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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 70 Records
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1971 (10) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... held on the ground that it was enacted for securing the distribution, of agricultural land to subserve the common good by imposing a ceiling and also ensuring that the persons to whom surplus lands had been granted after the same had vested in the State Government should supply sugarcane at fair prices. The impugned Act, apart from Section 28 already referred to, was held to be covered by Entry 18 in List II and Section 28 was held as within the ambit of Entry 35 of List II dealing with "Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the State". 47. In the result, we hold that as the attacks on the rivers of the Madras Ceilings Act fail, the appeals must be dismissed but without any costs. In all cases where the Madras High Court did not think fit to deal with the merits of the case as regards the application of the Madras Ceilings Act to the particular facts of a case, it will be open to the appellants to canvass the same before the appropriate forum.
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1971 (10) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... any further evidence being led for bringing home the charge to the appellants If on the existing material there is no ground for presuming them to be guilty then there can hardly be any point in framing' charges and going through the formality of a trial and then acquitting (hem. Such a course would merely result in unnecessary harassment to the appellants without serving the cause of justice. 22. The order of discharge made by the Chief Presidency Magistrate did not suffer from any serious legal infirmity and it was eminently a just and fair order. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in reversing that order on revision and the reasons given by it in support thereof are unsustainable. The impugned judgment will cause grave injustice to the appellants. 23. The result, therefore, is that these appeals must succeed and allowing the same we set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate discharging the appellants.
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1971 (10) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ercise books, there were entries showing payment of various amounts, namely, Rs. 1,500/-on August 2, 1962, Rs. 15/-on August 12, 1962, Rs. 500/-on September 11, 1962, Rs. 100/-on September 28, 1962, Rs. 250/-on October 11, 1962, Rs. 1,000/-on October 23, 1962, Rs. 800/-on November 6, 1962 and Rs. 50/-on November 16, 1962 as commission to res. Lala. There was no evidence as regards the actual payment of these amounts except in respect of the last amount of Rs. 50/-, For that, Havaldar Gupta gave a statement to the effect that on November 16, 1962 Lala was to go to Calcutta on temporary duty, that Lala sent him to Manik Motor Works to obtain Rs. 50/-from accused Para Chand and that accordingly he went and obtained that amount and handed it over to Lala. 21. Assuming that these entries in the exercise books were genuine and the statement of Gupta was accepted, the question is, could this amount said to have been paid to Lala be commission as alleged? Two questions at once arise.
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1971 (10) TMI 117 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e whether the provision is mandatory or directory. Comparing the language of Section 204 (I-A) with the provisions of Section 195 etc. it would appear that while in the former section there is a clear prohibition against taking of the cognizance of the case, the provisions contained in Section 204 (I-A) can only apply after a judicial order is passed under Section 204 (1-A) and therefore in no sense can Section 204 (I-A) be equated with the provisions of Sections 195, 196, 196A. 197 and 198 of the Criminal P. C. 27. When I decided the case Ghulam Mohd. Burza v. Hajira Begum D/- 31-10-1969 (J. & K.) (Supra), the aspects mentioned above were not brought to my notice, nor was the decision of the Supreme Court (supra) cited before me. However considering the matter from all aspects, I feel myself in complete agreement with the opinions expressed by Bhat and Mufti Baha-ud-Din JJ. 28. I, therefore, hold that there is no force in this revision petition which should be dismissed.
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1971 (10) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the question involved in that case was entirely different and the appellant can derive no assistance from it. Argument has also been advanced that there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Deputy Registrar appointed under the Bombay Act for adjudicating upon the dispute between the parties and that it was at the best a case of lack of territorial jurisdiction. We find ourselves unable to accede to this contention because we are of the opinion that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Registrar appointed under the Bombay Act for dealing with the dispute arising out of the dealings of the Mangalore branch of the appellant society with the respondent. The dispute between the parties as would appear from what has been discussed above, could only be adjudicated upon in accordance with the provisions of the Madras Act. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. As no one has appeared on behalf of the respondent, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (10) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... then is whether the punishment of compulsorily retirement imposed by the President can be sustained even though the first two charges have not been proved. 20. Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra 1963 Su. 1 S.C.R. 648. that if the order of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established. 21. We reverse the judgment under appeal and hold that order of the President imposing the punishment of compulsorily retirement was not liable to be quashed. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1971 (10) TMI 114 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt has power to condone the delay and extend the time fixed under Section 148, Code of Civil Procedure, even if the original time fixed by the Court had expired. 25. In view of the foregoing, I would hold that Mr. Rajni Kant had no jurisdiction to allow further extension of time to Respondent No. 2 to deposit the balance of the auction price by 28th February, 1970. 26. In view of what I have said above, this appeal succeeds, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is reversed, the order made by Mr. Rajni Kant, granting extension of time to Respondent No. 2 for the deposit of the balance of the purchase price is quashed and the auction sale, dated 24th August, 1959, in favour of Respondent No. 2 is set aside. The Rehabilitation Department can now take further proceedings regarding the auction sale held in favour of the Appellants on 17th January, 1969, in accordance with law. In the circumstances of this case, I would make no order as to costs. Gopal Singh, J. 27. I agree.
