was qualified to be registered as an elector or not. In other words it upheld the finality of the electoral roll as it stood on the last date for filing nominations for the election. 12. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 5th Edn., at page 194, Section 40 expressly says that the right of the covenantee is not an interest in the land bound by the covenant nor an easement. It is not an interest because the Act does not recognise equitable estates and it cannot be said as Sir George Jessal said in London & South Western Rly. v. Gomm 1882 20 Ch.D.562 that if a covenant "binds the land it creates an equitable interest in the land." The expression "covenant runs with the land" has been taken from the English law of real property. It is an exception to the general rule that all covenants are personal. Even on the footing that the clauses relating to renewal in the lease, in the present case, contain covenants running with the land the rule against perpetuity contained in Section 14 of the Act would not be applicable as no interest in property has been created of the nature contemplated by that provision. 9. For the above reasons the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 94 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 8377; 5,000 or more. In this connection, it may be noticed that on and from February 2,1909 the new Rule 8, which I have reproduced earlier, came into force under which each successful ticket should have earned a dividend of ₹ 5,000 and over. This, however, was not the case under the old Rule 8 with which I am concerned. 15. I, therefore, answer the questions set out in the originating summons as follows - So far as the first question is concerned, I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to the payment of the amount of dividend of ₹ 10,462.50 p. by cheque from the defendants under Rule 8 of the Rules for the Jackpot but that the plaintiff is entitled to payment of the amount of such dividends by cheque from the defendants under Rule 8 of the Rules for the Jackpot read with the said document, exh. A. I answer the second question in the affirmative, 16. The defendants will pay to the plaintiff the costs of this originating summons which I quantify at ₹ 600.
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1969 (8) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the High Court, then they cannot be considered to be aggrieved by the impugned decree and, therefore, they cannot claim any locus standi to appeal against it. 9. From whichever point of view one looks at the position, the appellants cannot claim a right of appeal from the decree of the High Court determining the pre-emption money to be ₹ 105,800, The right to appeal against that decree can only be exercised by a person whose claim of pre-emption in respect of the sale in question can be considered to have been adversely affected by it. The appellants on their own argument possess no such right. 10. The preliminary objection, therefore, succeeds and allowing the same we dismiss the appeal with costs. Respondents 1 to 3 claim to have deposited the amount within the time specified by the High Court and as the appellants do not as indeed cannot claim a decree in their favour from this Court, it becomes unnecessary for us to specify any date for the payment of such deposit.
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1969 (8) TMI 92 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... seizure was made in exercise of the power vested under this Act in the Customs authorities and the vehicle was in custody of that authority when this application came to be given by the petitioner Raichand to the Judicial Magistrate had no authority or power to pass the impugned order. At any rate, it could be said on consideration of the propriety that the order is not proper. On both these grounds, this order requires to be set aside. 28. The reference is, therefore, accepted and the impugned order, dated 5th April, 1969 is set aside. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Umbergaon is directed to pass consequential orders in view of the undertaking given by the petitioner in miscellaneous given by the petitioner in miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 111 of 1969 decided by this Court on 9th May, 1969. 29. Mr. Mehta, who appears for the petitioner, states at the Bar that his client will comply with the undertaking given by him. Orders accordingly. 30. Reference accepted.
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1969 (8) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... defendant before his death was willing to re-sell a portion of the suit properties. He had directed his wife to re-sell the major portion of item No. 1 of the plaint schedule to the plaintiff for a consideration of ₹ 11,500 though its price at that time is proved to be much more than ₹ 11,500. As seen earlier, the defendant was willing to sell item No. 1 in the plaint schedule to the plaintiff for ₹ 11,500. She expressed her readiness to do so in her written statement. She is evidently not willing to stand by that offer now because of the enormous rise of price of properties in recent times. Mr. M.C. Chagla, learned Counsel for the defendant told us at the time of the hearing that the property concerned in the defendant's appeal is now worth over a lac of rupees. That appears to be the reason why the defendant is backing out of the offer made by her in her written statement. All that one need say is that all is not well with defendant's case either.
