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Showing 1 to 20 of 76 Records
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1972 (7) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inordinate delay. It rightly observed that laches is a well established ground for refusal to exercise the discretion to issue a writ. The Division Bench had also referred to public interest or public policy which could be taken into account in cases where a public servant had come to a Court for an order in the nature of mandamus for reinstatement. It had held that, in such cases, promptness on the part of the aggrieved servant is essential for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court so that the State is not called upon to pay unnecessarily for the period for which the dismissed servant is not employed by it. Indeed, delay may make the motives of the dismissed servant, who may have some technical ground to urge against the dismissal, suspect. We think that there are good grounds here for a refusal to exercise the discretion to interfere with the impugned order of dismissal. 12. The result is that we dismiss this appeal. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1972 (7) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he parties will be at liberty to ask for such amendments in the pleadings may be strictly necessary for clarification on the question of title and possession. But no such pleas will be allowed to be introduced which may change the nature of the case. Fresh evidence can also be adduced confined only to these two matters by both sides. It will be for the trial court to get a complete investigation made with regard to the various matters already mentioned by us by a Commissioner if any of the parties make an application in that behalf. Both sides have expressed willingness to produce before the trial court all such documents which are relevant and which are in existence to enable the court to dispose of the question of title and possession of both the parties in a satisfactory manner. 17. The appeal is consequently allowed and the case is remanded to the trial court for disposal in accordance with law in the light of the direction given above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (7) TMI 116 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... had no jurisdiction under Section 188. Criminal Procedure Code as amended in 1923 to try an offence committed wholly or partly in the Native State without a certificate of the Political Agent. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. 8. Therefore, applying the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed's case 1957CriLJ1346 it must be held that a part of the offence, namely, the deceiving of the complainants by the petitioner, took place in Malaya. Therefore, under the first proviso to Section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, a certificate of the Political Agent or the sanction of the State Government is a prerequisite for conferring jurisdiction on an Indian Court to try the petitioner. The reference made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, is, Therefore, accepted and the charge framed by the learned Magistrate as well as the proceedings pending against him are quashed. 9. In the result, the revision petition is allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 115 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ication to the facts of this case but the Article which would apply would be the residuary Article 120." 18. I am in respectful agreement with the above observations. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the suit of the respondents is held to be barred by time. 19. It may, however, be noticed that Basti Ram, one of the respondents, died on July 15, 1970. His legal representatives were not brought on record within the period of limitation. A Bench of this Court vide its judgment dates September 20, 1971, has dismissed the appeal so far as Basti Ram's share is concerned. 20. In view of my findings that the suit was a collusive one, the mortgage was for valid legal necessity and the suit of the respondents was barred by time, this appeal reserves to succeed qua respondents other than Basti Ram and his legal representatives and I order accordingly. The appellant will be entitled to have his costs throughout. S.S. Sandhawalia, J. 21. I agree. 22. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... earlier, the representation in the present case was received on January 3, 1972, shortly after the war had ended. It cannot be gain said that being the Order State the State Government was faced during the period of war at least with an extraordinary situation when it had to focus all its attention to problems arising from that situation. Obviously, some time had to elapse before normalcy in the working of its departments could return. But apart from this consideration, there was also an abrupt spurt in detention cases presumably on account of the declaration of emergency which required the Government to take a number of precautionary measures. In these circumstances we find it difficult to persuade ourselves that the delay of twenty-one days could rightly be treated as inordinate, in validating the detention Order and the petitioner's detention there under. 12. These were the only points raised before us. Both of them fail. In the result the petition has to be dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 113 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arlier, a direction to deposit undistributed, assets or amount in the Company's Liquidation Account can be given to the liquidator under section 244-B, and the said provision is not applicable to a transferee company mentioned in section 208-C of the Companies Act. 66. As regards the fourth objection about the liability of the joint liquidators, it has to be noted that it is a relief sought for against the joint liquidators who are respondents 3 and 4 in the appeal. Even if the cross-objections were maintainable it is well settled that under Order 41 Rule 22 a cross-objection can be urged against the appellant but not as a rule against a co-respondent (vide Panna Lal v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1516). It is thus clear that the said relief sought for against the joint liquidators, who are co-respondents, cannot be asked for in the cross-objections. For the above reasons, the cross-objections fail and are, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances without cost.
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1972 (7) TMI 112 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... per course to adopt Would be to refer the question for the decision of a Full Bench. Reliance was also placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S. N. Sarma, 1968 1SCR813 , where the Supreme Court observed that it was necessary to emphasise that judicial decorum had to be maintained at all times and even where criticism was justified it must be in language of utmost restraint, keeping in view that the person making the comment was also fallible. Even when there was justification for criticism the language should be dignified and restrained, 12. We have answered the questions referred to us in the manner indicated before. We hope this will bring to an end a rather unpleasant controversy. The answers may be placed by the Learned Chief Justice before the appropriate Division Bench for final disposal of the case. The costs of the Full Bench will abide by the result of the appeal. A.K. Mukherjea, J. 13. I agree. M.M. Dutt, J. 14. I agree.
