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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 142 Records
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1970 (3) TMI 182 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acted upon in the same suit or proceeding, though it shall also have to be impounded under Section 33 and sent to the Collector for further action. Whether an instrument has or has not been admitted in evidence shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In so far as this Bench entertaining fresh petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is concerned, an affidavit shall be deemed to have been admitted in evidence as soon as It is made the basis of an order. 18. Whether an instrument chargeable with duty is or is not duly stamped shall, inter alia, depend upon three factors, firstly, whether the prescribed stamp duty has been paid, secondly, whether impressed stamp , and not adhesive stamp , in excess of the prescribed limits, has been used and the document has been written in the manner laid down in Section 13 of the Stamp Act, and thirdly, whether the instrument was so stamped before or at the time of execution vide Section 17 of the Stamp Act.
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1970 (3) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e been adopted very soon after his birth. That is the best that can be said on the basis of the evidence. That apart custom differs from place to place and from community to community. It is true that in a decree made in 1910, Shyam Behari Lal was described as the son of Ram Das. But in the very next year in another decree, he was described as the son of Gopal Das. We do not think that the evidence afforded by that solitary document showing Shyam Behari Lal as the son of Ram Das can outweigh the other evidence which is both satisfactory as well as voluminous. 25. On an appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are in agreement with the High Court's conclusion that Shyam Behari Lal was the adopted son of Gopal Das and there is nothing to show that the said adoption was invalid for any reason. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions raised in the appeal. 26. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ck his private vengeance, it could not be possibly in furtherance of the common intention for which others can be liable. But if on the other hand he killed B bona fide believing that he was A and the common intention was to kill A the killing, of B was in furtherance of the common intention. All the three accused in the present case were lying in wait and assaulted the driver of the first cart and stabbed him in pursuance of their prearranged plan. Therefore, all the three accused including the appellant must share the liability of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Further, in view of the finding that the pre-concerted plan was to cause injuries to the intended victim with dangerous weapons with which the assailants were lying in wait, the liability of the appellant is established. 16. The conclusion of Mehta, J. is correct. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The accused must surrender to the bail and serve out the sentences.
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1970 (3) TMI 179 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch conference took place, are mentioned. It would be impossible for anybody to make a representation against such grounds. These grounds, on the authorities of this Court, too numerous to be cited here, must be held to be vague. Therefore on both the twin grounds, namely, that he was deprived of his right to make a representation and also because the grounds in themselves were very vague, we must hold that there was no compliance with the law as laid down in the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act. The result, therefore, is that the detention must be declared to be unlawful and Chaju must be declared to be entitled to his liberty. He is ordered to be released. The detenu was questioned by us and he expressed a desire that he may not be released in Delhi, because he has no means of going back. He asked to be released in Jammu. We direct therefore that he shall be taken back to the place where he was in detention in Jammu and released within the shortest possible time.
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1970 (3) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o applied for revision and his application was rejected. He applied for special leave against that order but leave was refused by this Court. It was argued that that must conclude the matter. We do not agree. Bhimappa's statutory right to move the High Court could not be lost by reason of the revision. The result of the revision, therefore, had no bearing upon" the matter. 20. Bhimappa was thus entitled to have a hearing of his petition for special leave under Section 417(3) of the Code. Whether he could ask for leave against Malappa alone or against the other two because the charge under Section 120B I.P.C. was framed against all the three respondents on his complaint is a point which we do not decide because it will be for the High Court to consider the matter when his petition is considered and only if it is allowed. 21. We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and remit the case for consideration of the petition under Section 417(3) filed by Bhimappa.
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1970 (3) TMI 177 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rivastava and Ors. 1970 3SCR266 , and while negativing the argument it was observed that Whether a duty arises in a particular case to issue a show cause notice before inflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority's satisfaction that the person to be penalised has no defence but on the nature of the order proposed to be passed, xx xx xx. The learned Counsel urges that this would be casting heavy burden on the Board. Principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome but this price a small price indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law. In view of this position, the second submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents must also fail. 22. We, therefore, allow the petition and make the rule absolute by issuing a writ of certiorari quashing and setting aside the order dated October 13, 1969, passed by the first respondent under Section 258 of the Act. The respondents will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioners.
