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Showing 1 to 20 of 105 Records
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1971 (11) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n 11AA of the Act, as it now stands, and vary or revise the orders of assessment in all these appeals already made, so as to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act. If any assessment has not been completed, it is needless to state that the fresh order of assessment will have to be made by him, in accordance with the principles laid down by us in those decisions, read along with the provisions of the Act, as it now stands, after the amendment, introduced thereunder by the Amendment Act. 19. The appeals are allowed in part and the judgments and orders of the High Court are modified by declaring that the impugned notification is valid and it has effect from September 11, 1956, and sales tax on edible oils can be levied after that date. In other respects, the appeals are dismissed, subject to the directions given to the assessing authority in the earlier part of the judgment. Parties will bear their own costs in all these appeals.
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1971 (11) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ired to be called from Calcutta and Bombay. On the other hand the case appears to be mostly hinged on the issue of the Way Bills to Respondent 2 by Respondent 1 without receipt of goods from Respondent 2 which the Respondents say was due to the practice followed by the complainant to popularise its transport business. The execution of the Way Bills by Respondent 1, their issue by him without receipt of the goods and the obtaining of money by the second Respondent from the Bank by discounting them with it are some of the elements and except perhaps for the non-receipt of the goods by the people to whom they were alleged to have been booked, are all dependent on local witnesses. In any case the expenditure involved is not the sole criterion for granting permission. 12. In the view we have taken this appeal is allowed, the permission granted by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court in Revision is set aside and we direct that the trial do proceed in accordance with law.
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1971 (11) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g that the defendant was bound to search for his creditor and pay him the money on the Sunday." Crowder, J. said "This is not like the case of an ordinary contract; and I desire not to be understood as at all interfering (1) English Law Reports 141, p. 768. with any of the cases which have been referred to with reference to contracts. The cases upon the construction of statutes are also founded upon an entirely different consideration." We may also state that there is no evidence in this case that at the time when the compromise was entered into, either of the parties knew that the 31st of December, 1959 and the 1st of January, 1960, would be holidays. In these circumstances we think that the deposit made by the respondent on 2-1-1960 was in substance and in effect a deposit made in terms of the compromise decree and that the High Court was right in its conclusion. We dismiss the appeals but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w what the allegations against them were. If they wanted to produce any other person in support of their stand that the accused was only arrested on the 10th and not on the 5th or that the injuries found on the accused were old and were not fresh they could have done so. They do not deny that the Chief Medical Officer examined the accused nor is it possible for them to say how the injuries found on the accused some of which were fresh could be caused. They were certainly not old injuries nor is it their case that when the accused was arrested on the 10th he was found to be suffering from swollen feet or injuries which were fresh. None of the remarks to which exception has been taken, in our view could be described as unwarranted, unnecessary or irrelevant or can be characterised as generalisation or of a sweeping nature. There is, therefore no ground for granting the Prayer for expunging any of the remarks in the order of the High Court. In this view the Appeal is dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... manent is on the tenant and that the mere fact of long occupation at a fixed rent does not raise a presumption of permanent tenancy. The same view was held in Subrahmanya Chettiar and Ors. v. V.P. Subrahmanya Mudaliyar and Ors. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. In Bejoy Gopal Mukerji v. Pratul Chandra Ghose Supreme Court Report 1953, Vol. IV p. 930 this Court said that neither possession for generations at uniform rent nor construction of permanent structures by itself is conclusive proof of permanent tenancy. It is the cumulative effect of these circumstances coupled with several other facts that may lead to an inference of permanent tenancy. In the circumstances of the case we think that the learned single judge was right in his conclusion and that the Div. Bench went wrong in reversing the judgment and decree passed by him. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree of the Division Bench and restore the decree passed by the single judge. In the result we allow the appeal with costs.
