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Showing 1 to 20 of 75 Records
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1970 (12) TMI 99 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... led to discharge his duty to take stock of the entire material on record and came to a conclusion which is not supportable on the evidence on record. The bar under section 100. Civil Procedure Code, would not apply to such a case. 23. This is one of the instances where, taking of advantage of the helpless condition of the minor child who became an orphan, the near relations -- the defendants 1 5--have colluded together to eat up her property under the false pretext of sale for legal necessity. The purchaser is no other than a father's brother's son who was aware of the entire situation. The sale cannot be said to be at all binding on the plaintiff. 24. I would accordingly reverse the decree of the courts below and direct that the plaintiff's suit be decreed. The plaintiff shall be entitled to a declaration that the sales under Exts. C, B and A do not bind her interest. She would be entitled to the other reliefs prayed for. She shall also have her costs throughout.
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1970 (12) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , 1968, and the incident occurred on January 22, 1965. A person can surely improve within three years. 17. We are inclined to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Magistrate. We hold that the appellant has discharged the burden. There is no reason why the evidence of Shyam Lal, D.W. 1, and Than Singh, D.W. 2, should not be believed. It is true that they are relations of the appellant, but it is the relations who are likely to remain in intimate contact. The behavior of the appellant on the day of occurrence, failure of the police to lead evidence as to his condition when the appellant was in custody, and the medical evidence indicate that the appellant was insane within the meaning of Section 84, I.P.C. 18. We accordingly allow the appeal and acquit the appellant of the offence under Section 435, I.P.C, because at the time of the incident he was a person of unsound mind within the meaning Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. His bail bond shall stand cancelled.
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1970 (12) TMI 97 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of sale, the defendant No. 1 is directed to value the said properties as a whole and also in convenient lots by a valuer of repute and advertise the properties for sale in newspapers, and at its discretion through other mediums as well. The defendant No. 1 is also directed to engage the services of an estate agent or estate agents of repute. 168. The defendant No. 1 is further directed to give all relevant information with regard to valuation, advertisements, and steps taken by it for sale of the said properties to the plaintiffs' solicitors, at their request. After sale of the said properties, the defendant No. 1 is directed to dispose of the proceeds of the said properties, including the proceeds of sale in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement dated December 13, 1930. The defendant No. 1 will pay the plaintiffs their costs of and incidental to the suit. The defendant No. 2 will pay and bear its own costs. Certified for two counsel. Liberty to apply.
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1970 (12) TMI 96 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner should seek the relief of refund of ₹ 8965.23 paise by instituting a suit. We are clearly of the opinion that the said amount is being withheld from the petitioner without any authority of law. We are further of the view that as the writ petition was filed within three years of the date when the mistake became known to the petitioner, there is no ground for refusing relief to it. In the result, we quash that part of the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, made on 30-10-1965, whereby he rejected the claim of the petitioner to concessional rate being charged for the sales of ₹ 96959/- and assessed the tax on these sales at the rate of 10%. We also direct the respondents to refund that amount of tax to the petitioner which was deposited by it in pursuance of the aforesaid direction in excess of the concessional rate of 2%. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1970 (12) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ingly on the facts of this case we are of the opinion that the trial was not vitiated because the accused persons were denied identification. 23. Regarding the second point, we have already extracted the evidence of the doctor, and it is quite clear to us that the evidence is not in conflict with the prosecution case. If the occurrence took place at about 7.30 a.m. and the deceased had not taken any food in the morning, his stomach would still be empty at 7.30 a.m. If anything the medical evidence destroys the case of the defence that the murder took place at about 3 in the morning. We are unable to think that the deceased would leave with Prem Narain at 3 a.m. to catch a bus which was supposed to leave at about 7 a.m. 24. This appeal is by special leave and this Court does not re-appreciate the evidence. The other points raised by the learned Counsel are of that nature, and at any rate there is no substance in those points. 25. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1970 (12) TMI 94 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th judicial discretion, and it is of the essence of such discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions without either being appealable. It is only when the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong that an appellate body is entitled to interfere." In the instant case. I am of opinion that the discretion exercised by the lower Appellate Court is plainly wrong and as such I am justified to interfere even with the discretionary order passed by the Court of Appeal below. Accordingly, I hold that the learned Additional District Judge has failed to exercise his discretion judicially; thereby acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction and his order must be set aside. 13. In the result, this Rule is made absolute. The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge is set aside. There will be no order for costs.
