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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 113 Records
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1971 (9) TMI 193 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... courts below are set aside and the proceedings are now remitted back to the trial court for determination of rent that the landlord is entitled to recover. 5. In the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs. 6. In C. R. P. No. 715 of 1971, the only difference is that the landlord is the same but the tenant is a different person. The application for recovery of rent is for the year 1967-68 and it was filed on 7-2-1969. The trial court has rejected the application on the ground of limitation and that has been confirmed by the appellate court. Having regard to the view expressed by me in C. R P. No. 557 of 1971, it has to be held that the orders passed by both the courts below even In this case is erroneous and accordingly they are set aside. The learned trial Judge is now directed to determine the rent that the landlord will be entitled to recover and dispose of the proceedings in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs.
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1971 (9) TMI 192 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... agriculture. So long as the tenancy subsists, the raiyat is entitled to avail of the right of pre-emption under Section 8(1), even though he does not cultivate the land of his holding. Cultivation of the land or actual user of the same for agricultural purpose by a co-sharer raiyat is not a condition precedent to enforcing the right of pre-emption under Section 8(1). 14. In the instant case, there being no dispute that the purpose of the tenancy is agriculture, the petitioner must be held to be a raiyat of the holding. The finding of the learned Munsif that the petitioner not being himself a cultivator, is not a raiyat within the meaning of Section 2(10), is erroneous. 15. In the result, the order of the learned Munsif dismissing the applications of the petitioner under Section 8(1) is set aside and the orders of the Senior Land Reforms Officer allowing the applications of the petitioner are restored. The Rules are made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1971 (9) TMI 191 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n by Ch. Ghulam Nabi Mir, S.H.O. to summon the appellant for interrogation soon after the alleged discovery of his name. No convincing or even intelligible explanation is forthcoming for interrogating the other P.A.C. men on the 8th and 9th October. Such investigation can scarcely inspire confidence. 16. As a result of the foregoing discussion we do not consider it possible to uphold the conclusion of the High Court on the legal evidence existing on this record. In the absence of any test identification parade and excluding from consideration the statements made under Section 161, Cr. P.C. we find no reliable material on which the appellant's conviction can be sustained. The High Court was in error in affirming the appellant's conviction for the offence of murder and confirming the sentence of death. It was equally in error in upholding his conviction and sentence under Section 307, I.P.C. The appeal accordingly succeeds and allowing the same we acquit the appellant.
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1971 (9) TMI 190 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n to the release of these three Directors from the undertaking. Both Mr. S.C. Sen and Mr. Prabir Sen submitted that their clients would be content if the order made on April 7, 1971, is continued until final determination of the suit Accordingly, we order that in the event of it being ultimately held that the investment to be made by the 8th appellant on the basis of the impugned resolution, is illegal and in the event of the investment not being regularised in accordance with law within three months of the final determination of the suit, the Directors of the 8th appellant other than Shri B. P. Khaitan. Shri R. Chaudhuri and Shri B. Malik undertake to this Court through Counsel for the 8th appellant to have the shares of the 8th appellant sold and/or disposed of within four months from the date of final determination of the suit and further undertake to this Court to reimburse any loss that the 8th appellant may suffer by reason of sale of the shares pursuant to this order.
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1971 (9) TMI 189 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble to refund it because it is a deposit. They are both in the position of depositories. Accordingly, the article applicable is Article 145 of the Indian Limitation Act and if for any reason this article is not applicable, there is no doubt that Article 120 is applicable to the present case." Thus there is sufficient authority for the view I have taken in the matter. The contracts in this case were completed on 27-1-1958 and the suit has been filed within six years of that date. Although on behalf of the defendant, the Engineer incharge has deposed that the amount of security deposit was refundable six months after the completion of the contract, but no such period is fixed in the agreement and in its absence the time will begin to run from the date of the completion of the contract, But in any case the suit was instituted within six years of the completion of the contract. 14. I, therefore, do not find any force in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1971 (9) TMI 188 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the ground that it is in excess of the power granted to the Central Government. Suspicious circumstances in a given case may lead to a reasonable belief, but suspicious circumstances cannot be equated with 'suspects'. We, therefore, hold that the observations of the Supreme Court in Badri Prasad v. Collector Central Excise. AIR 1971 SC 1170 do not help or advance the argument of the learned counsel. 25. In the view that we have taken we do not find any necessity to go into the question whether the impugned clause 5 of the Order violates Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, leave that question open. 26. We accordingly hold that the order of seizure passed by the second respondent in pursuance of the powers derived by him under clause 5 (iii) of the Order is illegal as Clause 5 (iii) itself is in excess of the power. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-. Goods seized be returned. Petition allowed.