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1969 (8) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t 3 a.m. he was seen on the Tween Deck when he told a seaman on duty that he was going to bed. At 6.15 a.m. he was found missing and a search was undertaken. The dead body, however, was not found either on that day or later on. The evidence does not show that it was a stormy night. The Commissioner made a local inspection of the ship and saw the position of the bridge and deck and found that there was a bulwark more than 31/2 feet. Nobody saw the missing seaman at the 'so-called place of accident. The Additional Commissioner held that there was no material for holding that the death of the seaman took place on account of an accident which arose out of his. employment. In our opinion the Additional Commissioner did not commit any error of law in reaching his finding and the High Court was not justified in reversing it. For these reasons we hold that this appeal must be allowed and the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated March 5, 1965 must set be aside. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (8) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppellant in that case contended that it was a case of recovery of an illegal tax and therefore a claim for its refund fell outside the provisions of Section 48 of the said Act. The respondent, on the other hand, contended there that the collection of tax was not without jurisdiction but only irregular and therefore the suit would be in respect of a matter purporting to be done under the Act. This Court held that where power existed to assess and recover a tax up to a particular limit the assessment or recovery of an amount in excess was wholly without jurisdiction. To such a case, the statute under which action was purported to be taken could afford no protection. On logic and principle the same reasoning applies to the provisions contained in Section 135 of the Indore Municipal Act, 1909 with the result that the suit in the present case is not within the mischief of Section 135 of the Indore Municipal Act. 13. For these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ngana region for the reason that before the extension of the parent Act to this area no tax similar to the one levied under the parent Act was payable in that area and that this exemption was granted under a different enactment. It is apparent that for these reasons the challenge under Art. 14 cannot succeed. The same is the position with regard to the tax payable by the appellants and that which the transporters having permits for inter-State routes have to pay. As has been pointed out in the affidavits filed on behalf of the State the laws in the two States, Madras and Andhra Pradesh are different and persons having primary permits from Madras are naturally governed by the laws operating in that State. No question of discrimination can arise when taxes are being imposed under two different sets of laws in different States or geographical areas. o p /o p The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. o p /o p R.K.P.S. Appeals dismissed. o p /o p
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1969 (8) TMI 87 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax where whole or any part of the turnover has escaped assessment is also the period of limitation for purposes of levying the penalty on such escaped assessment. In this view of the matter, the penalty proceedings for the assessment year 1957-58, which have been initiated on 12th May, 1964, are time-barred while in relation to the assessment year 1958-59, they are well within time. Therefore, the levy of penalty, in so far as the assessment year 1957-58 is concerned, is quashed. 5. IN view of the amendment brought in by Act 16 of 1963 with effect from 1st August, 1963, the other contention that the penalty leviable is only 1 1/2 times the tax assessed is not pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the result to the extent that we have set aside the penalty levied for the assessment year 1957-58, the writ petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed in part and in all other respects it is dismissed, but without costs. Government Pleader's fee ₹ 100.
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1969 (8) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ompletely defeated by taking certain collateral proceedings and obtaining a stay order as was done in the present case or by unduly delaying assessment proceedings beyond a period of three years. It is undoubtedly open to. the legislature or the rule making authority to make its intention quite clear that on the expiry of a specified period no final order of assessment can be made. Then taxing authorities would certainly be debarred from completing the assessment beyond the period prescribed as was the case in sub-s. (3) of s. 34 of the Income tax Act, 1922, but such is not the case here and we would hold that the assessment proceedings relating to the year 1962-63 were within time. The appeal is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court is set aside. The case shall g0 back to the High Court for disposal of such points as were previously not decided. In terms of the previous order dated April 3, 1969, the respondents shall be entitled to costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (8) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... xcept those which are purely religious. In the field of art and cinema also the adolescent is. shown situations which even a quarter of a century ago would be considered derogatory to public morality, but having regard to changed conditions are more taken for granted without in anyway tending to debase or debauch the mind. What we have to see is that whether a class, not an isolated case, into whose hands the book, article or story falls suffer in their moral outlook or become depraved by reading it or might have impure and lecherous thought aroused in their minds. The charge of obscenity must, therefore, be judged from this aspect. We do not think that any of the impugned passages which have been held by the High Court as offending s. 292 I.P.C. can be said to pervert the morals of the adolescent or be considered to be obscene. In this view, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and fine. The fine if paid is directed to be refunded. o p /o p Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1969 (8) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the locality. Similarly, in the second ground, he alongwith his associates prevented the police constables from discharging their lawful duties and thus affected everybody living in the locality. In ground No. 3, again the whole locality was in danger as the detenu and his associates were armed with deadly weapons and these were in fact used for indiscriminately endangering human lives in the locality. The object of the detenu seems to have been to terrorise the locality and bring the whole machinery of law and order to a halt. We are unable to say that the Commissioner of Police could not in view of these grounds come to the conclusion that the detenu was likely to. act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the future and it was necessary to prevent him from doing so. The fact that public order is affected by an act which was also an offence under the Indian Penal Code seems to us to be irrelevant. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed.
