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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 90 Records
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1972 (8) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ering the law relating to preventive detention. 9. We are unable, as at present advised, to hold that the view taken by this Court in Amulya Chandra Dev, W. P. No. 118 of 1972, D/- 10-7-1972 (SC) (supra) is erroneous requiring reconsideration by us. The circumstances relied upon in the explanation in that case are very close and similar to those In the present one. We have, therefore, no option but to told that the State Government failed to consider the petitioner's representation received on January 4, 1972 with reasonable dispatch or as expeditiously as possible. This representation was only considered on February 12, 1972 though the go-slow movement was admittedly over by the end of October, 1971-Nothing has been said about the situation in January and February, 1972, The result, therefore, is that the petitioner's detention must be held to have to become invalid. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the petitioner directed to be set at liberty forth-with.
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1972 (8) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason to believe that the appellant was suffering from any unsoundness of mind, and that therefore, he could straight away proceed with the committal proceedings. In our view, the Magistrate failed to make such an inquiry which it was incumbent upon him to make at the very threshold, and that having not been done, the committal proceedings, as also his order committing the appellant to the Sessions Court for trial were both vitiated. Consequently, the appeal must be allowed and the High Court's order and also the committal order passed by the committing Magistrate must be set aside and a de novo committal proceeding directed. We further direct the Magistrate to hold those proceedings in compliance with the requirements of Section 464 and give an opportunity to the appellant to produce evidence, if he so desires, to satisfy the Magistrate that there are reasons to believe that he is suffering from such unsoundness of mind as would incapacitate him from making his defence.
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1972 (8) TMI 146 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 1792 of 1966 decided on 27 August, 1969). 11. It is manifest that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal not only referred to the Government Order as indicating the basis for giving preference for the grant of permits but also applied the Government Order in assessing the competing claims of the contenders for permits. "Once it is found that a Tribunal which under the statute has to deal with applications for permits in a judicial manner is directed by the Government to adopt any specified method for assessing the merits of the applicants and the Tribunal takes into consideration such direction of the executive, the judicial determination by the Tribunal is polluted. 12. The High Court was right in directing that the applications must be dealt with and disposed of "outside the ambit of the impugned Government Orders or their constraining interference". 13. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (8) TMI 145 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d on his death the same is not open to his legal representatives unless there is anything in the provision of the Act which makes the legal representatives statutory tenants to the same extent as the deceased. It is not the case that there is any other provision of the Act which gives protection to the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant. 12. As already stated, all contentions except those which are personal to the deceased were open to the legal representatives to put forward in the second appeal. The contention about the validity of the notice for the termination of the tenancy was one such contention on which they could have supported the decision of the District Court. But as already pointed out the learned Judge has correctly decided that the contractual tenancy had been duly terminated by notice. Apart from that point no other point was urged before the High Court or before us and hence the present appeal must fail. There will be no order as to costs.
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1972 (8) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... position that he found that the accused was in normal condition. His evidence has not been challenged in cross-examination. We think that not only is there no evidence to show that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him, but that there is nothing to indicate that he had not the necessary mens rea when he committed the offence. The law presumes that every person of the age of discretion to be sane unless the contrary is proved. It would be most dangerous to admit the defence of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime, The mere fact that no motive Has been proved why the accused murdered his wife and child or, the fact that he made no attempt to run away when the door was broke open, would not indicate that he was insane or, that he did not have the necessary mens rea for the commission of the offence. We see no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings on this point either. We dismiss the appeal.
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1972 (8) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 8 (31, 32 Victoriae, Cap. 40) ss. 3 and 5 are similar in terms to ss. 2 and 3 of the Indian Partition Act. The statement in Halsbury's Laws of England and the law laid down in the decided cases, it is urged, do not support the view which has been pressed on behalf of the respondent. The view expressed was that the court had a discretionary jurisdiction if any interested party requested for sale to order sale notwithstanding the dissent or the disability of any other party, if it appeared to the court that it would be more beneficial for the parties interested. The provisions of the English Partition Act do not appear to be in parimutuel with those of the Indian Partition Act and we do not consider that any assistance can be derived from the English law on the points which are being determined by us. In the result the appeal fails and it is dismissed. But in view of the entire circumstances we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. G.C, Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 142 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y involve postponement in the hearing of the trial which adjournments should be compensated for. The applicant (defendant No.1) before me would, therefore, pay as condition precedent for filing such an application before the trial Court a sum of ₹ 150/- to the plaintiff as the costs. 19. In the result, this revision application is allowed. The orders produced at Exhs. 55 and 57 are set aside and the trial Court is directed to proceed in this regard as indicated above. The application to the trial Court will be made expeditiously and the applicant's counsel undertakes to do it within two weeks from today. The said application will be considered and decided by the trail Court keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. Although this revision is allowed, it is directed that the applicant shall pay further costs of ₹ 75/- of this revision to the non-applicant No.1 original plaintiff. No costs as far as non-applicant No.2 is concerned. 20. Revision allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 141 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... whom the election petition was sent for trial. In Brij Mohan v. Z. A. Ahmad, AIR1964All523 the Division Bench held that it was not mandatory that the affidavit required by the proviso to Section 83(1) should accompany the election petition when the petition was presented before the Election Tribunal to receive the affidavit when the petition had been transferred to it for trial, and hence the election petition could not be dismissed on the ground that the affidavit as required by Section 83(1) proviso did not accompany the petition but was filed later before the petition came on for trial. The Allahabad High Court also considered the absence of mention of Section 83 in Section 90 which was the section parallel to section 86. 12. In the view which I have taken issue No.1 (a) is answered in the negative. So far as issue No.1 (b) is concerned, the finding is "Does not arise. If necessary. No." The trial of the petition will not proceed further. 13. Order accordingly.