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1971 (11) TMI 171 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t reason' this court is precluded from enquiry into the question whether the Governor General personally applied his mind before it was issued. . (D)This contention has already been dealt within, considering the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the petition. The grant of costs and interest by the Registrar in making the award was beyond The jurisdiction and, Therefore, void. This part of the award is, however severable from the rest of the award and does not vitiate it. (18) The writ petition is, Therefore, substantially dismissed but is only allowed to a small extent. The last part of the award granting costs and interest to the respondent No. 1 against the petitioner is quashed. The rest of the award is upheld. The orders passed by the Cooperative Tribunal in appeal and revision would also stand modified to the extent that they uphold the rest of the award but not the grant of costs and interest. In the above circumstances we make no orders as to costs.
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1971 (11) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oes not disclose that he had applied his mind to the material on record. That order does not show what charges against Shri Abrol have been established. The order reads I have gone through the charges and the explanation furnished by Shri R.P. Abrol. From the material on the file, I am definitely of the opinion that he is not a fit person to be retained as part time member of the Electricity Board. I, therefore, order that Shri Abrol may be removed from membership under Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. C.M. may kindly See. After C.M. has seen, immediate orders be issued. Sd/-Sohan Singh Basi, I.P.M. 17-7-1969. 12. This order cannot be said to be a speaking order. It is arbitrary to the core. Such an order cannot be upheld. Hence it is not necessary to go in to the other contentions advanced on behalf of Shri Abrol. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, both these appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs.
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1971 (11) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong ; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law ; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code See the decisions of this Court in Pandurang Dkoni Chougule v. Maruti Hari Madhav 1966 1SCR102 , D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company Private Ltd., v. Samp Singh and Ors. 6. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow appeal No. 840 of 1971 and dismiss No. 841 of 1971. The resulting position is that the order of the High Court is set aside and that of the first appellate Court restored. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs in this Court.
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1971 (11) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ales Tax Act always. The only limit on the power of a legislature to create a fiction is that it should not transcend its power by its creation. The limitation on the power of the legislature of Mysore in 1964 when it enacted Act No. 9 of 1964 was that on the sale of declared goods it could not have imposed sales tax at a rate higher than that specified in Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act as it stood then. There was no limitation on its power to impose tax on the turnover of sales of textiles before April 1, 1958, when they were not declared goods. 21. The question whether after April 1, 1958 when textiles became declared goods, the rate of tax as provided in the Second Schedule to the Mysore General Sales Tax Act 1957, as amended, would stand modified in view of Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 does not arise for consideration before us and so we express no opinion on that aspect. 22. We dismiss the appeals with costs. There will be only one hearing fee.
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1971 (11) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oviso to Article 31A(1) must bear a similar meaning. The essence of "personal cultivation" seems to be cultivation by or on behalf of the owner of the land. It is quite clear that under the tenure known as Bhagchar, the cultivator shares his crop with the owner. So, when he grows the crop he grows it in his own right and not on behalf of any person. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that a crop-sharer cultivates on behalf of the landlord. 23. In the result we hold that the High Court was right in holding that Chapter III of the Act is valid. We further hold that the High Court should not have gone into the question of the validity of Chapter IV and we accordingly set aside that part of the judgment. 24. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 854 of 1968 is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. The other appeals are allowed, and the writ petitions filed by the respondents in the State appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals.