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1971 (9) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tment of forgery under secs. 468 and 471 and of false, impersonation under sec. 419 read with sec. 109. Assuming that the Magistrate before taking cognizance had persued the statements of witnesses recorded by the police during investigation, it was conceded by counsel, after he himself had gone through them from the record, that none of the witnesses had alleged therein either directly or indirectly of the appellant having entered into a criminal conspiracy with Bakshi Singh for forging the passport. It- cannot be disputed that the charge-sheet also prima facie disclosed the offence of abetment. That being so, it is ,impossible to sustain the argument that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under sec. 120B, and therefore, consent under sec. 196A(2) was required as a condition precedent or that the committal order and the proceedings for committal which be took were vitiated for want of such consent. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (9) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he substantive sentences of imprisonment in the case of N.K. Banerjee. Harihar Prasad and B.P. Sinha will run concurrently. (v) All other convictions of N.K. Banerjee. Harihar Prasad and B.P. Sinha are set aside. (vi) Appellant Kohili and Jwala Prasad are each convicted under Section 120B read with Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months. Each of them is also sentenced to pay a fine, which in the case of Kohili will be ₹ 30.000/-and in the case of Jwala Prasad will be ₹ 20.000/-with rigorous imprisonment for six months in default in case of each of them. (vii) Sahani is dead. Under an order of Court his interests are being looked after by his son. His conviction under Section 120B read with Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code remains, but in his case in view of Section 70. of the Indian Penal Code the fine is fixed at ₹ 25.000/- 88. With these modifications, the criminal appeals are dismissed.
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1971 (9) TMI 185 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich did not fall within either the category of tax or of fee. I am not bold enough to say that the passage extracted from the decision of the Supreme Court in L. T. Swamiar's case has an effect different from these decisions “In my opinion, the passage extracted itself indicates that there are only two classes of levy, one, a tax with no quid pro quo or consideration to the payer of the levy, and two, a fee where there is a quid pro quo or consideration to the payer by services rendered or at least by the conferment of a privilege as in the case of a licence fee.” In other words, if a licence fee confers a privilege on the payer which he otherwise does not have, the licence fee is a fee if there is no such privilege and the licence and the licence fee are merely for the purpose of control in the common interest, then the licence fee is a tax notwithstanding its name as a fee. With the aforesaid clarifications, I agree with the judgment of my learned brother.
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1971 (9) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ess or business carried on by the parties after 11-7-1940. The business carried on by the defendants in the name of "Lachiah Setty and Sons" and "Gin Coffee Works" is to be regarded, after 11-7-1940, as the separate business of the defendants. (4) The plaintiffs shall be put in separate possession of the properties coming to their share on partition by metes and bounds. The partition shall be effected by a commissioner appointed by the Court in respect of all properties not required under the law to be partitioned by the Deputy Commissioner. In respect of properties, partition of which is required under the law to be effected by the Deputy Commissioner, the partition shall be effected by the Deputy Commissioner or his Subordinate Gazetted Officer. The present possession of the parties shall be respected as far as possible. (5) The order of costs made by the High Court is confirmed and the appellants shall pay the costs of the respondents in these appeals.
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1971 (9) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ith this case point out that the legislature since chosen to specifically prescribe 3 years as limitation period by addition of sub- sec. (1A) to Sec. 77 while deleting Sec. 80. See 77(1A) provides that "Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose". By this amendment the claim under clause (d), as well as, the one under clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 75 which provides for the adjudication of a claim by the Insurance Court for the recovery of any benefit admissible under the Act for which a separate limitation was fixed under Sec. 80, is now to be made within 3 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. This. amendment also confirms the view taken by this Court that the power under Section 96 (1) (b) does not empower the Government to prescribe by rules a period of limitation for claims under Sec. 75. In the result this appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (9) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Each one must be held to have made a gift of her share of the property though the gift is made through one single document. It is surprising that the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal should have ever thought that the gift in question was by an association or by a body of individuals. The Gift-tax Act did not change the general law relating to the rights of property. It merely sought to tax a gift of the property owned by a person. As mentioned earlier the property with which we are concerned in this case is a property owned by two persons as tenants-in-common, each one having a definite share. In our opinion, the High Court was absolutely right in answering the question referred to it in favour of the assessee. Civil Appeal No. 1436 (NT)/71 accordingly fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Civil Appeal No. 1237 of 1969 is dismissed as not being maintainable. No costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (9) TMI 181 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icate. At the time those sales were made in favour of Jai Hind Stores, the registration certificate of the concern was still subsisting and the dealer could not have any knowledge that the registration certificate of Jai Hind Stores would be cancelled with retrospective effect. We fail to understand as to how the dealer can be deprived of the benefit of the deduction contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act in respect of the above-mentioned sales. As the deduction claimed by the dealer was in respect of sales made prior to the date of the order of cancellation of the registration certificate of Jai Hind Stores, we need express no opinion on the point as to what was the effect of the delay in notifying the cancellation of the registration certificate in the official Gazette. We would, therefore, answer the question, referred to this court, against the department. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1971 (9) TMI 180 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eipts and invoices were to be retired from the banks by the purchasers themselves. The assessee was merely to prepare invoices on the receipt of the pro forma chalans from the manufacturers and to collect C forms from the buyers. All money realised by the assessee from the purchasers was to be deposited by it in the account of the manufacturers. This modus operandi is consistent only with the status of the assessee as a selling agent. It is not consistent with the position of a person who buys goods from outside U.P. and sells them within U.P. in his own right. We have thus no hesitation in holding that although the sales in question are inter-State sales yet the assessee is not liable for the payment of the tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. We, accordingly, answer the two questions in the following manner Question No. (1) in the affirmative. Question No. (2) in the negative. The assessee is entitled to the cost which is assessed at Rs 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (9) TMI 179 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ove, can demand the tax without any further proceedings or without any further processing as required under law. As I stated, the question in the instant case is academic and I am not inclined to go through it as to what the purport of the validating provision is. On the facts, and as I am satisfied that the principles of natural justice have been violated, I direct the respondent to give the petitioner a fresh opportunity as indicated above. It is represented by the learned Government Pleader that during the pendency of these writ petitions by way of abundant caution the respondent has passed orders of assessment consequent upon the demands raised under challenged notices. Those orders, in view of the rule nisi being made absolute in these two writ petitions, shall be deemed to be non est by the assessing authority and he shall proceed afresh in the light of the observations already made. The writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1971 (9) TMI 178 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as may be prescribed any of his powers under the Act except those under sub-section (1) of section 21. It is not disputed that powers under section 7(4) had been delegated to the assessing authorities. A plain reading of rules 12 and 13 indicates that publication in the Official Gazette is required only in those cases where the Commissioner himself, after the names of the dealers are forwarded to him, has to pass final orders of cancellation. The assessing authority, when it is competent to cancel a registration certificate, is under no obligation to follow the procedure of rule 12, and publish the names. The reasoning of the Sales Tax Tribunal is unexceptionable and Mr. Bhagirath Dass, the learned counsel for the assessee, has not been able to persuade us to take a different view. In the result, the references are answered in favour of the department and against the assessee. There is, in the circumstances of this case, no order as to costs. References answered accordingly.
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1971 (9) TMI 177 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ible for the movement of a purchaser. Nor was it considered to be his responsibility to trace him (purchaser). These considerations have been held to be wholly irrelevant and not germane to the issue, namely, whether the transactions are proved to be genuine. An argument was advanced in Ram Pal s case(1) that the purchasers were men of straw and this was a good piece of evidence, but the contention was repelled. In an over all assessment, we are satisfied that the present case is on all fours with the cases cited above and we must hold that there was no evidence on which the assessing authority or the appellate authority, acting under the Act, could find that the transactions in respect of which deduction was sought by the assessee were proved to be collusive and not genuine. In the result, the reference is answered in the negative, namely, for the assessee and against the department. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1971 (9) TMI 176 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be arbitrary. Even best judgment assessment implies and imports a legal and judicial consideration and the assessing authority cannot just base the same on some suspicions without there being any material on which it could rely. The assessing authority has just mentioned a figure at Rs. 51,523.88 but if it had fixed the increase at Rs. one lakh or any other amount, there was nothing to stop it. We are, therefore, satisfied that in the circumstances of the present case there is no evidence on which reliance could be placed to add a sum of Rs. 51,523.88 to the turnover. In the result, the first question referred to us is answered in the negative, that is, against the department and in favour of the assessee. The second question relates to the imposition of penalty and that too must be answered in favour of the assessee when the increase in the turnover cannot be sustained. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1971 (9) TMI 175 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tus of the petitioner was raised expressly and was ultimately decided in favour of the petitioner, there would have been no cause for the petitioner to file the present rectification applications at all. It cannot be said that it discovered that it was not a dealer for the first time only in the year 1968 when the petitioner submitted the applications for rectification. It is seen from the applications themselves that the basis, provocation and the reason for filing the applications for rectification is the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal for the years 1961-62 and 1962-63. It is in this view, I have stated that if the contention is accepted, every assessment order ought to be treated only as a nebulous order, unless the period of three years, provided for under section 55(1), expires by efflux of time. This is neither the intendment of the Act nor the purport of section 55(1). For the above reasons, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1971 (9) TMI 174 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t in case the goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax so levied shall be refunded to such person, in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. Thus, it is seen that section 6 conforms to section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act and does not go contrary to that section. As already pointed out by us, section 15 does not lay down that the sales tax on declared goods can be collected only under the Central Sales Tax Act and not under the State Act. We, therefore, find that the Tribunal has committed an error when it came to the conclusion that tax on declared goods can be collected only under the Central Sales Tax Act and not under the Sales Tax Act. We, therefore, decide and hold that tax can be levied under section 6 of the Sales Tax Act on groundnuts which are one of the declared goods. In the result, the revision is allowed. No order as to costs. Government Pleader s fee Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred only). Petition allowed.
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