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1970 (12) TMI 93 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... obability of a recurrence (when, in other words, if does not imply any law from which its recurrence can be inferred) does not prevent that phenomenon from being an act of God. It must, however, be something overwhelming and not merely an ordinary accidental circumstance, and it must not arise from the act of man." I see nothing in the decision in Chidambarakrishna lyer Nataraja lyer v. South Indian Rly. Co. (21 TLJ 1) to which my attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the defendant to warrant the view that even when the accidents are purely the result of acts of human agency, it should be taken to be acts of God. 16. The criminal activities of the unruly mob which robbed the goods transported in the defendant's lorry can-not certainly be an act of God so as to absolve the defendant from the rule of absolute liability as a common carrier. Hence the defendant will be answerable for the loss of the goods. In the result, I dismiss the second appeal with costs.
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1970 (12) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... manent post to another permanent post, he is entitled to a lien in respect of that another post to which he is permanently posted as a result of the transfer. This is the effect of Rule 2007. That being so, the appellant could not possibly contend that the transfers of respondents 4 to 8 to the Stores Department were contrary to the Fundamental Rules or that the transfer of their liens from the posts to which they were posted in 1947 to the posts in the Stores Department was in any manner contrary to the rules. 13. The other point raised by the appellant was also without substance as he failed to show before the High Court that these transfers were made without there being vacancies in the respective posts to which respondents 4 to 8 were transferred. That being the position, the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's writ petition. 14. The appeal must consequently fail and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (12) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fter the date on which the Government was required to refer the case to the Advisory Board. This Court has taken the view in Durga Show and Others v. The State of West Bengal, 1970 (3) SCC 696.) that a delay of 16 days in disposing of a representation submitted by a detenu of the Government is a long delay where a person is detained without a trial under a special law relating to Preventive Detention, and unless there is satisfactory explanation forthcoming explaining the delay, that by itself would be a sufficient ground for releasing the detenu. In this case the State of Maharashtra sent an intimation rejecting the representation one month 12 days after the petitioner was taken in custody, and 27 days after the representation was received. Again the representation was rejected after the expiry of the period for making a reference to the Advisory Board. Following the judgment in Durga Show's case (supra) referred to above we direct that the detenu be released forthwith.
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1970 (12) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... together vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations current findings against the respondent on that point. The resupplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the trial judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit. A faint attempt was made by the learned counsel for the respondent to assail the decision of the trial court on issue No. 1 Both the single Judge and the Division Bench had given concurrent finding against the respondent on that point. The respondent cannot be permitted to reagitate the matter before us. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Division Bench and restore that of the trial, court. The appellant will further be granted a declaration that he is entitled to the salary and allowances for the period subsequent to the date of the decree of the learned Single Judge of the High Court to the date of his superannuation. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this, Court. Appeal allowed
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1970 (12) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l Company Ltd. I.L.R. 39 Cal. 284.. The decision of the Madras High Court in Obai Gounden v. Ramalinga Ayyar I.L.R. 22 Mad. 217 taking a contrary view has not been followed by the High Courts in India and the consistent view that has been taken is that registration ,of an agreement is necessary which reduces the rent of an existing registered lease See Mulla on Indian Registration Act, 7th Edn. pp. 75-76. The other contentions faintly raised before us arising. out of issue No. 3 and that Exh. A-4 had been acted upon do not survive in view of the conclusions arrived at by the High Court and the view that we have taken about the admissibility of the aforesaid document. The Civil Miscellaneous Petitions which were filed in this Court shall stand dismissed as, in our opinion, no ground has been made out for admitting additional evidence or for impleading the Oriental Coal Co. Ltd. as a party respondent here. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. G.C. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (12) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mentary proof to establish that the entire land was Nehri, the petitioners can place it before the authorities concerned in order to get their account corrected. As matters stand at present which indicate that all possible efforts were made to obtain the information from Pakistan, I find no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order. The petition is devoid of force and is here by rejected. 15. We consider this order to be fair and reasonable. There is no doubt that it is still open to the Appellants to avail of the opportunity afforded to them to procure and produce such material from which it can be established that the entries in the Fard Taqsim and Khasra Girdawari are not correct or that the lands owned by the Appellants' father were canal lands entitling the Appellants to an allotment of 49.2 standard acres. Till then no exception can be taken to the orders passed by the concerned authorities. The appeal there fore fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1970 (12) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... se is not a legal right to property. There is no fundamental right to privy purse. There is no fundamental right to Rulership.- A series of decisions of this Court have held that Article 363 is a bar to rights and privileges, recognition of Rulership from being agitated in courts. These decisions have spoken the words of the Constitution. The petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the petitions are allowed and writs will issue declaring that the orders made by the President on September 6, 1970 challenged here, were illegal and on that account inoperative and the, petitioners will be entitled to all their pre-existing rights and privileges including right to privy purses, as if the orders have not been made. The petitioners will get their costs of the petitions. One hearing fee in those petitions in which the petitioners have appeared' through the, same counsel. K.B.N.
