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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 44 Records
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1970 (5) TMI 71 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be separated. In such cases where part of the consideration' is void, the whole contract is vitiated. Atkinson, J., observed that If any part of the consideration supporting a contract is void, it taints the whole contract with illegality; and even though a part of the consideration may be legal yet you cannot sever the illegal from the legal; the taint of illegality vitiates the entire contract. Quoted from Sanjiva Row's Contract Act, 1959, Edition, Vol. I page 436. 13. Therefore, in our opinion the Sub-Judge was wrong in holding the suit as maintainable. The partnership in question is an illegal contract and no suit for rendition of accounts and for its dissolution can be maintained. The revision is therefore, allowed and the order of the Sub-Judge, Ramban, is set aside but as the petitioner has taken advantage of his own fraud, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, C.J. 14. I agree. Raja Jaswant Singh, J. 15. I also agree.
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1970 (5) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... revised advertisement, the remission of the matter to the Commission, the recommendation of Respondent 1 by the Commission and the proceedings of the Syndicate's meeting of July 3, 1963 including the revision of the draft minutes were all in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the University Statutes and therefore the Chancellor had no jurisdiction under Section 9(4) of the Act to annul the decision of the Syndicate or the proceedings of the meeting of July 3, 1963. 18. In the result, the High Court was right in holding the annulling order of the Chancellor to be without jurisdiction as it was passed on a wrong assumption of jurisdiction made on a misinterpretation of the Act and the University Statute. The High Court accordingly was justified on that ground as also on the ground that there was an apparent error of law on the record to quash the impugned order of the Chancellor. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Each party will bear his own costs.
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1970 (5) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ting. No duty is chargeable on such materials. The authorities are trying to do indirectly what they could not do directly, namely, charge excise duty on articles used for laminating jute products. ( 4. ) In the view I am taking, it is not necessary to decide the other questions that were raised, namely, whether Rule 10 or Rule 10A was applicable in this case and whether the petitioners were entitled to raise any objections without applying under Rule 9. In my opinion, no Excise Duty is chargeable in respect of the differential weight, i. e., the weight of the materials used for lamination as has been done in the impugned notice and the notice must be quashed as being without authority of law. The Rule would be made absolute. ( 5. ) There would be a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned notice of demand and a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition directing the respondents to forbear from giving any further effect to the said impugned notice. THERE will be no order as to costs.
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1970 (5) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aring. The notice which is issued is not a summons to appear before the Court. It is only an intimation of the fact of the lodgment of the appeal. It is for the party informed to choose whether to appear or not. Summonses issue to defendants, to witnesses and to persons against whom complaints are filed in a criminal court. If a summons issues to a defendant and he does not appear the court may take the action to be undefended and proceeding ex parte may even regard the claim of the plaintiff to be admitted. This consequence doe,. not flow from the notice of the lodgment of the appeal in this Court. The Court has to proceed with the appeal albeit ex parte against the absent respondent. If a summons is issued to a witness or to ,a person complained against under the law relating to crimes, and the witness or the person summoned remains absent after service a warrant for his arrest may issue. We hope that these remarks will serve to explain the true position. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (5) TMI 67 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ugned sub-rule, such a declaration would not suffice and a further declaration in form C must be obtained from the appropriate authority in the State of Andhra Pradesh where the Kerala dealer might not even have been registered. The impugned sub-rule would be inconsistent with the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8. 4.. Sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act prescribes that the State Government may make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules made under sub-section (1) to carry out the purpose of the Act. Since the impugned sub-rule is clearly inconsistent with the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8, it must be declared ultra vires. 5.. The writ application is allowed and the impugned sub-rule (11) of rule 12 is declared ultra vires. A writ of mandamus be issued directing the State Government not to give effect to the impugned rule. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. ACHARYA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1970 (5) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that it is a correct and complete return. If after the enquiry held by him he still finds that the return is incorrect or incomplete he is empowered by section 7(3) to make a best judgment assessment. There is no provision such as section 139(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, entitling an assessee to furnish a return even beyond the time allowed by the statute. Section 7(1) empowers the Sales Tax Officer to extend the date for submission of the return but unless the date is extended there is no obligation upon the Sales Tax Officer to consider the return filed out of time. In the result, the assessment order under consideration must be considered as an order under section 7(3) of the Act read with rule 41(5) of the Rules and not as an order under section 21 of the Act. The question referred is answered accordingly. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 150. Counsel s fee is assessed in the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (5) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tue of rule 23. That a demand should first be made by the assessing authority requiring the dealer to make good the deficiency in the first instalment of the exemption fee before he can be made liable to assessment to tax is not contemplated in law. The four questions are, therefore, answered as follows Question No. (1)-In the affirmative. Question No. (2)-The first part of the question is answered in the negative no answer is returned to the second part of the question. Question No. (3)-In the negative. Question No. (4)-In the negative. Except for two dealers, M/s. Girdhari Mal Jai Dayal and M/s. Ram Nath Ram Dularey, no other dealer entered appearance before us. The Commissioner of Sales Tax will, therefore, be entitled to his costs as against those two dealers in the sum of Rs. 150 each and there is no order as to costs against the remaining dealers. Counsel s fee is assessed in the sum of Rs. 300. TRIVEDI, J.-I agree. MUKERJEE, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1970 (5) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tive of a deceased assessee. Under section 7-C of the Act where a person dies his legal representative shall be liable to pay, out of the estate of the deceased person, the tax payable by the deceased. There is no legal fiction under which the legal representative can be treated to be an assessee in default automatically. It is under these circumstances that a Division Bench of this court held that before a recovery proceeding could be launched against a legal representative of a deceased person, a notice of demand is necessary to be served upon him so as to enable him to pay up the dues in accordance with the notice of demand. That case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. For all these reasons we answer the question in the negative in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Sales Tax is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 100. The counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the negative.
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1970 (5) TMI 63 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to Assistant Sales Tax Officers under clause (c) and that all the residuary powers of assessment of purchase tax and in case of dealers of other classes not covered by clauses (b) and (c) will remain undelegated with the Commissioner himself. 4.. In this view of the matter we think that the Assistant Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to assess purchase tax in the present case. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of this court, of which one of us (B. Dayal, C.J.) was a member, in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. J.P. Namdeo, Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Rewa, and Others.Miscellaneous Petition No. 171 of 1967 decided on the 9th December, 1969. 5.. We accordingly allow the writ petition and set aside the assessment as well as the demand made on the basis of that assessment from the petitioner. The petitioner will get his costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1970 (5) TMI 62 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is well-founded. The 1st respondent was clearly in error in the view he has taken that where the dealer has collected the amounts but refunded the same before the Ordinance, the case does not fall under sub-section (1) of section 10. The petitioner, in our opinion, satisfies the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 10 and is not liable to sales tax on the turnover of inter-State sales of cotton during the period from 9th November, 1964, to 31st March, 1968. In that view, the demands impugned in W.Ps. Nos. 5178, 5180 and 5181 of 1969 are quashed. The demand made in W.P. No. 5179 of 1969 in respect of sales of cotton for the period from 10th November, 1964, to 31st March, 1965, is quashed. The objections raised in W.P. No. 5179 of 1969 against the levy of tax in respect of inter-State sales of cotton for the period from 1st April, 1964, to 9th November, 1964, have been considered and rejected by us in W.Ps. Nos 2109 of 1968 and 5361 of 1969. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (5) TMI 61 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y of any firm or Hindu undivided family to pay tax in the event of the dissolution of such firm or partition of such family, recovery of tax from third parties, appeals, reviews, revisions, references, refunds, penalties, compounding of offences and treatment of documents furnished by a dealer as confidential, shall apply accordingly Provided that if in any State or part thereof there is no general sales tax law in force, the Central Government may, by rules made in this behalf make necessary provision for all or any of the matters specified in this sub-section. There is no provision in the Amendment Act of 1969 laying down that the Rajasthan Act as it stood on the date of the coming into force of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1969, will be applicable. This contention of the learned Additional Advocate-General has therefore no force. We accordingly uphold the second preliminary objection and dismiss both the reference applications with costs. Applications dismissed.
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1970 (5) TMI 60 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... notices to the petitioners proposing to make rectifications of the assessment orders under rule 38 bringing to tax the turnovers that were exempted by the appellate authorities. As held by us in several writ petitions, the assessing authority is not competent to make rectification of the assessment orders where the exemptions were granted by the appellate authorities. The proper authority to make the rectification is the appellate authority. Therefore the impugned notices challenged in these writ petitions are hereby quashed giving liberty to the appellate authorities to make the appropriate rectifications. The petitioners are also at liberty to raise all their objections before the appellate authorities. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1970 (5) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
High Court has passed an order in substance remanding the case referred for opinion under section 11(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, to the Additional judge (Revisions)?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. In a case referred to the High Court, the High Court has no power to remand the case to the Tribunal. The High Court has to answer the question referred. If the High Court was not satisfied with the statement of the case, the High Court could call for a supplementary statement of the case. On the question referred the correctness of the "approach" of the Judge (Revisions) was apparently not in issue; the court had merely to find whether on the facts and circumstances the assessee was entitled to claim exemption from tax liability.
