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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 114 Records
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1972 (9) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ounsel for the appellant has urged that the appellant's act of taking the responsibility to refund the amount in case of wrong payment and the depositing of a part of the above amount in the bank suggest his bona fide. There appeal's to be some force in the argument. If there were a conspiracy between the appellant and the other accused, he would have taken care not to make himself responsible for refunding the amount in case of wrong payment. He would also have taken care not to apply to the court that the voucher for the amount payable to Rattan Singh should be drawn in his name. Lastly, he would not have deposited the amount in the bank. 12. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we are of opinion that there is no prima facie evidence in support of the charges framed against the appellant. Accordingly his commitment cannot stand. 13. The appeal is allowed. The order of commitment against the appellant is quashed. The trial may proceed against the other accused.
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1972 (9) TMI 163 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
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... ... ..... Range, Division II., Ahmedabad. The respondents are further restrained from taking any steps or proceedings against the petitioners either under the Act or under the rules made thereunder in respect of the petitioners said product of gummed paper and textile wrappers. 18. We wish to make it clear that though in paragraph 13 of the petition some reference is made to the item of paper gummed tapes which are sought to be converted under Item No. 60 by reasons of the Finance Bill No. II of 1971 which came into force somewhere in 1971, we are not concerned with the paper gummed tapes which may be falling in the category of Adhesive tapes all sorts. The sole question before us is, whether the intermediate product of gummed paper was being manufactured in the petitioners' factory at the relevant time and that is why we have confined our discussion to that item only. 19. The respondents will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioners. The rule is made absolute accordingly.
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1972 (9) TMI 162 - RANGOON HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion (1) as regards service of notice on such a family, and that the summons should be served in accordance with section 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 5, Rule 21. In my opinion the Commissioner's view is correct. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to have prescribed section 63(2) as the only method by which a joint Hindu family could be served, they would not in my opinion have used the word "may" but the mandatory word "shall". And, with regard to the argument that the sub-section on this reading is unnecessary and surplusage, there is force in the Commissioner's argument that the intention was to fasten the firm with personal responsibility, so that, if. necessary, the penal provisions of section 51 could be applied. I would accordingly answer the reference in the affirmative. As the firm have failed in their contention, they should pay the Commissioner's costs, seven gold mohnrs. Carr, J.-I concur. Das, J.-I concur.
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1972 (9) TMI 161 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... he period 30th September, 1937 and 31st January, 1948, under Section 9-A of Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1938). The argument that surrender by the widow amounted to a 'transfer' within the meaning of Act IV of 1938 was rejected (vide observations at pages 615 and 616). 6. From the foregoing reasons it will be seen that the grandsons, surrendered do not occupy the position of transferees in the sense that any title is transferred to the transferees i.e., grandsons. What happens is that there is a civil death so far as the life-tenant is concerned and the grandsons become absolute owners of the property. There is no 'transfer' within the meaning of Section 53. 7. The appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit decreed. No costs in second appeal. The plaintiffs will be entitled to their costs in the courts below. No leave. The defendant will pay the court-fee due to Government in the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. 8. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the area on the basis of income, productivity, or age of building, etc. But we do not think it necessary to pass upon this hypothetical question as Section 4 did not revive or resurrect Rule 2(c), much less, give it retrospective operation. 11. In this view, we have no occasion to reach the Constitutional question as regards the validity of the impugned sections of the Validating Act and we express no opinion upon it. We think that it was not necessary for the High Court to have struck down the provisions of Sections 3(2), 4(1), 4(2) and 5 of the Validating Act. When Rule 2(c) was held to be inoperative by virtue of the decision of this Court, all the reliefs claimed by the respondents in the writ petitions could have been given to them without striking down these provisions. It is a wise tradition with Courts not to decide a Constitutional question if the case can be disposed of on other grounds. We dismiss the appeals but, in the circumstances, make no order as to costs.
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1972 (9) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... thereby who alone could exercise those powers in the name of the President. Shri L. C. Gupta admittedly having no such power the order made by him was wholly illegal, ineffective and void. Such an order on the face of it deserved to be quashed and ought to have been quashed on that ground alone by the High Court without deciding the other points some of which are sub judice in proceedings under Act 40 of 1971. 7. For the reasons given above the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated December 18, 1971 made under Rule 155 of the Defence of India Rules is hereby set aside. The appellants will be entitled to costs in this Court but the parties will be left to bear their own costs in the High Court. 8. We would like to make it clear that in the view that we have taken any observations made by the High Court or conclusions arrived at on the various points decided by it will not be taken into consideration in any proceedings pending or to be taken in future by either party.