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1970 (3) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s clear from the record that the Court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the Court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity. 7. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the decisions of this Court in Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass 1969 2 SCR 432 and Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1966, D/- 3-12-1968 (SC). In the former case the decree under execution was made on the basis of an award and in the latter case, it was passed on a compromise. In both the cases this Court held that as the decrees in question were passed in contravention of Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act, they were void and hence no execution can be levied on the basis of those decrees. 8. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no Order as to costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 175 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, must be quashed as being without jurisdiction, in the facts of the case before us. 40. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and the order of the Court below is modified as follows 41. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing only that part of the impugned order of the Additional Collector which imposed a personal penalty of ₹ 35,000 upon the Respondent and a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Appellants to refund to the Respondent the sum of ₹ 35,000/-, within a period of two months from this date. In view of the divided success, we make no order as to costs. 42. In view of the above decision the amount of ₹ 2,00,000 out of ₹ 2,35,000 which is lying deposited with the Registrar, Original Side, in pursuance of the Court's order at the time of interim injunction dated 31-3-1969 and 1-4-69 be now refunded to the appellants on their making a proper application in that behalf. Ajay K. Basu, J. 43. I agree.
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1970 (3) TMI 174 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ditional financial burden which a revision of the wage-structure or dearness allowance would impose upon an employer, and his ability to bear such burden, are very material and relevant factors to be taken into account. 17. In view of the said principles, and in the face of what is admitted, namely, that the workmen of the S. S. Light Railway have been paid more dearness allowance than what had been ordered by the impugned award; clearly no case is made out for quashing the said award. Since it is seen that once of the Industrial Tribunal adjudicating on a dispute the said term regarding a condition of the service any vital change in the financial position of the management could be set up only by asking for yet another adjudication on the basis of such altered circumstances employers to pay. Nothing has been warrant any interference with the impugned award. 18. This petition, Therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 200. 19. Petition dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 173 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er Section 4(3), read with Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, can be sentenced to undergo imprisonment which may extend to two years. The nature of charge in the criminal case against Chaman Lal was of a contravention alleged to have been personally committed by him and the object of spending money on his defense in that case was to save him from being sent to jail. It cannot consequently 'be said that the expenditure of ₹ 6,000.00 was wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessed-firm. The fact that the acquittal of Chaman Lal was important for the reputation of the assessed-firm would not detract from the above conclusion. We, Therefore, are of the view that the expenditure of ₹ 6,000.00 is not a permissible allowance under Section 10(2) (xv) of the Act. The question referred to this Court is consequently answered in the negative. Looking to all the facts, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of the reference.
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1970 (3) TMI 172 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mbined with a notice under S. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, has to be served on the tenant personally? 1. The answer is in the negative. Even a notice of demand deemed or presumed to have been served on a tenant will be "service upon him of notice of demand". 2. Whether it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him? 2. The answer is in the negative. 3. Whether in the circumstances of the present case the Courts below were right in raising the presumtion under S. 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of the land lord? 3. The answer is In the affirmative. The presumption regarding service of such notice has also to oe made Under S, 27, General Clauses Act. 35. Let the papers of this appeal be now laid before the learned single Judge for the decision of the appeal. R.B. Mishra, J. 36. I agree. H.N. Seth, J. 37. I agree.
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1970 (3) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g acquitted the appellant could not be convicted with the aid of Section 34. In aid of that contention reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Prabhakar Navale v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 51 and Krishna G. Patil v. State of Maharashtra 1964 1SCR678 . Another contention raised in the appeal was that it would be an error to hold that there was intimacy between the appellant and Nilava wife of Babanna on the evidence of third parties when neither Babanna or Nilava gave evidence. We have only referred to two contentions amongst several others to illustrate both arguable and substantial matters of law and of fact. In the present case the High Court dismissed the appeal by a single word and it is not possible to know the reasons which persuaded the High Court to dismiss the appeal. 13. In the result the appeal is allowed. The order of dismissal of the appeal is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court for fresh consideration on hearing the parties.