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1971 (11) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aw made by the Parliament in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 327 would be subject to the other provisions of the Constitution including Article 324. Article 324 as mentioned above provides that superintendence, direction and control of elections shall be vested in Election Commission. It, therefore, cannot be said that when the Commission issues direction, it does so not on its own behalf but as the delegate of some other authority. It may also be mentioned in this context that when the Central Government issued Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 in exercise of its powers under section 169 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, it did so as required by that section after consultation with the Commission. We, therefore, find no substance in the contention that paragraph 15 of the Symbols Order is ultra vires the powers of the Commission. The result is that all the four appeals fail and are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. S.C. Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for the management to decide and if there is justification for punishment imposed, the Tribunal should not interfere; but where the punishment is so disproportionate that no reasonable employer would ever have imposed it in like circumstance, the Tribunal may treat the imposition of such punishment as itself showing victimisation or unfair labour practice. In view of the fact that the domestic tribunal acted on no ,evidence at all because it was found that the intention with which the Respondent had issued the notices to the International Cham- ber of Commerce and Industry could not be ascertained, the Tribunal was justified in allowing evidence to be led and on that evidence to come to the conclusion that the termination of service was wrong. We cannot help feeling that the Federation bad made a mountain out of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its prestige and reputation. In this view 'the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 164 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... th Pennycuick J. is that passage in the judgment, 1970 Ch. 626, 641 ; 78 I.T.R. 684 where he says that the evidence as accepted by the commissioners established that prospective purchasers on the Stock Exchange were entitled to that information as to the negotiations. I do not think that the evidence establishes any such entitlement ; and I do not think, with respect to Pennycuick J., that the special commissioners so held. They were very careful, as I read their case stated, in limiting their findings. I, for myself, entirely accept the reasoning which has persuaded Russell L. J. to his conclusion, and I agree with it. On those grounds I agree that the appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed with costs in the Court of Appeal and below. Leave to appeal refused. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue ; Simpson, Curtis & Co., Leeds. January 28, 1971. The Appeal Committee of the House of Lords (Lord Hodson, Lord Guest and Lord Donovan) granted the taxpayer leave to appeal.
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1971 (11) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid notification, it was not entitled so to do. The High Court, in our view, was right in quashing that order as also the demand notices issued in pursuance of that order. In view of our decision on the question of construction of the notification and sec. 30A, it becomes unnecessary to consider the second contention raised by the company's counsel that the order of 1963 amounted to a modification of the terms of the lease, and that therefore, the State Government could not unilaterally supersede such modification by issuing a subsequent order in 1965. For the reasons aforesaid, we are in agreement with the High Court's conclusions. Civil Appeal No. 168 of 1968 involves the same question and our decision in that appeal, must, therefore, be governed by the decision in this appeal. Both the appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. 'Mere will, however, be one set of hearing costs as the arguments in both the appeals have been common. Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ving regard to the second principle referred to above the Government cannot absolve itself from considering the representation even at a after stage. We have seen that after the Advisory Board's opinion is received the State Government 19 bound under Section 11 to consider whether it should confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned. Since the Government had not considered the representation as soon as it was received nor even at the time of the confirmation and continuation of the detention, the Government had failed in one of its obligatory duties with regard to the detention of the prisoners and, therefore, for that reason also the detention becomes illegal. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the detention of the petitioners must be declared to be illegal. No separate orders for the release of the petitioners are necessary to be passed now, since they have been already directed to be released after the closure of arguments in this case.
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1971 (11) TMI 161 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... significance. The subject of an annual assessment-list or a revised assessment-list is dealt with in Section 84 and retrospective effect to an annual assessment-list or to a revised assessment-list is given by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 84. For these reasons we are not in agreement with the decision in Jalgaon Borough Municipality's case. We think that it was not correctly decided and that, on the other hand, the correct view has been taken in the Chalisgaon Borough Municipality's case. The decision in Chalisgaon Borough Municipality's case and the earlier decisions of single Judges of this Court were all followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in The Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Zaveri Keshavlal 1965 6 Guj. 701. 29. In the result, we answer the questions framed as follows Question (i) in the negative. Question (ii) in the affirmative. The papers will now be sent back to the Division Bench for disposal of the Revision Application.
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1971 (11) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... occupied by owners themselves and falling under cl. (h) are concerned, counsel frankly conceded that different considerations would apply and therefore no objection could be taken to their being exempted from the tax. If buildings used for nonresidential purposes or on the basis of leave and licence are validly treated differently, buildings, if used partly for one and partly for another such purpose or purposes can also be similarly treated provided that no part or parts thereof occupied or used for a purpose other than those specified in the three clauses. Since these buildings forming separate classes by themselves form the tenanted residential premises, the provisions for exempting them cannot be held as violative of the equal protection clause. For the reasons stated above, the Act has to be held valid and the petitions unsustainable. Accordingly, the petitions are ,dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will not be any order of costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (11) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
Whether warranty expenses and bonus should appropriately be included in the return and not in the exworks cost?
