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Showing 1 to 20 of 58 Records
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1972 (11) TMI 109 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould be formed has no substance. 43. Before we close we may state that at the commencement of his reply to the arguments made on behalf of the petitioner the learned Advocate General wanted us to throw out the petition on certain alleged mis-statements of facts made in the affidavits. We consider it unnecessary to deal with the argument inasmuch as in the first place he was not able to convince us that there was any suppression of material facts or gross mis-statements in respect of them so as to disentitle the petitioner to be heard on merits. Moreover this argument was made when the whole case had been argued out by the petitioner from start to the finish. That apart, we have dealt with all the points argued by the learned counsel for both the parties and it is no stage for nonsuiting the petitioner on the ground of alleged mis-statements in the writ petition. 44. In the result we see no force in this writ petition, and hereby dismiss it, but, without any order as to costs.
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1972 (11) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... case to suggest that either of them was of that kind and gravity which would jeopardise the maintenance of public order. No doubt bombs were said to have been carried by those who are alleged to have committed the two acts stated In the grounds. Possibly that was done to terrify the respective victims and prevent them from offering resistance. But it is not alleged in the grounds that they were exploded to cause terror In the locality so that those living there would be prevented from following their usual avocations of life. The two Incidents alleged against the petitioner, thus, pertained to specific individuals, and therefore, related to and fell within the area of law and order. In respect of such acts the drastic provisions of the Act are not contemplated to be resorted to and the ordinary provisions of our penal laws would be sufficient to cope with them. 5. In the circumstances the petition must be allowed and the release of the petitioner directed. Order accordingly.
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1972 (11) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efeat the intention of Section 16 (5) (a). We are unable to construe the provisions in the manner suggested. To do so, would be to insert words in Clause (b) of Section (16) (5) which are not there. What it speaks of are articles and ornaments, and, if both of them are owned possessed, held or controlled by an individual or family, then the proper provision which will be attracted is Clause (b). There is no justification for the construction that the limit placed by Section 16 (5) (a) should be imported into Clause (b). There is no warrant for it in the language used. 5. This is a case where the ladies owned and possessed articles and ornaments which are not shown to exceed 4,000 grams or even 2,000 grams. That being the case, the notices served were without jurisdiction. 6. The petitions are, therefore, allowed with costs in one of them. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. 7. The 18 sovereigns seized from the respective ladies will be returned to them within a month from to-date.
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1972 (11) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e at the shop or he drank the mixture in the taxi as averred by the taxi driver, that bottle would have been found in the taxi or in his possession and would have been seized by the police. In either event, since the appellant was lying unconscious in the taxi, the taxi driver, when he brought the appellant and his companion to the police station, would have pointed out to the police officer that the two passengers had taken something in the taxi and that the bottle containing it was either in the taxi or in possession of the appellant. Nothing of that kind was done. It is clear that the production of a bottle of that mixture during the trial was an afterthought spun out with a view to bolster up a defence. 10. In our view the appellant failed to rebut the presumption which the Court is obliged to draw under the Act The High Court, therefore, was justified in reversing the Magistrate's order of acquittal and convicting the appellant. 11. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent of fair hearing in the rules or other source of power claimed for reconsidering the order dated April 22, 1960 is supplied by the rule of justice which is considered as an integral part of our judicial process which also governs quasijudicial authorities when deciding controversial points affecting fights of parties. We also express no opinion on the question of the correctness or otherwise of the view taken by the Patna High Court in the case of Liladhar Jha (supra) nor do we express any opinion about the the and effect of r. 12(2) referred to above or of any other rule or rules which may be attracted to the appellant's case. Indeed, this order is not to be construed as containing any opinion on the merits of the controversy except that the aforesaid orders of the President made in 1961 and 1964 have been quashed. The appellant is entitled to his costs from the contesting respondents. On facts of C.M.P. No. 4775 of 1968 no orders are called for. S.C. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (11) TMI 104 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion contained in the decision of the learned single judge the administrators appointed by him have conducted an election on the basis of Ext. P1. We do not want to nullify that election. The Board of Directors, who are now in office will continue for the remaining part of their term. But before the expiry of the term a fresh election of the Board of Directors will be conducted by those in office on the basis of Ext. P1 without taking notice of Regulation. 47 therein. If before the expiry of that term the existing Board of Directors do not conduct an election of the Board of Directors or if they are unable to conduct any such election, the administrators appointed by the learned single judge will take control of the affairs of the company and then conduct an election as contained in this judgment. The appeal is allowed. We also set aside the direction of the learned single judge making the appellant liable for costs in the proceedings before him. We make no order as to costs.