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1972 (7) TMI 111 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... 4 AP 36 while dealing with constitution of authority under the Motor Vehicles Act took the self-same view. We are led to hold, therefore, that the conduct of the petitioner could not confer jurisdiction on the State Transport Authority to deal with the matter. Again the plea of estoppel has its own limitations. We do not find any conduct of the petitioner which would really go to the extent of showing that he is personally estopped from approaching the Court. We would accordingly negative the preliminary objection. 11. On the basis of what we have already indicated, it would follow that the State Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to deal with the grant of a permit on the route in question and as such the grant of the permit by it is an act without jurisdiction. We would accordingly allow the application, quash the grant by the State Transport Authority and the decision in appeal upholding such grant with costs. Hearing fee rupees one hundred. K.B. Panda, J. 12. I agree.
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1972 (7) TMI 110 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , Which again does not support the argument that S. 50 will not apply where the amount is paid as advance rent, as contended by Mr. Shrikhande, Mr. Shrikhande himself fairly stated that that decision does not support the argument advanced by him and the learned Asstt. judge was not right in relying on the said decision. That was a case of monthly tenancy. That was not a case like the present one where under the registered rent note itself, an advance rent was paid as rent. being consideration for the lease. The learned Assistant Judge was therefore, not justified in applying the ratio in that decision to the facts of the present case. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds. The judgment and the decree passed by the learned Assistant Judge are quashed and the decree passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, on March 29, 1963 is resorted. The petitioner must get his costs throughout, including the costs of his cross-objections. Rule made absolute. 7. Order accordingly.
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1972 (7) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ector perhaps referred to Shyam Sunder's admission about it in his evidence. Annexure A, It is also argued that assuming that some plots were ancestral, however. Ram Ratan was ejected from those plots in 1340 Fasli and thereafter there was a resettlement by the Zamindar Jeewan Bux in favour of Ram Ratan and, therefore, Sia Ram had lost his title on account of that re-settlement under the Oudh Rent Act, which was then in force. We are not inclined to attach any significance to this argument. No documents were produced to prove the ejectment or re-settlement. Reliance was placed merely on oral evidence. One Chandrapal Singh was said to be a witness of the re-settlement, but he was not examined and nor the Patta was exhibited. It is in these circumstances that the learned Deputy Director came to the finding that the Khata was ancestral. This is a pure finding of fact and cannot be disturbed. 12. Altogether, therefore, this appeal has no substance and is dismissed with costs.
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1972 (7) TMI 108 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s hereby declared that the plaintiff will get 1/3 plus 1/18 share in the suit property. Defendant No. 1 will get 1/3 plus 1/18 share therein and each of the defendants Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 will get 1/18 share therein. The physical partition of the suit property will be made according to the shares mentioned above only with regard to the ground floor of the suit bungalow and all the out-houses. The first floor of the suit bungalow will be utilised for residence by the members of the family as before, till defendant No. I chose to make partition by metes and bounds. A copy of the decree of this appeal to be sent to the Collector under Order 33, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure for recovering the court-fees on the memo of appeal and the cross-objections from the appellant and respondents Nos. 4 and 5 respectively, In view of the facts of this case, there will be no order as to costs throughout. Cross-objections are also dismissed with no orders as to costs. 12. Order accordingly.
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1972 (7) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ere taken into consideration in arriving at that conclusion. This objection suggests that the order rejecting the representation should be a speaking order. In our view it is not necessary in this case to refer to or deal with any of these aspects because the petitioner has specifically given the date of his representation and the date on which he said it was considered and rejected, which on the face of it shows that there has been an inordinate delay which makes it incumbent on the State to explain it and satisfy the Court that there was justification for that delay. Since the State has not filed any, counter affidavit explaining why the representation of the detenu has not been expeditiously disposed of nor has it chosen to set out the various steps taken to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act, the detention must be held to be illegal. We had after the hearing itself, directed the detenu to be set free. We accordingly allow the petition. G.C. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssailable. 10. It has also been shown to us, by the learned Counsel for the respondents, that, although the respondents were allotted, after illegal reversion, as mere constables to the newly formed State of Mysore, yet, they had been working throughout the period of their service in Mysore as wireless Operators, because of their proficiency and experience in this work. Assertions made by respondents that they had been assigned and were doing the work of Wireless Operators in Mysore had not been controverted by the State of Mysore. It is, therefore, only just and proper that they should be treated as Wireless Operators and deemed to have been allocated in that capacity to the State of Mysore. In fact, this is the result of the orders of the Mysore High Court which had quashed the reversion orders while leaving the allotment intact. We see no grounds for interference with the orders of the Mysore High Court. 11. Consequently, these appeals are dismissed with one set of costs.
