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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 112 Records
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1970 (4) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is a known fact that the shows run full to the capacity only on the first days of the start of exhibition of a good and popular picture and that too only in the evening shows. The matinee and the night shows full (sic). As the picture gets older, the sale decreases. Towards the end, the number of persons to witness the picture thin down considerably and the amount of tax falls even below Rs. 50. Taking these points into consideration I feel that the business done by this Cinema in the assessment period was such as to give tax at the average rate of Rs. 125 per show. At this rate the total amount of tax payable in the assessment period comes to Rs. 67,500. This cinema is therefore, assessed to pay a tax of Rs. 67,500 for the period from 1-4-59 to 30-9-1959. 10. The facts mentioned above are cogent and relevant in the matter of computing the probable receipts by sale of cinema tickets. 11. For the reasons mentioned, above this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (4) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ain rights on him. Mere identity of some of the issues in the two suits does not bring about an identity of the subject matter in the two suits. As observed in Rakhma Bai v. Mahadeo Narayan, I.L.R. 42 Bom. 1155 the expression "subject matter" in Order 23, Rule 1, CPC means the series of acts or transactions alleged to exist giving rise to the relief claimed. In other words "subject matter" means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. We accept as correct the observations of Wallis C.J. in Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, I.L.R. 39 Mad. 987 that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject matter as the first suit. 6. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (4) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ons for the grant of permits on new routes or additional bus on existing routes, and it could therefore be held in those case that, there was a valid order under Section 47(3) of the Act. 66. The parties in all the appeals will bear their own costs because of the special features in these cases. First, no appeal was preferred against any order under Section 47(3) of the Act. Secondly, the point was canvassed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal without specific ground in that behalf. Thirdly, all parties competed for the permit on the basis of the limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority and the decision in that behalf was conveyed to all the parties. Finally, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal did not deal with the merits of the appeals pending before the said Authority and the matters are remitted to that Authority. In other cases where either the appeal has been allowed or the matter is remitted to the High Court, the parties will bear their own costs.
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1970 (4) TMI 166 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the Government Pleader that the authority prescribed under Sections 6(2) and 7(2) can assess the tax payable under Section 5. In view of the definition of prescribed authority by Section 3(7) of the Act, it is not possible to accept the same. The appeal provided for by Section 9 is only against the orders of the prescribed authority under Sub-section (2) of Section 6 or Sub-section (3) of Section 7. There is no authority at all contemplated for a decision of the matters under Section 5(2) or for any of the other matters which can legitimately be brought, under the provisions of the Act. 50. I am therefore satisfied that the Kerala Land Tax Act. 1961 not only offends Article 265 of the Constitution but in view of the several circumstances pointed out coupled with the absence of a machinery for assessment of liability in the Act, it is a colourable legislation being only a cloak to confiscate property of a citizen. I therefore allow the appeal and the Original Petitions.
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1970 (4) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s formulated the circumstances under which the jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked in the matter of a levy of tax. Therein this Court has laid down that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals, the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. It is further laid down in that case that questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its Constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authority are declared final or there is an express prohibition under the particular Act. We do mot think that the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the computation of the net profits made by the authorities under the Act. 12. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is allowed and the suit brought by the respondent company dismissed with costs throughout.
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1970 (4) TMI 164 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ases, as many writ petitions have to be filed as the number of petitioners. Piling of a single writ petition by several persons or by a petitioner against several respondents, in the circumstances stated above, is only a practical rule of convenience. We, therefore, hold that the above single writ petitions are maintainable, in law. There is no legal flaw in those petitions which necessitates their rejection in limine. 26. Since the above writ petitions do come within principles stated above we do not find any necessity to state and discuss the facts of each of those cases in this order. 27. We, therefore, allow W.A. 17 of 1969 and set aside the order of our learned brother Sambasiva Rao, J, and hold that the petition as framed is maintainable, in law. We also overrule the preliminary objection raised in the above writ petitions that they are not maintainable, in law. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. All these cases may now be listed before a single judge.
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1970 (4) TMI 163 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... law or aimed at advancing public welfare. Clauses 4 and 6 of the proviso result in the imposition of higher duty on factories similarly placed and authorize the executive to treat them differently and thus deny the equal protection of laws guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution. They must therefore be struck down as void. 11. It may not be out of place to mention that this hostile discrimination was done away with subsequently by Notification No. 1315 dated 8-6-1967. 12. The imposition and collection of the duty under Clauses 4, 6 and 7 must therefore be held to be without jurisdiction and not authorized by law. The respondents cannot be allowed to appropriate the duty so collected. As the duty was collected under a void provision the petitioner is also entitled to an Order for refund of the duty collected from him by the respondents. 13. The writ Petition therefore succeeds and is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-. 14. Petition allowed.
