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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 63 Records
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1970 (1) TMI 92 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it and also for pendent lite and future mesne profits till the date of delivery of possession to the plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge has given no finding as to the amount of mesne profits. That, however, will be done in proceedings for the preparation of a final decree for mesne profits. 24. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs, the decree of the learned Civil Judge is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff for possession of the properties in suit is decreed. The plaintiff is also granted a decree for mesne profits against defendant No. 2 for a period of three years preceding the date of suit and for pendent lite and future mesne profits. The decree for mesne profits, however, is only a preliminary decree. The amount of mesne profits payable to the plaintiff by defendant No. 2 shall be determined by the trial court and a final decree in respect of the amount due shall be passed in favour of the plaintiff against defendant No. 2 on payment of requisite court-fee.
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1970 (1) TMI 91 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... attributed to the plaintiff in the former suit in not impleading the present plaintiff; nor is it said that the present plaintiff had any special case of his own. The questions involved were pure questions of law and eminent Counsel have appeared for the parties. 42. In the result, however looked at, whether as a case of representation of the office of trusteeship by the parties on record in the earlier case, or as a case of representation of the estate in which the plaintiff is interested, by the persons actually brought on record as legal representatives, either way, the decision on appeal in the former suit which has become final would bind the plaintiff and bar him from re-agitating the issues. 43. It follows that both on the merits and on the principle of res judicata the plaintiff's claim has to fail. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Nagapattinam are therefore set aside. The suit shall stand dismissed with costs. The appeal is allowed with costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 90 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the present suit is concerned, there is no impediment, therefore, to the plaintiff being granted the reliefs asked for. 18. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. First respondent's advocate's fee ₹ 250 to be drawn out of the amount to the credit of the suit in the lower court. 19. The appellant claims to have paid a substantial consideration for the property. But unfortunately the sale to him has been set aside on the ground that it was trust property. The present prayer of the appellant is that on equitable considerations the property might be leased out to him by the trust on reasonable terms as to rent and so on. This is a matter, however, for the authorities of the Hindu Religious and charitable Endowments to consider. The appellant-petitioner herein may move the Board who may consider his request sympathetically, in view of the special circumstances mentioned above and the observations in the judgment. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hospital, the hospital is run. Treatment is thus a part of research and training. In these circumstances, the Tuberculosis Hospital cannot be described as an industry. The order of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi on the preliminary point must be reversed. The reference to the Tribunal under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act was incompetent. The appeal is allowed but we make no order about costs. C.A. No. 1777 of 1969. 33. The objects of the Kurji Holy Family Hospital are entirely charitable. It carries on work of training, research and treatment. Its income is mostly from donations and distribution of surplus as profit is prohibited. It is, therefore, clear that it is not an industry as laid down in the Act. The reference made by the State Government, Bihar was thus incompetent. The appeal will be allowed. There will be no order about costs, except in the first case (C.A. 1705 of 1967) in which the earlier order of this Court shall be given effect to.
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1970 (1) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... all material times. 9. learned Counsel for the respondent could not point to anything by which the amending Act could be called in question. It was conceded that it was within the competence of Parliament to create the fictions it has created in the original Act XX of 1957 and again by the amending Act XXIII of 1969. learned Counsel, however, said that we must take a humane view of the position of a person like the respondent who would lose his all by the acquisition and that too through legislation which makes the provisions fictional rather than real. As to the first part we can only say that if the law allows it, the court must award it and as to the second part we say that this kind of legislation by making obligatory notifications fictional does not accord with our sense of propriety but we cannot say anything against it since Parliament undoubtedly possesses the power to make such fictions. 10. In the result the appeal must be allowed, but we make no order about costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 87 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eal and court-fee has to be paid on each of the counts. 16. In A. S. No. 414 of 1964 the further question is whether the order of the Court below is wrong. In our view it is not. The learned Subordinate Judge rightly held that the award of interest was accidentally omitted in the decree and that such a decree has to be corrected. The use of the word 'etc' is not without significance. There has been an omission which has been relieved by the lower court exercising jurisdiction under Section 152, C.P.C. This is not a case where Section 34, C.P.C. applies. We are inclined to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge. As interest is part of compensation, it cannot be rightly whittled down on technical grounds. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 17. In the view expressed by us in the main appeal, no further orders are necessary in A. S. No. 203 of 1964, which has been heard by us in Court with the appeal for convenience. 18. Order accordinglyhfs12
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1970 (1) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR
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... ... ..... from the possession of the judgment-debtor, although it is recited in the sale transaction between the judgment-debtor and the objector that the possession of the attached house was given on 11-1-1965 which is a date prior to the date of the attachment. In the circumstances in which the sale transaction was alleged to have taken place, it would be difficult for the executing Court to go into the question of title in this summary investigation. The possession of the judgment-debtor therefore should be treated in the circumstances of our case to be a possession on the judgment-debtor's own account. There is nothing on record to show that he was holding possession either on account of the said objector or in trust for the objector. In this view of the matter, therefore, I will have to allow this application and set aside the order passed by the trial Court. 12. I, therefore, allow this application with costs and set aside the order of the trial Court. 13. Revision allowed.