Whether the Commission has erred in allowing depreciation on the actual cost and not on the replacement value?
Held that:- As we agree, with the Commission that the entire cost on account of warranty in. elusive of labour charges should be borne by the manufacturers, it is wholly unnecessary for us to refer to any specific figures except that while considering the question of return the general idea relating to cost to the manufacturers would certainly be borne in mind and taken into consideration.
The Commission came to the correct conclusion that bonus is connected with profits and it cannot be included in the exworks cost.
Indeed it has not been disputed on behalf of the Government and the Attorney General quite properly and fairly accepts that some proper method should be devised for escalation or de-escalation, as the case may be. We have been suggested a number of formulae on behalf of the manufacturers as also the government but we shall indicate at a later stage what, in our opinion, is the best and the simplest method of providing for escalation and deescalation. We are satisfied, however, that a provision should be made and ought to have been made by the Commission in this behalf.
According to the principles discussed or to be discussed in the matter of fixing of a fair price the main objective is to protect the interest of the consumer while at the same time provide a reasonable margin of profit to the producer. The general approach has to be to determine the ex-works cost and then to arrive at the fair price after examining other claims of the industry and providing a reasonable return. We, therefore, find no such principle which has been demonstrated to be wrong in the report of the Commission so far as the fixation of the return is concerned.
We are, therefore satisfied that the capacity for production of Hindustan Motors should have been assessed at the figure given by the technical team, namely, 30,000 cars and 5,000 trucks per year. Import licenses, which were granted have also not been shown to have been given on the basis of the figures of production determined by the Commission. For the first half year 1970-71 the recommendation was for the grant of 11,075 cars although in the application the estimated production was stated to be 15,000 cars. It was only for the second half year 1970-71 that the import license was recommended and granted for 15,000 cars. There is no difficulty, therefore, in arriving at the figure of production of cars, namely, 30,000 cars but the departure which the Commission made in the matter of production of trucks has been seriously disputed on behalf of the Hindustan Motors. For the reasons that have been stated the correct figures would be those which were determined by the technical team of the Commission, namely, 30,000 cars and 5,000 trucks. In view of the fact that the company had not kept any regular record of data it was not possible to determine accurately the use of locally purchased and imported steel separately. In these circumstances we do not consider that the conclusion arrived at by the Commission has been shown to be demonstrably erroneous or wrong
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1971 (11) TMI 158 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to us by saying that in making the best judgment assessment it is not always necessary to give a subsequent opportunity to the assessee to show cause against the proposed best judgment estimate over and above the one to be given to him to show cause against the proposal to assess him to the best judgment of the authorities concerned. However, if the best judgment assessment is to be made either on the basis of any fact on record or on the basis of any information given or obtained or on the basis of comparable cases or by working out an average rate, such facts or information must be brought to the notice of the assessee so that he gets an opportunity to explain the circumstances. Such an opportunity need not be given in two stages, but it has to be given in accordance with the principles of natural justice so that the assessee is not affected adversely without being heard. 12.. We leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (11) TMI 157 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat by curtailing the period of three months notice to such period as the Government considered reasonable, would in a way amount to depriving the people of their democratic right of being heard before any tax was imposed on them. Besides, as already held in an earlier part of this judgment, Parliament while enacting the Amendment Act of 1959 (20 of 1959), put its seal of approval to the curtailed period of notice. As such the curtailed period of notice shall be taken to have been provided by Parliament on the ratio of the Supreme Court s decision in Venkatrao Esajirao Limbekar s caseA.I.R. 1970 S.C. 126. The impugned notification, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal, whimsical and arbitrary. For the reasons stated above, the Letters Patent Appeals are accepted and the Civil Writ No. 593 of 1971 is dismissed. So are the remaining writ petitions dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Appeals allowed and Petitions dismissed.
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