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Showing 1 to 20 of 30 Records
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1971 (6) TMI 56 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with the order of Ghose. J., with the help of Keshavlal. It is alleged that the arbitrators are near relations of the partners of the plaintiff firm. o p /o p 29. By considering all these points, in my opinion, Mr. Deb's arguments have great force behind them and as indicated above, I have no hesitation to accept them. In my opinion, the Special Officers appointed herein being Officers of the Court must obtain prior directions from the appropriate Court before they are advised to refer to arbitration the subject-matter of the dispute in a pending suit in which the company is involved and more so, when none of the directors of the company are functioning as such directors. I am further of the opinion that neither the arbitration agreement nor the Terms of Settlement have been properly, signed except as indicated above and in any event the matter cannot be agreed to arbitration without a petition. Accordingly, I reject the same. There will be no order as to cost. o p /o p
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1971 (6) TMI 55 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the rate of estate duty was not made applicable to the father in a Hindu undivided family governed by Mitakshara school of law, the net wealth which would have been acquired by the sons would have been more than the net wealth which they would have acquired in the case of the Dayabhaga school of law. Precisely, in order to get over this inequality, section 34(1)(c) of the Act has been enacted. The classification is based upon intelligble differentia which distinguishes one group of fathers from another group of fathers under the two schools of Hindu law, i.e., Mitakshara and Dayabhaga. We respectfully agree with the decision of the Madras High Court in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Asst. Controller of Estate Duty (1), and hold that section 34(1)(c) of the Act is neither violative nor repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution. Both the contentions raised by the petitioner fail and are rejected. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100.
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1971 (6) TMI 54 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . In a similar case of a printing press the business of which was to print on orders, letter heads, bill books, account books in The State of A.P. v. Sri Krishna Power Press, Vizianagaram(1), the learned judges repelled the contention of the assessee that the works involved in that case constituted works contract. Suffice it to say that therefore a transaction which results in transfer of property in finished goods, as in these cases cinema tickets printed to certain specifications, cannot be construed as a works contract. The transactions are sales within the meaning of clause (n) of section 2 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The fact that the finished products (cinema tickets) cannot be sold to the general public is certainly no ground for regarding the contract as works contract. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the findings of the Tribunal and dismissing these two revisions with costs in each. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... whether the information was upplied separately in regard to every sale or whether it was supplied in a consolidated form. It must be stated that the forms are not supplied by the Government but are prepared procured by the dealers independently. Looking at the substance of the matter, respondents must be held to have complied with the legal requirement. The other question which the department wants to be referred to this court is whether the burden of proof in a case of the present nature lies on the assessee or on the department. This is an academic question, because though initially the Tribunal had held that the burden would lie on the department, it was subsequently held, under an order of rectification, that the burden must lie on the assessee to establish his claim for deduction and not on the department to prove that the assessee is not entitled to the deduction claimed by him. We, therefore, dismiss the petition and discharge the rule with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of his an attempt was being made to distrain his articles. The record discloses that Sri Purushothaman was maintaining that he had no funds or belongings of his own and he was unable to pay arrears of tax. Now that the position is made clear, as it ought to be, that the distraint notice is only directed against the belongings or movables of Sri Purushothaman in the hands of the petitioner, it is not necessary to issue a rule. I may make it, however, clear that I am not expressing any opinion on the propriety of the notice of distraint as it cannot be issued in the instant case on the ground that Sri Purushothaman was of unsound mind. But in view of the statement as above and as it is accepted by the petitioner, it is not necessary for me to further delve into the matters to find whether the notice as such is properly or legally issued by the concerned authorities. In this view, no further orders are passed as they are not necessary in this writ petition. Ordered accordingly.