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1970 (1) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vil Procedure, the application for review must be heard and disposed of by the remaining Judge sitting alone Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112. But Order 47, Rule 5 does not proprio vigore apply to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, to which the principles underlying some of the provisions of the Code have been applied by analogy. That being so, the provisions of Order 47, Rule 5 cannot be invoked in derogation of Rules 3 and 4 of this Court. It is obvious that, in this case, the order as such is not covered by Order 47, Rule 5. That being so, the application for review must be heard by a Bench of two Judges as provided by Rule 3, Even if the matter is regarded as one to which Rule 3 does not apply, it must still be heard by a Bench of two Judges as provided by Rule 4, more particularly for the reason that my Lord the Chief Justice has so directed and constituted this Bench. The case will now be posted in the usual course for hearing the parties on merits.
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1970 (1) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... law operates unequally by reason either of classification or its absence, such a provision would be hit by the equality clause of Article 14. see East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh. 1963 1SCR404 Even amongst the selected plantations inequality as a result of uniformity of tax must result because it is possible that the user of the land for one specified purpose may give a better and a more valuable yield than the user of another land though situated in the same area for another specified purpose. This, in our view, has happened in so far as the tax on tea plantations, with which only we are concerned in these petitions, is concerned, and therefore, to the extent that Act XVII of 1960, as amended by Act XIX of 1967, imposes the tax on holders of tea plantations, it is violative of Article 14 and is therefore, void. 41. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the petitions are dismissed with costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 83 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the incorporation of the Corporations and other matters relating to them fall within the ambit of entry No. 43. Therefore, the constitution of the Societies and their working would have fallen within the ambit of entry No. 43 but for the fact that Co-operative Societies are excluded from its purview. The very fact that in entry No. 43, Corporations engaged in the business of banking are specifically mentioned, it clearly follows that Co-operative Societies doing that business were taken out of entry No. 43. List I, and deliberately put in entry No. 32, List II. In view of the clear wording of the two entries, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the State Legislature has no jurisdiction to regulate the functioning of the Co-operative Societies engaged in the business of Banking. 14. For the reasons recorded above, these petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. S.S. Sandhawalia, J. 15. I agree.
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1970 (1) TMI 82 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cision for the reasons which we have given earlier. 16. In Chagnti Raghava Reddy v. State of Andhra , it was contended that as the assessments were according to the best judgment not being on merits it was in the nature of penalty arising out of the misdeeds of the father and consequently the sons were not liable to such debt of the father. This contention was negatived. Though there is no discussion on this question the conclusion is in accordance with the view which we have expressed above. 17. For all the reasons above stated we are of the opinion that Gopalkrishnan Nair, J., was right in holding that the arrears of income-tax due by the petitioner's father in respect of separate business prior to partition between him and his son can be recovered form the son after the partition under the doctrine of pious obligation. 18. No other question has been argued before us. 19. The writ appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250/-. 20. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s objection was not raised before the High Court either in the Court of First Instance or before the Division Bench. But the objection was prominently mentioned in the petition and there is no reply to it. We are unable to hold that because the High Court has not considered the question, the respondent will not be allowed to rely upon this contention in support of the order. If the plea raised by the respondent in his petition is true, and we see no reason to hold that it is not, the order challenged by him is plainly illegal and is liable to be set aside. 7. We express no opinion on the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court on the two questions decided by them, nor on the question that the action of the Divisional Forest Officer was mala fide. If hereafter any order is passed by the Forest Authorities, the validity of the order will be determined uninfluenced by the findings recorded by the High Court in appeal. 8. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w operates unequally by reason either of classification or its absence, such a provision would be hit by the equality clause of Art. 14. (see East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh.((1) 1963 1.S.C.R. 404) Even amongst the selected plantations inequality as a result of uniformity of tax must result because it is possible that the user of the land for one specified purpose may give a better and a more valuable yield than the user of another land though situated in the same area for another specified purpose. This, in our view, has happened in so far as the tax on tea plantations, with which only we are concerned in these petitions, is concerned, and therefore, to the extent that Act XVII of 1960, as amended by Act XIX of 1967, imposes the tax on holders of tea plantations, it is violative of Art. 14 and is, therefore, void. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the petitions are dismissed with costs.