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1970 (4) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on 5; if on the other hand a notice has been issued under Section 9(1), damage has also to be paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 48(2) and (3). But these observations do not assist the case of the appellants. It is clearly implicit in the observations that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification. 8. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1970 (4) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Registrar and the Joint Registrar and we do not find any such infirmities in them which would justify interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court could not act as an appellate Court and reappraise and re-examine the relevant facts and circumstances which led to the making of the orders of supersession as if the matter before it had been brought by way of appeal. The limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when a writ in the nature of certiorari is to be issued are well-known and well-settled by now and it is pointless to re-state the grounds on which any such writ or direction can be issued. We are satisfied that there was no justification whatsoever for quashing the orders of the Joint Registrar and that of the Registrar in appeal. The appeals are consequently allowed with costs and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petitions are ordered to be dismissed One hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1970 (4) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... roved to have been the owner of the suit properties on the day the Jagir Abolition Act came into force, he is entitled to the compensation provided in that Act. Therefore the plaintiff is interested in establishing that on the date Jagir Abolition Act came into force, he was the full owner of the suit properties. The facts of this case fall within the rule laid down by this Court in Himatrao v. Jaikishandas and Ors. ( 1963 3 S.C.R, 815). On the facts of this case the interests of justice would have been better served if the High Court had ordered the impleading of the State of Madhya Pradesh in the appeal before. it and determined the rights of all the parties finally. Hence we set aside the decree of the High Court and remand the case to that Court with a direction that the State of Madhya Pradesh should be impleaded and the rights of all the parties decided in accordance with law., In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs of this appeal. Case remanded.
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1970 (4) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o permit the transfer, and recommended the transfer to the Transport Commissioner. The recommendation being, for reasons already stated, invalid, the order of the Transport Authority that he had no objection to permit the transfer must in our judgment amount to sanction of the transfer. That order was made during the lifetime of Sabulal and the transfer became effective in favour of the Roadways. 10. On its plain terms Rule 199-A of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, has no application after the transfer is Sanctioned. The Rule provides When the consent of either or both the parties to the transfer of a permit is withdrawn before transfer is sanctioned, the Transport Authority shall drop further proceedings in regard to the transfer of that permit. 11. Appeals Nos. 145 and 146 of 1967 are allowed, and Appeal No. 550 of 1967 is dismissed. The Roadways will get their costs in the three appeals in this Court and in the High Court There will be one hearing fee in this Court.
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1970 (4) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er of Income-tax 1965 56 I.T.R. 52, 59-60 ; 1965 1 S. C. R. 770 (S. C.) this court observed " Whether a particular expenditure is revenue expenditure incurred for the purpose of business must be determined on a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, and by the application of principles of commercial trading. The question must be viewed in the larger context of business necessity or expediency. If the outgoing or expenditure is so related to the carrying on or conduct of the business, that it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and not for acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character, the possession of which is a condition of the carrying on of the business, the expenditure may be regarded as revenue expenditure. " On the facts found by the Tribunal it is quite plain that the expenditure in question is a revenue expenditure. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (4) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted by filing a memorandum of appeal. The filing of memorandum of appeal therefore brings an appeal into existence; if the memorandum is deficient in court-fees, it may be rejected and if rejected, the appeal comes to an end. But if it is not rejected and time is given to the appellant to make up the deficiency and this opportunity is availed of, s. 149 of the Code expressly provides that the document is to have validity with retrospective effect as if the deficiency had been made good in the first instance. By reason of the deeming provision in s. 149 the memorandum of appeal is to have full force and effect and the appeal has to be treated as one pending from the date when it was before the Stamp Reporter and the deficiency noted therein. In the result, the appeal must be allowed with a direction that the High Court should hear the Special Appeal instituted on the 9th November, 1962. The costs of this appeal will abide by the decision of the Special Appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1970 (4) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s not "require the State Government to pass a reasoned order" is wholly irrelevant. The nature of the proceeding requires that State Government must give adequate reasons which disclose that an attempt was made to reach a conclusion according to law and just. Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has not attempted to support the reasons given by the High Court. He merely contended that there are in the files of the Government, orders passed by the District Magistrate and also of the State Government which gave reasons in support of the orders. The orders have, however, not been communicated to the appellants, and were not even produced before the High Court. Obviously we cannot consider those orders, if any, at this stage. The orders passed by the District Magistrate and the State Government cancelling the licences of the appellants are quashed. The State will pay the costs of the appellants in this Court and in the High Court. Appeal allowed and Orders quashed.