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1970 (12) TMI 86 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has contended that the assessment orders have been made in violation of the rules of natural justice and therefore they are liable to be quashed. From the facts stated, it is clear that the respondent has denied the opportunity to the petitioner to urge his objections to the proposed assessments. The withholding of the account books, documents and other papers relating to the three assessment years and at the same time asking the petitioner to show cause against the proposed assessments, in our opinion, amounted to denial of reasonable opportunity. The withholding of the account books, etc., was wholly unjustified. In the result, these writ petitions succeed and the impugned assessment orders dated 30th June, 1969, and the proceedings are hereby quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs in these writ petitions. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. The respondent is at liberty to make fresh assessment orders after returning the account books and other documents. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 85 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er 1970 25 S.T.C. 489. In our opinion, the decision in that case is clearly distinguishable. The question raised there was whether in the absence of an offence created by the relavant provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, it was permissible to proceed against a dealer in respect of an offence mentioned in the State Sales Tax Act. The learned judges proceeded on the view that the creation of an offence was a substantive matter and held that since section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act did not incorporate by reference any substantive provision of the State Act, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that the provision in section 15-A(5) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is not a substantive provision in that sense at all. The question referred is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (12) TMI 84 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r components of motor vehicles. Therefore, the amendment might have been made only to clarify the position. In the decision Kikabhoy Chandabhoy v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay 1949 17 I.T.R. 523 A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 6., it was held that it is not necessary to hold that in every case where the Legislature amends the law it does so because, but for the amendment the effect would have been something different. The Legislature may add or delete the words in order to clarify the position. We respectfully agree with that view expressed by the Bombay High Court. As we have already held above, bodies of motor vehicles would certainly come under parts or components of motor vehicles. If that is so, the transactions in question will attract sales tax at the rate of 7 per cent. Thus, on both the points, the petitioner fails. No other point has been argued before us. Accordingly the three tax revision cases are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (12) TMI 83 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t from that angle, the terms to which we have made a reference above as found in the contract in the present case would be inconsistent with a contract of sale. From the foregoing discussion, it would be clear that in our opinion, the contract in the present case is a contract for work, pure and simple, or at any rate a composite and indivisible contract for work and labour which also incidentally involved supply of materials and that it cannot be separated into two distinct contracts of work and supply of material. In the result, our answer to the question referred to this court for our opinion is that the transaction envisaged by the contract entered into by the assessee with the Public Works Department of the Government of Gujarat dated 6th September, 1965, for manufacture and supply of bricks is a works contract and not a contract of sale of bricks. The opponent Commissioner of Sales Tax will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (12) TMI 82 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to take action by himself to collect the deficit stamp duty and penalty or for that purpose impound the documents and send them to the Collector. It is not doubted that the Commercial Tax Officer had already completed the assessments in question in the proceedings relating to which the documents were filed even by the time action was taken by the 3rd respondent and requested the 1st and 2nd respondents to collect the stamp duty and penalty, if necessary, by resorting to proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act. Also, it is not the case of the respondents either, that at that time even any appeals were pending before the 2nd respondent against the assessment orders passed by the 1st respondent. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and a writ of prohibition will issue forbidding the respondents from recovering from the petitioners the stamp duty and penalty on the documents in question. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in this writ petition. Petition allowed.
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1970 (12) TMI 81 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions of law raised in the appeals, we do not think it proper to make any observation in that behalf or decide them here. It is open to the petitioner to raise these and other grounds available to it before the Appellate Tribunal and we have no reason to suppose that the Appellate Tribunal would not consider them and dispose them of in accordance with law. Since this court had already granted stay during the pendency of these writ petitions, and it is more than two years that the appeals are pending before the Tribunal, in the circumstances of the case, we consider it reasonable that the Tribunal should dispose of the appeals expeditiously without insisting on the payment of the tax. This observation is made because of the averments made in paragraph 21 of the affidavit filed along with the writ petition, in W.P. No. 2883 of 1968. Subject to the abovesaid observations, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 for both the cases. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (12) TMI 80 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ound. There is no authority under the Act to demand from an assessee any amount in excess of the tax assessed. If an assessee collects any amount in excess of the actual tax, the assessing authority cannot demand such excess amount. The assessing authority can only demand the tax that is actually assessed on the turnover of the assessee. Therefore it is clear that the assessment orders and the demand notices for recovery of amounts in excess of the tax assessed are clearly illegal and without jurisdiction. The second ground that the petitioners are entitled to exemption under section 10 of the Amendment Act is a ground which the assessees can urge in the remedies provided under the Act. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned assessment orders and the demand notices are quashed. The respondent is at liberty to make fresh assessment orders in accordance with law. The petitioners are entitled to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 one set. Petitions allowed.
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