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1970 (5) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... of sub-section (2) of section 633. There is, to my mind, another aspect to the matter. If the High Court is not possessed of jurisdiction to grant relief under sub-section (2) of section 633 after the institution of criminal proceedings, I fail to see on what principle the High Court will have such jurisdiction after the termination of the criminal proceedings in respect of the defaults which were the subject-matter of the criminal proceedings. For these reasons, I am of the view that this petition is incompetent and this court has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs sought for under subsection (2) of section 633 of the Act. In view of this conclusion, I do not find it necessary to determine the question as to whether the petitioners acted reasonably or honestly in not complying with the, direction given by the Magistrate within the time limited by it. This petition was therefore, stand dismissed, but, in the circumstances, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1970 (5) TMI 49 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Certificate of registration and Charges – Rectification of register of ... ... ... ... ..... luded from relying on the certificate and the decision would necessarily have been the opposite from the decision which the court in fact reached. For the reasons which I have already given, it appears to me that Charnley s case ( supra) cannot be distinguished on the ground that the defect in that case related to the accuracy of the particulars, whereas in the present case it relates to the time within which the particulars were delivered. The final, alternative, submission made by Mr. Slade was that in any event this is a case in which the court can and should exercise its powers under section 101 to rectify a mis-statement in, the register. The rectification of the register so as to record the date of the creation of the charge as being, say, March 9, 1964, would not, of itself, help the liquidator. I do not think that section 101 gives power to the court to go further or to order the deletion of the whole entry from the register. I agree that the appeal should be allowed.
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1970 (5) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Transfer of Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal, Powers of Court to rectify register of members, Powers of Court to rectify
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1970 (5) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
Whether proceedings can be said to commence for recovery when the assessing authority makes a motion within section 32(1) to the Collector for recovery of the agricultural income-tax and penalty as an arrear of land revenue?
Held that:- there is hardly much difference between the provisions of section 32 of the Act and the corresponding provisions of section 46 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Both these statutes relate to taxation of income and the provisions in question are in pari materia although the words employed may not be exactly the same. The proceedings for recovery, therefore, in the present case, were rightly held to have commenced with the making of the orders contained in annexures "A-1" to "A-5".
So far as the year 1363F. was concerned the date of the last instalment was September 19, 1958. According to annexure "A-5" the Sub-Divisional Officer, Lakhimpur, made an order on October 1, 1959, with regard to the demand for that year. The High Court found that the Deputy Commissioner had made an endorsement on October 5, 1959. As the order was made on October 1, 1959, it was beyond one year from September 19, 1958. In the appeal filed by the departmental authorities it has not been shown in what manner the High Court was in error in holding that the proceedings for recovery of tax and penalty for the year 1363F. were barred by time. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (5) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of the Gift-tax Act are attracted in respect of the sum of ₹ 70,000 thrown into the hotchpotch of the assessee's joint family by the assessee ?
Held that:- Since the donor happened to be a member of the Hindu undivided family to which the gift in question had been made, the gift to the extent of the donor's share in the said amount was exempt, he brought to tax the balance of amount under the provisions of the Gift-tax Act
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1970 (5) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the declaration by which the assessee has impressed the character of joint Hindu family property on the self-acquired properties owned by him amounts to a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Gift-tax Act ?
Held that:- The declaration by which the assessee has impressed the character of joint Hindu family property on the self-acquired properties owned by him did not amount to a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Act. Allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court
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1970 (5) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Either under section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, or under section 154 of the 1961 Act, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to rectify any mistake in any assessment order or refund order must be confined to a mistake which is apparent from the record – Whether rectification can be made on the ground that consideration paid was lower than the written down value and excess depreciation can be disallowed? When assets are transferred in consideration of fully paid up shares, it is difficult to say whether the actual consideration is only the face value of the shares – therefore, Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice under section 154 purporting to correct an alleged error apparent on the records
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