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1972 (9) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eantime he reached the age of superannuation and the Government passed an order directing that he be retired from service from the date on which had reached superannuation and given a reduced pinion of two-thirds to which he would be ordinarily entitled in view of the irregularities committed by him. One of his contentions was that Article 311(2) applied to his case and, therefore, lie was entitled to a notice before his pension was reduced to two-thirds. To that the answer was that Article 311(2) did not apply to him and. under Article 302 of the Regulations his pension was liable to be reduced Lit Government's discretion. He had known what the charges there against him and what punishment was proposed to be inflicted upon him. Therefore, lie was not in a position to come that his pension was reduced without notice to him.In the result we hold that the three writ petitions were correctly decided by the High Court and the appeals must fail. They are dismissed with costs.
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1972 (9) TMI 157 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... funds, as he is bound to do under the statute. The official liquidator states that this does not earn 6 separate interest and the interest which is apportionable to this sum of ₹ 30,000 is ₹ 9,000. We, therefore, direct the official liquidator to pay a sum of ₹ 39,000 to the applicant-respondent. The official liquidator will pay the sum of ₹ 39,000 to the respondent within two weeks after he obtains the copy of the decree. If there is any default, the amount will carry an interest of 6 from that date. 36. As the amount involved is large and as the applicant-respondent has been kept out of this money for a considerable time, for over a decade, the office is directed to furnish the copy of the decree to the official liquidator forthwith, within Wednesday, the 27th September, 1972. It is hoped that the official liquidator will make the necessary application for the grant of the decree copy forthwith to enable the office to furnish the copy of the decree.
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1972 (9) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on of the High Court. 10. In view of these two decisions of this Court which are binding on us, we have no manner of doubt that the High Court of Bombay was quite right in accepting the conclusions and findings of the Customs authorities about the proper scope of Item 74(vi) of the I.T.C. Schedule. In our opinion, there is nothing in the decision of the Collector which can warrant its condemnation as perverse or unreasonable. Even if it be assumed that because of the language used in the two items viz Items 74(vi) and 74(x) of the I.T.C Schedule, there is some room for confusion, it would not be competent for the High Court to interfere in a writ petition with the conclusion or finding-of the Collector of Customs regarding the scope and ambit of those items. 11. In the result this appeal fails. We dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the Bombay High Court. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, however, we make no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appellant has challenged the decree obtained by Ashar and others as also the warrant of execution. On the other hand, the suit instituted by Ashar and others against inter alia the appellant in 1965 for possession is pending. This Court cannot say with exactitude that any final decision has been reached on the respective and rival rights and claims of the appellant and the respondent. If is, therefore, neither desirable nor practicable to take notice of any fact on the rival versions of the parties as to subsequent events. For the reasons indicated the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The High Court in view of the conclusion on section 42A of the 1882 Act set aside the decree and chose not to deal separately with the other application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The High Court will now deal with the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The parties will pay and bear their own costs, in this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g the proceedings initiated against the appellant in (1) Civil Appeals Nos. 1561 and 1562 of 1965 decided by the Supreme Court on 6 October 1967. respect of Charge 1(b), made it impossible for the appellant to get himself fully exonerated. Since the appellant had been exonerated of Charge 1(a) and since Charge 1(b) was withdrawn, it is impossible for Government to proceed on the basis as if the appellant has not been fully exonerated or to assume that the order of suspension was one which was not wholly unjustified.In that view of the matter, we do not think that case of the State of Assam and Anr. v. Raghava Rajagopalachari (supra) can be of any assistance to the respondents. In the result this appeal succeeds. The judgment and order of the High Court- are set aside. The orders dated 27 February 1967 impugned in the appellant's petition before the High Court are quashed. The appellant will get the costs of this appeal as well as the costs incurred below. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ernment may choose and discriminate, in proceeding against one person in one manner and another person in another manner. The Act creates a charge on the property. The Act forbids creation of a third part right by the transferee until the amount represented by the charge is paid in full. In the teeth of statutory security and enforceability it is totally unreasonable restriction on the enjoyment of property by resuming the site for defaults in payments of money and forfeiting the monies paid by the transferee. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the Government is not entitled to forfeit the monies paid and resume the site under the provision contained in section 9 of the 1952 Act. These provisions violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(f). These provisions are unconstitutional. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. In view of the fact that there is no order as to costs in the High Court the parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 152 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... es are committed at different points of time. Levy of penalty under one does not affect the power to levy penalty under the other. 23. We may make it clear that the learned counsel did not put forward any explanation for the delay which would constitute a reasonable cause. We are, therefore, satisfied that the provisions of section 271(1)(a) were attracted. The only point that would remain for consideration is, whether the amount of penalty has been properly levied. We consider that the penalty has to be calculated in the light of the decisions in M.M. Annaiah v. CIT (1970) 76 ITR 582(Mys.) and CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1971) 80 ITR 14 (Cal). In other words the amount of tax due at the time of the assessment would be the basis on which 2 per cent for each month of default will have to be worked out. The ITO is directed to examine the quantum of penalty in the light of the above and give proper reduction that may be due to the assessee. 24. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng or dismissing an employee from service and, therefore, the High Court was right in holding in the present case that the removal of respondent no. 2 by the Assistant General Manager (Transport) was illegal. Mr. Chagla then contended that by reason of the delegation, the Assistant General Manager had become an agent of the General Manager and the act of the Assistant General Manager must be deemed to be the act of the General Manager himself. We are not concerned here with the law of a agency. It is implicit in the statutory prohibition debarring removal by a lesser authority, that the appointing authority has to personally apply its mind to the question of removal and cannot delegate such a function. Since the authority which can ’remove an-employee is the appointing authority or its superior in office, the protection thus provided cannot be destroyed by importing concepts of agency. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. K.B.N. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gence Bureau about the demand of bribe to the appellant. These are the facts found by the Court. These facts prove that the offence was committed. The last contention on behalf of the appellant was that the sentence of imprisonment should be set aside in view of the fact that the appellant paid the fine of ₹ 10,000. In some cases the Courts have allowed the sentence undergone to be the sentence. That depends upon the fact as to what the term of the sentence is and what the period of sentence undergone is. In the present case, it cannot be said that the appellant had undergone any period of sentence. If it is said that the appellant had heart attacks and therefore the Court should take a lenient view about the sentence the gravity of the offence and the position held by the appellant at the relevant time do not merit such consideration. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will surrender to his bail and serve out the sentence. S.C. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... valid for a contravention of Art. 19 ( 1 ) (b) , of the Constitution, yet, on fuller consideration, I respectfully concur with Mylord the Chief Justice in declaring it invalid because it is capable of being used arbitrarily so as to discriminate unreasonably and unjustiably and thus to affect the exercise of rights conferred by Articles 19(1) (a) and (b) without sufficient means 'of control over possible misuse of power. The Rule of law our Constitution contemplates demands the existence of adequate means to check possibilities of misuse of every kind of power lodged in officials of the State. I would prefer to 'strike it down for contravening Article 14 of the Constitution although, if its' repercussions on the rights guaranteed by Art, 19(1)(a) and (b) were also taken into account, it could be struck down as an unreasonable restriction on those rights as well. For the reasons given above, I respectfully agree with the order proposed by Mylord the Chief Justice.
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1972 (9) TMI 148 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ame being without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity, can be ignored, as its invalidity can be set up even at this stage and in these proceedings. The learned Additional District Judge, as also the executing Court, therefore, were not justified in dismissing the objections of the appellants, Shahabia Begum and Sharf-ud-din. 11. Accordingly, the appeals are accepted; and as the two orders dated April 29, 1971 passed by the learned Additional District Judge and also the orders passed by the execution Court, dismissing the objections of Shahabia Begum and of Sharf-ud-din, cannot be sustained, the same are set aside. In the result, the objections filed by Shahabia Begum and Sharf-ud-din are upheld. The entire proceedings, relating to the auction of the property in dispute being without jurisdiction are set aside and the sale certificate and the warrant of possession, which have been issued, are cancelled. The parties, however, shall bear their own costs. 12. Appeals allowed.
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1972 (9) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction, but that fact would not absolve the complainant who wants the magistrate to issue a process against the accused person from leading some credible evidence as may prima facie show the commission of the offence. In the present case the Presidency Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the, High Court took the view that there was no sufficient cause for proceeding on the complaint filed by the appellant. I find no sufficient ground to interfere in this appeal under section 136 of the Constitution with the said concurrent finding. No credible material has, in my opinion, been brought on record by the appellant as may show prima facie that there was entrustment of the share scrips in question to the accused. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. ORDER In view of the majority judgment, the appeal is allowed and the High Court's judgment and order is set aside. We direct the Chief Presidency Magistrate to issue the process and to proceed with the same.
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1972 (9) TMI 146 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ants failed to establish that the dominant purpose of the lease was manufacturing purpose. In that view. the appellants could not have challenged the legality of the notice. The High Court, therefore, was right in the conclusion it arrived at and no reason has been shown justifying our interference with it. That being the,, position, it is not necessary to go into the question whether s. 107 has any impact on s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a question which the Division Bench, while referring this appeal to a larger Bench, though the appeal raised. For the reasons stated above the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Mr. Chagla appealed to us that Some time may be given to the appellant-company for vacating the premises in question as, according to him, there are some machines still lying on the premises which will have to be removed. We give the company one month's time from today for vacating and giving quiet possession to the respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (9) TMI 145 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... being more than a transfer of a mere right to sue are permissible and are valid. But express assignment by the assured of all his rights is necessary and subrogation by itself will not enable the insurer to sue in his own name (1896 A. C. 250; (1883)-11 Q.B.D. 380)". It is regrettable that the attention of the High Court was not drawn to the above decision. correct, that the assignment conveyed to the insurance company, the entire right in respect of the subject matter of the insurance, including the right of the assured to sue in its own name and that, after the assignment, the assured had no cause of action to institute the suit against the Railway Administration for recovery of damages. I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, dismissing the suit, without any order as to costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of majority the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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