|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 52 Records
-
1971 (5) TMI 77 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e Code of Civil Procedure other than execution applications in suits which have been decreed by the Subordinate Courts prior to 31st October, 1966, the valuation of which suits was more than twenty five thousand rupees it will be the High Court which will have jurisdiction to entertain and try the same; (B) execution applications in suits decreed by the Subordinate Courts which had a valuation of more than twenty five thousand rupees prior to 31st October, 1966 can be entertained by the Court which actually passed the decree or the High Court though the jurisdiction to execute the decree may mean any entertaining the application and then transfer of the application to the proper court for execution having territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the matter. (23) We make no orders as to costs of the present proceedings. Both the applications should now come up for further proceedings before the Single Judge on 16th July, 1971. S.N. Andley, J.- I agree. B.C. Misra, J.- I agree.
-
1971 (5) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 604.12 Paise. That would indicate that he requires large quantity of petrol and oil for his motor vehicles, oil engine etc. used for domestic and agricultural purposes. It is true that the extracts of accounts (Ex. P. 1 and P. 2) show that cost of petrol and oil purchased from 31-5-1968 was about ₹ 2250/-but it is impossible to believe that the entire cost was incurred in connection with this election. I hold that the petitioner has failed to establish that the returned candidate had incurred or authorised additional expenditure of ₹ 2,000/-from 31-5-1968 to 15-6-1968 in connection with his election and I decide this issue as not proved. The reasoning and approach of the High Court is unexceptionable and nothing urged by Dr. Singhvi has persuaded us to disagree with the High Court's conclusions. 15. These were the only points urged at the bar in support of the appeal. As we find all of them to be without substance, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (5) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ndings of the courts in which forged documents are produced or false evidence is led and the conclusions of the criminal courts dealing with the private complaint. It is for this reason as suggested earlier, that the Legislature has entrusted the court, whose proceedings had been the target of the offence of perjury to consider the expediency in the larger public interest, of a criminal trial of the guilty party. 11. In this case the offence under Section 471 I.P.C. is clearly covered by the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) but the offence under Section 467 I.P.C. can in our view be tried in the absence of a complaint by the court unless it is shown by the evidence that the documents in question were forged by a party to the earlier proceeding in his character as such party, in other words, after the suit had been instituted. 12. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, in the terms just stated. The lower court, we hope, will dispose of the case with due despatch.
-
1971 (5) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... tion that the transfer of the petitioner was made in bad faith. We ourselves are fully satisfied that the Government acted in good and without any improper motive in transferring the petitioner in view of the admission by the petitioner of some of the allegations contained in the telegram received by the Government in April 1970. (32) The transfer of the petitioner as Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, was made only because of his desire not to be posted as Collector of Customs, Calcutta even though the latter post carried the special pay of ₹ 200.00 per month. The petitioner is, Therefore, in. the zone of consideration for appointment to higher posts in the same way as he would have been if he had continued as the Director of Revenue Intelligence or as Collector of Customs, Calcutta-particularly because his record of service is said to have been very meritorious. (33) We, Therefore, dismiss the writ petition. But in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
-
1971 (5) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... negative. In so far as question No. 1 is concerned my answer is that the document in question is an Instrument of Dissolution of Partnership-cum-three Mortgages which are separately chargeable with stamp duty under Articles 46 and 40 respectively. 29. The applicant would be entitled to his cost which is assessed at ₹ 100/-. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Revenue authority as required under Section 59(2) of the Stamp Act. C.S.P. Singh, J. 30. I agree. BY THE COURT 31. Our answer to question No. 2 is in the negative. In so far as question No. 1 is concerned our answer is that the document in question is an instrument of dissolution of Partnership-cum-three mortgages which are separately chargeable, with stamp duty under Articles 46 and 40 respectively. 32. The applicant will be entitled to his cost, which is assessed at ₹ 100/-. A copy of the judgment shall be sent to the Board of Revenue under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar.
-
1971 (5) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 43 and not to Section 47 which deals with officiating and temporary appointments to certain posts. It would therefore appear that by the inclusion of the name of respondent No. 2 in list 'C' he still continued to be in his officiating and temporary capacity. In terms of Section 47 therefore the appointment ceased to be valid after two years, the period having expired long before the hearing of this matter. 23. No argument was advanced to us on the question of the validity of Section 131 of the U.P. Zila Parishad Act and we do not express any opinion thereon. 24. Although the major points raised by the petitioners are of no substance, we find ourselves unable to uphold the validity of the levy as it has not been shown to us that Kar Adhikari's appointment was valid in law. The order of assessment of ₹ 2,000/-on the petitioners dated 25th March, 1968 will therefore be quashed. In view of the divided success in the writ petition, we make no order as to costs.