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1970 (4) TMI 155 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e time when he passed the order. The Supereme Court held that the wrong conclusion, if any, arrived at by the Commissioner in his earlier order was because the points were not raised and considered and they could not be said to be errors apparent on the face of the record arising or occurring from an accidental slip or omission. Under Section 22 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act an error should be apparent on the face of the record and need not arise or occur from accidental slip or omission. In such a situation this dictum of the Supreme Court is not applicable. 13. The learned counsel also relied upon R. K. B. One Mills v. State of U. P. (1970) 25 STC 321 . In that case it was held that if a mistake becomes apparent on the basis of a fresh material, which was not existing on the record when the original order was passed, would not attract Section 22 of the Act. In the present case no such situation has arisen. 14. The petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1970 (4) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s in proportion to the amount of the net rent receivable by each of them and thereupon the owner's share of the consolidated rate shall be paid by such owners accordingly. Explanation.- But under the Act the quantum of the consolidated rate depends upon the annual value of land or building on the gross rent for which the land or building might reasonably be expected to let, and not the gross rent at which the subordinate interest of a tenant may be expected to sublet. In determining the assessment of annual value, the assessing authority is not concerned with the rent which the tenant may receive from his sub-tenant. It is the gross rent which the owner may realize by letting the land or building under a bargain "uninfluenced by extraneous considerations" which determines the-annual value. Section 193 only provides for apportionment of consolidated rate it is irrelevant in determining annual value. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (4) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot open to the Legislature to say that a judgment of a court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be otherwise than as declared by the Court." We are clearly of, the opinion that sub-s. (3) of s. 152A introduced by the Ordinance is repugnant to our Constitution. That apart, the said provision authorities the Corporation to retain the ,amounts illegally collected and treat them as loans. That ,is an authority to collect forced loans. Such conferment of power is impermissible under our Constitution-see State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde and anr. ( 1968 3 S.C.R. 489. 298 ) In the result, the above appeals are ’dismissed with costs and the writ petitions allowed and s. 152A(3) is struck down. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in those petitions-one hearing fee both in the appeals and in the writ petitions. Appeals dismissed.
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1970 (4) TMI 152 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pened on the basis which is wholly ultra vires the taxing statute. The excise authorities seek to include in wholesale cash price a packing charge which is wholly extraneous. Such an ultra vires order can surely be quashed by this court even when any alternative remedy exists. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, therefore, there is no substance whatever in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Vakil. 6. The second contention raised by Mr. Sorabji must succeed and it is, therefore, not necessary to go into the remaining contentions raised by Mr. Sorabji on which we express no opinion. 7. In the result, this petition is allowed by quashing the impugned orders and the impugned demand notices and the show cause notices as well as the final orders of July, 1964 in so far as the excise authorities seek to reopen the assessment on the company by including the packing charges of Ciba and the excise duty on the score. Rule accordingly made absolute with cost.
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1970 (4) TMI 151 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd (4) in other matters as may be directed by the committee. It is thus seen from the Act and the Rules that while the occupier of a factory is obliged to maintain a canteen and serve food and drink on a non-profit basis, there is a large amount of discretion in all other matters such as the choice of food and drink to be served, the prices at which they may be served, the time when they may be served, etc. In these matters, the voice of the managing committee, half the members of which are the occupier s own nominees, is to be that of an adviser only. Having regard to these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the transactions of supply of food and drink to workmen in the canteen maintained by the company, in pursuance of the Indian Factories Act and the Rules, are sales and do constitute business for the purposes of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1970 (4) TMI 150 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... us stones was subsequently taxed at a higher rate does not mean that jewellery was not covered by the term ornaments as used in the earlier notification. All that the State Government has done by the subsequent notification is to subject more costly ornaments at a higher rate leaving the cheaper quality of ornaments taxable at a lower rate as before. We do not find it possible to accept the contention that jewellery studded with pearls and precious stones was an unspecified item not covered by the term ornaments. We accordingly answer the question by saving that jewellery in which precious stones were studded with gold and silver would be covered by the term ornaments as used in the notification of 5th April, 1961, and would be taxable at the rate of 3 per cent. and not as an unspecified item at 2 per cent. The Commissioner of Sales Tax would be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs.100. The counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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