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1969 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The scheme of the Act is to abolish all Estates and vest the concerned property in the State but at the same time certain rights were conferred on persons in possession of lands or buildings. It is reasonable to think that the persons who were within the contemplation of the Act are those who were in possession of lands or buildings on the basis of some legal title. Bearing in mind the purpose with which the legislation was enacted, the scheme of the Act and the language used in s. 9, we are of opinion that the word "held" in s. 9 means "lawfully held". In other words we accept the correctness of the view taken by Mukerji and Dwivedi, JJ. For the reasons already mentioned we are unable to agree with Desai, C.J. that the fact that the appellants had demolished the buildings put up by the respondents and put up some other building in their place had conferred any rights on them under s. 9. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (8) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o reach them. The authority to do so must, therefore, have emanated from Parliament. The existing provision related to regulation of leases and matters connected therewith to be granted in future and not for alteration of the terms of leases which were in existence before Act 67 of 1957. For that special legislative provision was necessary. As no such parliamentary law had been passed the second sub-rule to Rule 20 was ineffective. It could not derive sustenance from the second Proviso to s. 10(2) of the Land Reforms Act since that proviso was not validly enacted. In the result, therefore, these appeals must succeed. They are allowed with costs. A mandamus shall issue restraining the State Government from enforcing the provisions of the second Proviso to s. 10(2) added by Bihar L, and Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Bihar Act 4 of 1965) and the second sub-rule of Rule 20 added by a notification on December 10, 1964 to the Bihar Mineral Concession Rules, 1964. Appeals allowed.
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1969 (8) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of that female are accorded the right of preemption. To reiterate, the right of preemption is accorded manifestly on the principle of consanguinity, the property of the female vendor ’being that of her husband, and there is no reason why the step-son should be excluded and the nephew of the husband included. From this alone it must be inferred that the Legislature had intended to include a step-son and consequently retrospective operation had to be given to the amending Act as such a construction appears to be in consonance ’and harmony with the purpose of the Act". The result, therefore, is that the respondent was entitled to. exercise, her right of preemption under paragraph First of cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 15 even before the amendment made in 1964. At any rate whatever doubts existed they were removed by the Amendment Act of 1964 which must be given retrospective operation. The appeal consequently fails and it is dismissed with coats. Appeal dismissed
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1969 (8) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... We accordingly reject the argument of the respondent that the rights of Dulichand were not heritable. It is also urged on behalf of the respondent that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred by the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 (Act no. 66 of 1950). This issue was decided against the respondent in the trial court and also in the first appellate court. The decision of the lower courts on this point was not challenged in the High Court and it is not permissible for the respondent to raise this question at this stage. For the reasons already given we hold that the judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated September 7, 1965 in Second Appeal no. 275 of 1962 should be set aside and the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Indore dated April 21, 1962 in First Appeal No. 26 of 1961 should be restored. This appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed
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1969 (8) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aizada and we do not find anything in the case to show that this error was tainted by any mala-fide motive on the part of the counsel for the litigant. In the circumstances we think that the High Court would have been justified in extending time under s. 5 of the Limitation Act and the reasoning of the High Court unfortunately started from a wrong angle. We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and remit the appeal for hearing and disposal according to law. The appellant will however pay all the costs of the respondent which have been incurred till today irrespective of the result. We may mention that there are two appeals pending before us. The other appeal is from the revisional order of the High Court and we think that there is no need to pronounce any decision in that appeal, because it becomes infructuous by reason of our decision in this appeal. As the appeal before. the High Court is an old one, we hope that the High Court will be able to give it priority.
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