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1971 (10) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e there had been earlier litigation about the house allotted to the appellant and his brothers, the same could not be the subject matter of arbitration dispute. A dispute is referred to arbitration because the parties agreed to such a reference and the mere fact that the property which is the subject matter of dispute was also the subject matter of an earlier litigation, cannot prevent the parties to refer the dispute about that property to arbitration. What is referred to arbitrators in such a case is the fresh dispute and although the finding of the Court in the previous litigation may have a bearing on the dispute referred to the arbitrators, it would not stand in the way of reference of the fresh dispute to the arbitrators. It is not the case of the appellant before us that the precise dispute which was the subject matter of the award dated 20th October, 1956 had been adjudicated upon earlier in a civil Court. 9. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1971 (10) TMI 111 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se before us. Here the issue is whether the creditor of the deceased assured can satisfy his decree for money against the assured by seizing the money payable under the policy to the nominee. We have already answered this issue in the affirmative. And it is not necessary to deal with the precise problem arising in Kesari Devi. 19. The nominations in the two policies do not create a trust in favour of the nominees. They do not create any vested interest in them in the lifetime of the assured. On the other hand, the policies clearly show that the assured continued to hold title to the policies until his death. The amounts due under the policies were payable to the nominees only in the event of his death. So the nominees will be his legal representative, and the money may be seized by the decree-holder for payment of his loan. 20. The revision is allowed. Mata Prasad and Vishwanath Prasad are impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor, Dwarka Prasad.
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1971 (10) TMI 110 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the department that the purchasing dealer was a registered dealer, and it was a mere clerical mistake not to mention the number of his registration certificate. We see no reason why in such a case the taxing authorities should not permit either amendment of the C form if satisfied of the facts, or the filing of a duplicate C form properly filled. 4.. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is that the assessing authority ought to give an opportunity to the dealer to explain errors or omissions noticed by the assessing authority in declarations in form C prescribed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, before rejecting them as invalid, if the assessing authority is satisfied that the mistake was merely a clerical mistake or an inadvertent omission and that a correct certificate could be issued by the purchasing dealer at the time of the transaction. 5.. The assessee will get its costs in this court. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (10) TMI 109 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... certificate of registration of such dealer had initially been granted to the transferee and the transferee shall on application to the prescribed authority be entitled to have the registration certificate amended accordingly , as well as from the following decisions Bajranglal Bajaj v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others 1965 16 S.T.C. 350., Industrial Development and Investments Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bombay 1957 31 I.T.R. 688. and Motichand and Devidas, In re 1946 14 I.T.R. 534. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the sales tax authorities, including the Tribunal, were in error in coming to the conclusion that there was a transfer of business as such, and not a sale of the stock of the business. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will get its costs which are assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1971 (10) TMI 108 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estions relate to the entertainability of the appeal on account of the fact that the one-third amount was deposited after the date which was given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for making the deposit. Those questions could have been decided by the Board of Revenue after taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. But, since the Board of Revenue has not adverted to those facts and has not decided either way whether the appellate authority could exercise discretion or had no discretion in the matter, it was incompetent to refer those questions to this court. It is for the Board of Revenue first to consider the relevant facts and to come to a decision and only then can those questions arise out of its order. We, therefore, decline to answer questions Nos. (2) to (5). 6. Our answer to question No. (1) as stated above in paragraph 4 will be sent to the Board of Revenue. Parties will bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (10) TMI 107 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the legal title in the goods to the extent of the mortgage amount had passed to the corporation. The corporation was the legal owner of the mortgagee rights and no attachment of the property could be made by the department in derogation of the rights of the corporation. Indeed, as already stated, the department can recover its dues only out of the equity of redemption which belongs to the company. In view of the above, we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and hold that the department has no priority over the mortgage debt of the corporation. We, however, express no opinion as to whether the amount due to the department will have priority over other unsecured debts as that point does not arise in this case. As the department wrongly took the position, that it had priority over the claim of the appellant, the costs of this appeal and that of the writ petition incurred by the appellant would be borne by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (10) TMI 106 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te trade. If Central sales tax is again collected in respect of those transactions and the application for refund of the tax to which the assessee is entitled under the Act is unduly delayed, the Government would in effect be retaining amounts to which the assessee will be entitled and the assessee will be put to considerable hardship. In so far as W.P. Nos. 3055 of 1971 and 3076 of 1971 are concerned, they relate to the period January to March, 1971, that is, part of the year 1970-71. As the assessment year is over, even according to the respondent, there is no impediment in considering the application for refund along with the assessment for the said year. We, therefore, direct that the application for refund in respect of these periods will be heard and disposed of expeditiously along with assessments for these years. Subject to the above direction the writ petitions are dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (10) TMI 105 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963. The same principle was restated and applied by the Supreme Court in D.C. Johar and Sons (P.) Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Ernakulam, and Another 1971 27 S.T.C. 120 (S.C.)., which was a decision rendered in an appeal preferred by the petitionercompany. It was held that the company was not entitled to claim exemption in respect of freight and packing and delivery charges notwithstanding the fact that separate bills had been made in respect of those amounts. The Supreme Court pointed out that the tax levied is a tax on the turnover, that is, on the aggregate of the sale price received by the dealer in respect of the sale of goods. The question being thus concluded by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the second ground of exemption put forward by the petitioner has also only to be rejected. 14.. The original petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (10) TMI 104 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tax Act should commence within a period of four years, prescribed for making the best judgment assessment under section 14(1) of the Act. The learned judges answered that question in the affirmative they did not consider whether the penalty should be levied simultaneously with the making of the best judgment assessment. The principle that is applicable for levy of penalty under sub-section (2) of section 14 also applies to the levy of penalty under section 14(4) of the Act. In view of the decision referred to above, we hold that the proceedings for levy of penalty under section 14(4) of the Act also have to be initiated within a period of six years prescribed for making the best judgment assessment under section 14(4). As admittedly, the notice has been issued after the period of six years had elapsed, it is held that the notice is invalid. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the notice in question is quashed. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1971 (10) TMI 103 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld certainly have no jurisdiction to impose greater duty on tobacco and its products in excess of what the Central enactments and particularly section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and article 286(3) of the Constitution of India have provided for. But the State Legislature can certainly act within those limits. 44.. Viewed in this light, we do not see any bar to the taxing of tendu leaves by the State Legislature, which according to us, is not at all covered by the phrase tobacco unmanufactured or manufactured in all its forms or its finished products. Thus, in our opinion, the attack on the legislative competency of the State Legislature as also on the validity of the impugned provision fails and, consequently, we dismiss all these writ petitions with costs. Counsel s fee in each case shall be Rs. 50, if certified. The balance of the security deposit, after deduction of the costs awarded, be refunded to the respective petitioner or petitioners. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (10) TMI 102 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d from 1st April, 1961, to 31st March, 1962. Entry No. 48 in Schedule I to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act was amended by Act No. 18 of 1960 with effect from 1st July, 1960, and reads as follows 48. Utensils made of bamboo, e. g., dauri, supa, etc. These articles were, therefore, exempted from any tax under the Act. Bamboo baskets are dauri made of bamboo or, as described in the entry quoted above, are utensils made of bamboo . They were, therefore, exempt from tax in the year in question. No tax was, therefore, leviable under section 7(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act during that year. 2.. Our answer to the question, therefore, is that on the facts and circumstances of the case the bamboo baskets purchased from unregistered dealers used in carrying limestone to kilns will not attract purchase tax under section 7(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The assessee will get its costs of this reference. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (10) TMI 101 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y an intimation of the order was sent and on that the petitioner applied for a copy of the order and as soon as he obtained the copy of the order he filed the application in this court under section 22(2). In similar circumstances, a similar contention as to limitation was negatived by us in Piare Lal Khushbakhat Rai v. The State of Punjab 1971 27 S.T.C. 398. For the reasons recorded in the aforesaid decision, we must hold that the application made on 8th May, 1968, is within time. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, admittedly the question that requires determination is a question of law. For the reasons recorded above, we direct the Tribunal to refer the following question of law for our opinion, along with the statement of the case Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the order of assessment dated 24th July, 1961, was not an order under section 11(4) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act? We, however, make no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1971 (10) TMI 100 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mited v. The State of Madras 1968 22 S.T.C. 485. That was a case of a body-builder. In the process of building of the bodies certain scrap aluminium came into being. The sales tax authorities brought the sale proceeds of the scrap aluminium to tax by including the same in the taxable turnover of the assessee. The Madras High Court held that it could not be done. It appears to us that this case is distinguishable. In the business of body-building no manufacturing process was involved in which the resultant waste was aluminium. It could not, therefore, be held that the resultant waste aluminium was the result of a manufacturing process. The Madras decision does not in any way support the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee. For the reasons recorded above we answer the second question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In view of the divided success there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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