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1972 (11) TMI 103 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Assistant Registrar ought to have exercised his discretion under Section 18 of the Act and refused registration of the respondent proposed trade mark. I am conscious of the rule that an appellant court should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the Registrar under Section 18 of the Act. But in this case the leaned Assistant Registrar had declined to exercise his discretion against the respondent only because he was to the view that the respondent were not guilty of dishonest trade practice. This view of the learned Assistant Registrar is clearly wrong and Therefore the discretion vested in him had been exercised on the basis of the wrong view. this is a fit case in may view where this court should interfere with the discretion exercised by the leaned Assistant Registrar. I hold that by reason dishonest trade mark. The order of the learned Assistant Registrar is set aside and the appeal is allowed. There shall be on order as to costs. 9. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (11) TMI 102 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fore us, the premises have been let and the assessment of annual value is on the basis of the agreed rent which is legally recoverable under the Delhi Rent Act as standard rent has not been fixed by the Controller or statutorily determined under the provisions of this Act. The learned Single Judge was, Therefore, not right in holding that even in these cases the appellants must ascertain the reasonable cost of construction as well as the market price of the land, if any, and arrive at a rateable value for assessing the property tax. The judgment under appeal in writ Petitions Nos.80, 133 to 137 and 176 of 1971 is, Therefore, set aside. (44) We are told that even after this decision some other points will survive. All the writ petitions will, Therefore, now be placed before a learned Single Judge for disposal in the light of this judgment. In the circumstances of the case we do not make any order as to costs of these appeals and of the writ petition for the hearing before us.
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1972 (11) TMI 101 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from that, the question involved in the present case is about the jurisdiction of the District Judge, and by refusing to investigate into the objections raised by the petitioner the District Judge had refused to exercise jurisdiction in him by law. Consequently this is a ground on which a petition under Article 226 or even under Article 227 of the Constitution would be maintainable. Consequently the petition cannot also be thrown out on the objection of maintainability. The petition is, therefore, allowed, the order passed by the District Judge, Indore, is set aside, and the case is sent back to him for investigating into the objections raised by the petitioner and their disposal in accordance with law. The order of attachment passed shall, however, continue, until the disposal of the matter by the District Judge. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1972 (11) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of doubt that the Government will have to take some immediate action by either making some ad-hoc provision in respect of the price or taking some other step which may be open to it to give the necessary relief to the sugar producers in this behalf. 46. As the Bonus Ordinance has been promulgated after the prices were fixed by the impugned order that order cannot be struck down on the ground that the prices fixed by it did not take into account the changes in the rate of minimum bonus made by the Ordinance. Even so, in the changed circumstances, the Government ought to make modifications in the impugned order in respect of the prices of levy sugar so as to adjust them in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. Except for the above the writ petitions shall stand dismissed with no, order 'as' to costs. Liberty to the parties to file applications for directions in respect of the Bank guarantees furnished by them in pursuance of stay orders passed by this Court.
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1972 (11) TMI 99 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the trial Court that the cheque has been given by the second defendant only towards part payment of the sale consideration and not by way of security in respect of another transaction as alleged by the second defendant. As a matter of fact, there is absolutely no evidence to show, except the ipse dixit of the second defendant, that the cheque was given only as a security. The plaintiff had nothing to do with the arrangement between the second defendant and T. K. Mani, and it is not clear as to why the second defendant issued a cheque in favour of the plaintiff, who according to the evidence of the second defendant, is an utter stranger. I have to, therefore, set aside the finding of the lower appellate Court that the cheque is not supported by consideration. 14. The result is the second appeal is allowed and the decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are restored. There will, however, be no order as to costs. No leave.
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1972 (11) TMI 98 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quite correct. 21. No other point was agitated before us by the learned counsel for the appellants, except this that his clients were prejudiced, because no specific issue was framed regarding the alleged will dated 15-12-1957. 22. This point was never raised either before the trial Court or the lower Appellate Court. The parties under stood their respective positions and led evidence regarding the will under Issue No. 1 and it was on that account that no specific issue was framed regarding it. Besides, nobody even claimed a separate issue regarding the said will and that matter has been dealt with while discussing issue No. 1. In our opinion, therefore, the appellants have not been prejudiced by the non-framing of a separate issue regarding the will. 23. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, we will leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, J. 24. I agree. 25. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 97 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ore, in view of the undoubted fact that the promissory note had been admitted in evidence no objection could be raised at any stage in the suit that it was not duly stamped. Section 35 is only a bar to the admissibility of unstamped or insufficiently stamped documents. Since an unstamped document is inadmissible in evidence, the Full Bench in C. R. P. No. 255/65 and batch dated 3-10-1972 took the view that no suit can be laid on such admissible document. But, that principle has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason that the promissory note had already become part of the record as one of the exhibits. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Full Bench has no application. The lower Court is, therefore, right in decreeing the suit when it came to the conclusion that the promissory note was supported by consideration. For this reason the revision petition must be found as having no merits. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. 176. Order accordingly.