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1971 (6) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of the contract. It is clear to our mind that this is not a contract for sale of goods. The production of the picture stipulated for in the contract was really a production of a work of art which really involved the skill of an artiste. Under the circumstances, although construction of a document would be a question of law, and it would be so in this case also, we are satisfied that, on a construction of the contract, the reasons for holding that the contract was for a work of art are so overwhelming that no useful purpose would be served in directing a reference to be made. It may be stated that an attempt was made before the authorities to split up the price, part being allocable to sale of goods and the rest to be treated as appertaining to the production of a work of art. That attempt failed and that aspect does not survive for consideration nor has it been raised in this petition. We therefore dismiss the petition and discharge the Rule with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ground that in view of the judgment in the Bengal Immunity case 1955 6 S.T.C. 446 (S.C.)., the tax was recovered illegally by the Government. The Supreme Court held that the Sales Tax Act was a self-contained code, that section 20 was a bar to the suit and that the proper remedy for the assessee was either to file an appeal or to apply for revision and ask for condonation of delay on the ground that the mistake which was responsible for the recovery of the tax illegally levied was discovered only when the judgment was pronounced by the Supreme Court in the Bengal Immunity case 1955 6 S.T.C. 446 (S.C.). The Supreme Court added that such a plea would have been competent. The course adopted by the respondents in the present case is in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court and if the matter is looked at from that point of view it would be futile to admit this petition. For these reasons, we dismiss this petition and discharge the rule with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Counsel for the department had conceded before the Tribunal, and the same concession is made before us, that the judgment of the Supreme Court in KhosIa s case(1) would apply to the present case. It is however contended that an additional point which was urged in the present case was not urged before the Supreme Court and therefore the Tribunal should be asked to make a reference to this court for determination of that point. This, in our opinion, is not permissible. The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in KhosIa s case(1) and on those facts the Supreme Court negatived the contention of the department that the sales were in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The judgment of the Supreme Court is binding on us and we cannot refuse to follow it on the supposition that if some other point was urged before the Supreme Court, the decision would have been different. We therefore dismiss this petition and discharge the rule with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 48 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the learned counsel is that clause (a) refers to an offender and clause (b) to a defaulter. Since the petitioner is only a defaulter and not an offender, the warrant has to be issued only to the Collector of the District, under clause (b). This distinction appears to us to be baseless and if accepted, it renders the main provisions of sub-section (1) of section 386 nugatory. Sub-section (1) provides for the recovery of fine in either or both of the ways specified under clause (a) or (b). When an application is made to a Magistrate under section 13(3)(b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, the Magistrate can recover the dues under the said Act as if it were a fine imposed by him. By the fiction created under section 13(3)(b), the petitioner is in the position of an offender or a defaulter for the purpose of recovery of fine. The contention of Mr. Gandhi, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 5.. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... availed of such remedies, he cannot seek for such a relief under article 226 either, for this would be by-passing the provisions of accredited statutes. The petitioner has allowed the original assessment to become final and it is this final order which is sought to be enforced by the respondents no doubt through the channel of the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act. There is no public duty enjoined upon the respondents to correct an order of assessment which has become final because they have no jurisdiction to do so and indeed it would be improper to undertake any such correction. The respondents therefore not having erred in their public duty and having exercised jurisdiction under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, it cannot be said that the order challenged has to be injuncted by the issue of a rule of prohibition. The rule nisi is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was found that the principles of natural justice, in particular, the principle of audi alteram Partem was not observed, a Division Bench of this court in Murali Trading Co. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer 1967 19 S.T.C. 221 (1967) 1 M.L.J. 258. set aside the original order of assessment and directed the concerned assessee to withdraw the appeal pending before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Following this decision, I direct the assessee to withdraw the appeal before the appellate authority and contemporaneously set aside the order of assessment which is impugned herein, as a full and fair trial has not been given to the petitioner when the order of assessment has been made. It is, however, open to the assessing authorities to start fresh proceedings for assessing the petitioner, but they shall do so after giving the petitioner every opportunity of stating his case and filing his documents. The writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1971 (6) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Cochin agreeing to sell specified varieties of coir-yarn against samples shown and accepted. A copy of the printed agreement which has been extracted in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner indicates that the petitioners have contracted to sell and deliver coir-yarn of the quality and on terms and conditions stated on the reverse of the form and it was after entering into such a contract that the goods were moved from Travancore-Cochin State to Madras. If after entering into such a contract the goods are diverted and not sold, it would amount to a breach of contract and penal consequences are bound to follow. Therefore, the movement of the goods was the direct result of the contract of sale, which was necessarily incidental to the sale, and the transaction, therefore, comes within the exemption to article 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. In the result, the revisions are allowed. But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (6) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... of the jurisdiction conferred on the winding-up court by sub-section (2) of section 446, there would be conflict of proceedings and conflict of decisions. Sub-section (1) is intended to avoid such a situation and it confers the ultimate control in the matter on the winding-up court which is entrusted with the function of collecting and distributing the assets of the company according to law. Applying the above principle, it follows that an assessment or reassessment proceeding or a proceeding to impose penalties under the Income-tax Act does not fall within the ambit of sub-section (1) of section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, as such a proceeding does not come under subsection (2) of the above section, while sub-section (1) would apply to a claim for arrears of income-tax or any other amount by way of penalty or otherwise, as such a claim falls under sub-section (2). These applications are, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1971 (6) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Requirements with respect to memorandum, Alternate Director – Appointed and Term of Office of, Notice for Meeting, Winding up – Application for, Winding-up of foreign companies
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1971 (6) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Shares certificate – Limitation of time for issue of certificate ... ... ... ... ..... s, 11th edition, pages 254-55). The said sub-section nowhere provides for delivery of the certificates of shares or debentures or debenture-stocks but only enjoins upon the company to have the same ready for delivery. The said words in the sub-section, in my opinion, should not be construed in such a way as to give an extended meaning to the words to have them ready for delivery . The subsection (1) does not impose an obligation upon the company to deliver the said shares, etc. Thus, in my opinion, sub-section (3) to the said section does not authorise a person to have an order for delivery of the said shares. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, this application is misconceived and must fail. In the premises, this application is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not, however, make any order as to costs. Certified for counsel as against respective clients. All interim orders shall stand vacated. Operation of the order is stayed for four weeks.