-
1971 (5) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e. But the supervening events Should take &way the basis of the contract and it should be of such a character that it strikes at the root of the contract. From the facts found in this case it is clear that the plaintiffs sought to take On lease the properties in question with a enjoy those properties either by personally cultivating sub-leasing them to others. That object became because of the supervening events. Further the terms of the agreement between the parties relating to taking possession of the properties also become impossible of performance. Therefore we agree with the trial court as well as the appellate court that the contract had become impossible of performance. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. But taking into consideration the fact that both the plaintiffs as well as the defendant had become the victim of circumstances which were beyond their control, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ncil decision reported as Bhagwan Das v. The King('A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 263.) cited by Shri Sarin also goes against his contention. It is further note-worthy that this objection was not raised in the High Court. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the submission that the appeal against the order of acquittal was filed in the High Court by an unauthorised person. The appeal on behalf of the accused persons must, therefore., fail. Mr. Shroff rightly did not press the appeal against acquittal of the five accused persons, which was based on the concurrent order by both the courts below. In regard to Mahmood also, who having served out his sentence has already been released, he did not seriously press his appeal for enhancement of sentences. Otherwise too, in regard to the prayer for enhancement of the sentences, we do not find any cogent grounds for differing with the order of the High Court. In-the final result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed. G. C. Appeals dismissed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nferred on it. While the University can prescribe Punjabi as a medium of instruction it cannot prescribe it as the exclusive medium nor compel affiliated Colleges established and administered by linguistic or religious minorities or by a Section of the citizens who wish to conserve their language script and culture, to teach in Punjabi or take examination in that language with Gurmukhi script. The University Act having compulsorily affiliated these Colleges must of necessity cater to their needs and allow them to administer their institutions in their own way and impart instructions in the medium and write examination in their own script. In this view the petitions are allowed with costs. The impugned Circulars of 15-6-1970 as amended by Circular of 2-7-1970 in terms of the resolution of the Senate Sub-Committee of 1-7- 1970 and that of 7-10-1970 are struck down as being invalid and ultra vires of the powers vested in the University. Costs one hearing fee. Petitions allowed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uch interference with the workers does not amount to undue influence as defined in Section 123(2) of the Act read with the definition of 'electoral right' contained in Section 79(d) of the Act. The second argument was that, in judging the evidence of witnesses of the two parties on this issue, the High Court has applied different standards and, by so doing, has disbelieved the evidence of witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant on the basis of circumstances which have been ignored when believing the evidence of respondent's witnesses. It, however, appears to us that it is unnecessary to go into these aspects and to deal with the question whether any corrupt practice of undue influence was committed or not, because the finding we have recorded in regard to the Commission of corrupt practice on the ground of caste Under Section 123(3) of the Act is sufficient to dispose of this appeal which has to be dismissed. As a result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
-
1971 (5) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rpreted the section. The appellant having obtained special leave, the appeal is now before us for disposal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the word 'and' in Sub-clause (xvii) should, in the context, be read as 'or', and that all specialised farms used for non-agricultural purposes are entitled to exemption. We see no force in this contention. The sub-clause specially mentions two types of specialised farms, namely, those devoted to poultry farming and dairying. As regards others, it leaves them to be prescribed by rules under Section 44 of the Act. In this context it is impossible to read the word 'and' as 'or'. Rule 4(4) prescribes those specialised farms, but farms used for horse-breeding are not included. We agree with the interpretation placed by the High Court. 6. In the result Civil Appeal No. 2018 of 1968 fails. The facts in the other two appeals are similar. These must also fail. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1971 (5) TMI 66 - HOUSE OF LORDS
... ...
... ... ..... arrived at by subtracting from the expected retail selling price the amount of the salesman's commission. It appears from the case stated that " it was suggested on behalf of the company that there might be other items of direct selling cost, besides the salesman's commission, which should be taken into account, but no attempt was made to specify them or attach a figure to them. " In these circumstances I wish to reserve the question whether if the evidence were available it might be appropriate to make some further deductions from the expected retail selling price before arriving at the " market price " which is required for the application of the usual formula. In my opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of Cross J. . who had affirmed the decision of the commissioners, was correct and should be upheld. I would dismiss the appeal. Appeals dismissed. Solicitors Titmuss, Sainer and Webb ; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
-
1971 (5) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the orders dated August 5, 1966 and June 12, 1968 are legal and valid?
Whether the petitioner was absent with or without leave
Whether the right to receive pension by a Government servant is property, so as to attract Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution?
Held that:- A reference to r. 5 of the Pension Rules shows that the officers mentioned therein are entitled to pension. The order dated August 5, 1966 declaring under r. 76 of the Service Code that the petitioner has ceased to be in government employ is set aside and quashed. The order dated June 12, 1968 stating that under r. 46 of the Pension Rules, the Department is unable to grant the petitioner pension is also set aside and quashed. When the order dated August 5, 1966 can no longer survive, the order dated June 12, 1968 quite naturally falls to the ground.
For the purposes of quantifying the amount having regard to the period of service and other allied matters, it may be necessary for the authorities to pass an order to that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to an officer not because of the said order but by virtue of the Rules. The Rules, we have already pointed out, clearly recognise the fight of persons like the petitioner to receive pension under the circumstances mentioned therein.