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1970 (1) TMI 79 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ufacture of goods, there was reasonable excuse for the assessee to use the goods for retreading. Penalty under section 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. is attracted if, after purchasing any goods for any of the purposes specified in clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 8, the assessee fails without any reasonable excuse to make use of the goods for any such purpose. In the view of the Tribunal the fact that during the previous years the department had considered retreading as amounting to manufacture was a reasonable excuse. That view of the Tribunal, in our opinion, was right and cannot be considered as erroneous. Therefore, we hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal s view that the assessee had reasonable excuse for failure to use the goods for the purpose for which they were bought, is correct in law. In the result, the sales tax revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 7, which was the subject-matter of the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. There was no issue, in the second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, as regards the turnover of Rs. 2,32,456.22, because by then the assessee gave up his rights to agitate about the propriety of the inclusion of such a turnover. He cannot, therefore, complain against the treatment given to the subject-matter in the case by the Appellate Tribunal when such a treatment was the result of his own conduct. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Ramachandran that the parenthesis as it may think fit would also include a case of the kind under consideration. The phrase must be understood ejusdem generis and the Tribunal could pass only such further orders as would be necessary and which touch upon the matters in issue in the appeal before them. They cannot traverse beyond it and this the Tribunal did. The order of the Tribunal is right and the tax case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t by the Tribunal are without any basis whatsoever. The tax case is rejected. TAX CASE No. 402 OF 1969. The same assessee is concerned in this tax case, and the year of assessment is 1963-64. In this case also the best judgment assessment was made by the revenue and the Tribunal considerably reduced the quantum by adopting another yardstick of estimation. This, again, is a case where the account books of the assessee were rejected because on the date when the mills were inspected, there was a suppression of over one lakh of rupees on one single day. The revenue rightly, therefore, assessed the assessee in its best judgment. They, however, estimated the turnover and added 50 per cent. to the book turnover, as returned by the assessee. The Tribunal reduced it and added only 25 per cent. of the same and thus brought the totality as the assessable turnover. No question of law arises and in addition the finding of fact is justified. The tax case is dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mes payable only after a notice of demand is served. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Ghasilal 1965 16 S.T.C. 318 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1454. That was a case under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. There the Supreme Court held that no penalty could be charged under section 16(1)(b) of that Act unless the tax was ascertained by the assessing authority under section 10 or by the assessee under section 7(2) because until then no tax could be said to be due within the meaning of section 16(1)(b) even though there might be a liability to be assessed to tax. We have not been able to understand as to how this case helps the learned counsel for the department. For the reasons stated above, this petition must succeed and the same is allowed. The proceedings for the recovery of interest from the petitioner under the certificate of recovery dated 29th January, 1968, are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
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1970 (1) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation Act by force of the statute itself and cannot be available to tribunals when the period of limitation prescribed has no reference to the Limitation Act and is to be computed entirely with reference to and within the four corners of the provisions of the statute which creates the tribunal. In the result I answer the question referred to us in the negative. As no one has appeared for the respondent-assessee no order is made as to costs. The counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. By the Court In accordance with the majority opinion our answer to the question as reframed by us is that the time spent in prosecuting the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeals in default can be excluded from computing the period of limitation for filing the revision by the application of the principle underlying section 14(2), Limitation Act. As the respondent has not appeared there is no order as to costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (1) TMI 74 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from the total turnover. Therefore it cannot be said that the principal would be assessed to tax with regard to the turnover for which the agent was assessed. Though the liability of the principal is also there, with regard to the tax to which the agent was assessed, it cannot at the same time be said that he was also assessed to tax for the same turnover for the purpose of claiming refund in his own assessment proceedings. Accordingly, we hold that the principal is not entitled to refund of any tax that might have been paid by his commission agents more so when the assessments made against the commission agents have become final and the claim for refund by them is barred by time. Under these circumstances we hold that the assessee in the present tax revision cases, who is a principal, cannot claim refund of the tax paid by his commission agents. Accordingly all the tax revision cases fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (1) TMI 73 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unity to explain the omission to disclose the turnover or to furnish correctly any particulars and shall make such inquiry as he considers necessary. The assessee was given an opportunity to explain the omission to disclose the information and necessary inquiry was held in that behalf. It was open to the assessee to show that he had not failed to disclose any information and that there was no suppression of any turnover. All that has to be seen is whether he had a reasonable opportunity to show that there was no omission or suppression and not whether a notice should have been given even before he was assessed to tax on the escaped turnover. Since there has been no violation of the requirements of sub-section (4B) of section 14, we see no reason to interfere with the order imposing penalty. We, therefore, find no merits in these two revision cases and they are accordingly dismissed with costs in one case. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 (Rupees two hundred only). Petitions dismissed.
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