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1971 (6) TMI 39 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Power of inspectors to carry investigation into affairs of related companies ... ... ... ... ..... nswers so admissible in evidence do not include unsworn answers given as a result of what I might term informal questioning by the Board of Trade inspectors. There is, of course, nothing whatever improper in the inspectors so questioning a person informally, but it does seem to me that unsworn answers given in those circumstances the outside the ambit of section 50 on any fair reading of that section with section 167 of the Act of 1948. The Board of Trade inspectors have not got, and do not require, any statutory authority to put a series of oral questions to a person as a preliminary to their investigation into the affairs of the company, but I do not think answers given in those circum stances, unsworn, are really, the sort of answers which section 50 of the Act of 1967 has in mind. In those circumstances I reach the conclusion that the answers in transcript no. 18 to which I have referred are admissible in evidence against the bank, but not the answers in transcript no. 3.
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1971 (6) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Dividend manner and time of payment of, Notice for meeting ... ... ... ... ..... nly if it is further shown that the dividends were declared and paid and that the tax also was collected by them from the dividends. Then only the obligation to pay to the credit of the Central Government would be cast on the accused in other words, it is not a mere default or omission to pay tax which a party is bound to pay. That is not the subject-matter of the offence here. Here the offence is the failure to deduct and pay. When the deduction itself is hot proved, the further obligation to pay cannot be thrown on the accused. The offence, if at all, was committed under section 51 of the 1922 Act, which cannot survive so as to be made the subject-matter of a complaint under the 1961 Act, as under the latter Act section 276(d) requires that the deduction and payment of tax should be one under the provisions of Chapter XVII-B of the 1961 Act. That requirement being absent, the charge is bound to fail and in confirmation of the order of acquittal, these appeals are dismissed.
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1971 (6) TMI 37 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Shares of shareholders dissenting from scheme or contract approved by majority – Power and duty to acquire
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1971 (6) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Stay/Dispensation of Pre-deposit - Hearing - Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... appellant before the Government of India was in fact heard before the order impugned was made. In the present case no such hearing was given. In that view 6t the matter, the appellate order passed by the Appellate Collector of Customs is hereby set aside. The Appellate Collector of Customs will now hear the matter in accordance with law. It is stated before me by Mr. Gupta that the penalty has already been realised by the respondents. Mr. Roy, however, contended that it is not to his knowledge that such was the case. Be that as it may, while hearing the application under section 129 proviso, the parties will be at liberty to urge the points taken before me. 5.I, therefore, make the Rule absolute to the extent indicated above. The appellate order is set aside. The matter will now go back to the Appellate Officer who will hear the matter under section 129 proviso in accordance with law. 6.This order is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in this Rule.
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1971 (6) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural justice - Adjudication - Evidence - Relevance of - Summons ... ... ... ... ..... one. The petitioner had a right to be heard in the proceeding itself before the proceeding could be concluded and the order of confiscation could be made. That was not done by the Collector. Therefore, both the objections raised as against the final order of the confiscation dated September 27, 1969 must be sustained and S. R. 8607(W) of 1969 must succeed. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside. 18.In the result, both the Rules succeed and are made absolute. The impugned order of confiscation passed by the Collector of Customs dated September 27, 1969 and the interlocutory order passed by the said Collector refusing the petitioner s prayers made on June 20, 1969 and as communicated by the departmental memo. dated July 26, 1969 are set aside. The Collector would now be at liberty to proceed afresh with the adjudication in accordance with law. Let a writ in the nature of Certiorari do issue in each case incorporating the above direction. There will be no order as to costs.
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