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1972 (8) TMI 140 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or all these reasons, the appeal in A. S. 321 of 1965 is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs in both the courts. As the plaintiff has completely failed the courts-fee payable to the Government on the plaint will be recovered from her. If, in the meanwhile, any portion of the court-fee had been paid by the first defendant in pursuance of the direction of the trial Court, the plaintiff is liable to reimburse the same to the first defendant. 11. A. S. No. 562 of 1970-There is absolutely no substance in this appeal which has been preferred as cross appeal by the plaintiff in respect of the items disallowed. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that the plaintiff has totally failed to prove that these assets were acquired with the aid of the income from the properties belonging to the testator. The appeal in A. S. No. 562 of 1970 is dismissed. No costs. The plaintiff-appellant will pay the court-fee due in this appeal. 12. Order accordingly.
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1972 (8) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ned wolfram ore concentrate containing 65 WO3 which was of the merchantable quality and was known commercially as such and imported as ore. Apart from all this it must be remembered that in interpreting items in Taxing Statutes resort should be had not to the scientific or technical meaning but to the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them in their commercial sense. There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt that the goods imported by the appellants fell within item 26 of the Import Tariff and no duty was leviable on them. The appellants were entitled to the refund of the amounts which were paid by them by way of duty. 7. For the reasons given above the appeals are allowed with costs and the impugned orders including that of the Central Government dated 25/29th November 1966 are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to make appropriate orders for refunding the amounts collected from the appellants by way of duty on the goods in question. One hearing fee.
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1972 (8) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... i was correct. If that be so it becomes apparent that Dhanta Devi never took possession of the property in dispute pursuant to the usufructuary mortgage deed executed by the respondent in her favor. It appears that even as the widow of her husband Mool Chand Kapoor she had a right of residence in the house and it was largely in that capacity that she continued to keep a portion of it or received rent form some of the tenants. 11. Ordinarily this Court is most reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact of the High Court or appreciation of evidence by it, but we have gone into most of the material circumstances and considered the important pieces of evidence because of the difference of opinion among the learned Judges 'of the High Court. However, for the reasons that have been indicated above we are satisfied that the conclusion of Modi and Jagat Narain JJ. Were correct and must be upheld. In the result the appeal fails but we make no order as to costs in this Court.
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1972 (8) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d, therefore, to that extent was invalid. It is also not in dispute that the rout with which we are concerned, is also an inter-state route and, therefore, in it was the Regional Transport Authority alone which could have exercised the functions with regard to the grant of permits on inter-state routes and not the State Transport Authority. This position is not contested before, us by the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the appellants. His main complaint in the appeal before us was that the High Court had interpreted section 44(3)(b) in a manner which would have created grave public inconvenience. That was the chief reason why the appellants felt compelled to come to this Court. The final order passed by the High Court requiring the Regional Authority to proceed in accordance with law is correct. In the circumstances of the case the appeal had to be dismissed with no order as to costs. That order has been already passed on 20-7-1972. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... xalite party. The second ground of detention alleged that the killing of Ajahar Ali Khan was committed with the object of promoting the political ideology of the petitioner and his associates; in other words, for terrorising those who did not subscribe to or were opposed to that ideology. Thus, the act in question was not merely confined to a specific individual but was aimed at those who did not agree with the said ideology, and to create a feeling of terror and a feeling that any one or more of them could be the target of an attack to that upon the victim named there. Such an attack committed for the aforesaid motive and in the circumstances there set out was bound to have an impact upon the normal life of the people living in that locality and cannot, therefore, properly be said to relate to law and order only and not to public order. 7. These were the only contentions raised before us and since neither of them can be sustained, the petition fails and has to be dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his opinion on the propriety of making a detention order must be given due consideration and respect by this Court. The petitioner's representation was also duly considered by the State Government and rejected. The Advisory Board, after hearing the detenu-petitioner in person also expressed the opinion that there was sufficient cause for his detention. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us in habeas corpus proceedings to hold an independent enquiry into the question whether or not the grounds on which the impugned order of detention is passed are false or non-existent. Nor can the impugned order be held to be mala fide as suggested by Shri Jain. There being no legal infirmity in the order of the petitioner's detention and, the facts affirmed by the District Magistrate, which must be accepted on the facts and circumstances of this case to be true, being relevant to the object of detention, this petition must fail and is dis- missed. Petition dismissed G.C.