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1970 (3) TMI 170 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Central Government to appoint directors and the other to stay operation of any action taken detrimental to public limited companies. Such powers are powers of supervision and are in no way comparable to the powers of control and management given to the Central Government under Chapter III-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. We are unable to accept this contention. 52. In the result, we hold that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs which it has granted and in any case that relief cannot be granted all to the respondents workers in either of the two cases before us because both the petitioner companies were exempt under the provisions of Section 32, Clause (iv) from the provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act. We set aside the orders of the Payment of Wages Authority in both the cases. The applications of the workmen in both the cases shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 53. Applications dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 169 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of fact, Alagiriswami, J., in Raso Moopanar v. Ramamurthi Iyer (1967) 1 M.L.J. 287, is of the view that the power of a civil Court to order restitution is not wholly governed by Section 144 Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judge proceeded on the basis that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting the same. The learned Chief Justice in Maylisami Gounder v. Mummoorthi Chettiar C.R.P. No. 439 of 1967, observed It may be unfortunate that notwithstanding the reversal of the eviction order the tenant is unable to get restoration. But, it is for the Legislature to provide for the situation. 4. It is, therefore, clear that in the absence of an express provision or a provision by necessary intendment which would enable a civil Court to direct re-delivery, the civil Court does not possess such power. The order of the Court below is, therefore, wrong and the same is set aside. The civil revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ince of Delhi, then in Part C State of Delhi and now it functions in the Union territory of Delhi. 29. It is no doubt true that the words are susceptible of the other meaning also but so long as the words are capable of bearing the meaning we have given it is not necessary to discover another meaning under which the whole scheme would become void. Provisions of law must be read as far as is possible with a view to their validity and not to render them invalid. In our judgment the expression 'belonging to' only conveys the meaning that it is a police force constituted and functioning in one area which may be authorised to function in another area. The change from 'for' to 'in' makes no difference because both expressions fit in with the meaning of the phrase 'belonging to' in the Entry. We see no force in this argument also. 30. The result is that the appeal is devoid of force. It fails and will be dismissed. There will be no order about costs.
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1970 (3) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s in the case joined the transferees from Vernon Seth Chotia but made no attempt to join Vernon Seth Chotia, the son of the original mortgagor. The suit could be only properly framed with all the parties before the Court. In our opinion, even if Vernon Seth Chotia was not a necessary party, he was at least a proper party. ,If he had been brought before the court, we would have known from him whether he had given the authority to execute the document and he could have adopted the act of Sardar Chawla by ratifying it again. The suit was not properly framed. For all these reasons, the appeal has no merits and it fails and will be dismissed with costs. We are surprised to note that the learned Judge in the High Court did not award costs. Normally costs should follow the event and it is not the rule that costs should be left to be borne to the parties. Here a case was decided against one of the parties in a contentious matter, and costs should have been awarded. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the ground that the decree is a nullity. But, in our judgment, for the purpose of determining whether the Court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to try the suit, it is necessary to determine facts on the decision of which the question depends', and the objection does not appear on the face of the record, the executing Court cannot enter upon and enquiry into those facts. In the view of the High Court since the land leased was at the date of the lease used for agricultural purposes and that it so appeared on investigation of the terms of the lease and other relevant evidence, it was open to the Court to hold that the decree was without jurisdiction and on that account a nullity. The view taken by the High Court, in our judgment, cannot be sustained. The appeal is 'Allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. The order of the Court of Small Causes is restored. The respondent Munshi will pay the costs of the appellant throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (3) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... orders of the, Inspector-General of Police dated December 16, 1952 the Superintendent of Police passed an order D.O. No. 3777 dated December 31, 1952 that among other officers, the respondent, who was officiating as Sub- Inspector, has been selected for confirmation as Sub- Inspector of Police (Unarmed Branch) with effect from September 1, 1951 and that he has been confirmed as Sub- Inspector of Police (Unarmed Branch) from the same date and absorbed against an existing substantive vacancy in the district. These orders clearly show that the respondent was appointed permanent Sub-Inspector of Police not by the Inspector-General of Police but by the Superintendent of Police. Obviously because of these records, such a contention, as is now taken on behalf of the respondent, was not raised before the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court set aside. The first respondent will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellants. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (3) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... would have connection with his official fun- ctions. In our view the sub-section aims at folding within its ambit not only outsiders "who are likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted" by the public officer but also any subordinate or any other person who is connected with the official functions of the public servant. In the result all the appeals are dismissed. Although we do not endorse the view of the High Court with regard to the date of the commencement of the investigation so far as Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, we do hold that serious irregularities were committed in the so-called "full-fledged enquiry" to the prejudice of the appellant. We do not however feel that there is any need to modify the directions given by the High Court to the Special Judge who will follow the directions of the High Court in addition to the modification indicated by us. Appeal's dismissed.
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1970 (3) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aw does not arise for consideration in these proceedings so long as that order is not set aside or declared void by a competent authority. Hence the same cannot be ignored The Subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order. For this reason alone the order of Mr. Mankodi was Liable to be set aside. 5. The High Court has come to the conclusion that under Section 63(2) of the Act, the State Government had power to entertain the revision application filed by the girasdars. In view of our earlier conclusion we do not think it necessary to go into that question. Hence we refrain from deciding that question. 6. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Before leaving this case we would like to impress on the Tribunal which is now required to decide the case the fact that this matter has been pending for about 20 years. Therefore it is imperative that it should be disposed of as early as possible.
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