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1972 (11) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased, Guha. Moreover, the plaintiffs had claimed against Guha, in the alternative, a decree for substantial amount consisting of the part consideration paid and certain other amounts. If Guha had been alive or if his legal representatives had been impleaded in time the court could, while setting aside the decree for specific performance, grant the alternative prayer which was only made against Guha. This cannot be done now. In these circumstances we are of the view that order 41, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be of any avail to the appellants. The abatement of the appeal, so far as Guha was concerned, will prove fatal to the entire appeal as either inconsistent and contradictory decrees will have to be passed or proper reliefs cannot be granted in the absence of a necessary party against that party or his legal representatives. The appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... company will go unprotected. The company may or may not pay the claims. It may fritter away its assets. The policy-holders would be constrained to resort to.litigation against the company or realisation of their claims against it. The take-over of the under-taking of the company under the Act improves by reason of Government's management the prospects of their claims satisfaction. It is also calculated to protect all interests by applying after the take-over, if that course is deemed necessary, to revive the business of the company. Section 2(e) is in our view not discriminatory. For the foregoing reasons, section 15(o) also is not discriminatory. As in our view the attack based on Art. 14 cannot succeed, it is unnecessary to deal with the respondents' contention based on Art. 3 1 A (b) and (d) of the Constitution. In the result, we would dismiss the petition with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the writ petition is dismissed with costs.
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1972 (11) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the sentence passed by the court martial, is a contention which cannot be accepted. To accept this contention would mean that all the procedure laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure should be adopted in respect of the court martial, a contention which cannot be accepted in the face of the very clear indications in the Constitution that the provisions which are applicable to all the civil cases are not applicable to cases; of Armed Personnel. It is not a requirement of the principles of natural justice. Indeed when he was informed that the subsequent sentence passed on him had been sent to the Chief of the Army Staff for confirmation it was open to the petitioner to have availed himself of the remedy provided tinder Section 164 of presenting a petition to the confirming officer, i.e. the Chief of the Army Staff in this case. He does not appear to have done so. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there are no merits in this petition and dismiss it. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... take the figures as given and explained by the Advocate-General we cannot say that the State is making a profit out of the administration of civil justice. Various items both on the receipts side and the expenditure side have to be carefully analysed to see what items or portion of items should be credited or debited to the administration of civil justice. It is true, as held by the High Court, that it is for the State to establish that what has been levied is court-fees properly socalled and if there is any enhancement the State must justify the enhancement. We are accordingly constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the High Court and remand the case to it. We direct that the High Court should give an opportunity to the writ petitioners to file an affidavit or affidavits in reply to the affidavit dated October 11, 1966. The High Court shall then decide whether the impugned fees are court fees or taxes on litigants or litigation. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (11) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... It must be remembered that the personal liberty of an individual has been given an honoured place in the fundamental rights which our Constitution has jealously protected against illegal and arbitrary deprivation, and that this Court has been entrusted with a duty and invested with a power to enforce that fundamental right. It is, therefore, obligatory on the part of the State to place before this Court all the relevant facts relating to the impugned detention truly, clearly and with the utmost fairness. This Court normally accepts without reservation the sworn affidavits by responsible officers on the assumption that the facts stated therein are absolutely true and that there is no misstatement or concealment of relevant facts. It is, therefore, incumbent on the officer concerned swearing the counter-affidavit to take good care to satisfy himself that what he states on oath is absolutely true according to the record. This petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the price fixed under the impugned order, i.e., ₹ 124.63, is in consonance with s. 3(3C)?
Held that:- The claim for additional interest at ₹ 2.29 per quintal does not appear to be sustainable, nor also the claim for deterioration of stock owing to the stock lying stored up beyond the normal period, the loss by way of deterioration during such period being the normal incidence of the trade which the manufacturer must anticipate. Regarding the claim of 63 paise owing to increase in freightage (i.e., of 54 paise by road and 9 paise by rail), the Tariff Commission refused to concede that claim. Even before us there are no adequate materials to come to any precise conclusion as to the ,extra burden which the appellants had actually to bear, though increase in freightage during the year is admitted.
There is no doubt that if the sales after May 24, 1971 which were all in free market were to be taken into account, the average realised would come to much more than ₹ 130.77. There is, therefore, no doubt that taking the picture as a whole the Haryana factories got in any event a reasonable return on the capital employed. Thus on the construction of sub-section 3C adopted by us and such of the materials produced before us, we are of the opinion that no case for quashing the impugned order has been made out, nor has the price fixed by Government been shown to be inconsistent with the sub-section. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (11) TMI 90 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... icer did not merge in the Assistant Commissioner s order and was not an order in relation to an assessment, then it is an order other than assessment and, therefore, no time-limit applied to such a case is an argument which is devoid of force. We have already held that the order of the Assistant Commissioner was in relation to an assessment and, therefore, it could have been revised within four years from the date of service of the assessment order on the dealer. The order of the Assistant Commissioner, as has already been stated above, does not relate either to the licence fee or registration fee, or to a proceeding relating to refund of tax. The Assistant Commissioner s order, therefore, related to an assessment , and the Deputy Commissioner s order being outside the time-limit of four years is evidently time-barred. We, therefore, uphold the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and dismiss this tax revision case with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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