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1972 (8) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t; The marginal note for S.44-F reads "avoidance of tax by sales cum dividend". This marginal note also gives an indication as to what exactly was the mischief that was intended to-be remedied. The legislature was evidently trying to circumvent the devices adopted by some of the assessees to convert their revenue receipts into capital receipts. The marginal note also throws light on the intention 'of the legislature. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the deemed dividend contemplated by s. 2 (6A) (c) cannot be considered as "income" under s. 44-F. For the reasons mentioned above we agree with the High Court that s.44-F is inapplicable to the facts of the assessee's case. This question is common to all the above-mentioned appeals. Hence we need not go into the other subsidiary questions arising for decision in any of those appeals. In the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeal dismissed..
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1972 (8) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ld be guilty of an offence if he continues to carry on the mine without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the requirement of Reg. 3 is complied with. In other words, Reg. 3 does not render a continued disobedience or noncompliance of it an offence. As in the case of a construction of a wall in violation of a rule or a bye-law of a local body, the offence would be complete once and for all as soon as such construction is made, a default occurs in furnishing, the returns by the prescribed date. There is nothing in Reg. 3 or in any other provision in the Act or the Regulation which renders the continued non-compliance an offence until its requirement is carried out. The High Court, in our view, was right in holding that the complaint was time barred as the offence in question fell within the substantive part of s. 79 of the Act and not under the ’Explanation attached to it. The appeals, therefore, must fail and is dismissed. S.C. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the death of the complainant the appeal filed by him abated, and whether his son Ashok Kumar could be brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased complainant?
Whether on the averments in the complaint and the evidence on record a case of counterfeiting the property mark of the complainant could be maintained?
Held that:- From the findings arrived at by the Trial Magistrate it must follow that the appellant marked his scent and the packets and receptacles in which it was packed with the same name, the same picture and the same inscriptions with the intention of causing it to be believed that the scent so marked was the one manufactured by and sold in the market by the complainant.
The evidence clearly showed that the scent so marked by him was sold by him in the market with the intention and object aforesaid. The appellant thus committed the offence of both using a false property mark and of selling goods marked with a counterfeit property mark. Though the complainant used the words 'trade mark' at several places in the complainant it was loosely used as can be seen from paras 14 and 15 of the complaint. The complainant's accusation was the use by the appellant of a property mark with the object of "palming off" to likely purchasers his scent of inferior quality as if it was the scent made by and belonging to the complainant and selling it or exposing it for sale as if it was the scent manufactured by and belonging to the complainant. Thus the High Court was right in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and in restoring the order of conviction and sentence by the Trial Magistrate. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in exercise of the powers conferred by section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 the Central Government could amend rule 49 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 with retrospective effect?
Whether the allotment in favour of the appellants could be cancelled under some other provision of law?
Held that:- Accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and quash the order relating to the cancellation of allotment of the lands in dispute in favour of the appellants.
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1972 (8) TMI 129 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce a commodity of very different use. Adopting the same test as indicated above, besan cannot be accepted in the popular and commercial sense to be the same commodity as peas or chana. Besan does not have the same use as chana or peas and one needing chana or peas would not be prepared to accept its besan in its place. When the assessee purchases chana or peas with the undertaking that he would resell them in Orissa, but converts the same into its besan and sells, there is really a violation of the condition in the declaration giving rise to the tax liability under the proviso. 10.. Our answer to the question, therefore, shall be that there is no violation of the declaration contemplated under section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Act by sale of biri and mung in the shape of dal, but there is such violation when peas and chana are converted into besan and sold as such. We direct both parties to bear their costs of this reference. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (8) TMI 128 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the ground that by reason of a subsequent change in law the petitioner was not entitled to the refund claimed by him. Moreover, the mandamus issued by this court for the refund of the tax is still in operation. Unless that order is withdrawn, the Sales Tax Officer is bound to give effect to it. The learned standing counsel states that an application for the review of the judgment of the High Court in the writ petition mentioned above has already been filed and the same is pending. That, however, does not alter the position. So long as that order is not discharged, it remains in operation. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the appellate authority rejecting the petitioner s appeals as incompetent is bad in law and the same is quashed. The petitioner s appeals shall be restored to their original numbers and shall be heard and decided on merits in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this petition. Petition allowed.
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