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1972 (7) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isdiction in the primitive sense of the term-we do not think the order was vitiated by any error of law. The rejection of the application for time and the consequent dismissal of the petition for permission to sue in forma pauperis can hardly be said to sound in jurisdictional error even in its extended sense, as already explained. We are also not satisfied that the refusal to adjourn occasioned any failure of natural justice so as to render the order a nullity. Nor is there anything to show that in rejecting the application for time the Court acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. We would, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal but in the circumstances make no order as to costs. This order will not in any way affect the validity of the order passed by the High Court on August 26, 1971, directing the respondent to delete the name of the wife of the appellant from the array of parties. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt was allowed to the actual consumers to whom the goods had been sold by the vendors on behalf of the petitioner. If there is no sale by the petitioner to the vendors outright, there is no question of payment of discount in respect of any particular sale. The amount of commission paid to street vendors by way of commission cannot be said to be a discount on the price paid by the buyer, the buyer in this case being the consumer himself. We are fortified in this view by the decision in Hyderabad Chemicals Fertilisers Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1968 22 S.T.C. 298. , wherein it has been held that where a company sells its products through selling agents, commission paid to such agents cannot be deducted as a discount allowed to the buyer, as there have been no sales to the agents. We, therefore, reject the alternative contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as an effective appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. If, therefore, this hurdle is removed, then the only order which could be revised by the Board in the circumstances is the original order of assessment made by the assessing officer on 29th August, 1966. When its jurisdiction was sought it rejected the petition observing that it sees no reason to interfere. The order ex facie does not contain any reason and is, therefore, non-speaking. In these circumstances it is difficult to hold that the Board of Revenue did exercise its jurisdiction when it ought to have. In these circumstances, the rule nisi is made absolute with reference to the order of the second respondent, and the Board of Revenue is directed to deal with the revision petition dated 2nd January, 1970, filed by the petitioner and dispose of the same in accordance with law and in accordance with the decision referred to in the grounds of revision. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 102 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lined to think that the Legislature by this amendment intended to reopen the transactions and events which were concluded. The amendatory Act, 1963, also therefore supports the view which we have taken that the word miller prior to its amendment in 1963 meant both decorticating as well as oil millers. In the view which we have taken about entry 3-C as it stood at the relevant time, we hold that the tax on the turnover of Rs. 4,35,214.32 has been rightly levied. The only other contention which was sought to be raised before us related to another item of the turnover of Rs. 97,200. It was, however, soon realised that there were no merits in the grounds raised in that behalf. It was, therefore, expressly stated before us that the petitioner does not desire to press the points raised in regard to that portion of the turnover. Since no other contention was advanced, the result is that the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (7) TMI 101 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... self gave exemption and if that exemption has been inadvertently not claimed by the petitioner, it is certainly a case where the taxing authorities also should equitably view the situation and render justice. That such a turnover is not liable to tax cannot be disputed after the decision of the Supreme Court. If it is established by the petitioner that such a turnover has been included in the original assessment order, then this court would be perpetrating an illegality if the order of the respondent were to be upheld. Such illegalities ought to be avoided as hinted by the Supreme Court in L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer 1970 78 I.T.R. 26 (S.C.). In this view of the matter, the rule nisi is made absolute and the respondent is directed to entertain the application for rectification and deal with it in accordance with law. The petitioner is also at liberty to adduce such acceptable evidence in proof of the exemption. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (7) TMI 100 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt of tax where whole or any part of the turnover has escaped assessment is also the period of limitation for purposes of levying the penalty on such escaped assessment. In this view of the matter, the penalty proceedings for the assessment year 1957-58, which have been initiated on 12th May, 1964, are time-barred, while in relation to the assessment year 1958-59, they are well within time. Therefore, the levy of penalty, in so far as the assessment year 1957-58 is concerned, is quashed. In view of the amendment brought in by Act 16 of 1963 with effect from 1st August, 1963, the other contention that the penalty leviable is only 1 frac12 times the tax assessed is not pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the result to the extent that we have set aside the penalty levied for the assessment year 1957-58, the writ petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed in part and in all other respects it is dismissed, but without costs. Government Pleader s fee Rs. 100.
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1972 (7) TMI 99 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ans twisted thread thicker than string and thinner than rope, that ordinarily cord is understood as rope of small diameter or a thick string, that string, cord and rope are different species of the same genus, namely, yarn, and that yarn as such means spun thread which may form one of the threads of a string, cord or rope. But that decision will not help the petitioner as the word braided did not come up for consideration in that case. While construing the words braided cord as occurring in the notification, it is not possible to overlook the significance of the word braided and place emphasis only on the word cord . As already stated, though the rope manufactured and sold by the petitioner may come under the same genus as cord it cannot come under the words braided cord . In our view, the order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is correct and does not call for any interference. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Appeal dismissed.
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