The right of the petitioner to receive pension is property under Art. 3 1 (1) and by a mere executive order the State had no power to withhold the same. Similarly, the said claim is also property under Art. 19(1)(f) and it is not saved by sub-article (5) of Art. 19. Therefore, it follows that the order dated June 12, 1968 denying the petitioner fight to receive pension affects the fundamental right of the petitioner under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution, and as such the writ petition under Art. 32 is maintainable. It may be that under the Pension Act (Act 23 of 1871) there is a bar against a civil court entertaining any suit relating to the matters mentioned therein. That does not stand in the way of a Writ of Mandamus being issued to the State to properly consider the claim of the petitioner for payment of pension according to law. Appeal allowed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 64 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as given rise to questions both of facts and of law, on which the existence of the legal right controverted depends. Thus, the second condition of article 131 is also fulfilled. In its scope, article 131 is sweepingly prohibitive against the exercise of jurisdiction by all courts other than the Supreme Court and confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, if the above conditions are satisfied. If a dispute as regards the parties and its nature falls within the ambit of this article, no court other than the Supreme Court has any jurisdiction to determine that dispute. It is only the forum of the Supreme Court, to which resort can be had by the petitioner for the determination of the disputed questions raised by it against the State of Haryana. In the result, we hold that these petitions are not maintainable in this court and disallow them without any order as to costs. If thought advisable, the petitioner may seek its remedy in the Supreme Court. Petitions dismissed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 63 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... grant the first two reliefs. We think that the purpose of the petitioners would be served if it is declared that the search and seizure of documents effected by the 4th respondent was illegal. As we have already held that the administrative instructions issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax are illegal, we think we should issue a direction to the Sales Tax Officer restraining him from being guided by the said instructions in the assessment proceedings against the petitioners. In the result the petitions are partly allowed. We grant a declaration that the search and seizure made by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer (S.I.B.) in these two petitions is illegal. We issue an order restraining the Sales Tax Officer (Sector VII, Kanpur) from acting in accordance with paragraph 5(j) of the administrative instructions issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax by circular No. SS-(S.I.B.) 66-67-21ST dated March/April 1, 1967. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 62 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aising of such contentions does not by itself give a right to the assessee not to show those transactions in the return. The transactions in the present case were mostly of paddy and it is not understandable how the petitioner could bona fide believe that paddy and rice constitute one commodity. A perusal of Schedule C cannot leave any room for doubt that rice and paddy are two separate and distinct commodities shown differently at serial Nos. 8 and 9 of the said Schedule. In the result, the order of the Tribunal upholding those of the appellate and Assessing Authorities imposing penalty on the petitioner for submitting a false return under section 10(7) of the Act is unexceptionable. It is not open to this court to sit in appeal on the quantum of penalty even if the same is, in view of the previous record of the petitioner, considered to be rather excessive. The writ petition consequently stands dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... enged by the petitioners concerned, under which they had been made liable to pay sales tax and that too at an enhanced rate under section 3-A(2), is liable to be held unenforceable against them on certain other ground which will be stated separately in the judgment by which the writ petitions filed by the retail vendors are to be decided on merits. 63.. In the result the three petitions filed by brick manufacturers are allowed with costs. The following clause in section 3-A(1) of the Act added by U.P. Act 2 of 1970 and such declaration may be made notwithstanding that the goods or class of goods are not capable of being sold or according to prevalent commercial practice are not ordinarily sold at more than one point is held to be invalid and ineffective. The impugned notifications dated April 5, 1961, and December 1, 1962, are also held to be invalid. The turnovers of the petitioners shall be taxed in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Act. Petitions allowed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 60 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s. If these facts are proved, the refund shall be made to the dealer who has made the inter-State sales. The law does not lay down a further condition that the dealer who has made the inter-State sales should have paid the tax under the Act. The petitioner s claims for refund were rejected on the sole ground that the tax had been collected from the first purchasers and not from the petitioner who was the second purchaser in the State. The petitioner having satisfied the two conditions referred to above, was entitled to the refund of tax collected under the Act. The sales tax authorities were therefore not right in rejecting the claim for refund. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we allow these revision petitions, reverse the decision of the Tribunal in S.T.A. Nos. 160, 161 and Here italicised. 162 of 1969 and direct the assessing authority to make the refund to the assessee. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200, one set. Petitions allowed.
-
1971 (5) TMI 59 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oner-firm on the basis of this registration certificate for the manufacture of khandsari and gur-sheera, may not be entitled to deduct from its their gross turnover the value of such sales as khandsari is a tax-free goods but the petitioner cannot be held liable to the sales tax department for the payment of sales tax on the purchase of that gur. It was open to the seller to realise it from the purchaser, that is, the petitioner, but it is not open to the department to realise it from the purchaser because it is, under the Act, payable only by the seller. The levy of sales tax on the amount of Rs. 1,31,522.31 at the rate of 6 per cent. is, therefore, liable to be quashed. For the reasons given above, I accept this writ petition with costs and quash the order of the Assessing Authority, Kamal, dated 10th April, 1968, in so far as it levies tax of Rs. 7,891.32 on the purchase value of gur amounting to Rs. 1,31,522.31 under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. Counsel s fee Rs. 100.
-
1971 (5) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Power of tribunal to stay winding-up
|
